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ABSTRACT 
 
This qualitative analysis examines the effects of a growing environmental ethic on 
the electric power grid in southeastern New England from the late nineteenth century to 
the start of the new millennia.  The increased awareness of the environment evolved into 
a new belief system of the population and altered the methods of construction, operation 
and maintenance of the advanced technology system of the electric power grid.  The 
manner in which this occurred suggests that technological momentum is a better concept 
than technological determinism with which to examine the development of technological 
systems in the modern world.   
This dissertation examines the trinity of actors affecting this process.  The electric 
power companies, with the New England Electric System as the main protagonist, 
attempted to expand the electric power grid to meet expected consumer demand and 
economic opportunities.  A devoted cadre of nascent environmentalists, dismissive of the 
commercial and technological requirements of the electric power grid, suggested to the 
population that the new idea of protecting the environment should instead take priority.  
The interaction of these two forces led to a governmental response that attempted to 
continue to meet the population’s demands while preventing the degradation of the 
environment.  The resultant transformation of the population’s perception of the electric 
power grid, its regulation by the government, and its operation by the system members, 
suggest that advanced technology systems are influenced as much by philosophical 
concerns as any technical constraints.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There's a powerful, obedient, swift, and effortless force that can be bent to any use 
and which reigns supreme aboard my vessel. It does everything. It lights me, it 
warms me, it's the soul of my mechanical equipment. This force is electricity. 
 
- Captain Nemo to Professor Aronnax in Jules Verne’s  
Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea 
 
 
The development of the electric power grid in the United States transformed the 
nation into an energy-intensive society.  Americans had shown interest in electricity from 
the days of Ben Franklin’s earliest experiments and had profited from his workman-like 
accounts of his lightning rod to make their homes safer.1  Application of electric energy 
as a major power source was still over a century away however and electricity remained 
more of a curiosity than a source of power for society.  In the 1800s electricity was used 
to power the telegraph stations that formed the communications network of the Victorian 
era and to energize other minor applications.2  Power to drive the Industrial Revolution 
was chiefly provided by coal-fired steam plants or water mills running intricate systems 
of belt-driven machines, while on the farms animal and human power predominated.3  
This methodology, though grueling for the majority of the population involved in 
agriculture or industry, was nonetheless sustainable.     
                                                 
1.  E. Phillip Krider, "Benjamin Franklin and Lightning Rods," Physics Today, 59, 
no. 1 (January, 2006): 42. 
2.  Steve Parker, Electricity (London: Dorling Kindersly, 1992), 31, 37. 
3.  Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 14. 
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Thomas Edison’s electric power generation prototype built in New York City in 
1882, showed how electricity could be used to drive industrial activities and fill consumer 
desires.4  Over the course of only a few years, Edison developed and built a pilot electric 
generation station in New York City, the transmission lines from its coal-fired dynamos 
to the electric load locations and all the electrical connections, circuit breakers and fuses 
necessary to energize the lights in the selected buildings.5  Edison’s construction was the 
first electric power grid in history, a combination of subsystems that generated electric 
power, transmitted it across metal cables to the designated establishments and then 
distributed the energy to the lightbulbs within those buildings.6   
Under the guiding light of a host of ingenious inventors, engineers, and financiers, 
this system of electric power generation, transmission and distribution system rapidly 
expanded throughout the nation.  By the middle of the twentieth century, the network of 
electric power plants and supporting systems provided a reliable and economic source of 
energy to all facets of society.  This mature technology seemed poised to take the next 
great leap forward in the continuous quest for greater effectiveness and efficiency.  
Instead, the flood tide of technological development was altered by forces that had 
seemed insignificant when the electric power grid had been created.   
Concurrent with the technological culmination of the electric power grid was the 
emergence of various schools of environmental ethics that took hold in popular 
                                                 
4.  Ibid., 49-60. 
5.  Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power (1983; repr., Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 47.   
6.  Ibid., 40-43.  
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conception and gained political traction.  The new social construction of environmental 
ethics acted to alter the course of development of the electric power grid in southern New 
England from one based purely on technical efficiency and effectiveness to a vector that 
had to account for principled concerns for the environment.  How this occurred is the 
central research question to be examined in this dissertation.  More generally, this action 
demonstrates that the concept of technological momentum is a more insightful hypothesis 
than technological determinism when investigating the progress of advanced technology 
systems.  
Purpose 
The theories of technological determinism as initially proposed by Lewis 
Mumford and then expanded on by Jacques Ellul suggest likely outcomes for any 
advanced technological society.  Both authors discussed the effects of the tightening vise 
grip of advanced technology on modern society.  For Mumford, the “monotechnics” of 
industrial age society acquired an internal inertia based on the generation of greater 
human control and power.7  Earlier technological endeavors based on life itself such as 
improved farming tools or home-spun woolen clothes were displaced by this quest for 
authoritarian control over nature and society.  Ellul later posited a more general theory 
for the expansion of technology in human society.  To Ellul, technology had led to the 
modern form of “technique” that had displaced all previous human endeavors.8  With its 
                                                 
7.  Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon of Power, Myth of the Machine Volume Two 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964, 1970), 155. 
8.  Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. Trans. John Wilkinson (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1964), 4.   
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characteristics of rationality, artificiality, self-augmentation, universality and autonomy, 
technique diffused throughout and engulfed all elements of society.  Future progress 
became solely based on technique’s internal demands to achieve the one best way, the 
most efficient one.9  Slowly but surely all human activity was swept up and subordinated 
in this effort while earlier human desires and longings were brushed away as the 
technological drive increased without bound.   
Thomas P. Hughes’ discussion of technological momentum provides a different 
and perhaps more insightful hypothesis describing technological activity, one that allows 
advanced technology systems to be affected by social concerns as much as the technical 
demands of the maturing structure.  The advanced technology systems do acquire a 
considerable developmental velocity, yet the mass of interrelated organizations, devices 
and schemes is not irresistible.  Instead, much like any object in motion, forces affecting 
these organizations can lead to a change in direction in the development of the 
technological system.  This is more difficult to achieve as a technology matures and 
organizational stakeholders resist any system disruption, but other humans still retain 
agency to alter the future development of the system.10    
The discourse between these two hypotheses suggests an intriguing space in the 
investigation of a particular advanced technology system.  The electric power grid, one of 
modern society’s underpinnings, certainly meets the requirements of an advanced 
technology system in all of these authors’ conceptions.  When the development and 
                                                 
9.  Ibid., 21.   
10.  Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and 
Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 470-471.   
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operation of the electric power grid over the past few decades in southern New England 
is examined, one notes that this system developed somewhat differently than the 
theoretical construct of technological determinism would have predicted.  The political 
mandates rising from the increased concerns of the population regarding environmental 
issues led to changes in the way the electric power grid was constructed and operated.  
The rise of this environmental consciousness and ethic acted as a dampening force on the 
electric power grid’s technological trajectory and is more supportive of Hughes’ 
hypothesis than Ellul’s or Mumford’s deterministic route.  Examining how this occurred 
is the purpose of this investigation.   
Interdisciplinary Analysis 
Analyzing the evolution of the electric power grid in southern New England 
requires an interdisciplinary approach to better comprehend how the summation of forces 
affected the operation, maintenance, and construction of this advanced technology 
system.  Certainly an appreciation of the technology of the electric power grid itself is the 
necessary entering argument for this examination.  A general comprehension of the 
processes of generation, transmission, and distribution of the electric power grid is 
important in understanding how they function together to provide electricity to the 
consumer, affect the overall efficiency of the system, or inflict the greatest damage to the 
environment.  In an examination of how technology informs technique to promote the 
most efficient system possible, one must be acquainted with the major advances in 
electric power technology. 
Yet the knowledge and comprehension of the kilowatt ratings or carbon dioxide 
emission production of any individual plant is not sufficient to fully comprehend what is 
xix 
 
transpiring.  Theories of technology as proposed by Ellul, Mumford and Hughes are used 
to provide the hypotheses with which to examine the electric power grid’s development 
as a system of advanced technology.  Propositions regarding the ethical consideration of 
the environment mandate attention as these evolving concepts motivated individuals 
attempting to change the electric power grid’s mode of operation.  The ethical standards 
of the electric power grid’s operators must also be considered in this analysis as another 
force that affected the system’s development and growth.  Such theoretical constructs 
were influenced by the technological advances that had been accomplished, but also 
provided feedback into the system on what should be done in the future.   
Finally, the historical influences on the electric power grid and its operators and 
critics cannot be disregarded.  The basis for human action regarding this advanced 
technology system evolved under the stresses of numerous contingent forces.  Humans 
were affected by political and economic events even as they attempted to enjoy the 
benefits from the electric power grid and minimize its shortcomings.  For example, the 
1973 Yom Kippur War had economic ramifications that led to great changes in fuel 
prices and subsequently on many other aspects of the electric power grid well beyond the 
results on the battlefield.   
The combination of these three perspectives provides an opportunity to attain a 
more balanced comprehension of the numerous forces affecting the electric power grid 
and how the resultant development should be considered.   A reductionist methodology 
attempting to only examine the proximate causes of merely one of these forces is 
inadequate to fully comprehend what is occurring.  Instead all of these unprivileged 
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viewpoints needs to be considered.  Indeed, it is the careful synchronization of these 
perspectives that shines the greatest light on the development of the electric power grid.       
Method and Structure 
This qualitative analysis is divided into seven chapters.  The inquiry will examine 
how the operation of the electric power grid in southeastern New England, with an 
emphasis on Rhode Island, was altered by the development of environmental ethical 
concerns of the population.  While other factors will be considered, such as political, 
economic, and technological, the focus of this investigation will be on the environmental 
ones that disturbed the equilibrium of the electric power grid.  The analysis will follow a 
general historical timeline but will branch off into a parallel construction in the 
examination of the particular issues.   
Chapter One will be an introductory chapter which will contain a literature 
review.  The chapter will consider Mumford’s and Ellul’s views on technological 
determinism as well as Hughes’ concept of technological momentum.  This review will 
consider other authors’ critiques on the subject of technological determinism and 
momentum to provide a well-structured notion of these concepts.  A discussion of the 
electric power grid and a systems analysis of its components, physical and organizational, 
will be conducted and a definition of the grid will be proposed.  A review of the various 
strands of environmental thought will be presented to highlight the similarities and 
differences between the types.   
The next part of the dissertation will provide the background of how the electric 
power grid developed in southern New England, looking at the technological, 
environmental, and political forces acting on the system.  Chapter Two will provide the 
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historical background to the subsequent analysis.  The initial construction of the electric 
power grid in southern New England will be described as well as the technological and 
social challenges to its operation.  The objective is to describe how this advanced 
technology system reached maturity and eventual culmination during the mid 1960s due 
to a number of economic, technical, and political factors.   
In Chapter Three the development of the nascent environmental movement, 
nationally and locally, will be considered, and how the concerns for the environment led 
to a developing environmental ethic that led to regulatory and political actions.  The 
operating doctrine of the technological system of the electric power grid and the 
developing environmental concerns initially acted out of synchronization with one 
another, but the events of the early 1970s would force the two into alignment.  The 
numerous environmental laws passed during the first Nixon Administration, the shock of 
the oil embargo in 1973, and the general economic malaise of the decade coincided with 
real technical limits limiting the operation of the electric power grid.11  The interaction of 
these events was not necessarily a smooth one, but it set the initial conditions for a 
number of other conflicts which will be examined in the subsequent chapters.   
Chapter Four discusses the Rhode Island state government and its method of 
regulating the companies operating the electric power grid.  The state allowed the electric 
utility companies to exercise a natural monopoly over its consumers in designated areas 
in return for governmental supervision of their activities and pricing. The evolution of the 
                                                 
11.  Richard F. Hirsh and Adam H. Serchuk. “Momentum Shifts in the American 
Utility System: Catastrophic Change-Or No Change at All?” Technology and Culture 37, 
no. 2 (April 1996): 286-293. 
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state’s interaction with the owners and operators of these electric utility companies is 
unique as the leadership of the state government and the electric utilities were often the 
same people.  The resultant momentum generated by this confluence of personnel was an 
important factor in the rapid maturation of the grid in southeastern New England.  This 
was not always beneficial for the citizens of the state, however, and the intervention of 
the federal government and the new political forces in Rhode Island worked to disrupt 
this unity.  The convergence of interests of the electric utilities and the government 
tended to bring these elements back together, even as the new environmental movement 
was coming of age and working to do just the opposite.     
Having examined how the electric power grid matured in the southeastern New 
England area, the second part of the dissertation will analyze how the emerging national 
environmental ethic acted to stimulate humans to effect change in the grid’s construction, 
operation, and maintenance.  Chapters Five through Seven are examinations of specific 
events over the subsequent decades where ethical concerns for the environment affected 
the electric power grid in southeastern New England.  These effects often rose from the 
principled concerns of citizens and resulted in political or legal actions that prevented the 
construction of a particular component of the electric power grid, advocated for a new 
manner of energy conversion and transmission, or promoted an entirely new makeup of 
the system.  Some of these efforts were more successful than others; some are still 
ongoing.  The reaction to the advanced technology system was not one that would have 
been foreseen even a few years before environmental ethics became an important 
concern.  To some extent this is the story of the trials and tribulations of the New England 
Electric System (NEES, now National Grid) as it struggled to adapt in a very complex 
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situation.12  In each of these chapters, the effects of national trends in the operation and 
regulation of the electric power grid are considered as is the continuing evolution of 
environmental beliefs.  The interaction of the Rhode Island political arena to these 
technological, legal and ethical influences is also examined.    
The first period, discussed in Chapter Five, involves the planned construction of 
two nuclear power plants in Charlestown, Rhode Island, during the 1970s.  Proposed 
during the height of the energy crisis of that decade, this plant created more negative 
popular reaction than any regional electric power plant previously had.  These plants 
were not built, in large part due to the citizen response against nuclear power and its 
environmental impact, though the economic concerns of the New England Electric 
System were also evident.13    
Chapter Six will discuss the subsequent state and federal government, electric 
utility company and environmental group actions during the 1980s and 1990s, including 
the growing reaction against the coal-fired plants in Providence, Rhode Island and Fall 
River, Massachusetts.  Several of these plants are still in existence, but the public reaction 
against them is due in no small part from the pollution they generate, demonstrating the 
tension rising from the interplay of the reliable and economic operation of the electric 
power grid and the public concerns of the environmental cost of its operation.  The 
construction of gas turbine power plants in the area seemed to simultaneously meet the 
                                                 
12.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 199-245. 
13.  Ibid., 222-224. 
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requirements of a more efficient electric power grid that was also less detrimental to the 
environment.   
Chapter Seven will examine these same actors in the new century when increasing 
concerns regarding climate change caused by human activity, including that from the 
operation of the electric power grid, became predominant.  The accomplishments of the 
state and federal government, electric utility companies and environmental groups to 
create a more sustainable electric power grid will be surveyed.   Numerous wind turbines 
were constructed to provide power to the grid as well as mitigate the production of 
exhaust gases associated with anthropomorphic global warming.  While the abortive 
Cape Wind project is the most well known of these projects, numerous wind turbines 
populate the Ocean State.  Their construction and operation was often supported by 
governmental subsidies that were created from the taxation of the consumer’s electric 
bills, a levy supported by the population in order to attain a more sustainable society.  As 
this effort reached equilibrium, the efforts to reduce greenhouse gas production by 
shutting down the coal burning Brayton Point power plant reached fruition after a 
generation long struggle.       
Chapter Nine serves as the conclusion and proposes recommendations for further 
inquiry.  It includes an assessment of the validity of the models of the development of 
advanced technology systems.  The conclusion will suggest that human agency does 
affect the momentum of advanced technology, though perhaps in methods and magnitude 
not envisioned when a technology is first considered.   
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Relevance to the PhD Program at Salve Regina University 
The question of how a new ethical vista, that of environmental ethics, affected the 
operation and development of the electric power grid, arguably one of modern society’s 
most important technological systems, is in phase with the program’s emphasis of what it 
means to be human in an age of advanced technology.  The research question includes 
many aspects and themes associated with the core courses of the humanities syllabus.  
Certainly the electric power grid is an important component of the modern technological 
society, providing the musculature for that current civilization to achieve its physical 
objectives.  The theme of technological determinism is discussed in several of the courses 
with Ellul and Mumford being important observers of technology.  Hughes, as a 
commentator on technological momentum and as well as the interaction of complex 
technological systems in modern society, is also a good fit for the themes of the 
curriculum.   His proposal on how such advanced technologies might be altered by 
popular will forms the basis for the research question.  Environmental ethics was 
arguably a byproduct of the reaction to advanced technology system waste streams.  How 
this ethos provided negative feedback to the system in a specific region in a particular 
time period may provide additional insight in support of the concept of technological 
momentum.  The interaction of these elements, technology, philosophy and ethics 
requires an interdisciplinary approach as it is not apparent that a single proximate cause 
exists to explain the changes in the electric power grid over this period of time.  It is 
hoped that this dissertation will lead to a greater discussion of the merits of technological 
momentum for advanced technology systems and how the citizenry might act to shift the 
technique that underpins modern existence.
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CHAPTER 1  
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Technique worships nothing, respects nothing.  It has a single role: to strip off 
externals, to bring everything to light, and by rational use to transform everything 
into means.   
 
- Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society 
 
 
In sum, it is difficult to change the direction of large electric power systems - and 
perhaps that of large sociotechnical systems in general - but such systems are not 
autonomous.  Those who seek to control and direct them must acknowledge the 
fact that systems are evolving cultural artifacts rather than isolated technologies.  
As cultural artifacts, they reflect the past as well as the present.   
 
- Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power 
 
 
Advanced technology systems require significant human activity over long 
periods of time to reach maturity and ubiquity.  The electric power grid in southeastern 
New England took decades to achieve this condition.  In the beginning electric power for 
lighting appeared more as the latest technological fad as well as a possible competitor to 
gas lighting in households.  Decades later electricity had replaced practically every other 
power source in the region.  One could connect into the electric power grid almost 
anywhere and either supply or receive reliable and consistent power.  The question arises 
of how this transpired, and more generally, how any advanced technology system 
evolves.  The lore of some “heroic” era of invention and technological development 
2 
 
leading to social progress might appear satisfying, but could be more myth than reality.1  
Since the electric power grid did not spring miraculously out of the earth after Benjamin 
Franklin had smote the ground with his lightning rod and Thomas Edison had electrified 
it with his dynamos, one is still left with the question of how and why this advanced 
technology system flourished in the manner that it did in southeastern New England.  
Was this evolution inevitable based on the technical requirements of electric power 
generation, or were other forces at play that influenced the growth and development of 
the system?  Were there particular instances where decisions were made affecting the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the electric power grid that were based on 
concerns other than what engineering economic analysis might have demanded?  
Different observers of technological development have proposed contending theories to 
explain why advanced technology systems progress in the particular manner that they do.  
Theories of technological determinism as promoted by Lewis Mumford and Jacque Ellul 
suggest that technology is acting autonomously, “independent of social constraints.”2  
Other scholars, such as Thomas P. Hughes, proposed that social concerns can provide 
negative feedback into the developing technological system, often providing forces as 
powerful as the technological ones.3  Examining how and why the electric power grid 
developed in southeastern New England may suggest that a particular model better 
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explains how advanced technology systems develop and allow predictions for future 
responses.   
 Technological Determinism and Technological Momentum 
While there is no single definition of technological determinism, several common 
elements are shared among most descriptions.  In technological determinism, technology 
acts as an independent variable.  Changes in technology result in changes in society.  
Depending upon the perspective, technology is the most important factor in the causal 
analysis.  Analysis of this dynamic tends to fall into one of two categories.  A “hard” 
version of technological determinism indicates “that technological change determines 
social change,” and is “autonomous or independent of social influences.”4  The “soft” 
account posits that “technological change drives social change but at the same time 
responds discriminatingly to social pressures.”5  Different philosophers of technology 
placed different weights on either of these versions based on what they were attempting 
to prove or their method of analysis.  Theories of technological determinism as postulated 
by Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford fall into the harder versions of this theory while 
concepts suggested by historians of technology such as Thomas P. Hughes are more 
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aligned with the softer proposition.6  Each outlook added insight to how advanced 
technology systems developed and how this development might affect society.         
It is notable that the philosophers of technology most associated with the concept 
of technological determinism typically did not use this phrase. Their large body of work 
has been extensively examined by other writers with resulting schools of thought and 
critique embracing their overarching themes.  The emphasis and inflections within the 
grand narratives proposed by Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul varied over time as they 
considered the criticism of their proposals.  These interpretations fall within numerous 
views of “hard” and “soft” technological determinism, but Mumford and Ellul generally 
saw technological forces as being the prime mover in modern society.7   
Mumford’s theoretical development was perhaps the longest of the theorists.  
Commencing his analysis in the 1930s, Mumford spent much the next forty years writing 
about the role of technology in the development of human civilization.8  His early work, 
Technics and Civilization (1934) attempted to fashion a clockwork flow of human 
development through successive forms of energy transformation and mechanical 
construction, from wind and water, through coal and iron, and climaxing in electricity 
and alloys.  Technology affected human society as much as society affected the growth 
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and spread of technology.  While examining the effects of such mechanical devices, 
Mumford also considered the qualitative influences of human culture and psychology on 
these eras.9  Mumford stated that, “In projecting one side of the human personality into 
the concrete forms of the machine, we have created an independent environment that has 
reacted upon every side of the personality (italics in original).”10  By “machine,” 
Mumford envisioned the whole interaction of an entire technological system, including 
the science and art of its use as much as the physical components.11  By the time 
Mumford completed the two volumes of The Myth of the Machine (1967 and 1970), his 
earlier optimism on the benefits of advanced technology had decayed and his more 
nuanced assessment of technology’s effects emerged.  Technological systems were 
affected by human agency over the millennium, and vice versa, but now the interaction 
was not as balanced.  At the dawn of history, the use of technology was focused on 
providing sustainment for survival, “broadly life-centered, not work-centered or power-
centered.”12  When human survival became less tenuous, “technics supported and 
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enlarged the capacities for human expression.”13  As human knowledge and its 
corresponding “technological pool” expanded, a more demanding technology also 
evolved.  This technology was less focused on physical and mental sustenance, but more 
on “economic expansion, material repletion, and military superiority.”14  The exploitation 
of subsequent technological advances to amass power (“monotechnics” in Mumford’s 
theoretical construct) was certainly emboldened by the profusion of knowledge during 
the Industrial Revolution.  To Mumford the desire of authoritarian organizations to use 
political, military and economic power to achieve domination over human society (the 
“megamachine”) and the natural environment went back to the beginning of civilization 
itself.  What was new was the concept that the advantages from such technology were 
seemingly irresistible.15  This interaction was not always in the population’s interests as 
previous technical crafts were displaced by the pervasive production of monotechnics.16  
Additionally, the megamachine, while providing for human physical requirements, also 
necessitated the population’s compliant reverence of authority.17  Mumford was not 
optimistic on the ability of the population to resist the temptations of the megamachine.  
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Though Mumford exhibited some faith that humans would ultimately escape from the 
rising technological tide, he did not propose any strategy of resistance.18   
Jacques Ellul demonstrated much less optimism in his concept of Technique.   If 
technology was becoming the most important factor in human society for Mumford, to 
Ellul it had already subsumed human activity.  Humans were along for the ride in the new 
milieu of “technique.”  “Technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and 
having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human 
activity (italics in original).”19  Technique had replaced the ancien régime based on nature 
with a closed system independent of human interaction or alteration.  Artificial, self 
focused and divorced from earlier human values and ethics, technique developed in a 
manner not related to any ultimate objective, and its components formed an ill-defined, 
complex system.20   Technique did not just modify all human thoughts and actions, 
whether political, economic or moral; instead all of these functions required realignment 
to satisfy technique’s demands.  Technique had created such a dominant environment that 
humans could not formulate other courses of action outside the boundaries of technique.  
Persons adapted to the new environment of technique, becoming just one element in a 
human capital strategy that technique coopted to achieve its ends of greater effectiveness 
and efficiency across all domains.  Ethical concerns, moral dilemmas, and core beliefs 
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became dominated by the utilitarian demands of the new master.  Technique even 
endeavored to displace religion and other spiritual concerns while attempting to attain 
some asymptotic rationality.21  The increasing acceleration of technological development 
subsumed previous human thoughts and desires.  Technical civilization, no longer human 
centered, made human agency and freedom irrelevant even as basic human needs and 
wants were handily provided for by the ever increasing productive means.  Humans were 
now no longer masters of technology but merely the objects of technique.22  Since 
technique could not be disposed of, humans would need to transcend it, though Ellul 
could not propose the manner in which to accomplish this task.23   
   Critical reaction to Ellul and Mumford was mixed.  While both authors’ ideas 
were seen as pessimistic, Ellul generated more disapproval of his deterministic 
assessment.24   Even Mumford found Ellul’s ideas too fatalistic.25  Yet the assessment 
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that technological concerns had achieved primacy gained traction and generated great 
acclaim.26   
One of the responses to such notions of technological determinism came from 
Thomas P. Hughes.  While both Mumford and Ellul looked at Western society or 
civilization as a whole, Hughes focused his attention on specific advanced technology 
systems to form his theory of technological momentum.  Hughes first postulated his ideas 
based on an analysis of the German chemical industry from just prior to the First World 
War through the interwar period.  Here, a “technology stimulated by war gathering a 
momentum carrying over into peacetime.  The commitment of engineers, chemists, and 
managers experienced in the process, and of the corporation heavily invested in it, 
contributed to this momentum.”27   The talent and creativity of the personnel operating 
this technology adapted the chemical plants from producing nitrogen fertilizer for 
agricultural purpose to munitions for the war and then later to synthetic gasoline to 
support the expanding German automobile industry and meet the demands of domestic 
consumption.  At each junction the ability of this group to identify problems and propose 
innovative solutions for this system is instructive.  Hughes observed that, “The creative 
potential of the chemists and the engineers, the vested interests in the plant, and the 
proprietary attitude toward hydrogenation of the technical men in managerial positions all 
contributed to the momentum.  This momentum had two major components, the drive to 
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produce and the drive to create.”28  Coupled to the dominant political party in Germany, 
this creativity would result in severely negative results for the company, industry, and the 
country as the synthetic gasoline plants helped refine the fuel for the panzers to overrun 
most of Europe in the Second World War.29  Deflecting the trajectory of the German 
petro-chemical industry that took decades to create and achieve maturity required 
immense forces.  The momentum of the system was only curtailed by the damaging of 
the plants by Allied bombers and their eventual capture by the resurgent Red Army of the 
Soviet Union.   
Hughes’ examination of the invention, expansion and maturation of the electric 
power grids in the United States, Germany and Great Britain in his book, Networks of 
Power (1983) expanded these concepts.  For Hughes, technological systems were not 
merely composed of those physical parts that might make up a complex machine, 
however large.  They might also include portions of the environment that while not 
strictly a component of the technical structure, interact with and influence the course of 
its development.  For the electric power grid the system might be composed of the 
electrical generators, the transmission lines, various switching stations, and transformers 
as well as the electric utility regulating organizations, the corporate business 
organizations and the universities that educated new cohorts of operators.  This expansive 
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definition resists precise boundaries desired by the technician or scientist.30  As an 
advanced technology system grew beyond the initial technical issues challenging the 
system creators, a host of administrative, economic, organizational and legal connections 
were built in parallel, in the process creating a symbiotic relationship between the 
technology itself and the human organizations devoted to its production and 
maintenance.31  When critical problems restricted the growth of the system, managers and 
engineers acted to define and then solve the problem, allowing further growth.  Greater 
numbers of people become involved with the mature system and larger amounts of 
capital and more numerous and complex system component interrelationships were 
formed, all tending to resist any alteration in course of the system.  This process creates 
momentum for the system, a concept not dissimilar to the Newtonian definition.  To 
Hughes, advanced technological systems “have a characteristic analogous to the inertia of 
motion in the physical world.  Their mass of technical, organizational, and attitudinal 
components tends to maintain their steady growth and direction.”32  The mass of the 
system includes the machines and physical components that required considerable capital 
investment to create, as well as the human component of its operators.  The system 
velocity is attained through quantifiable rates of growth, either accelerating or 
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decelerating.  The direction comes from the goals of the system managers, with 
additional momentum provided by the commercial entities, political bodies, professional 
societies and others that interact with the actual technical core of the system.33   
Once an advanced technology system acquires momentum, it can be as difficult to 
alter its trajectory as any massive physical body in motion.  Successful advanced 
technology systems act to reduce disruptive threats to the system as managers of the 
technical core organization and subordinate support groups desire maintenance of the 
status quo.34  Those organizations with vested interests in maintaining the normal 
direction of the overall system, such as the financial backers, the political groups that 
receive resources from it, or the government agencies that regulate it, are likely to be 
conservative, desiring to protect the capital and intellectual investments that they have 
already provided to the system.  Governmental influence, organizational resistance and 
doctrinal adherence are all used to protect the system from undesired influences.  Having 
built the technological system, individuals and organizations are loathe to let it be 
transformed, regardless of the requirements to adapt to new contingent forces or ideas.35 
  Yet systems exhibiting technological momentum are not unalterable or 
autonomous, though the summation of contingent forces required to alter their course can 
be considerable.  A shift in economic forces, system catastrophes or even a change in the 
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belief system of the population using the technology may all act to change the course of 
the development of an advanced technology system.36  Economic forces entailed a wide 
number of market issues that change the desire or the ability of the consumers to buy the 
product.  In the electric power grid, the cost of fuel to run the power generating plants, 
the interest rates charged for capital  or an overall financial downturn might result in a 
different market dynamic directly affecting the amount of electricity that was needed and 
hence the profitability of the electric utility.37   
Catastrophic system failures might also induce the population to avoid the 
consumption of a particular product or overall rejection of the technological system.  The 
sinking of RMS Titanic in 1912, the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, or the 
multiple nuclear reactor meltdowns at Fukushima, Japan in 2011 might all be considered 
system disasters that challenged the perceptions of the reliability and safety of their 
respective systems.  These events should not be considered as merely an unfortunate turn 
of events for an individual component of the various technological systems.  Rather, 
multiple minor failures and/or natural events had to occur to cause the avalanche of 
overall system collapse.  These casualties are suggestive of “tightly coupled systems with 
a high degree of interconnectedness.”38  In these examples, the complexity of the 
advanced technology system had increased at a rate faster than the ability of the system 
operators and managers to comprehend, let alone control.  The actual disaster should thus 
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be seen not as an isolated event but as an indictment of the system and the societal values 
underpinning the system’s momentum.39   
Finally, the overall beliefs of the population using the technological system might 
diverge from the ones that had initially supported its birth and growth.  Writing in the late 
1980s, Hughes postulated that the emergence of a popular counterculture in the late 
1960s and 1970s might turn the population of the United States away from technological 
systems that emphasized the concentration of electric power production and 
centralization of its control.40  Since the initial publication of Networks of Power in 1983 
a large segment of the population of the United States has converted to embrace portions 
of this developing ideology, with effects that Hughes was not able to examine.   
All three elements, shifting economic force, systemic technological failure, and 
changes in the population’s beliefs may be seen in the course change in the development 
of the electric power grid in southeastern New England.  How the effects of “a 
confluence of contingency, catastrophe and conversion” acted on the electric power grid 
in the past few decades is a key question to be addressed in this study.41           
The Electric Power Grid 
When considering the technological advances since the Industrial Revolution, one 
could easily point to several areas that have had lasting effects.  The advent of the 
combustion engine and subsequent advances in the automobile radically altered the 
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distances that the population would consider travelling in the normal course of their day.  
The development of chemistry and metallurgy permitted the creation of advanced 
fertilizers and stronger materials, ensuring a consequent population boom from greater 
supplies of food and the structures to house the people.  Improved communications from 
the telephone, television, and computer permitted the spread of these technologies at a 
faster rate than ever before.  Yet these developments might have been no more than 
luxuries for a select few without widespread access to electric power.  Instead, by 
creating a flexible and relatively inexpensive form of power, humans vaulted from the 
“Age of Synergy” into the twentieth century with the fruits of all of these advances.42   
Today it is nearly unfathomable to consider a modern society without electricity.  A 
technological society could survive and perhaps even flourish without personal motor 
vehicles, stretching tracts of suburban sprawl or even chemically enhanced lifestyles.  
Cutting off the electric power in any advanced society, though, would rapidly lead to 
excessive social friction and economic dislocation.  The blackout in the northeastern 
portion of the United States in November 1965, caused by failing to reset the power level 
of a single circuit breaker in the Niagara Falls power station, affected over 30 million 
people in the northeast, stranding thousands in subways and elevators.43   Just recently, 
severe storms that struck New England caused hundreds of thousands to lose electric 
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power, some for over a week.44  A long term loss of electric power in the nation would 
have more significant economic and social impact.  The population can no longer subsist 
without the reassuring glow of the incandescent lamp and its successors or the other 
comforts and necessities that electric power provides.  Millions of urban dwellers would 
be unable to leave their apartments, walk to the countryside and become subsistence 
farmers, assuming this was even an option without the use of electrically produced 
fertilizers or fuel.45   
 The American electrically driven society was not built overnight.  It took 
generations to develop the technological and scientific comprehension of electricity and 
create the infrastructure to power the nation.46  Some of the decisions made in the 
creation of this network were based on the pursuit of efficiency and profits while others 
were made for political considerations.47  The net result has been an amalgam of systems 
that provide electricity to practically the entire population at an affordable price, but 
require the expenditure of significant environmental capital.  
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In an advanced technology system as pervasive as the electric power grid, it is 
somewhat surprising that the definitions for it are not particularly clear or well explained.  
Many descriptions focus on the physical components of the system, particularly the 
power generation plants, the transmission lines and the transformers.48  In these 
descriptions the electric power grid is composed of three distinct subsystems; generation, 
transmission and distribution (see figure 1).  The generation section consists of those 
facilities that convert energy, usually in the form of mechanical energy, to electrical 
 
Figure 1.  Basic Structure of the Electric System.  U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task 
Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes 
and Recommendations, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy.gov, 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf (accessed 
July 21, 2015). 
 
energy.  This may be accomplished in a variety of ways, such as burning a fossil fuel to 
generate thermal energy and through heat transfer boil steam to run a turbine generator 
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that produces the electrical energy.  Other methods to generate electricity include the use 
of falling water at dams to drive turbine generators or wind as a motive force to turn the 
blades of wind turbines.49  The output of any one source of electric power varies greatly 
on the plant operating parameters though typically U.S. power plants generate alternating 
current (AC) power at 60 cycles per second or hertz (Hz).   
While power generation may provide the greatest visual image of the electric 
power grid, the transmission subsystem is equally important.  As the electric power 
generation plant is usually not in the same location as the final user of the electric power, 
the electricity must be transmitted on circuit lines.  At the electric power generation 
plants, the output voltage is typically stepped up to over 69 thousand volts (kV) in order 
to minimize the energy losses as the electricity is transmitted to the end users.  Building 
the transmission poles and stringing the lines can be as challenging as building the power 
generation plant due to costs, terrain, acquiring land right-of-way access and meshing 
different generations of technology.50  Once the electric power has been transmitted to the 
location where it will be used, its voltage then must be stepped down and spread out to 
the various users with the distribution subsystem.  The voltage is lowered at local 
substation step-down transformers and then transferred using low voltage lines to the end 
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users.  While some industries use higher voltages, the vast majority of the population uses 
electricity at 240 and 120 Volts (V).51   
With the large scale use of electricity in modern society, no individual power 
plant can provide all of the electricity consumed by the population and industry.  The 
construction of the electric power grid permits various electric power generation plants to 
be connected to the network and all provide their output to the transmission subsystem.  
Through continuous monitoring of the power plants output and the demand of the grid’s 
electrical consumers, the grid operators at regional operational control centers are able to 
maintain a stable system voltage and frequency.  In the event of a system disruption due 
to an electric power plant shutting down caused by equipment failure or a downed 
transmission line, the operators can attempt to reroute electric power from other sources 
to maintain the continuity and reliability of the system.52   
 Hughes proposed a more expansive definition of the advanced technology system 
such as the electric power grid beyond the basic technical components.  For Hughes, a 
technological system includes the “interacting components of different kinds, such as the 
technical and institutional, as well as different values . . .”53  Constructors of advanced 
technology systems such as the electric power grid realized that their creations extended 
into other spheres of interest and acted to insulate the system from possible orthogonal 
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concerns.  If successful, the system grew and prospered, overcoming the initial threats to 
growth.54  Even this description seems limited, particularly for a system such as the 
electric power grid.  It tends to ignore the actual users of the system who might act as 
more than mere consumers for the electric power being produced and provide negative 
feedback to the operation of the system itself.  The effects of the technical components on 
the physical world that contain them are also neglected, positing that the system operates 
in a space devoid of other biological or inorganic systems.  A better description would 
pay greater heed to these actors as they provide input to the electric power grid’s 
construction and operation, above and beyond any transmission loss or voltage drop.   
 Putting these ideas together, a more inclusive concept of the electric power grid 
includes the physical components of the system (the power plants, transmission lines and 
distribution stations) as well as the organizations and people that directly affect the 
production and consumption of electric power.  These groups contain businesses such as 
the ones that operate the electric power plants and transmit the electricity (such as the 
New England Electric System), but also those that consume electric power (for example 
the city of Providence to run its electric street cars).  Other establishments that directly 
affect the production of electricity include the governmental supervisory bodies (such as 
the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission) whose decisions often limited the 
operations and maintenance of the electric power grid.  Additionally, the colleges and 
universities that educate the engineers and the technical societies that set the standards for 
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efficient and ethical operation of the electric power grid must be incorporated in any 
definition.55  While the general population as direct consumers of electric power is a 
component of the electric power gird, the citizen groups that indirectly affected the 
system are not.  These groups (such as the Conservation Law Foundation) certainly did 
have a strong influence on how the electric power grid was operated and maintained, but 
only by their ability to influence the voting public and their elected representatives.    
Both Mumford and Ellul noted the creation and operation of the electric power 
grid in their assessment of modern technological systems, though neither devoted specific 
analysis to this particular system.  Mumford’s early views saw the expansion of electric 
power supplies as a means to free the population from the “basest forms of drudgery.”56  
Linking the various electric generating sources would allow the diffusion of economic 
activity throughout the nation and not merely concentrated on those locations nearest the 
power sources.  Advances in automation and shifting the work force out of menial jobs 
would lead to the transformation of the working class.57  The combination of the various 
types of electric power generation and transmission would provide efficiency and 
reliability to all of its users, preventing the accumulation of excessive population or 
power in denser urban centers.58  Over time Mumford’s optimism appeared to diminish 
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and the electric power grid was reconceived as just another portion of the 
“megamachine,” dispensing ambiguous gifts at the cost of human integrity and 
freedom.59   Ellul had fewer positive notes regarding the electric power grid.  The 
interconnectedness of the various means of electric power generation demanded technical 
solutions to the issues of operation and maintenance, solutions that could only be 
provided by trained technicians with the support of the state.  Once again technological 
problems could only be solved with additional applications of technique, a palliative 
method that only furthered technique’s domination of mankind.60    
Environmental Ethics 
Similar to the electric power grid taking over seventy years to attain maturity, the 
development of an environmental ethic took generations to achieve a widespread place in 
the public consciousness.  On the surface this appears surprising, as not long after Edison 
was building the Pearl Street electric power system in New York City, John Muir was 
establishing the first national conservation movement, the Sierra Club, in California.  In 
time, organizations such as Muir’s would have a significant effect on American society 
and the operation one aspect of its technological back bone, the electric power grid.  The 
parallel evolution of American conservationist and then environmental thinking had 
similar features to the initial growth of the electric power grid.  It had a strong element of 
practical problem solving in its approach to protect human life and the environment.  The 
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premier theorists for conservation and then environmental protection were more self-
taught than educated at prestigious universities.  Finally, government assistance was seen 
as essential to meeting the goals of the various individuals and groups that wanted to 
maintain and protect the environment.  Over time the character of these similarities would 
change.  A professional cadre of committed individuals with an ethic for protecting the 
environment as strong as any electric grid operator’s emphasis on efficiency came to the 
forefront of the environmental movement.  Their actions would affect the manner in 
which the electric power grid was perceived, regulated and operated.       
The modern environmental movement might well consider John Muir’s exertions 
as important as anything Edison accomplished.  Muir’s walking expeditions through 
some of the most pristine areas remaining in North America convinced him of the 
necessity to safeguard all types of biologic forms, not just those advantageous to the 
spread of human civilization.  To Muir, nature’s existential rights were not based on 
human necessity but were self-evident.  For that matter, an untouched wilderness was a 
requisite for the population’s acquaintance to prevent the hectic pace of modernity from 
cracking the essence of humanity.  An accomplished writer and organizer, Muir 
popularized his biocentric views through magazine articles and books and used the Sierra 
Club, which he helped found in 1892, to create to generate the popular support required 
to preserve the forests and wilderness areas of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.61   
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In contrast to Muir’s views, his contemporary, Gifford Pinchot, saw the country’s 
forests and natural resources as assets for human use to fuel the nation’s development. 
While Muir wanted to preserve areas of the nation untouched by human growth, Pinchot 
wanted to manage the consumption of natural resources so that they would not run out 
and be unavailable for future generations.  The appeal of the wilderness as some sort of 
aesthetic reserve seems to have appealed to Pinchot less then the possibility of its long 
term use for human progress.  Both Pinchot and Muir were able to gain access to the 
national leadership in what was initially a mutually reinforcing effort, leading to 
legislation that established the national park system and made conservation an issue for 
the republic.  Over time, however, the goals of the two men diverged, leading to a public 
disagreement regarding the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley in California to provide 
water and electricity for the nearby city of San Francisco.  A portent of current 
environmental and developmental imbroglios, this Gordian knot was cut only when 
President Woodrow Wilson sided with the developers in 1913 following a seven year 
struggle in Congress.62 
If the proponents to dam the Hetch Hetchy Valley won the battle, Muir’s 
followers won the war of ideas, though this was not immediately evident.  In the first 
decades of the twentieth century, conservation was the greater motivational force behind 
national organizations such as the National Wildlife Foundation and the Audubon 
Society.  State and local organizations might be concerned with maintaining a particular 
parcel of land clear from human development or providing a link to human interaction 
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with nature, but these efforts were typically small compared to the development of 
industry in the nation, particularly that of the electric power grid.  Certainly the New 
England Electric System, which was busy building its own hydroelectric power dams on 
the Connecticut and Deerfield Rivers, did not appear to have been limited by the 
population’s desires to conserve portions of the wilderness.  The thrill and excitement of 
the useful new electric powered technology was more compelling than any concerns of 
the environmental damage it might be causing.63   
Environmental concerns tended to be sublimated by the greater problems of the 
Great Depression, the Second World War, and then the postwar afterglow even as the 
electric power grid was achieving maturation.  Conservation issues had not evaporated, 
but the concerns had not reached any critical mass that would affect public policy.  
Conservation of open spaces and scenic vistas still appeared as the more important 
problems to be addressed.64   
A more sophisticated environmental perspective was provided during this period 
by Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic.”  Leopold saw the relationships between humanity and 
the environment as incredibly complex interactions that required great humility when 
attempting to comprehend, let alone control.  A new manner of thinking was required to 
deal with this relationship, one that “changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of 
the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies respect for his fellow 
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members, and also respect for the community as such.”65  Leopold examined these 
relationships in terms of energy exchange between the participants, but the actors were 
not simply elements that could be plugged into or removed from the circuit.  The 
members had expansive functions whose limits could not be easily determined.  In any 
case the environment was not a reservoir for purely economic endeavors.  The protection 
of the environment required a personal commitment towards conservation, as economic 
and political motivations were not sufficient.66  Leopold’s oft-quoted adage that “A thing 
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise,” should not be understood to presume 
the total inviolability of nature.67  Such an ethical proposal did not propose equal rights 
for animals and plants, but desired responsible and prudent interaction with the 
environment by mankind.  Leopold saw conservation as an important human activity and 
emphasized personal responsibility for this change in emphasis. 
In the 1960s, the problems of environmental degradation caused by increased 
population growth, industrial production and modern technology edged their way into the 
national discourse.68  This was a period of unprecedented interest in ecological actions 
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that affected many aspects of American technological society, especially the electric 
power grid.  The decade’s early years had seen business as usual for the electric power 
utilities.  The larger companies experimented with different types of energy sources, even 
as the business model that formed the backbone of their concept of operations was 
becoming less dynamic.69  The promise of practically free electric power provided by 
civilian operated commercial nuclear reactors proved illusionary, the costs of carbon-
based fuel continued to rise and the increased regulation of the utilities by national and 
state organizations tended to lower the companies’ profits.70  Business was not booming, 
but it was safe and profitable.  The 1960s were to turn this complacency on its head 
during a number of interconnected phases.  The stalling out of the further expansion of 
the electric power grid, an increasing realization of the ecological stresses that this vital 
technology created, and external political, economic and social problems created a 
powerful combination affecting continued development.  More importantly, the 
environmental concerns that had been dormant during the Depression and the World 
Wars came roaring back into the national consciousness.  The system received its first 
major shock in 1965 when a minor electrical fault cascaded into a major power outage 
throughout the northeastern United States, eventually blacking out the homes and 
                                                 
69.  David B. Sicilia.  Electric Power and Electrification.  In The Encyclopedia of 
New England, ed. Burt Feintuch and David H. Watters, 851.  (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2005).    
70.  Richard F. Hirsh. Technology and Transformation in the American Electric 
Utility Industry. (1989. Reprint, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 82-
86. 
28 
 
businesses of over thirty million people.71  This catastrophic failure of the electric power 
grid foreshadowed what was to come, although few would have predicted it based on 
economic or technological factors.   
The 1960s also saw numerous changes in the cultural course of American society, 
not the least of which was the explosion in the importance of the environmental 
consciousness of the population.  The publishing of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 
1962 was the spark that rekindled the fire Muir had set earlier.  Carson’s warning of the 
unseen, though not undetectable, effects of manmade chemicals on the environment 
created national notoriety for Silent Spring.  Her description of the use of the pesticide 
Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloro-ethane (DDT) suggested that it affected life forms far 
beyond the initial intent of insect eradication.  The byproducts of such poisons could be 
identified in the water supplies of the areas they were used and often caused deleterious 
effects on other life.  At the same time, DDT use failed to keep the insect population at 
bay as the rapidly reproducing target species quickly developed resistance to it and the 
other toxic substances.  Carson considered other methods of proposed insect control had 
greater promise with less collateral damage to the biological landscape in man’s attempts 
to mold the environment to his preferences.72  While reaction against Carson’s clarion 
calls were swift and often vehement, her ideas penetrated the psyche of the national 
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consciousness and caused a new burst of environmental awareness.73   Despite Carson’s 
death in 1964, governmental agencies and non-governmental groups began to take greater 
notice of environmental concerns.   
The late 1960s and 1970s saw an explosion in environmental thinking that 
considered human responsibilities to the environment from many viewpoints.  The sum 
of these often divergent perspectives on how to consider environmental concerns did not 
result in a single environmental ethic but a catalog of perspectives that granted greater 
equality to all members of the earth’s biological community.  Over time, this eruption of 
new viewpoints and diverse modes of analysis would result in concepts that would 
motivate large segments of the population.  This newfound enthusiasm for protecting the 
environment would affect the operation of many advanced technological systems, 
including the electric power grid.    
Some of this discussion built off of the previous work of Leopold and Carson and 
was pragmatic in its appreciation of the environmental issues.  Scientists such as Barry 
Commoner proposed a set of environmental postulates in 1971 to help harmonize the 
challenge of human activity in the world with the demands of the environment.74  
Commoner also opposed the prevalent Western view that nature was simply a resource to 
be efficiently expended or used up.  The view that the earth was some infinite sink where 
the waste heat and combustion products from energy production could be blithely 
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disposed of was rejected.  The earth had a finite capacity to absorb polluting residue, and 
if this capacity was exceeded, irreparable harm might result.75  At the same time Paul 
Ehrlich in The Population Bomb, published in 1968, and then the Club of Rome’s Limits 
to Growth in 1972, emphasized the finite nature of the planet and suggested that new 
designs had to be considered to deal with the expansion of the world population to levels 
previously unimaginable.   
 These environmental perspectives were secular in origin with the religion 
relegated to a marginal component of the discussion.  This was not an inadvertent 
omission.  For some environmentalists, the very foundations of Western Civilization 
buttressed the root causes that led to these abuses of the environment.  The distinctive 
nature of western Christianity was particularly responsible for the condescending view of 
the environment.  “Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen,” argued Lynn White in 1967 in his seminal 
paper “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.”76  This human-centric religion 
diminished the status of the environment when it called for man to go forth and subdue 
the earth, placing the land as merely another resource to placate human desires.  
Additionally, the western proclivity for action made it not only permissible but almost 
ordained behavior for humans to go and achieve some worthy goal, with little regard to 
the consequences.  White argued that this Western attitude was instrumental in the 
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scientific and technological discoveries that led to the Industrial Revolution.  As long as 
this common Christian mindset prevailed, the tendency for man to exploit and damage 
the environment would predominate.  From White’s perspective, “we shall continue to 
have a worsening ecologic crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no 
reason for existence save to serve man.”77  White proposed that the vision of Saint 
Francis of Assisi, where man has equality with nature and not mastery of it, should be the 
ideal.78   
White’s missive created a storm of response across academia and religious 
institutions.  Some Christian denominations viewed the ecological concerns arising from 
the production and consumption of energy more stridently.  Within these organizations a 
desire for the creation of a Christian Environmental Ethic was espoused.  Such a tenet 
would acknowledge the value of God’s creation of the earth and include the environment 
as a characteristic for the common good of mankind.  This ethic viewed the health of the 
environment as an international goal that required the good works of the entire world, but 
especially those nations creating the most pollution, to solve the problems.79   
Other ethicists looked at the environment as having its own inherent value.  This 
stream of thought flows from the initial source of “deep ecology” postulated by 
Norwegian Arne Naess in the early 1970s.  Naess rejected balancing human affluence in 
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the developed world against the degradation of the environment across the globe, 
proposing a new ‘ecophilosophical’ perspective to supplant such rationalized tradeoffs.  
A value system embracing biological diversity, anti-class posture, the fight against 
pollution and resource depletion and a belief in the complexity of ecological systems 
beyond normal human comprehension formed the basis of Naess’ new ‘ecosophy.’  
Attaining Naess’ principles would lead to a human polity of smaller organizations with a 
flatter decision making process more in tune with his proposed value system.  The 
political opportunities suggested by this normative value system would replace the 
previous ones based purely on scientific reductionism.80     
These ethical concerns regarding the environment are not all inclusive, but 
represent major secular outlooks.  They are usually not diametrically opposed to the 
operation of the electric power grid, but electric energy production and consumption 
requires evaluation before making decisions that may affect the environment.  In 
engineering matters, one cannot violate the physical laws describing the application of 
electricity and electromagnetism.  Natural restrictions may be tempting to flaunt, but 
designers know that nature will always side with the hidden flaw.  Environmental 
precepts are not as obvious, but they may be as unkind if flouted.   
Such prudence often became the basis for political action protesting the normal 
operating procedures of the electric power grid.  The undercurrents of social unrest from 
the stresses of participation in the Vietnam War, concerns regarding finite resources 
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compared to an exponentially increasing population, and greater research on the effects 
of industrial pollution led to the transformation of public interest in environmental issues.  
The environmental organizations rising from these tensions and apprehensions resulted in 
a number of legislative actions which tended to cement the initial gains of the movement 
as well as provide legitimacy for their philosophical underpinnings.81  In the United 
States, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 provided the 
executive branch the authority to deal with conservation and then later ecological 
concerns.82   
The environmental movement in America became more apparent and effective 
following the watershed events of the 1960s and 1970s as Mideast oil crises, unpopular 
Asian wars and the establishment of environmental regulatory bodies resulted in an 
environmental consciousness that echoed the spirit of the times.83  This sea change was 
not initially noted by the operators of the electric power grid.  Environmentalists viewed 
the tensions from electric power generation in a different light than engineers and 
businessmen.  Those concerns were not some fantasy mixture of “desire for Elysian 
Fields, a conservation ethic and a vision of American energy independence that requires a 
                                                 
81.  Jon Agar, “What Happened in the Sixties?” British Society for the History of 
Science 41, no. 4: 577-584.  
82.  Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire, Rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2003), 121-124.   
83.  David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 217-237. 
34 
 
technological revolution in the way we make and use energy.” 84  Instead, they were 
consistent, deeply felt ethical narratives that permitted the critical examination of the 
production and consumption of energy, but used different paradigms than the ones 
preferred by engineers and economists.    
Multiple strands of environmental thought and philosophical concerns motivated 
the population of the United States.  Regardless of whether these new values were some 
sort of replacement for the atrophying faith traditions of the West or the expansion of a 
non-secular, non-exclusive humanism, people were inspired by these environmental 
postulates and corollaries.85  This enthusiasm led them to create local organizations that 
often acquired influence in the local political processes, at times leading to friction 
between the contending desires for safe and reliable electric power and the values of 
environmentalism.  The manner in which this interaction occurred and the results of the 
collision is the central research question to be explored in the dissertation.   
Review of the Literature 
The literature covering the electric power grid in the Unites States, the nation’s 
environmental movement and foundational ethical concerns and the concepts of 
technological determinism and technological momentum is extensive and varied.  
However, most books or articles typically covers one or perhaps two of these topics; rare 
is the account that tries to place all three strands of thought in the same conversation.  
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Thus technological determinism or momentum may be combined with the development 
of the electric power grid, but the effect of environmental ethics on the subsequent 
operation of the system is given short shrift.  Additionally, many histories of the 
development of the electric power grid focus on the “heroic” period of its creation and 
growth, and less on its maturation and inertia in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Thus, the past and current literature only tangentially covers the proposed research 
question, leaving an appreciable area for new analysis to explore.  The sparse coverage is 
particularly noticeable when these elements are applied to the southeastern New England 
area.  Incidents in Massachusetts might attract national attention, but the area of 
Narragansett Bay lacks significant analysis.   
The discourse on technological determinism and momentum has its own library.  
Ellul’s The Technological Society (1954), while not the first volume written in this 
collection, is perhaps the most important.  Here Ellul begins his account of how technique 
has engulfed all human endeavors in a drive for maximum efficiency.  While Ellul does 
not explicitly define his hypothesis as technological determinism, his writings focused the 
discussion on this idea for subsequent analysis.  Ellul wrote extensively over the years 
expanding his initial concepts and ideas but The Technological Society is the starting 
point for this concept.  Little time or energy on the electric power grid itself, but his 
works provided a general theory of how technology had affected human development and 
humanity itself.  Later works by Ellul devoted more time to how ecological concerns 
were influencing human interactions with technique.   
Langdon Winner’s books Autonomous Technology (1977) and The Reactor and 
the Whale (1986) picks up on Ellul’s postulate that technique gives rise to a technological 
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politics focused on efficiency.  Yet Winner takes offense to the notion that “the 
movement of advanced technology is universally centralizing and that this centralizing 
tendency eventually culminates in control by an extremely powerful technologically 
oriented state.”86  Instead, a diffusion of power from the advanced technological systems, 
such as transportation or the electric power grid, to the organs of the state seems the 
norm.  Autonomous Technology examines Ellul’s theories but provides less insight on the 
effects of the new ethical standard of environmentalism on the technocracy.  In The 
Whale and the Reactor, Winner considers this in greater depth, as well as some aspects of 
the electric power grid.  Winner is more interested in the intersection of politics and 
technology, particularly the manner in which technological systems may create political 
side effects.  Technology may be used to solve a political problem, but may also result in 
unplanned and unexpected political effects.87   The Rhode Island example of political 
institutions using the new technology of the electric power grid to advance their control 
of the political levers of the state almost appears to suggest the converse of Winner’s 
ideas.   
Lewis Mumford’s works bracket Ellul’s in time and scope.  His multiple volumes 
on human civilization and the encroachment of technological systems into the human 
sphere spanned his life and provided different perspectives how this trend affected 
                                                 
86.  Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology, Technics-out-of-Control as a 
Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977): 252.  
87.  Carl Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology: The Path between Engineering 
and Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 197-188.   
 
37 
 
modern society. His early work in Technics and Civilization (1934) suggested greater 
human agency than his later thoughts in The Myth of the Machine (Volume One, 1966, 
and Volume Two, 1970) where technological excess diverging from human nature held a 
superior position.  Mumford did spend greater time in discussing the effects of the 
electric power grid on human civilization, allowing how it might prevent excessive 
centralization of political and economic power.  His concepts of regionalization would be 
later cited as supportive of environmental concepts, though Mumford’s work was more of 
the conservationist mentality.   
Noted scholar and Society for the History of Technology co-founder Thomas P. 
Hughes’ extensive work provides both the starting point for a discussion of technological 
momentum, as well as ground breaking work on the creation and development of the 
electric power grid in Europe and North America.  His 1969 article “Technological 
Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany, 1898-1933” was his first step in 
exploring the concept of technological momentum, which was expanded upon in later 
works such as Networks of Power  in 1983 and then in American Genesis: A Century of 
Invention and Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970 in 1989.  By observing a number of 
advanced technological systems in different nations (the chemical hydrogenation industry 
in Germany from the early twentieth century to the interwar period and the electrical 
utility industry in Germany, Great Britain and the United States from the 1880s to the 
1930s), Hughes concluded that these systems, far from having a life of their own, grew, 
matured and even occasionally transformed themselves as they penetrated the societies 
where they were developed.  Hughes’ use of a systems approach to examine these 
advanced technology systems was also important as he viewed them as not merely 
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technical artifacts interacting with the population, but also forming other organizations 
that assisted or hindered their growth.  Networks of Power is perhaps the most important 
of Hughes’ works as it looks extensively at the growth and development of the electric 
power grid.  Ending his study in the mid 1930s, Hughes did not examine the changes that 
occurred to this system in the later part of the century.  
Other authors have examined the electric power grid during this later stage.  
Richard Hirsh in his works Technology and Transformation in the American Electric 
Utility Industry (1989) and Power Loss, The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring 
in the American Electric Utility System (1999), as well as other journal articles, surveyed 
the electric utility industry in the past few decades.  The latter study is more inclusive of 
Hughes’ concept of technological momentum.  Both books focus more on the technical 
and economic aspects affecting the electric power grid and less on how the environmental 
movement provided negative feedback to the system.  Hirsh’s studies cover the entire 
country and end prior to the current stress of anthropomorphic global warming 
reenergized the environmental consciousness of the nation.   
John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank’s book, From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (1996) provides a general overview of 
the electric power grid’s development in the southeastern New England area.  While 
conceived as an in-house history of the New England Electric System Company, the 
authors cover the story of the numerous businesses and technologies that provided 
electric power to the New England area.  This is particularly valuable as while most other 
studies focus on particular time periods, this volume’s longer time line permits greater 
reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of some of the company’s decisions.  The 
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study is focused more on the technological and business side of the electric power grid 
and less on the resistance provided in the past few decades by expanding environmental 
concerns.       
Other works look at particular aspects of the electric power grid’s operations, 
social impacts, interactions with government and industry, or marketing.  Robert F.  
Falb’s 1964 Honor’s thesis from Brown University on “Marsden Perry, the Man Who 
Owned Rhode Island” is both instructive and amusing.  He details how Perry, a cunning 
businessman, established an electric power monopoly in the state of Rhode Island, 
cornering the state government along the way.  David B. Sicilia, in his PhD dissertation 
(1991) and articles, examined how marketing of the nascent electric power industry 
assisted its expansion and interacted with other facets of the culture in the Boston area.    
David Roe’s Dynamos and Virgins (1984) discussed how the state of California regulated 
the electric utilities in the 1970s based on environmental concerns.  This book is of note 
as the author is well versed in the technical aspects of power generation and transmission 
as well as the environmental concerns of his focus group.  Wendy Williams' and Robert 
Whitcomb’s Cape Wind: Money, Celebrity, Class, Politics, and the Battle for Our Energy 
Future on Nantucket Sound (2007) provides the most recent example of how divergent 
forces affect the electric power grid’s operation.     
The Electric City (1991) by Harold L. Platt describes the growth of the electric 
power grid in the Chicago area from 1880 to 1930.  This period paralleled the early 
evolution of the New England Electric System in southeastern New England, a company 
that used many of Samuel Insull’s methods to achieve dominance.  The New England 
Electric System management team also took numerous actions to fend off Insull’s drive 
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for continental control of the utility industry.  Insull’s system was widely copied across 
the country for better and worse.  That the New England Electric System managed to 
survive the Great Depression and the new federal regulation of the 1930s while Insull’s 
business empire did not provides an interesting contrast to examine.   
Vaslov Smil’s numerous books and articles on the development of the electric 
power grid and other advanced technology systems gives historical context to the 
immensity of these projects and the time required to change them.  Both Creating the 
Twentieth Century (2005) and Transforming the Twentieth Century (2005) provide global 
perspectives on how the seminal technological inventions of the late 1880s changed the 
world and led to the current modern technological society.  Smil’s work also considers 
any number of possible calamities and suggests that the current system arrived at after 
generations of toil, will take an equal lengthy time to alter.     
While the literature associated with the evolution of environmental ethics and the 
environmental movement in America is extensive, most of the literature is focused at the 
national or global levels either philosophically or technologically.  With the adage to 
“Think globally but act locally,” many authors attempt to promote or discuss a unifying 
theory of environmental values, allowing the regional chapters to deduce the necessary 
actions to achieve fulfillment.  The readings emphasize political action taken at the 
national level, or global concerns to be addressed, but typically fail to address how 
specific actions affect the operation of the electric power grid.    
Roderick Nash’s ground breaking work Wilderness and the American Mind 
(1973) followed by The Rights of Nature, A History of Environmental Ethics (1989) are 
important in discerning the development of the American concepts of environmental 
41 
 
thought.  The first book is particularly insightful on the struggle between John Muir’s and 
Gifford Pinchot’s ideas as one can see the strands of their discourse extending into the 
modern day.  Pinchot was the more politically connected of the two and chalked up a 
number of early victories though Muir is arguably the touchstone of modern 
environmental thought.  The Rights of Nature, A History of Environmental Ethics extends 
Nash’s analysis into the late 1980s and analyzes some of the contemporary ideas on the 
concept of environmental ethics.   
The numerous works by John Muir set the initial baseline for ethical concerns for 
the environment in the United States.  In his strident defense of the wilderness, Muir 
sounds much like an Old Testament prophet haranguing the population to atone for their 
sins.  A Sand County Almanac by Aldo Leopold (published in 1949 not long after his 
death) is the next step in the process of assigning value to the environment above and 
beyond that of a standing reserve of natural resources.   
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) is the entry point to the modern 
environmental movement’s beliefs.  This work is perhaps the dividing point between the 
previous conservationist mindset and a new value system that transcended the more 
anthropocentric concept of the environment.  Carson’s book emphasized the long term 
effects of man made chemicals on biological life cycles and sparked the subsequent 
interest in averting such problems.  Silent Spring was less a philosophical treatise than a 
well constructed argument against the use of pesticides.  In many ways this work is a 
quintessential American document, written not by some “expert” or “intellectual,” but a 
well informed citizen suggesting practical responses to observed problems.  Subsequent 
authors in the late 1960s and 1970s made the case that the old conservationist paradigm 
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was no longer operative, such as Lynn White in “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis" (1967) or Paul Ehrlich in The Population Bomb (1968) and the Club of Rome’s 
Limits to Growth (1972) which emphasized the finite nature of the planet.  With the 
expansion of the world population to levels previously unimaginable, new designs had to 
be considered.   
Barry Commoner was in many ways a successor to Rachael Carson.  Like Carson, 
Commoner explored the effects of various complex chemicals on the environment, 
though unlike Carson he did not propose a new ethic per se to seal with the ecological 
crisis.  As an advocate of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Commoner examined the effects 
of nuclear fallout on not only the human population, but the rest of the biologic realm 
after he discovered that the organs of the federal government were underplaying the risks.  
During the 1960s and 1970s Commoner published a wide array of books and articles on 
the ecological crisis though Closing the Circle (1971) is perhaps his best known work.  
Later in the decade he authored The Poverty of Power (1976) and The Politics of Energy 
(1979) which more closely examined the role of the electric power grid on the 
environmental crisis.  Commoner was a scientist but his effective writing and energetic 
action in the political realm established him as a leading prophet of the environmental 
movement.   
In contrast, Arne Naess’ The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology 
Movement, A Summary (1973) offers no less than a complete new value system to replace 
the past.  Naess wanted to by pass the previous values of conservation and pollution 
mitigation and proceed directly to an entirely new value system.  This new philosophical 
philosophy of Deep Ecology would provide a new final vocabulary as a basis to make 
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responsible political decisions regarding the protection of the biosphere as well as the 
promoting biological diversity, preventing the exploitation of humans by one another 
while emphasizing local autonomy.88     
Samuel P. Hays offered a number of commentaries on American Environmental 
Politics in both Beauty, Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States, 1955-1985 (1987) and Environmental Politics since 1945 (2000).  Both books 
examine the larger national perspective of the issues and value systems proposed by 
environmental ethics, and less on the specific regions that deep ecologists are enamored 
with, or the specific energy concerns associated with the electric power grid.    
Amory B. Lovins’ 1976 article, “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken,” is of 
interest as it straddles the intersection of power, politics and environmental ethics.  His 
proposal to shift electric power generation to wind based sources appeared radical at the 
time of its publishing in the height of the 1970’s energy crisis.  While aimed at a national 
audience, one can trace the progression of many of Lovins' ideas into the 21st century in 
the Cape Wind project that is currently under review.  Lovins wrote many other books 
during the subsequent decades focused on practical suggestions on how the electric 
power grid could be successfully operated while minimizing its effect on the 
environment.  
Ralph Nader and John Abbot’s The Menace of Atomic Energy (1979) is of note 
for a number of reasons.  It describes in great detail many of the strengths and 
                                                 
88.  Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement.  A 
Summary,” Inquiry 16, no. 1: 95-100. 
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weaknesses of the standard nuclear power plant, particularly the entire life cycle 
environmental costs of its construction, operation and maintenance.  It is also helpful for 
a list of possible activities that citizens might do to prevent the construction of any of 
these facilities in their areas.  Ironically, many of the nuclear power plant projects the 
authors inveighed against were constructed and brought on line.  Meanwhile, they 
completely neglected the protests in Rhode Island that were successful using many of 
their proposed techniques and tactics. 
Written works on the historical analysis of southeastern New England, with an 
emphasis on the state of Rhode Island, are often thin volumes.  Snippets of specific 
incidents, biographies of important political figures, or dusty governmental records are 
available, but need to be critically considered when evaluating the complete picture of 
politics in the Ocean State.  Both William G. McLoughlin’s Rhode Island: A History 
(1970), and Patrick T. Conley’s Rhode Island in Rhetoric and Reflection (2002) provide 
important vignettes on the course of Rhode Island history, particularly some of the larger 
than life characters of the late 19th and early 20th century.  Both note the intersection of 
government and utility leadership during this era but do not describe how this juncture 
was split apart by the political forces of the New Deal and later environmental movement 
in the state.  Particularly lacking is any analysis of the growth of the many environmental 
groups in the state.  While the environmental groups’ web sites do suggest their own 
historical background and environmental mission, the actual historical record is sparse.  
Duane Lockard’s New England State Politics (1959) examines some of the more seemly 
portions of Rhode Island government, but does not cover the stresses of the later decades.  
Biographies and autobiographies of some of the major political leaders of the period 
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should also be read with some level of skepticism.  Erwin L. Levine’s Theodore Francis 
Green, The Rhode Island Years (1963) and Theodore Francis Green, The Washington 
Years (1971), Ruth Morgenthau’s Pride Without Prejudice, The Life of John O. Pastore 
(1989) and David McKean’s Tommy the Cork (2004) all provide insights on seminal 
political leaders on the Ocean State.  Arlene Violet’s Convictions (1988), Claiborne Pell’s 
An Uncommon Man (2011) and even Vincent  “Buddy” Cianci, Jr.’s Politics and Pasta 
(2011) serve more as background to the manner of which state politics was conducted 
and the intellectual background of some of the key leaders than a historical record.   
The records of the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Rhode Island serve 
as a means to second check some of the claims of the secondary sources.  These must 
also be examined critically as the regulatory body’s actions were frequently linked to the 
political motivations of the state government.  Additionally the Commission was often 
more interested in the other public utilities than the electric ones, diluting the strength of 
this source.  The state’s annual reports from the Department of Agriculture and 
Conservation and its successors also provides respected insight on how the state viewed 
environmental problems.  The Federal Trade Commission’s reports of the electric utility 
companies are also valuable as they provide a great wealth of material to confirm or deny 
statements from secondary sources, as well as indicate the thought processes of the actual 
leadership of the holding companies in the 1930s.  While the amount of data that these 
state and federal regulatory bodies provided increased with the decades, the intent of the 
regulatory bodies’ leadership and their insight on the problems they were dealing with 
became more opaque
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CHAPTER 2  
BUILDING MOMENTUM: THE ROAD TO CHARLESTOWN 
 
We cannot measure the limits of future developments.  We have seen much, but 
we have produced only a sample of what is to be.  The central station men of this 
country do not realize the possibilities that lay before them. 
 
- Marsden Perry  
 
An independent observer contemplating the status of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England in the spring of 1970 would have noted the pervasive reach of 
this technological system.  The product of this advanced technology system was available 
to the vast majority of the population in the region.  It powered the sinews of the 
economy as well as providing energy to improve the quality of life of the people through 
any number of electric appliances, heat to their residences, and lights to keep the darkness 
at bay.  The system was professionally run by the public utility companies.  The structure 
was well maintained and updated with new, more efficient means of power generation, 
transmission and distribution, and the sustained growth of the system seemed inevitable.  
Society and government were stable with biannual elections the helped reflect the 
population’s desires and regulatory organs to monitor the public utilities’ actions.  The 
population seemed relatively content with the safety and reliability of the system as well 
as the cost required to tap into this energy source.  The companies and organizations 
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running the electric power grid gave the impression of relative stability with a future path 
clearly envisioned by their leaders and managers.1   
This overlapping consensus was not to last locally or nationally.  The turbulent 
1970s was a period when the electric power grid under the control of the public utility 
companies came under great stress.  Some of this strain was due to technological 
problems, some was due to poor management of the system and some was due to 
economic pressures outside the control of any of the people ostensibly controlling the 
electric power grid.  An additional component of those forces was the rise of an 
environmental ethic in the population and the manner in which the political process in the 
nation would respond to this emerging concern.  The net effect of all of these forces 
affected the electric power grid in different ways in different areas of the country based 
on the characteristics of the population, the ability of companies operating the grid to 
anticipate and to adapt to change, and the history of the grid’s operation in the region.  
Each region was affected differently; all of them were altered in the process.2   
While the history of the men and organizations that conceived of, built and 
operated the electric power gird is demonstrably not the same as the technical 
components that made up the grid itself, there is a strong correlation between the system 
and its human operators.  Concurrently, there were numerous organizations that 
contributed to some segment of the electric power grid, but the most important actor in 
                                                 
1.  Richard F.  Hirsh, Power Loss, The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring 
in the American Electric Utility System (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999): 49. 
2.  Richard F. Hirsh and Adam H. Serchuk. “Momentum Shifts in the American 
Utility System: Catastrophic Change - Or No Change at All?” Technology and Culture 
37, no. 2 (April 1996): 286-287.  
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this process was the organization that eventually evolved into the New England Electric 
System (NEES).  The growth of this company and the parallel development of the 
electric power grid in southeastern New England provide ample data for the discourse 
between the competing theories of technological determinism and technological 
momentum.    
Marsden Perry in Rhode Island 
Following Thomas Edison’s construction of the Pearl Street electric power station 
in New York City in 1882, this system of electric power generation, transmission and 
distribution rapidly spread to southeastern New England.3  Edison’s seminal invention 
generated electric power using six coal-fired dynamos and transmitted DC electricity 
using copper wires to the nearby buildings in Manhattan to power their electric light 
bulbs.4  In April 1882, the first electric power system was sold to a business group in Fall 
River, Massachusetts where it powered the lights of several small businesses and 
facilities.5  A month later an electric power demonstration in Providence, RI, piqued the 
interest of experienced entrepreneur Marsden Perry.  Perry, with familiarity in the 
manufacturing and banking industries, was sufficiently impressed by the exhibition to 
buy a controlling interest in the Fall River Electric Company.  There he learned about the 
different issues affecting this new means of industry, the financing of the large capital 
                                                 
3.  Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 35-36. 
4.  Ibid., 53-60.  
5.  Samuel Insull, then an employee of Thomas Edison was behind the sale.  See 
Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” (Honors thesis, 
Brown University, 1964), 8.   
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expenditures required for business growth, the technical requirements of plant operation 
and the necessary local political connections to speed the process.6   
Other businesses were erected in Providence to compete in the wide open new 
market for electric power generation for mainly lighting applications.  The Rhode Island 
Electric Company was established in 1882 under the direction of local business 
leadership while the Narragansett Electric Light Company was formed in 1883 from a 
merger of business interests from Maine and Massachusetts with a subsidiary of 
American Electric, a Boston, Massachusetts firm.  The Narragansett Electric Lighting 
Company of Rhode Island, created under the leadership of Edward Goff, strung up new 
incandescent electric lights in the hallways and entrance of his Providence office building 
to attract public attention for this new technology.  By April of 1884 Goff was able to 
edge out the Rhode Island Electric Company for the lucrative street lighting contract for 
the city of Providence and use the capital he had amassed to build a multi-generator 
power station.  Following this Goff was willing to profit from his activity and sold the 
company to Perry and his backers.7  
                                                 
6.  Not all of the lessons were positive ones.  At one time the Fall River Electric 
Company was seized by the local authorities for the non-payment of debts.  See Robert F.  
Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” (Honors thesis, Brown 
University, 1964), 8-9.  
7.  Goff was a sales agent of the Thomson-Houston Company of Lynn, MA.  This 
company built lighting facilities in New England using arc-lights technology.  Goff was 
responsible for the company’s expansion in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  See John 
T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the 
New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 14-16.    
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Perry’s stewardship of Narragansett Electric Light Company in the 1880s was 
illustrative of the types of problems that all electric power companies were experiencing.8  
Operators of the new technology were often ignorant of the methods to best run their 
plants or string the wires to the houses.  Learning how to do it safely and efficiently 
required trial and sometimes costly errors even as the electrical companies were selling 
the product to compete with the older, more accepted technology of coal gas for home 
lighting.9  The utilities’ generators created Direct Current (DC) electric power which 
limited the distance it could be transmitted to customers.  Since much of the power 
requirement for Perry’s generators only existed at night when the street lights were 
lighted, the electric power company’s production was not matched by any need during 
the rest of the day.  This resulted in the company having to overspend for generator 
capacity that was often unused.10  Capital requirements for the new generating capacity 
were significant, which required a close relationship between financiers and utility 
managers.  As the company expanded and gained traction by providing a desired product 
                                                 
8.  Boston Edison, a Massachusetts electric firm had similar problems involving 
the right of way for stringing power lines, matching load for large and small customers, 
determining how to charge the same, and the issues of turning off the power for 
delinquent accounts.  See David B. Sicilia, “Selling Power: Marketing and Monopoly at 
Boston Edison, 1886-1929” (PhD dissertation, Brandeis University, 1991): 103-185.   
9.  David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 5-6. 
10.  Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 10.   
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to the city’s population, political assistance to gain the necessary exclusive franchises to 
permit long term capital spending became more important.11      
Perry was assisted in the expansion of the Narragansett Electric Light Company in 
a number of ways.  He acquired control of the company and rode the technological wave 
sweeping through the western world at the time, of which the technology of electric 
power generation, transmission and distribution was only one of many.  Perry had 
excellent financial and political connections in the Rhode Island area.  As one of the 
directors of the then minor Bank of America in Providence, Perry had access to the 
necessary capital for his new business.  With this job Perry also gained important 
political connections in the Rhode Island government.  Men like Rhode Island Senator 
Nelson “Boss” Aldrich, the head of the United States Senate’s Finance Committee and 
the acknowledged “General Manager of the United States,” Charles R. “Boss” Brayton, a 
former Union General from the Civil War and now head of the dominant Republican 
Party and patronage in the state, and Zechariah Chafee the ethically challenged president 
of Bank of America, were all helpful to Perry in navigating the political shoals of the 
state.12  With such connections Perry was better poised to gain the additional financial 
backing and the political permits required to grow his business.   
                                                 
11.  McLoughlin’s work depends heavily on Falb’s research for the business and 
technical items but incorporates some of the larger issues in Rhode Island political 
currents of the time.  See William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1970): 178.   
12.  Aldrich replaced former Union General Ambrose Burnside as the state’s 
junior senator after Burnside’s death in 1881.  Brayton, a former Union Officer in the 
Civil War, had attained the rank of Brigadier General based on superior performance as 
the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Rhode Island Heavy Artillery and Chief of Artillery in 
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Competition in the early days of the Narragansett Electric Company against its 
Providence rival, the Rhode Island Electric Company, was severe.  Perry’s success 
against his competition was the result of several factors.  He was an effective salesman, 
convincing more of the local businesses to install the new electric lights over the familiar 
gas lighting.  As inventors began to tap the potential of the new energy source, other 
consumer electrical loads became feasible.  Electric fans and traction motors to run the 
local trolley system were among the first new customers for Narragansett’s output.  This 
resulted in Narragansett Electric’s sales doubling in the first few years of its existence.  
Perry installed greater numbers of electrical generators to cover this load growth, though 
the rapidly improving efficiency of the electrical technology allowed him to invest more 
money back into the company and still run a profit.13  Perry expanded the generating 
capacity at his first plant on Aborn Street in Providence repeatedly in the late 1880’s only 
to build a new station at the junction of Elm and South Street in 1890.  The latter coal- 
fired plant had the capacity of 10 megawatts (MW) of power generation, more than 20 
times the previous total capacity of the entire company.14  As Narragansett Electric’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Department of the South.  Brayton’s units were involved in the Union siege of 
Charleston, SC in 1863.  See William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970): 148-168, and Frederic Denison, Shot and Shell: 
The Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery Regiment in the Rebellion, 1861-1865 
(Providence, RI: J A. & R. A. Reed, 1879).     
13.  Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 13-15. 
14.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 17.    
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generating capacity expanded, Perry could use the economies of scale to offer discounts 
to the rates charged to his customers.15   
Electricity use rapidly expanded into the Providence industrial areas, particularly 
the jewelry and textile manufacturing firms.  These firms often had their own water mills 
or steam engines and turbines to generate electricity.  This electricity was used to power 
the looms to make material or the machine tools that punched out and shaped the metal 
for buttons and or silverware.16  The generators also powered the foundries for melting 
the base metal for these products.17  Initially the cost of installing a new power source for 
lighting or machine motive force prevented the shift to electric lighting and power, but as 
more companies realized the benefits of the new technology, numerous independent 
electric generators were installed in the factories and mills.  Incandescent electric lighting 
proved superior to both the electric arc lights and gas lighting in illumination and aroma 
and decreased the chance of fires as well.  Electric motors were a more efficient way to 
power the individual machine tools and looms as the companies no longer had to install 
large water mills or steam turbines to drive the shafts and belts of the machines.18  Each 
                                                 
15.  Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 15-16.   
16.  For example, the Rockland textile mill in Scituate, RI had a power capacity of 
approximately 100 kW.  See Heritage Room Committee, Scituate, Rhode Island (London: 
Arcadia Publishing, 1998): 31-32.  
17.  Gary Kulik and Julia Bonham, Rhode Island, An Inventory of Historic 
Engineering and Industrial Sites (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 
186. 
18.  Lisa Fink, Providence Industrial Sites (Providence, RI: Herald Press, 1981): 
19.  
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of these plants had self-contained electrical systems and was powered by either water 
turbines or coal-fired steam plants. The dynamos generating the electricity were often run 
by Corliss Steam engines, themselves manufactured in Providence.19      
The population viewed the new technology in a positive light.  The zeitgeist was 
one of encouragement of the technological advances seemingly coming at breakneck 
speed.  The electrical lighting of the streets followed by homes and then the 
electrification of various aspects of industry and transportation were seen first as exciting 
novelties but evolved into common day happenings.20  The previous technologies of gas 
lighting, water power for industrial purposes or horse power for transportation had 
disadvantages that were disparaged by the new electric power’s proponents to gain 
popular approval.  The new electric power enabled a higher quality of living in a time 
where industrial activity was drawing a greater portion of the population into urban areas 
at a higher population density.  Burning gas left an unpleasant smell and risked fire.  
Linking industry to geographic water fall locations constrained the locations of possible 
commercial activity as well as limited the water flow.  Eliminating extensive equine 
wastes in the crowded cities could only have been seen as an aid to public health and 
sanity.21   
                                                 
19.  Gary Kulik and Julia Bonham, Rhode Island, An Inventory of Historic 
Engineering and Industrial Sites (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 
183-185. 
20.  David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 5, 57.  
21.  Ibid., 86. 
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Narragansett Electric’s expansion caused much of its competition to whither.  In 
1889 Perry was able to buy out the Rhode Island Electric Company and achieve a 
monopoly over electric generation, transmission and distribution in the city of Providence 
and rapidly throughout most of the state of Rhode Island.  Perry followed this up by 
purchasing other utility companies with electric franchise rights across the area, making 
the Narragansett Electric Company the dominant player in the electric power business.22   
With strong support of the new technology from industry and individual consumers, and 
with Perry’s high level political and financial contacts, local Rhode Island governments 
were reticent to disrupt Perry’s expanding monopolies.  The local electric companies 
created natural monopolies as they built their generating plants, strung the transmission 
lines and even wired homes and businesses for lighting.  The presence of one company 
tended to diminish the efforts of others to compete in the same area as the initial capital 
investments for generating plants and transmission lines were so large as to discourage 
encroachment.  Municipalities would often sell the exclusive rights for electricity sales to 
particular businesses and organizations.23  The length of these exclusive rights allowed 
the new electricity companies to amortize the cost of expensive equipment and 
regressively plan in order to make a profit.  Shorter leases induced additional uncertainty 
                                                 
22.  Perry’s utility monopolies in electricity and water as well as the Providence 
streetcar lines served over 70% of the population of the state by the turn of the century.  
See William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1970): 178. 
23.  Perry’s acquisition of the East Greenwich Electric Light Company and the 
Bristol County Gas and Electric Company in 1895, and then the East Providence Water 
Company in 1896 earned him the franchise to sell electricity in those areas of the state.  
See Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” (Honors 
thesis, Brown University, 1964), 14.    
56 
 
in the management of the companies, increasing the perceived risk and thus reducing 
desires to expand.  Buying up the local companies and more importantly their exclusive 
franchises allowed Perry’s firm to achieve domination over larger areas of the state.24   
Given the technical problems with the initial electric power grids, the possibility 
of any one business gaining too large a share of the overall market in a given area was 
still low, minimizing the potential danger of an all powerful monopoly for electric power.  
The initial transmission range of the DC electricity was limited to a few miles from the 
generating plant as transmission losses became exorbitant.  The different power plants 
had a wide range of output voltages that were usually incompatible with one another.  
The generators themselves were small and inefficient.  The Edison electrical system 
worked well for shorter ranged loads but could not offer coverage over a wider area.25   
These limitations were transcended by a number of technological innovations in 
the late 1890s.  George Westinghouse demonstrated the superiority of Alternating 
Current (AC) as a more efficient means to transmit electric power over longer distances.  
Westinghouse’s research also led to the development of vastly improved electric 
transformers which permitted the output voltage of AC generators to be greatly increased 
at the power plants.  The higher output voltage dramatically reduced the transmission 
losses in the lines between the generators and the customers, where another transformer 
                                                 
24.  In other states, the government was the leading force in the electrification of 
the area, with the local electrical generation and transmission directed by elected officials 
and town bureaucracy, often more efficiently than private entrepreneurs.  See Richard 
Rudolph and Scott Ridley, Power Struggle, The Hundred-Year War over Electricity 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986): 31-32. 
25.  Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 61-62.  
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would reduce the voltage to the lower levels used by the consumer.  Concurrently, using 
new steam turbine technology to power the electric generators demonstrated a significant 
increase in efficiency, allowing more electric energy to be produced from a smaller 
amount of coal fuel.26  The increased standardization of the industry also led to agreed 
upon technical requirements for the components being built.  The common frequency of 
60 Hz that is the standard today in the United States is the result of Westinghouse’s 
work.27   
These features created the conditions for the electric power companies to expand 
their range of service, but they were not inexpensive.  Investors were not keen to loan the 
fledgling electric companies the capital required for expansion and increased efficiency 
unless the companies could procure long term exclusive franchises.  Perry attempted to 
procure these in Providence but was stymied by the resistance of the Providence City 
Council in 1890.  Enlisting the assistance of the Providence Gas Company and the Union 
Railroad, Perry induced the Rhode Island General Assembly to pass legislature 
permitting state municipalities to grant companies franchises for terms up to twenty five 
years.  Unfortunately for Perry, the Providence City Council failed to take advantage of 
this new ordinance with either the electric company or the railroad.  Rebuffed, the state 
legislature went over the heads of the local government and passed a new law in 1892 
granting twenty year franchises to both the railroad and Perry’s electric company, though 
                                                 
26.  Ibid., 62-74. 
27.  The 120 Volt standard was a function of Edison’s initial plant in New York 
City.  See Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 97, and Thomas P.  Hughes, Networks of Power (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983), 127-128.   
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taxing Perry’s business at three percent of his net income.28  Perry later bought the Union 
Railroad to acquire its franchise as well as other local railroad franchises to establish 
complete control of the Providence horse-propelled trolley cart transportation network.  
As Perry gained control of the trolley companies, he accelerated their purchases of 
electric motor traction cars that required electric power to run, ensuring an increased 
demand for his electric power plants.  Producing greater amounts of electric power to 
meet this demand required even larger electric generators which were very expensive.  
Senator Aldrich, a leader of the U.S. Senate’s Finance Committee, had numerous 
acquaintances that were willing to loan Perry the required capital.   Meanwhile “Boss” 
Brayton greased the skids for the trolley companies by promoting favorable legislation 
that prevented local governments from resisting Perry’s acquisitions.  Perry’s holdings 
and wealth increased dramatically, Aldrich profited from his association with Perry and 
the power of Brayton over the legislature was strengthened.29   
                                                 
28.  While a twenty year franchise may seem excessive, a similar franchise 
provided to the Newport and Providence Ry. Company, established in 1902, allowed the 
company to “do electric lighting in Newport” under a “perpetual” charter.  Bond agencies 
would often trumpet the returns of 6-7% for Narragansett Electric a decade later, so a 3% 
tax seems reasonable.  See  Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned 
Rhode Island” (Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 17,  Poor’s Manual of Public 
Utilities: Street Railway, Gas, Electric, Water, Power, Telephone and Telegraph 
Companies (New York: Poor’s Manual Company, 1918): 148, and “Public Utilities 
Summary,” United States Investor, XXVII, no. 9 (February 26, 1916): 367.    
29.  Falb’s account would make an excellent moral tale of wealth, greed and 
power, all the more amazing as it was true.  Aldrich received “stock options, loans and 
other business opportunities” from his political allies.  See Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden 
Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” (Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 
16-32, and Patrick T. Conley, “Nelson W. Aldrich’” in Rhode Island in Rhetoric and 
Reflection (East Providence, RI: Rhode Island Publications Society, 2002): 411-412.    
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Other Rhode Island electric companies followed similar lines of effort in 
establishing their own local monopolies.  In Pawtucket, the Bridge Mill Power Company 
obtained franchises from the City Council and state legislature to run power lines.  The 
company also supplied electric power to the railroad running between Pawtucket and 
Attleboro, Massachusetts.  In May 1893, the Bridge Mill Power Company merged with 
the local gas company to ensure that any competition was internal to the company.  The 
Bridge Mill Power Company’s main generation plant in Pawtucket, built in 1893, used 
both water and steam power to generate electricity for its customers.  The plant generated 
a full 750 kilowatts (kW), a fairly large capacity for the time, and included six of the new 
generators made by the General Electric Corporation.30     
Business interactions with Narragansett Electric expanded beyond those with its 
immediate customers.  Other organizations noted the opportunities the electric power 
company presented and took advantage of them.  Local businesses altered their 
production to provide the materials Narragansett Electric required.  The American 
Electric Company, a Providence-based company that made wire and conductors for the 
equally cutting edge telephone technology, also made insulated cables for Narragansett 
Electric and the other electric power companies.  The company was established in 1870 
when the owner, Eugene F. Phillips, began making wire for the telegraph companies.  By 
1880, Phillips had built a factory in Providence but the demand for wire exceeded 
production, so in 1893 he built a larger one on the Seekonk River.  The expanding 
                                                 
30.  “The Bridge Mill Power Plant of the Pawtucket, R.I., Electric Co.,” The 
Electrical Engineer, December 23, 1896: 637-641.   
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company provided jobs for so many of the local inhabitants of the area that they named 
the new neighborhood Phillipdale after the company’s owner.31   
Overall the Providence region appeared particularly well suited for rapid 
electrification.  The efforts were spearheaded by Perry who continued to leverage his 
business acumen and insight on the possibilities of the new technology with his strong 
ties to the financial communities and political powers of the state.32  Northern Rhode 
Island was fairly compact and within reach of the limited electric power transmission 
range of the day.  The industries of the area were receptive to the new energy source and 
relatively easy to power with the new electric motors.33  Many of the industries already 
had a source of motive power, whether water mill or steam engine, to turn a new electric 
dynamo and electrify their own buildings.  Electrification of the trolley system for the 
short runs to and from Providence was achievable given the technical limits of both 
trolley motors and transmission lines.  Having the largest monopoly for electric power 
transmission in the area, Perry could set technical standards that permitted easier 
installation and repair of the new energy source for industry and household use.  With the 
Elm Street plant in operation, the coal to run the steam engines could be easily brought to 
                                                 
31.  “Obituary, Eugene F. Phillips,” Western Electrician, March 4, 1905, 173.  
32.  Lisa Fink, Providence Industrial Sites (Providence, RI: Herald Press, 1981): 
19.   
33.  Mumford estimated that introducing electric motors to factory production 
increased the efficiency of the site performance by fifty percent.  See Lewis Mumford, 
Technics and Civilization, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1934, 1963), 224-225. 
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the plant from the Providence waterfront.34  Technological, business, financial and 
political systems were all synchronized to propel the area into the twentieth century.35  
Yet Perry’s expanding electrical empire also generated resistance in the 
community.  Rhode Island residents were justifiably apprehensive about the monopolies 
that his companies had been awarded, even if they were doing a good job at providing the 
power, water and transportation required for an increasing urban population.  In an effort 
to rationalize the Providence trolley routes and stations, Perry shut down some of the 
older stops that had few customers even while building a new central station at 
Westminster and Dorrance Streets.  The resulting friction over issuing transfer tickets to 
displaced commuters required the intervention by the Rhode Island General Assembly in 
1902.36  A bitter strike by unionized railroad workers for higher wages broke out later in 
the year requiring the governor to call out the state militia to restore order and service 
                                                 
34.  In some ways the increased electrification of lighting in Providence slowed 
this progress.  The city’s lights made it more difficult for the coal ships to approach 
Providence at night as the background lighting obscured other navigation aids.  To 
mitigate this problem new lighthouses were built, though curiously enough they were not 
powered by electricity.  In fact Conimicut lighthouse in Warwick used a kerosene lit 
illumination until 1960.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, 
The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: 
Meridan Printing, 1996), 250, and Lisa C. Fink, Providence Industrial Sites (Providence, 
RI: Herald Press, 1981): 244.  
35.  It is often difficult to make a distinction between the state government, the 
financial levers of power, and the electrical utility companies as the people occupying the 
leadership positions of many of the organizations were the same ones.    
36.  Robert F.  Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 26.  
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after the police were unable to quell the disorder.37  Perry helped break the strike but won 
no friends amongst the Providence patrician class or the workers and middle class of the 
capital city who had supported the strikers.  
Further actions by Perry to buttress his firms’ monopoly led to internecine 
political strife within the Rhode Island Republican Party.  The Democrats had used the 
popularity of the railroad strike to win the governorship in the fall of 1902 and the new 
governor attacked “Boss” Brayton’s machine and control of the state government.  Even 
worse, the newspapers began to examine how Brayton exercised the levers of power in 
the state, including the so called “Brayton’s Law,” which allowed the state Senate to 
substitute their own nominee for a patronage position if they found the governor’s 
appointment lacking.  With the Senate under Brayton’s control, this was often the case.38  
Under constant attack in the Providence Journal, Brayton’s machine, buttressed by the 
cash advances from Perry and Senator Aldrich, was insufficient to stave off another 
Democratic victory in 1903.39  Somewhat apprehensive that Brayton had lost control of 
his political machine, Perry set up his own political structure by buying up the loyalty of 
the ward committees in Providence and Pawtucket with a generous application of charm 
                                                 
37.  Six companies of infantry, two of cavalry, Naval Reserves and a machine gun 
battery from Newport were ordered to establish martial law in Pawtucket to stop the 
rioting.  They failed.  Luckily saner minds prevailed and the violence slowly subsided.  
See Robert F. Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” (Honors 
thesis, Brown University, 1964), 39-43. 
38.  Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1959): 175.  
39.  Terms for the Rhode Island Governor lasted only one year until 1912 when 
they went to two years.  See Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1959): 175. 
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and money.  Under Perry’s guidance, the Republicans swept to victory in the 1904 and 
1905 elections.40   
Brayton, though ill, recovered sufficiently to mortally wound Perry’s political 
plan.  Brayton’s southern Rhode Island organization allied with the reform minded 
“Lincoln” Republicans in Providence and Democrats to swing the governorship back to 
the Democrats in 1906.  This faction was less interested in protecting the utility 
monopolies that Perry desired, but more in regaining the power they had lost previously 
to the upstart Perry.  The Democratic governor James E. Higgins won reelection in 1907 
even as Perry’s business regime was crumbling.  As part of the financial panic of 1907, 
banking giant J. P. Morgan spread rumors that Perry’s numerous railroad and banking 
businesses were undercapitalized.  Subsequent runs on Perry’s banks forced him to sell 
off most of his holdings, including the Narragansett Electric Company, to Morgan.41  
While hardly penurious, Perry’s influence as a political deal maker in Rhode Island, as 
well as the guiding force for the new electric power technology, was finished.42   
 
                                                 
40.  Robert F. Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 45-47. 
41.  Robert F. Falb, “Marsden Perry, The Man Who Owned Rhode Island” 
(Honors thesis, Brown University, 1964), 55-58 and 66-69 as well as William G. 
McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 
181. 
42.  Both Falb and McLoughlin describe Perry’s fall as one of financial overreach 
as well as political reaction from the patrician class in Providence with a strong assist 
from political treachery from Brayton.  Perry had to content himself with collecting 
manuscripts and his considerable philanthropy, segments which can still be seen 
throughout the state.  The extensive book collection in the U.S. Naval War College’s 
Mahan Reading Room is from a donation of the Marsden Perry Library.     
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 Harriman and Chase in the Connecticut River Valley 
Other electric power generation firms noted the opportunity that arose from 
Perry’s downfall.  In 1906, Malcolm G. Chase, the progeny of a Providence, RI family 
that owned a textile mill, and Henry I. Harriman, a textile mill manager and machinery 
inventor from Taunton, Massachusetts, formed Chace & Harriman, Inc. of Maine to 
develop hydroelectric power plants.  Abandoning their first area of interest in North 
Carolina, the developers shifted back to New England, where they found a suitable site to 
build a hydroelectric station at Vernon, Vermont, on the Connecticut River.  The local 
business ventures had failed to find the financial backing to build the electric generation 
station, resources that Harriman and Chase had greater access to.  By promising to 
provide a portion of the generated electric power to the local industry, Harriman and 
Chase received the vital state licenses to build the plant.43  The two men had larger 
designs than just the local industry, however.  They believed that the site was strategic for 
transmitting electric power to the central Massachusetts factories in faraway Worcester 
and Marlborough, a goal that the technical experts of the day had advised against.44    
                                                 
43.  The machinations of Harriman and Chase to find the most lucrative 
permutation of state licensing for the company headquarters, local geography to build the 
hydroelectric station, and local easement agreements to run transmission lines defies 
simplification.  Deerfield was to receive a maximum of 12,000,000 kw-hrs as part of the 
agreement, a not inconsiderable amount for the first decade of the century.  See Senate, 
Utility Corporations, Letter from the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission 
Transmitting, in Response to Senate Resolution no. 83, a Monthly Report on the Electric 
Power and Gas Utilities Inquiry, Nos. 31 and 32, New England Power Association, 70th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1931, S. Doc 92, pt. 31 and 32: 72. 
44.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 27-31.   
65 
 
Forming the Connecticut River Power Company in 1907, Harriman and Chase 
had to overcome technological, business, financial and political hurdles that covered the 
breadth from the local actors to those at national level to bring their vision to fruition.  
Financially, the bankers backing their efforts had to be cajoled with numerous 
advantageous bond issues that promised a higher return on the investment if the firm 
prospered.  These bond issues required the creation of subordinate holding companies in 
order to attract the required venture capital.  As the New Hampshire state regulations 
were too restrictive, the two shopped around New England and formed a new corporation 
in Maine, the “Connecticut River Power Company of Maine,” to take advantage of that 
state’s more lax financial regimes.  A Massachusetts holding company was also created 
as that state prohibited corporations from owning domestic utilities.45  The new company 
envisioned the transmission of electric power across state lines to Massachusetts so the 
politicians of that state had to be persuaded to amend the current laws protecting instate 
electric generating companies.  Finally the farmland surrounding the proposed dam site in 
                                                 
45.  In this era, a holding company was “A corporation formed for the express 
purpose of controlling other corporations by the ownership of a majority of their voting 
capital stock.  In common usage, the term is applied to any corporation which does in fact 
control other corporations commonly referred as subsidiaries.”  The often byzantine 
structure of these subordinate holding companies is described as “complex” by its 
successor, National Grid USA.  Attempting to follow the myriad mergers, business 
buyouts and stock sales conducted in the early years of the firm is a challenge.  See 
William E. Mosher and Finla G. Crawford, Public Utilities Regulation, (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1933): 322, National Grid “National Grid History,” National Grid, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/national-grid-usa-history (accessed 
January 6, 2014), and Senate, Utility Corporations, Letter from the Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission Transmitting, in Response to Senate Resolution no. 83, a 
Monthly Report on the Electric Power and Gas Utilities Inquiry, Nos. 31 and 32, New 
England Power Association, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1931, S. Doc 92, pt. 31 and 32: 67-
130.   
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Vernon, Vermont had to be purchased before construction could begin.46  The dam and 
water turbines were designed to produce 16 MW, larger than most of the era’s 
hydroelectric plants.47  Using the maturing transformer technology, the plant was able to 
step up its output voltage to 66,000 Volts (V) and transmit the energy to a distance of 66 
miles.48  It is a measure of the people involved that this project, conceived of in 1907, 
was completed in slightly over two years.49  Prowess in any single element of this 
problem would not have been sufficient to achieve success.  Harriman and Chace had to 
excel in all of them to achieve their goals.      
While the initial startup of the new power station had some problems, within a 
year industry requirements within range of the plant as well as residential lighting 
demands were outstripping the station’s capacity.  The strain on the system became more 
pronounced during the summer months when the river flow rate decreased, lowering the 
available energy production.  Harriman identified a number of suitable locations on the 
nearby Deerfield River to build new hydroelectric stations, but desired a better method to 
control the water flow on the river to manage the output of any new plants.  The solution 
                                                 
46.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 31-34.     
47.  John L. Ragonese, “Hydro Hall of Fame: Upgrading Vernon for Another 
Century,” Renewable Energy World.com, last modified November 13, 2009, 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/11/hydro-hall-of-fame-
upgrading-vernon-for-another-century. 
48.  Robert Duncan Coombs, Pole and Tower Lines for Electric Power 
Transmission (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1916), 134.    
49.  Chas. R. Cummings, “Power Development in Windham County,” The 
Vermonter, August-September 1912, 621.  
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to this problem was to build a large reservoir on the Deerfield River upstream of the 
possible sites.  Varying the flow rate from the reservoir would permit a constant electric 
power output from the downstream power plants as well as mitigating the risk of flooding 
to the towns along the river banks.50   
Construction of the next series of four hydroelectric power plants and reservoir 
dam on the Deerfield River was conducted in parallel.  Harriman and Chace leveraged 
the experience they had gained from the Vernon construction at the Deerfield sites to 
standardize equipment and assembly procedures.  Buying the land took some time.  This 
location, however, did not require the displacement of any human inhabitants when 
filling the dam’s reservoir, an area that covered two thousand acres.  The dislocation of 
other activities was not an issue either:  
No farms are despoiled.  It is a good fishing and hunting region. . .  Logging has 
been going on extensively for years along the streams and spurs of the railway.  
Spruce logs are now being taken from the waters of the newly formed lake, down 
the railway to great mills at Wilmington that can handle them.  The company will 
log the valley for hard wood for the next twenty five years.51   
 
As well as building the new stations, Harriman and Chace extended the high voltage 
transmission lines network from Vernon, VT to Worcester, MA using a new route 
                                                 
50.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 38-39.     
51.  Chas. R. Cummings, “Power Development in Windham County,” The 
Vermonter, August-September 1912, 624-625. 
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through Shelburne, MA.  This supplementary pathway provided a backup power supply 
to ensure “continuity of service” in the event of any transmission lines failure.52   
 
Figure 2. The Extension Of The Connecticut River Power Company’s Transmission 
Lines Throughout The State Of Massachusetts And Rhode Island.  “An Important New 
England Transmission System,” Electrical World, 28 December 1912, 1366. 
 
 
These new power lines extended the range of Harriman and Chace’s electrical 
transmission as well as their appetite for further expansion.  Increasing the line voltage to 
120,000 V allowed them to further lengthen their transmission and connect into the 
                                                 
52.  “An Important New England Transmission System,” Electrical World, 28 
December 1912, 1365.    
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Rhode Island electric power network.53  The two developers eyed the expanding markets 
of Rhode Island and attempted to move into the territory that the Narragansett Electric 
Lighting Company operated with an exclusive franchise.  While the Narragansett Electric 
Lighting had received a twenty year exclusive franchise to deliver electric power to the 
Providence area in 1892, the forthcoming expiration of this franchise was noted.  
Harriman and Chace created a new local utility company in 1912, the “Rhode Island 
Power Transmission Company” to compete with Narragansett Electric in the Rhode 
Island capital, promising less expensive power to future customers.  Narragansett Electric 
opposed this encroachment, suggesting that the interlopers would be unable to meet their 
promises due to uneven river flow rates.  Both companies suggested that their adversary’s 
proposed method to acquire financial backing for future projects would result in higher 
future costs to the customers.54   The competition ended up in the Providence city 
government, where the city’s Common Council voted to extend Narragansett Electric’s 
franchise, but for only five years for lighting, heating and power supply, and ten years for 
street lighting.55  On the other hand, the Rhode Island Power Transmission Company was 
permitted to trade wholesale electric power in the state.  Narragansett Electric would buy 
power from the Rhode Island Power Transmission company during large load periods 
when the company’s steam plants could not meet the demand, and sell power back when 
                                                 
53.  Ibid.    
54.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 48-49.  
55.  “Construction,” Electrical World, 17 August 1912, 382.    
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the other company had similar excessive demands.  The new Rhode Island Public Utility 
Commission, established in 1912, would monitor the transactions.56   
This confluence of the two companies marks an important event in the 
establishment of the electric power grid in southeastern New England.  Each firm could 
benefit from the other’s strengths in providing electric power to their customers.  Both 
companies were pressing to take advantage of the opportunities that new advances in 
electric power generation and transmission allowed.  The Connecticut River Power 
Company was proficient in the use of hydropower to generate electricity and had gained 
experience in the long range transmission of power.  Narragansett Electric had a more 
stable supply of electricity in its steam powered plants powered by coal delivered by sea.  
Both companies were expansion-minded, willing to absorb smaller entities in their quest 
for market share and higher profits.  For example, Narragansett Electric acquired a 
majority share of the Westerly Light & Power Company in 1916, making it the monopoly 
holder for electric lighting from Providence to the southeastern corner of Connecticut.57   
Similarly, Harriman and Chace had acquired a canal company on the Connecticut River 
and reorganized it as the Bellows Falls Power Company.  This company almost 
immediately became involved in a lawsuit with the Fall Mountain Paper Mill, a 
subsidiary of the International Paper Company, over water rights on the canal.  An 
armistice was achieved in 1918 between the two companies under the condition that the 
                                                 
56.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 49. 
57. “Public Utilities Summary,” United States Investor, XXVII, no. 25 (June 16, 
1916): 55. 
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Bellows Falls Power Company would expand the disputed canal size to increase the total 
water flow to both parties.  This the electric company did, eventually increasing the canal 
flow rate by a factor of four and building a 45 MW hydroelectric station to take 
advantage of this.58  Finally, both Narragansett Electric and the Connecticut Power 
Company were willing and able to use creative financial streams in order to attain the 
capital required for their large scale projects.59    
 While the competing firms were not electrically connected until 1916, both 
companies’ methods and values continued to operate in synchronization as America 
entered the First World War the next year.60  The onset of the war forced industries to 
shift to production to assist the expanding American military.  Since American 
involvement in the war was for only a short duration, industry had to react rapidly to 
meet the new requirements.  During the war the price of coal rose rapidly, straining the 
electrical generating companies as they provided electric power for wartime production. 
The electric companies did achieve greater interconnectivity during this period as they 
                                                 
58.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 59-60. 
59.  Both companies also benefited from close ties with the banking industry.  
Both Perry and Chace served as directors of banking firms, relationships that proved 
profitable in more ways than one.  See William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A History 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 148-168, and Senate, Utility 
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Gas Utilities Inquiry, Nos. 31 and 32, New England Power Association, 70th Cong., 1st 
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attempted to match power requirements with available capacity.61  The Rhode Island 
Power Transmission Company arranged to connect its transmission lines with the Fall 
River Electric Light Company and the Blackstone Valley Gas and Electric Company to 
match its arrangements with the Providence firm.62 
Narragansett Electric performed well in the years after the war despite the 
increasing decline of Providence industry in the first decades of the twentieth century.  
The textile industry in the area had been affected by increased competition from the 
Southern states with their cheaper labor costs, smaller distances from the cotton field to 
the newer factories, and fast flowing capital from the North.63  Electric power for lighting 
and household use, by no means universal in the city let alone the rest of the state, was 
considered a highly desirable item and the local utility and retailers worked to meet the 
demand.  The Rhode Island Electrical League was established in 1921 to promote the 
general welfare of its members, make the electrical industry available to the public and 
provide for the common improvement of the industry.64  Composed of both 
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62.  Ibid., 49. 
63.  While uniform orders for the Great War did help the textile businesses, 
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manufacturers and retailers of electrical goods and services, the Electrical League 
conducted Providence’s first electrical show in 1922, demonstrating the latest appliances 
and radio communications equipment.65  Narragansett Electric leveraged this and other 
groups to sell greater numbers of electric appliances and electric services, improving their 
profit and electrical load balance.66  The company was active in increasing its customer 
base, standardizing service to homes, and erecting utility poles in the city.67     
Narragansett Electric appeared to follow the strategy of “Grow and Build” as 
postulated by Samuel Insull, a former employee of Thomas Edison and now an electrical 
business empire builder of his own right.   In Chicago, Insull had demonstrated that the 
electric utilities could spend immense amounts of money to build new generating stations 
yet still be able to lower the resultant cost of power to the customers.  This balancing act 
required gaining a wide array of customers that used power at different times during the 
day.  Since most of the electricity usage occurred at night when people turned their lights 
on, Insull sought manufacturing firms with large power requirements that operated during 
the day to balance the overall load in any daily schedule.  Spreading out the total electric 
load over a twenty four hour period negated the necessity for the utilities to buy 
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66.  Narragansett’s direct marketing of electric appliances to its customers and 
assistance to retailers resulted in sales of $ 569,000 in 1922, including 4,284 irons, 4,768 
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expensive generating equipment that could meet the peak loads at any one time of the 
day, but would remain essentially idle at other times.  Since the machinery was producing 
power and profit throughout the day, the utility could actually provide power at a lower 
rate than before.68   
In Chicago, Insull had benefited from the advancing technology in electric power 
generation as manufacturers could build newer turbine generators that were larger in 
capacity, more efficient, required less space to operate, and produced less pollution.69  
Such growth could also be used to strangle any competition from manufacturers with 
their own electric generating capacity.  Insull proposed that expanding efficiencies and 
capacity would force such competitors to shut down their own power plants and take 
advantage of the electric utilities’ lower power costs.  This would then lead to greater 
profits for the utility, allowing them to expend greater amounts of capital for more 
powerful and efficient equipment, but still driving down the marginal cost of power for 
customers who would then increase their demand, thus completing the virtuous circle.  
                                                 
68.  The balanced load between manufacturing and household demands over the 
day was known as the “diversity factor.”  Attaining such quantifiable measure of 
effectiveness became an early goal of the electrical power industry.  See Richard F.  
Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry (1989. 
Reprint, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 17-19. 
69.  Harold L. Pratt, The Electric City, Energy and the Growth of the Chicago 
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This positive feedback to the system would allow the system to persistently grow, 
generating momentum for the electric power grid.70       
Still, Insull recognized that the monopolistic tendencies of such a system had 
some drawbacks, at least in the court of popular opinion.  As early as 1898 Insull had 
proposed that the electric utility companies negotiate with the state governments.  The 
utilities would trade off public oversight of their business by local regulatory bodies for 
the natural monopoly of electric power generation, transmission and distribution that was 
already being constructed.71  Electric utility regulation had already started in Rhode 
Island as the city and town governments had granted exclusive franchises to local electric 
power companies.  State regulation did not begin in Rhode Island until 1912, though 
Massachusetts had established a state regulatory body for all public utilities back in 1887.  
Many states looked at this new supervisory activity as similar to that of railroad 
regulation.  Since it was common for the local city traction companies to be electrically 
powered, this may have not been a bad idea of applying one regulatory methodology for a 
new technology.72  Rhode Island’s Public Utilities Commission followed this model and 
occupied the same facilities as the previous Railroad Commission.  The body focused on 
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railroad regulation with only peripheral interest in the new electric utilities.73        
Narragansett Electric, like the other state electric utilities, worked well with the Rhode 
Island Public Utility Commission which was supportive of the utility’s desires.74 
Nationally, the government had also begun to assert its authority over the 
regulation of the electric utility companies.  In 1920, Congress passed the Federal Power 
Act to regulate the development of hydroelectric power on navigable waters of the United 
States.  Conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot had promoted such legislation, 
reasoning that the government should not give away valuable hydroelectric sites to the 
electric utilities.75  The act created a Federal Power Commission under the authorities of 
the Secretaries of War, the Interior and Agriculture.   The Commission had the authority 
to investigate and collect information regarding the use of water resources in an area and 
whether suitable sites could be exploited for the generation of electric power.  The 
Commission could issue licenses for up to fifty years to organizations desirous of 
exploiting these locations in return for royalties.76  While the statute initially allowed the 
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construction of dams in the National Parks, this authority was rescinded in 1921.77  The 
commission, with staff members seconded from other departments which had divergent 
opinions on the importance of the organization and its objectives, was often overwhelmed 
with requests that were processed slowly.  In the first decade of existence, the 
commission met infrequently for short periods.78  The Commission also did not have the 
authority to regulate interstate electric power commerce, even if it had been more 
proactive.79  In 1928, Congress provided the Commission its own staff with the ability to 
conduct formal hearings.  The Commission was further altered by the Federal Power Act 
of 1930, which created a five member body with commissioners appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, however the initial commissioners were more 
interested in promoting the interests of the utilities than monitoring their operations.80   
At the end of the First World War, both the Narragansett Electric Lighting 
Company and the Connecticut River Power Company undertook projects to create large 
water reservoirs to assist with their power generation.  Chace and Harriman had 
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investigated the creation of a larger reservoir on the Deerfield River at Somerset, VT to 
power a new hydroelectric station.  They had started buying the land associated with this 
project in 1910 though actual construction of the dam to hold back the water did not 
begin until 1921.81  This flood area required the displacement of people living on four 
hundred farms.82  The reservoir filled the area of 2200 acres; Lake Harriman, as it came 
to be known, became the state’s largest lake.  When completed in 1924, the ten million 
dollar hydroelectric station coupled with the dam would produce 140 MW of power, 
more than the total generated by all of the other stations on the Deerfield River.  
Connected to the rest of the company’s transmission lines with newer 110 thousand volts 
(kV) lines to Millbury, MA, the new power supply was barely sufficient to keep up with 
demand.83  The dam also limited the damage caused by flooding on the Deerfield River in 
1926 and 1933, which killed hundreds of people in other parts of Vermont.84       
In Rhode Island, the Narragansett Electric Company became involved in a similar 
project.  In 1915 the Rhode Island legislature approved funding to create a new Water 
Supply Board.  This body was authorized to construct a large reservoir to provide fresh 
water for the expanding Providence population.  It took almost six years to acquire the 
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necessary land near the town of Scituate, let the construction contracts and actually begin 
construction of the dams and associated systems.  The completed reservoir became 
Rhode Island’s largest freshwater body; at approximately 3400 acres it was larger than 
Lake Harriman.  This flood area also resulted in the condemnation of numerous 
populated areas.  Five villages (Ashland, Kent, Richmond, Rockland and South Situate) 
were completely submerged by the reservoir’s waters.  Portions of five other villages 
around the new lake were affected.85   
The Narragansett Electric Company supplied electric power during the 
construction of the reservoir for lighting, sawmills, and pumping stations.86  When the 
reservoir was completed, the Gate House Hydroelectric Station at the dam powered the 
pumps and purification plant for the fresh water being supplied to Providence.  Excess 
energy was sold to the Narragansett Electric adding to the net power on Narragansett’s 
transmission lines.87 
It is interesting to note just how little popular reaction there was against the 
construction of these reservoirs.  In California, the proposal to use the land in the Hetch 
Hetchy valley on the Tuolumne River to build a water reservoir and hydroelectric power 
for the city of San Francisco resulted in a decade long conflict between the city’s 
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leadership and the nascent Sierra Club led by conservationist John Muir.  That struggle 
pitted the desires of the local political leaders and the electric utility, Pacific Gas and 
Electric, for electric power against the desires of Muir to preserve the pristine wilderness 
and not submerge it for power and water.  The cast of conservationists on both sides of 
the issue raised it to national prominence.  It eventually took an act of Congress in 1913 
to permit construction of the dam, the lobbyists for the city of San Francisco being more 
effective than the national outpouring to conserve the wilderness.88  The resistance to 
either reservoir in New England was much more muted.  Both New England projects 
required the displacement of hundreds of families, the cutting down of thousands of trees 
and even the destruction of entire villages.89  Admittedly, having a nationally known and 
connected figure such as John Muir to advocate leaving Hetch Hetchy as wilderness was 
a benefit, but both Somerset and Scituate reservoirs were larger than the Californian 
counterpart.  Aside from a long running lawsuit by the Joslin family, the majority of the 
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displaced people left with little resistance.90  The population was satisfied that the 
“greater good” of the community had been achieved.91 
Integration of the Systems 
Even as Narragansett Electric Company and the Connecticut River Power 
Company were involved in their large scale reservoir projects, Harriman and Chace were 
exploiting their success to make further inroads into the Rhode Island area.  The 1920s 
was a period of almost reflexive acquisition by their company, motivated by a need to 
diversify its electric power sources, expand its market share in the region, shore up its 
financial resources, and to prevent acquisition by other equally voracious firms.  Not all 
of this action was to the company’s benefit, but the net result was a central unifying 
organization that would direct the electric power grid’s future direction in southeastern 
New England.   
The sequence of events began shortly after the hydroelectric station at Lake 
Harriman came on line.  Harriman and Chase had reorganized their company as the New 
England Company, now under state of Massachusetts licensing.  The subsidiary 
companies, such as the Connecticut River Company, retained their operational 
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independence, but the New England Company controlled all of the voting stock.92  In the 
early 1920s while the International Paper Company was leveraging the Bellows Falls 
Power Company, a New England Company subsidiary, to expand the canal at Fall 
Mountain, the New England Company returned the favor, leveraging the greater assets of 
International Paper to fend off a potential hostile takeover by the brilliant electric power 
entrepreneur, Samuel Insull.  Harriman and Chace became concerned that Insull could 
exploit a critical vulnerability in their business model.  If Insull bought up the retail 
electric utility organizations that the New England Company sold power to, or at least 
attempted to, Harriman and Chace would be forced into a bidding war to retain their 
customers.  With its own financial resources stretched, the New England Company would 
be vulnerable to a direct attack on its own independence and a competitor would be able 
to buy up its stock at bargain prices.  With this threat in mind, Harriman and Chace 
negotiated with Archibald Graustein, the leader of International Paper, to stave off any 
aggression.  Graustein was interested in a deal as both companies had similar interests in 
exploiting the energy from river flow and because the profitable hydroelectric industry 
could reduce the losses in the more variable paper industry.93  The resultant deal in 1926 
provided twenty million dollars to the New England Company, though International 
Paper became the majority owner of the merged assets of the company.  The New 
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England company, having absorbed several other electric utility companies from the 
previous holdings of International Paper in the merger, was renamed the New England 
Power Association (NEPA) in 1926.94  
Meanwhile, flush with the twenty million dollars from the merger with 
International Paper, Harriman and Chace set out to protect NEPA’s financial 
vulnerabilities.  Still dreading that Insull would buy out their retail electric utility 
customers, they forestalled any hostile acquisitions by buying them out first.  This would 
also allow NEPA to supplant its hydroelectric power stations with steam powered ones, 
providing greater reliability to the system as well as keeping out competitors.95  NEPA 
first acquired the Grafton County Electric Light & Power Company in in Lebanon, NH.  
Since there were not any electric transmission lines connecting the utilities, the company 
was probably bought to gain entry into that state’s electric power market.96   
Harriman and Chace were much more interested in the Narragansett Electric 
Lighting Company in Rhode Island, but this company was a more challenging 
acquisition.  It was a more lucrative one as well, with a new 140 MW steam powered 
electric station in Providence.  The Narragansett Electric Lighting Company had little 
debt and few bondholders.  Already connected to NEPA’s transmission lines, 
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Narragansett Electric would provide a larger additional power supply and business 
income to support NEPA.97     
The acquisition of Narragansett Electric did have some disadvantages, not the 
least of which was the legal battles the firm was enmeshed in over the interstate sale of 
electricity.  In 1917, the company had contracted with Attleboro Steam & Electric 
Company in Attleboro, MA to sell electric power over the next twenty years.  In return 
for a constant cost for all of the electric power it required, the Attleboro company 
dismantled its own generating station.  This contract was reviewed by the Rhode Island 
Public Utility Commission which authorized the special rate that Narragansett Electric 
was charging Attleboro.  By 1924 this rate was no longer considered advantageous to 
Narragansett Electric, though Attleboro unsurprisingly thwarted any attempts to 
renegotiate the contract.  Narragansett then petitioned the Rhode Island Public Utility 
Commission for a new cost schedule to be charged to Attleboro.  The commission, after 
hearing arguments from both companies, sided with Narragansett, stating that the Rhode 
Island company could not make a fair return on its investments under the previous 
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contract.98  The aforementioned agreement was “detrimental to the general public 
welfare” and the proposed rate increase was therefore reasonable.99   
The directors of the Attleboro Steam & Electric Company disagreed and appealed 
the decision, reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in 1926.  The Attleboro Company 
proposed that the Rhode Island Commission held no authority to regulate the 
transmission of electricity across the state border as this was interstate commerce which 
fell under the purview of Federal regulation.  Since there were no federal statutes on such 
commercial activity, the Rhode Island interference on this issue was in violation of the 
commerce clause of the United States Constitution.  The Rhode Island Public Utility 
Commission objected, stating that such electricity sales were local in nature and should 
thus be subject to local regulation.  The Supreme Court sided with the Attleboro Steam & 
Electric Company, stating that this sale was “not local to either state, but is essentially 
national in character. The rate is therefore not subject to regulation by either of the two 
states in the guise of protection to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation is 
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required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.”100  Left 
unresolved was whether Congress was willing to deal with this issue or when it would.101    
 Meanwhile NEPA was in the pursuit of Narragansett’s assets.  A merger of the 
two companies appeared to be a sensible from the technological perspective.  Both 
companies had strengths that moderated the weaknesses of the other.  Electric power 
from NEPA was mostly generated by water flow, while Narragansett’s electric power 
was from coal-fired steam plants.  When the river flow was low in the winter, the electric 
power from Providence could be sent to the hills of Massachusetts and Vermont.  When 
the river flow was greater, the cheaper power could be sent south to Rhode Island.  
Connecting the two transmission systems would allow the merged organization to operate 
more efficiently and profitably.  Providence’s industry and population would also act as 
an attractive revenue stream for the combined companies.   
The leadership of the Narragansett Electric did not share NEPA’s views and 
desired to maintain control of the company within the state.  Another Providence 
company was more intrigued by the possibilities; the United Electric Railways (UER) 
had excess capacity and was willing to deal.  UER had been established in 1920 to take 
over the previous bankrupt Providence electric trolley company.  Business had not been 
profitable so the leadership of the company began to look for outside sources of money.  
The company’s charter was not permissive in this respect; it prevented the company from 
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increasing capital or selling excess electricity to outside entities.  In March 1926, the 
Rhode Island Republican Party leader, Frederick S. Peck, convinced other state 
legislators to charter a new company, United Electric Power (UEP) that was not 
constrained in these venues.102  UEP was also allowed to buy and sell assets, a feature 
that might permit acquisition of Rhode Island’s utility companies.  Popular reaction and 
the leadership of Narragansett Electric were opposed to this new charter; however, the 
legislature passed it under the proviso that UEP would fall under the state’s Public 
Utilities Commission.  Control of UEP was also promised to stay within the state.103 
 Mistrust of the UEP’s motives was warranted.  By midsummer assumptions of a 
merger between UER and Narragansett Electric under the auspices of UEP fueled stock 
sales of the two utility companies.  NEPA leadership disclaimed any involvement in the 
stock sales or interest in the utilities, but International Paper’s legal syndicate threw 
gasoline on the flames by setting up a new holding company, the Rhode Island Public 
Service (RIPS) company to acquire as much stock of Narragansett Electric as possible.  
The resultant struggle for control of the state’s utility companies took most of the next six 
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months to resolve, including influencing a gubernatorial election.  Offers and 
counteroffers for UER’s stock from both Narragansett Electric and RIPS resulted in UER 
falling in with RIPS.  Both companies used the Providence Journal to proclaim their 
virtues and deprecate their adversary’s vices.  The deep pockets of International Paper 
were eventually decisive in convincing Narragansett Electric stockholders that a quick 
profit now was more important than maintaining state control and Narragansett’s 
leadership submitted to International Paper’s buyout terms in October 1926.  By January 
of the next year, NEPA took a guiding position of RIPS, abrogating earlier promises of 
local electric utility autonomy.104  All that was left was the post-unification activity of 
cleaning up the residue from the merger.  UEP was rechristened as The Narragansett 
Electric Company to maintain brand continuity while acquiring the old Narragansett 
Electric Lighting Company’s assets.105  UER’s Manchester Street power plant was sold to 
the newly minted company.  Debts of the old companies were paid off through the 
issuance of stock in the new company.  Everyone was happy, except the leadership of the 
old Narragansett Electric company.106       
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Subsequent acquisitions cemented NEPA’s position as the dominant electric 
utility in central New England.  With International Paper & Power’s assistance, NEPA 
established other holding companies that purchased the Lawrence Gas & Electric 
Company in Massachusetts as well as the Webster & Southbridge Gas & Electric in 
eastern Connecticut.  Smaller Massachusetts electric companies in Seekonk, Lowell, New 
Salem, Fall River, Gardner, Attleboro fell under the NEPA orbit by the end of the 1920’s 
while Rhode Island’s East Greenwich Electric and South County Public Service joined 
Connecticut’s Mystic Power as NEPA purchases.107  Worcester Electric Light was one of 
NEPA’s final objectives as the decade ended, but this objective was a contested one as 
Insull was willing to compete.  The deeper pockets of International Paper & Power again 
won out and Worcester joined the NEPA family of firms.108  Other retail electric utility 
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companies in Boston and central Massachusetts were bought out by NEPA as the 1930’s 
began.109  Boston Edison resisted NEPA’s advances, but the two firms worked together to 
build the hydroelectric station at Fifteen Mile Falls in the upper Connecticut River in 
New Hampshire.  The turbines at this location brought 170 MW of electric power to the 
enlarged grid following the construction of 126 miles of transmission lines to the NEPA’s 
switching station in Tewkesbury, MA.110  Even NEPA’s subordinate companies were not 
immune to the desire for growth.  Narragansett Electric acquired all of the assets of the 
Bristol County Gas and Electric Company, the Tiverton Electric Light Company, the East 
Greenwich Electric Company, portions of the South County Public Service Company, 
and the West Gloucester Power and Light Company in 1936.111   
Acquiring control of these companies provided numerous advantages for NEPA 
and hence International Paper & Power.  Firstly, by keeping Insull and his financial 
backers at bay, NEPA gained a controlling share of much of the area’s electric power 
generating, transmission, and distribution companies.  Most of the companies possessed 
either electric power generation capabilities that could contribute to the networked 
system, or at least established customers that the more efficient NEPA could sell power 
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to.  The local ordinances providing local monopolies to these smaller firms made NEPA 
not only the electric utility of choice, but the only electric utility.  There were 
disadvantages as well.  Many of the smaller companies used obsolescent technology for 
electric generation that would require replacement.  The sheer size of the area and scope 
of supervision of the expanded number of facilities required a change in NEPA’s internal 
organization.  The area under NEPA was subdivided into six areas of operation, with 
Rhode Island and Fall River companies falling under the Southern Group.112  The town of 
Millbury, MA, housed NEPA’s central dispatching station, where operators could 
balance the power being generated by the various hydroelectric or steam generating 
stations to match the load required by the network’s customers. Monitoring the electric 
power grid’s voltage and frequency, the human dispatchers would transmit orders to the 
numerous stations using a private telephone system.113  
By this time both Harriman and Chace had been eased aside from the leadership 
of NEPA.  Soon after the takeover threat from Insull had been deflected, Graustein began 
a campaign to acquire the rest of the NEPA stock that Harriman and Chace still retained.  
Here he was helped by Chace, who had joined the board of International Paper.  Over the 
nest few years, Graustein bought more and more of NEPA’s stock until by 1928 he had 
gained full control of the company.114  With command of both International Paper and 
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NEPA’s properties, Graustein reorganized the companies into an expanding structure of 
holding companies and subsidiaries to provide the maximum flexibility for his control 
with the minimum actual capital required.  The resultant organization within the newly 
named International Paper & Power Company allowed Graustein to circumvent state 
restrictions for utility ownership.115  By setting up a number of subordinate holding 
companies, Graustein could use his preferred stock to direct the operation of subordinate 
organizations requiring large capital influx from bond and stock holders without 
necessarily risking his own money.  This organization was going to be tested and found 
wanting in the Great Depression, but in the roaring ‘20s it provided a means to attract the 
money necessary to buy the expensive electrical components and fund the immense 
engineering structures to power them.116    
While successful in expanding its power generating capacity and control of the 
market during the 1920’s, the next decade brought a number of difficult business and 
financial challenges to NEPA.  Technologically, the firm had been successful at 
producing large amounts of electric power for both industry and household consumers.  It 
generated its electric power from a wide variety of sources, was using increasingly 
advanced technology to provide its product at a reasonable cost, and had determined 
ways to get that power to consumers often hundreds of miles away from the power 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Electric Power and Gas Utilities Inquiry, Nos. 31 and 32, New England Power 
Association, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1931, S. Doc 92, pt. 31 and 32: 303-309, 312-314.    
115.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 67-70. 
116.  Ibid., 69-71. 
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generation sites.  Organizationally, the company, under the guiding light of International 
Paper & Power, had expanded in such a manner that the pyramid of holding companies 
created in Graustein’s quest for business empire was going to be found unstable under the 
economic shock of the Great Depression.117   
Zenith of the Holding Company: International Paper & Power 
The directors of International Paper & Power and the New England Power 
Association continued with their acquisition plan even following the stock market crash 
of 1929, though in some ways this concept was poorly conceived.  Numerous bonds that 
had been floated to fund previous takeovers would come due in the early 1930s, and the 
capital to finance these was difficult to obtain.  Additionally, the stock losses and 
bankruptcies across the nation resulting from the stock market crash in 1929 led to state 
and federal investigations of NEPA’s business operations and structure.  The 
Massachusetts Legislature’s Power and Light Commission and the Federal Trade 
Commission both investigated the company’s business ventures and holding company 
structure.118   The Massachusetts investigation sought to compare and contrast the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public vs. private electric utilities in the state as a 
means to denigrate the private companies.  Analysis concluded that the differences in 
price or service were not dramatic:   
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At their best the private companies are quicker to develop improved methods, the 
resulting gains being divided between the stockholders and the consumers.  At 
their best the municipal plants are less aggressive in demonstrating to their 
customers the advantages of an increased use of electricity, but pass along to them 
all gain resulting from the adoption of improved methods.  At their worst the 
difference between the two is the difference between graft at the top and graft at 
the bottom.119    
 
NEPA was able to deflect the criticism from the Massachusetts direction, 
claiming that its holding company structure was fundamentally different from that of its 
parent, International Paper & Power.  NEPA’s subordinate companies were all actually 
connected in the area’s electric power grid and thus more responsive to local demands, 
unlike those of Samuel Insull’s whose extensive holdings spanned the nation.120  The 
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (RIPUC) did not conduct any investigations of 
the electric utilities during this period.121   
                                                 
119.  Porter quotes a customer as suggesting that the best argument in favor of 
public ownership of one of the Boston utility companies (Boston Edison Company) was 
the company’s rates; the best argument in favor of private ownership was the quality of 
the Boston City Council.  See Charles H. Porter, “A Comparison of Public and Private 
Electric Utilities in Massachusetts,” The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 7, 
no. 4 (Nov. 1931): 394, 437-438. 
120.  Insull’s fall was all the more news-worthy as it transpired across the 
continent, much like his utility holdings, demonstrating that leverage works both ways.  
See Energy Information Administration, “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 
1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/archive/0563.pdf  (accessed January 27, 2014) and John T. 
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121.  The Annual Reports of the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission in the 
1920s and 1930s are filled information regarding the regulation of the state’s 
transportation systems such as the railways, jitney lines and bus companies. Information 
on the electric companies appears cursory compared to the others, particularly the jitney 
licensing.  As late as 1933 less than 10% of all monitored utilities in Rhode Island were 
electric ones.   See State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, Twenty-Second 
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Federal investigations were less easily repelled than the state ones in no small part 
due to the failures of other public utility pyramid holding company structures across the 
country.  The local utility companies at the bottom of these structures were hard at work 
generating, transmitting and distributing electric power.  A local utility might be owned 
by a superior holding company for the primary purpose of controlling it. This business 
might be purchased by another holding company in turn, adding additional levels to the 
overall structure of the organization.  Pyramiding was appealing to investors such as 
Graustein as it permitted the reduction in the amount of money required to achieve 
command of an operating utility at the low end of the pyramid.  It also permitted the 
exceptional increase of income received by the company at the top of the heap through a 
process known as leveraging.122   
When the holding company was expanding, this method of controlling the nascent 
electric power business was probably advantageous overall to both the owners and the 
consumers.  It did permit the attainment of great sources of capital to finance the large 
scale projects required to generate the power demanded by industry and households.  The 
pyramid structure allowed businesses to comply with the state and local ordinances which 
                                                                                                                                                 
Annual Report of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Rhode Island for the 
Year Ending December 31, 1933  (Providence, RI: The Oxford Press, 1934): 5-6. 
122.  In such a manner the expenditure of a small amount of money at the upper 
end of the organization allowed the control of numerous subsidiary companies.  When the 
profits of any subordinate level increased, the amount received at each successive level 
was amplified.  The FTC noted one five level organization earned profits of 295 percent 
off of profits at the lowest level of only 5 percent.  See Energy Information 
Administration, “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992,” 2-4, Energy 
Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/archive/0563.pdf  (accessed 
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Figure 3.  International Paper & Power Organizational Chart Emphasizing The Electric 
Utility Portion Of The Holding Company. See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. 
From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East 
Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 70, and Thomas Heinrich, “Product 
Diversification in the U.S. Pulp and Paper Industry: The Case of International Paper,” 
The Business History Review 75, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 491. 
 
often prohibited direct out of state ownership of the utility, but was more lenient to the 
indirect control of the holding company.  It permitted the standardization of methods, 
procedures and equipment over a wider area, increased the purchasing power of the local 
operating companies, centralized insurance claims, and overall provided a greater quality 
service to the customer.  An important feature of this structure is that it allowed the 
engineering, construction, and management functions of the organization to be 
centralized.  The professional nature of this staff ensured compliance with regulations 
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and technical specifications throughout the area of control of the overall company.  
Subject matter experts in advertising products and services, legal services and operation 
of the electric power grid could be dispatched to problem areas to act as trouble shooters, 
assuring a standard response to complications.123  The centralized management of the 
company could carefully apportion its talented work force to solve the difficult technical 
and financial problems they encountered.  Since the private sector was less apt to 
underutilize its personnel, it could provide better service at lower costs.124  As a greater 
number of problems were experienced and successfully solved, this staff also built up a 
standard, though often unwritten, doctrine to address issues.    
The other side of the holding company structure was less compelling.  The 
multiple layers of holding companies reduced transparency, often preventing regulatory 
bodies from assessing the nature of the business deals the parent companies were making.  
Leadership at the top of the pyramid became divorced from local problems and concerns, 
seeing the operating utilities as cash cows to be milked to expand profits at the higher 
levels of the organization.  Service charges for transactions between the layered holding 
companies were padded, property was sold at a loss from one company to another in the 
same organization, depreciation of equipment was put off, and financial devices created 
to make the overall company look profitable were all done, bleeding the operating 
company out of the money needed to maintain service while passing excessive costs on to 
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124.  “Federal Regulation of Holding Companies: The Public Utility Act of 
1935,” The Yale Law Review 45, no. 3 (Jan. 1936): 473.  
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the consumer.125  The consecutive mergers required to maintain the façade of ever greater 
profits allowed creative financing in the issuing of public bonds to finance the utilities’ 
projects.126   
International Paper & Power, and its subsidiary NEPA, fell somewhere between 
these two extremes.  While NEPA’s quest for regional dominance in establishing a 
reliable and diverse electric power grid was an impressive feat of technological mastery, 
its growth was certainly well motivated by financial gain.  The differences between the 
financial end and the operating end of the business were slight, particularly in the origins 
of the company.  There seems to be little difference between Marsden Perry the main 
developer of a new technology and Marsden Perry the chief financier of the process (as 
the President of the Union Trust Bank Perry was essentially bankrolling his own 
company as well as the Brayton political machine).  Harriman and Chase were also well 
connected to the financial powerhouses of their era.  Certainly Graustein at International 
Paper & Power appears as the archetypical New York lawyer pulling the strings of an 
immense business empire. While much of the vitriol heaped on the holding companies 
arose from the political sphere, the corresponding accolades from the business realm 
                                                 
125.  While the practices noted were certainly deleterious to the overall health of 
the stockholders at the lower end of the pyramid, the operating companies and the 
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were less telling, particularly for voters who had lost large sums of money after the 
market crash.127        
Disintegration of the Holding Company: The Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935 
The 1929 stock market crash exposed many of the flaws in this system.  Samuel 
Insull’s Middle West Utility Company, operating in 30 states and over five thousand 
communities, showed that leverage works both ways.  With the dramatic drop in stock 
prices, Middle West was saddled with fixed costs on its preferred stock and interest on its 
bonds.  Despite creative insider dealing to drive up the price of the stock, Insull’s actions 
could not resist market pressures and the company was placed in receivership in 1932.  
Upon inspection of the company’s financial records, Middle West was shown to have a 
shortfall of $177.7 million.128   
                                                 
127.  Hughes suggests the net gain of the holding companies of the development 
of the electric power grid was a positive one.  The greater specialization of the firms to 
deal with technical issues allowed for greater efficiency and effectiveness while the 
financial structures spread the risk of failure between the different companies and 
amongst the numerous bond holders.   The Great Depression exposed all of the flaws in 
the system in greater detail, as the excessively leveraged companies’ failures generated 
opportunities for their political adversaries to exploit.  The incoming Franklin D. 
Roosevelt administration could have easily seen the expanding power of the electric 
utilities as another facet of rival political party hostility.  Certainly NEPA, with its roots 
well interwoven with the Republican Party in Rhode Island, was no shrinking violet in 
such matters.  The connections to Rhode Island’s Democratic governor Theodore F. 
Green may have assisted NEPA survival.  See Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power 
(1983; repr., Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 393-401.   
128.  Insull fled the country though was later extradited back to the United States 
where he was prosecuted for securities fraud.  Found not guilty following an impassioned 
self defense on the witness stand, Insull again departed the country, dying in Paris in 
1938.  “I lost a lot of money with Sam Insull” was a common expression among Chicago 
pensioners.  See Energy Information Administration, “Public Utility Holding Company 
100 
 
International Paper & Power’s losses in the market crash were also immense, 
though somewhat lessened by the diverse nature of the organization.  With the collapse of 
the newsprint segment of the company, International Paper & Power ran up a $19.7 
million debt by the mid 1930s.129  NEPA was also hard hit, particularly with the decrease 
in revenue from electricity sales while its appliance sales decreased by over 40%.  
Though overall labor and fuel costs also declined, the net result was not advantageous to 
NEPA stockholders, who went most of the next decade without receiving dividends.130  
With a failure of the magnitude of Insull’s company in mind, the new Franklin D. 
Roosevelt administration had a strong desire to break up the numerous electric utility 
holding company pyramids by establishing Federal regulation of the industry.  Pressed by 
other legislative concerns with the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration did not 
address the holding companies and utility regulation until 1935.131   
Their eventual attack was assisted by work done by previous regulators.  In the 
late 1920’s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under direction from the U.S. Senate, 
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commenced a series of hearings on the large utility holding companies focusing on their 
financial structure.132  NEPA’s opportunity for Congressional scrutiny did not occur until 
March, 1931 when the directors of the various levels of the company presented testimony 
and evidence.  With over eleven hundred pages of evidence, the hearings detailed the 
business deals that permitted the growth of NEPA under International Paper & Power.  
While much of the records detailed energy production and infrastructure, the 
investigation also covered the numerous stock transactions required to purchase the 
subordinate operating companies.  The committee also investigated whether NEPA was 
using the press to garner popular support and to suppress local electric power initiatives 
in its quest for monopoly.133  NEPA President Frank D. Comerford testified on his 
company’s efficiency, stating, “A few months ago the Providence steam plant failed early 
in the morning, dropping a load of 50,000 kilowatts.  The automatic regulators at our 
Bellows Falls plant, 150 miles away, opened up their water wheels and picked up the 
load, so that there was no interruption.”134  While generally wary of the company’s 
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business practices, the investigation board did note the difference between NEPA and 
other, larger, but geographically more diffuse holding companies.  Investigators noted the 
operating intent of NEPA to act as a unified whole, with the sum of the components 
being more important than any of the parts, although the inclusion of older, obsolescent 
plants in the electric power grid mitigated against overall system efficiency.135   
By 1935, fresh off the gains of the midterm elections, the Roosevelt 
administration was able to focus its attention on addressing the problems of the large 
electric utility holding companies.  With the information provided by the FTC’s 
investigations as well as the results of the National Power Policy Commission on Public 
Utility Holding Companies, there was sufficient information to determine the overall 
nature of the problem.  At the start of the Roosevelt Administration, the thirteen largest 
electric utility holding companies controlled over seventy five percent of the industry; the 
three largest had forty percent.136   The holding companies’ actions were described in the 
harshest terms by the FTC, which stated “The use of the words such as fraud, deceit, 
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misrepresentation, dishonesty, breach of trust and oppression are the only suitable terms 
to apply.”137  Roosevelt meant to change the nature of this business.   
Wanting to break the hold of the holding companies, Roosevelt directed two of 
his trusted subordinates, Benjamin V. Cohen from Indiana, and Thomas G. Corcoran 
from Rhode Island to write the draft legislation.  Both men were gifted lawyers with 
sharp, incisive minds, but Corcoran was the driving force of the duo.  A native of 
Pawtucket, RI, Corcoran had graduated from Brown University in 1922 before earning 
his Doctor of Jurisprudence degree at Harvard and later serving as a law clerk for 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  Following private work in the late 
1920s, Corcoran became one of the “New Dealers” of the Roosevelt administration and 
worked on the Security Exchange Commission Act in 1933.  The president took a liking 
to the brash Ocean State native, nicknaming him “Tommy the Cork.”138   
Cohen and Corcoran’s proposed legislation addressed the holding company 
problems in two ways.  The first portion, Title I of what would become the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act, gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power 
to register and evaluate all holding companies.  With such information, the SEC could 
evaluate the whether the company should be allowed to maintain its current structure or 
direct its disassembly.  The rationale for the continued existence of any holding company 
was the maintenance of a “geographically and economically integrated system.”  While 
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initially such dissolution would be up to the holding companies themselves, after January 
1, 1940 the SEC could order the breakup of the company.  This part became known as the 
“death sentence” for the holding company.139   
If Title I sounded draconian for the holding companies, the second part, Title II,  
was perhaps an even more important portion of the draft legislation.  The SEC was 
empowered to regulate the surviving licensed electric utility holding companies that 
spanned numerous states.  The largest holding companies were to be broken up into their 
component parts focused on providing integrated service in a specific geographic area.  
Such consolidation would be based on defined areas and technical efficiency, and not on 
financial lucrativeness of any business arrangements.  Electric utilities residing in only 
one state would be left to local control.140  Title II also gave the Federal authorities the 
warrant to regulate the interstate transmission of electric power, a feature that had been 
an issue since the Supreme Court Attleboro decision in 1927.141 
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The general structure of this draft legislation was proposed in the House by 
Representative Samuel Rayburn (D-Texas) and in the Senate by Senator Burton K. 
Wheeler (D- Montana), both allies of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.  As might be 
expected, the electric utility holding companies reacted strongly against such legislation, 
but despite intense lobbying by the companies, the Wheeler-Rayburn Act passed the 
Senate in June 1935.142  Debate in the House was more antagonistic and bitter as the 
holding company lobbyists contested the bill’s advocates from the White House to sway 
congressional opinion.  Corcoran was a leader of the administration’s efforts, but even his 
drive and forcefulness was not sufficient.  Representative Ralph Brewster (R-Maine) 
even accused Corcoran of threatening to stop construction of a dam in his district if the 
congressman voted against the bill, a charge Corcoran vehemently denied.  The bill was 
amended in the House to delete the “death sentence,” a grievous blow to Roosevelt’s 
intent.  Attempts to reconcile the work of the two legislative bodies only increased the 
tension, but now, Congress began to publically investigate the efforts of the holding 
companies’ lobbyists, who were said to outnumber the members of Congress.  Under the 
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inquisition of Senator Hugo Black (D-Alabama), the petitioning schemes of the holding 
companies were uncovered, including the use of telegrams sent to Congressman by the 
local electric utility but signed with names of the representative’s constituents, and the 
large sums of money spent to influence wavering legislators.143  These actions to 
influence Congress were exposed publically, helping Corcoran sway the House to accept 
the Senate version of the bill, complete with the “death sentence.”  In mid-August, a 
compromise, proposed by Roosevelt’s confidante and loyal advisor Felix Frankfurter 
bridged the divide.  Frankfurter’s proposal allowed the SEC to permit holding companies 
to control more than one electric utility system, if the independent system would not be 
economically viable alone and if it was not too large or diffuse over a geographic area as 
to prevent efficient operation or local control.144  Thus mollified, the House passed the 
compromise bill and on 26 August 1935 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
was signed into law.145  This law also directed the amendment of the Federal Water 
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Power Act of 1920, hence known as the Federal Power Act, to permit the SEC to monitor 
the electric utility holding companies.146  Unsurprisingly, the holding companies were not 
willing to meekly acquiesce to the passage of the legislation.  Subsequent challenges to 
the law reached the U.S. Supreme Court which eventually upheld the legality of all of the 
portions of the Act, though it would take over a decade to do so.147 
While the full ramifications of the Public Utility Holding Company of 1935 and 
the amendments to the Federal Power Act would take a generation to fully implement, 
NEPA acted proactively.148  In December 1935 NEPA registered with the SEC as a 
holding company in anticipation of the breakup of its parent holding company, 
International Paper & Power.  International Paper & Power attempted to obtain a waiver 
from the SEC but the regulators rejected the parent company’s claims.  The SEC 
determined that with electric power generating plants in Canada and New England, 
International Paper & Power was both too large and spread out over a dispersed 
geographic area to efficiently operate the electric power grid.  The New England electric 
power grid controlled by NEPA and its sister subsidiaries was not well interconnected 
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with the Canadian power stations owned by International Paper & Power.  NEPA fell 
under the International Hydro-Electric System holding company in International Paper & 
Power’s pyramidal structure yet had not paid a dividend to the parent organization in 
years.  The SEC reviewed the status of NEPA and the other utilities powering the Boston 
area and ordered International Paper & Power to divest itself of these holdings.  The 
president of International Paper & Power dissolved the company in 1939 and 
disseminated the shares of the subordinate companies to the preferred stockholders and 
bondholders, sparking legal challenges that would last until 1947.149   
While NEPA had been removed from the controlling interests of International 
Paper & Power, it still had its own subordinate companies that aroused SEC interest.  
With its own subsidiary gas and electric companies such as Narragansett Electric and 
UER spanning southeastern New England, NEPA contained many of the features the 
Federal Power Act was purposely designed to eliminate.150  Here the SEC 
Commissioners were more willing to accede to NEPA’s protestations that the company 
was operating per the provisions of Title II of the Federal Power Act, operating as 
“integrated and coordinated electric facilities” in a geographic area.  While NEPA was 
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forced to shed a service company and reorganize its headquarters, the main structure of 
the organization was allowed to retain its shape.151 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the amendments to the 
Federal Power Act were thus important for two main reasons.  These laws broke apart the 
larger holding companies that often were national in their areas of interest, with 
unfocused or divergent interests.  Less geographically diffuse electric utilities with less 
convoluted financial setups and more economical organizations were allowed to survive.  
The others adapted or were dissolved by SEC directives.  International Paper & Power 
was too large and unfocused in its purpose, attempting to mesh the business concerns of 
paper and electric power production across two countries.  The company was unwilling to 
adapt and thus failed to survive.  NEPA, which had been mainly redesigned along the 
lines of the new legislation, did.  While some changes to the business structure of the 
organization was required, the company’s infrastructure remained under central 
control.152  NEPA would probably not have achieved the priority of focus in International 
Paper & Power given Graustein’s varied business interests.  Instead, the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electric power from the mountains of Vermont to the 
tidewater of Rhode Island under the direction of one corporate headquarters endured.   
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The Federal Power Act was also significant in that it signaled the growing interest 
of the federal government in regulating the operation of the expanding electric power 
system in support of the public interest of the nation.  While a great deal of the legislation 
was directed towards curbing the perceived financial abuses of the holding company 
structures, the act also made the federal government the authority in determining the 
limits of electric utility boundaries, designated the transmission of electricity as interstate 
commerce, and was used later to ordain war time and emergency powers over the 
industry.  Previously, regulation has been accomplished at the local and state level.  Now, 
the federal government would also be an active force in determining the features of the 
electric power grid.   
Growing Pains of NEPA 
Even as International Paper & Power was giving birth to an independent NEPA, 
the electric utility was attempting to meet all the external stresses of the Great 
Depression.  The expansion in the late 1920s had created excess capacity in the system 
that the decrease in electric load during the economic downturn rapidly exposed.  No new 
plants were built during this time period and the smaller less efficient generators were 
allowed to depreciate away without replacement.  Nevertheless, the company was able to 
maintain the backbone of the system, its larger generating stations, while still providing 
effective transmission and distribution to industry and consumers.  In many ways, the 
Depression shook out some of the excess that the parent holding company had imposed 
on NEPA, allowing it to focus on its core specialty.  This is not to say the company was 
without challenges in this period; far from it.  Demand for its main product was reduced 
and subsidiary revenue streams from appliance sales plummeted.  Numerous industries in 
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the NEPA operating area were shuttered; Providence’s main industries were devastated.  
Unemployment in the textile, jewelry and base metal industries exceeded 35 percent at 
the start of the Depression.153  The company was forced to reduce utility rates by twenty 
five percent due to falling consumer demand; a demand that would not be renewed until 
later in the decade.  Labor demands and natural disasters such as floods on the 
Connecticut River and hurricanes on the coast all strained the system.154  Even with the 
capital available from the federal government’s new Rural Electrification Administration 
(REA) to electrify previously unserved areas, the company’s expansion was limited.155  
NEPA made efforts to attract additional farmers to electrify their homes and farms, both 
to move into a new area for sales as well as to prevent the REA from creating local 
electric generating cooperatives in southeastern New England that might threaten the 
NEPA monopoly.156  Aided by the short distances in the NEPA electric power grid, 84 
percent of all farms were electrified in Rhode Island by 1939.  Perhaps more importantly, 
at least from NEPA’s point of view, no electric cooperatives as authorized by the REA 
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were established in either Rhode Island or Massachusetts.157   In this manner NEPA was 
able to maintain complete control of the area with little competition from federal 
government entities.   
 The start of the Second World War saw NEPA emerging as a separate 
commercial entity, focused on delivering electric power to its customers.  As a result of 
the 1935 Public Utilities Holding Company Act it was free of the distracted leadership of 
International Paper & Power, while it was still reorganizing itself to be a leaner business 
with fewer subsidiaries.  The Depression had eliminated some of the inefficient portions 
of the system but the company contained sufficient expertise and ability to expand to 
meet the needs of expected wartime production.  One of the company’s first moves 
following the start of hostilities in Europe was to expand the Manchester Street 
generating station in Providence.  This project had been delayed by poor economic 
conditions in the 1930s, but the concerns of the expanding war prompted the system’s 
first electric power generation construction since 1931.  Completed prior to the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the improvements to the power plant increased the total 
electric power generation capacity in the city to greater than 200 MW.  Transmission 
lines were also upgraded and expanded, and security forces were created to guard the 
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facilities against enemy sabotage.  While wartime shortages of fuel oil and rubber 
disrupted some supply chains, the emphasis on military production allowed the company 
to focus on the main effort.  NEPA was able to shift to coal as a fuel supply as oil was 
being used for other purposes and tankers were in short supply due to wartime losses 
from U-Boats and supporting the Allied advances.  Once again the system’s multiple 
power sources permitted the system to adjust to various external demands beyond its 
original design requirements.158   Providence textile industries also enjoyed a brief 
reprieve as they fulfilled government orders for uniforms and boots, while a shipyard was 
constructed to build merchant ships.159 
NEPA was able to provide both electric power and construction skills for the 
expanding war effort, both to power factories and military facilities, despite the loss of 
thousands of trained technicians and engineers to the armed forces.  The organization was 
capable of assessing new personnel and training them to the same standards of 
performance as the senior technicians and staff.  Military construction was also 
significant, particularly at Newport and Quonset Point.  NEPA construction teams and 
electricians provided support for the major expansion at the Naval Station in Newport, 
the firm’s largest military contract of the war.  Other NEPA personnel worked on highly 
classified programs supporting the war effort such as the Manhattan Project, 
antisubmarine fire control systems and radar.  Within the war effort, NEPA played an 
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important role in powering industry, managing significant programs, and using their 
employees’ problem solving experience in some of the most challenging technical 
difficulties.160     
While the end of the war caused a dramatic reduction in the size of the armed 
forces, NEPA anticipated continued expansion for the postwar era.  Initially, a lack of 
funds for capital investment hampered plans for growth as the company was still working 
with the SEC to eliminate some of the last vestiges of its subordinate holding companies.  
Simplification was the order of the day in order to accrue the assets required for 
additional growth, but the flattening of the organization was not without some cost.  In 
order to maintain a single organization managing the electrical gird in the area, the 
president of NEPA, Irwin Moore, had to reorganize the firm.  NEPA would issue new 
stock based on depreciation of its current assets and issue new bonds and stock to provide 
the money for long term growth and debt servicing.  A new organization, now named the 
New England Electrical Service (NEES), was established.  NEES still contained three 
wholesale companies, 36 retail organizations (both gas and electric), a railway company 
in Providence, and four other firms.  This reorganization was not initially sufficient to 
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achieve financial stability in the post war stock market.  Dividends were meager for 
several years, the United Electric Railway Company had to be sold off, and NEES had to 
eliminate its controlling shares of the Fall River Electric Lighting company, resulting in 
the loss of the Montaup generating plant.  An abortive attempt to sell off the firm’s gas 
generation companies in the anticipation of the arrival of cheaper natural gas supplies 
cost NEES time and money.  Five million dollars were required for the conversion which 
eventually proved profitable, but the up front cost put another strain on the company’s 
ledger.  On the other hand, NEES did acquire the Lynn Gas & Electric company, 
expanding the company’s hold in the northern Boston area, adding 40,000 new customers 
and an elderly 60 MW steam plant.161   
The initial creation of both the Rhode Island and Connecticut River ends of the 
NEES area of control had been driven in large part by knowledgeable engineers and 
financiers, who had learned their trade as the companies and the electric power grid grew.  
Political action, technological limitations, and financial constraints had all influenced the 
company’s development.  By the beginning of the post war period, NEES was essentially 
focused on one major product, electric power.  Subordinate companies were being shed 
under the watchful gaze of the SEC while superior holding agencies had been removed.  
The NEES operating area was physically self-contained, with opportunities to use 
geography to the advantage of the generation of power and without difficult technical 
salients that restricted the distribution of the product.    
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Education and Ethics for the Electric Power Grid Operator 
With greater specialization came a greater professionalization of the managers 
and operators of the grid.  In the “Age of Synergy,” spanning perhaps from just before 
Edison’s first electric power grid was installed in New York City to the end of the First 
World War, the number of trained or educated individuals constructing, operating or 
maintaining the system was relatively low.162  There were approximately nine thousand 
practicing scientists and engineers in the nation in 1880.  The large expansion in the 
technological fields in this period required a correspondingly larger number of 
individuals to operate them.  By 1950 there were around half a million technical 
operators.163  While organizations did conduct training programs for their technicians and 
plant operators to prevent equipment damage and the real possibility of electrocution on 
the job, the firm’s senior management and engineers received their education at 
college.164  While NEES (as well as all the electrical utilities in the country) employed a 
large number of different types of engineers, the staff of electrical engineers was the most 
important in the construction, operation and maintenance of the electric power grid.  Such 
personnel could only be accessed from the graduates of colleges and universities.      
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Local education institutions became interested in and associated with the 
expanding electrical technology.  Brown University in Providence, RI first offered 
engineering degrees in 1891 with electrical engineering taught as a portion of the Physics 
Department curriculum.  As Brown’s engineering programs matured over the next 
decades, there was considerable interaction with industry.  Expansion of engineering 
department facilities followed and interest in the student body in the discipline grew until 
over half of the freshmen in the class of 1907 were aspirants for a Bachelor of Science 
degree.165   The Mechanical, Civil and Electrical Engineering courses were merged into a 
single division at Brown in 1916 with William H. Kenerson as its chairman.  A Brown 
graduate in Mechanical Engineering in 1896, Kenerson attended Harvard University 
where he earned a Master of Arts degree in 1906 before returning to Brown.  As the 
division director, Kenerson instructed his students that the primary objective of an 
engineer was “to make things work.”166  A statue of the Hindu elephant god Ganesha 
graced the division spaces as a motivation for the students to be able to remove obstacles 
in their efforts, much like the Indian deity.167       
The University of Rhode Island lagged Brown University in several respects.  The 
university itself was established in large part because Brown University had failed to 
meet its side of an agreement with the Rhode Island state government.  In 1863 the state 
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legislature passed an ordinance designating Brown University as the recipient of funds 
from the recently passed Morrill Land Grant Act, as long as the institution would meet 
the duties and responsibilities of the law.  Brown was willing to take the resources, but 
over the decades became less interested in providing higher level education for 
agricultural pursuits.  This was noted in the state legislature and especially by the 
representatives in the more agriculturally focused southern part of the state.  In 1888 the 
state bought land in Kingston where an Agricultural Experimental Station was 
established.  This was later expanded into the state Agricultural School using 
reprogrammed federal funding.168  The school’s name was changed in 1892 to the Rhode 
Island College of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts (RICA&M) and opened in 
September of that year with courses in mechanical engineering as well as agricultural 
science.169  Serious legal wrangling between the state and Brown University occupied 
both parties over the next few years as Brown concluded that the burdens of the Morrill 
Act were more demanding than desired, but was unwilling to pay back the sums already 
appropriated.  In 1894 a truce was established allowing the state to shift the resources to 
the new school in Kingston.  Legislation passed the Republican controlled State Senate 
following Brown’s offer to settle the conflicting claims.170  While John H. Washburn, the 
                                                 
168.  The legality of this funding mechanism appears to have been slightly 
irregular, though not perhaps abnormal for the state. See Herman F. Eschenbacher, The 
University of Rhode Island  (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1967), 30.   
169.  Ibid., 72.   
170.  This struggle eventually rose to the level of a U.S. Supreme Court appeal by 
Brown University.  See Herman F. Eschenbacher, The University of Rhode Island (New 
York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1967), 44-69. 
119 
 
president of the new college, would soon run afoul of the Republican Party machine led 
by Charles Brayton, his initial years were influential in charting the course of the new 
institution.  The college emphasized the practical aspects of science and technology.  
Students were prepared for real-world agriculture or industry, teaching their newly 
learned profession to others, or additional education at medical or veterinary school.  An 
electrical engineering course combining a fusion of similar mathematics and physics 
classes was created in 1900.171  A separate Electrical Engineering Department was not 
established until 1938.172 
A privately financed college, the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), was 
another college located within the NEES boundaries.  Established in Worcester, MA, in 
1865 as part of that state’s Morrill Act program, the college focused on an engineering 
curriculum from the start, with an emphasis on practical and commercial applications and 
interaction.173  Higher education in engineering and science existed side by side with the 
more technical training of skilled workers in the school’s mechanical shops.  WPI 
initially offered diplomas in mechanical and civil engineering as well as in chemistry and 
physics.  In the 1880s the technological advances in electricity began to receive serious 
study at the college, illuminated perhaps by the city building electric street lights in 1891.  
A graduate course in electrical engineering was first offered by the school in 1889 and by 
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1896 WPI had established an undergraduate electrical engineering course from the 
offerings of the physics department.174  This course grew in popularity such that half of 
the students at the college were electrical engineering majors.  This curriculum continued 
to expand over the next few decades from eleven courses in 1897 to forty one in 1915.175    
Along with academics, several technical related student organizations were 
founded, including the “Tech Elect,” an electrical engineering group founded by the 
Electrical Engineering department’s founder, Professor Alonzo Smith Kimball.  In the 
new century, the Electrical Engineering Society was established in 1902 by Prof. Harold 
B. Smith.  This popular group received support from both faculty and students, and 
became affiliated with the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in 1904.176  
Following World War I, students were allowed to take a 12 to 15 month industrial 
cooperative course, spending the period with an electricity focused industry after which 
they would return to the school to complete their degree. 177  While the college 
concentrated on technical subjects and the sciences, business course were offered as well, 
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leading to an option of concentrating in administration and business as part of the 
electrical engineering major.178    
As well as serving as the founder of the institute’s Electrical Engineering 
Department and developing submarine detection equipment for the Navy in the First 
World War,  H. B. Smith also went on to head the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers (AIEE), the nation’s premier professional electrical engineering society.179  
The AIEE had been formed in 1884 somewhat as a countervailing force against other 
international societies that were scheduled to attend the International Electrical 
Exposition in Philadelphia.  The founders included many of the key inventors and 
commercial leaders in the burgeoning technology, including inventor-entrepreneurs such 
as Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell.180  The organization was to accept as 
members practitioners of the trade on both the engineering and commercial side as well 
as instructors and other interested observers.  The organization was attuned to activities 
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that reinforced the development of technology to support industrial expansion, such as 
the precision measurement of electric parameters and the use of mathematics to better 
comprehend electrical phenomena.  This knowledge assisted the capability to build, 
operate and maintain complex technological systems.  The new society would hold 
meetings, elect officers, publish papers, propose standards, interact with other 
engineering societies, shield its members from intrusive legislation, and instill a greater 
professionalism in the growing ranks of electrical engineers.181   
Education and the establishment of technical standards were some of the most 
pressing issues promoted by the society in its first decades of existence.  The struggle 
between educating the new members of the profession in a broad range of science and 
mathematics, as well as practical laboratory work, as opposed to merely training the new 
worker for the upcoming job, was apparent in the early years.  The emphasis on 
education became predominant, though with a curriculum heavily weighted towards the 
technical end of the spectrum.  Business and economics were also valued, but the hands-
on work of the student in an actual electrical company was considered more important as 
a means of gaining the real world experience that would be required to excel upon 
graduation.  Not all members concurred with this assessment, but a large number of 
students across the nation had practical experience in an actual firm as part of their 
education.182     
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Standardization was another consuming line of effort for the society.  Here the 
organization struggled to first create common units of measurement, definitions and 
terminology.183  Later efforts attempted to build consensus on applied science, 
engineering and manufacturing.  Much like any work with many authors, gaining 
consensus was not an easy task, but by the mid 1940s most standards had achieved 
international acceptance, assisted no doubt by the destruction of competing electrical 
firms in Europe.184   
While the creation of technical standards took time to achieve accord, the 
consensus to create an ethical standard for the practitioner of the new engineering 
discipline was more contentious and required numerous revisions.  In 1906, Dr. Shyuyler 
Skaats Wheeler had proposed a code of “Engineering Honor” to the assembled members 
of the AIEE in Milwaukee.  Later that year, a working group composed of Wheeler, H. 
W. Buck, former chief electrical engineer at the Niagara Falls hydroelectric power 
station, and noted scientist Charles P. Steinmetz, wrote a Code of Ethics for consideration 
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by the society.185  Submitted to the body in May, 1907, it drew immediate criticism, even 
from its authors.  The first segment of the code required engineers to act with the “highest 
principles of honor” in mind, as well as emulate the same standards of conduct 
professionally that he might follow in other portions of civil society.  This latter 
admonition failed to make the first edit of the code.  While other aspects of the code’s 
emphasis on business concerns caused comment, the section discussing the engineer’s 
relation to his employer drew stern discourse.  The engineer was required to bring to the 
attention of his employer any flaws or defects in the functioning of system he was 
responsible for that might be dangerous to the humans operating it.  If the employer did 
not take corrective action, the engineer should remove himself from the activity.  
Criticism of this resulted in the removal of the last action, with only the requirement to 
notify the employer of the problem remaining.186   
Additional revisions caused the entire process to stall and the code languished in 
the society’s files until 1911 when the new President of the AIEE, Dugald Jackson, 
appointed a new working group to establish a broad based “moral standard or the ethics 
of the profession.”187   The group, composed of members from all facets of the electrical 
industry, as well as the members of the original committee, submitted their assignment in 
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the beginning of 1912 for consideration by the society.  The new revisions further diluted 
the requirements for action by engineers upon discovery of safety problems, but were 
suitable enough to pass muster with the Board of Directors, which voted to accept it in 
March, 1912.188   
While a business oriented ethic, the AIEE’s Code of Professional Conduct also 
clarified the engineer’s role in dealing with the public and other non-technical persons.  
The code suggested that only its well educated devotees could comprehend the subject of 
electrical engineering and the ramifications of any project.  Engineers were to “assist the 
public to a fair and correct general understanding of engineering matters . . . and to 
discourage the appearance of untrue, unfair or exaggerated statements on engineering 
subjects in the press.”189   Members should endeavor to avoid providing “opinions on a 
subject without being fully informed as to all the facts relating thereto,” as to do so was 
“unprofessional.”190  Finally, an engineer in charge of a project “should not permit non-
technical persons to overrule his engineering judgments on purely engineering 
grounds.”191   A noted omission was that the code did not discuss the effects of any 
operation or construction of electrical devices on their surroundings or the possible public 
hazards associated with their use.  
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As approved, the code was endorsed again in 1922 by the AIEE’s Board of 
Directors, but by the 1940’s desires to update the code took hold in the society.192  A 
committee with Jackson as its chairman proposed a revised Canon of Ethics with thirty 
one items in 1942.  The draft was reviewed by other American and Canadian engineering 
societies, as well as the numerous subordinate organizations of the AIEE, gaining final 
approval by the AIEE’s Board of Directors in November 1947.  Further changes to the 
code then ensued in order to incorporate some of the provisions of the 1912 Code of 
Professional Conduct.  These changes were then adopted in August of 1950.193   
The 1950 Statement of Principles of Professional Conduct of the American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers was broader in scope than its predecessor.  While still 
emphasizing the business portion of the engineering profession, the code expanded upon 
the engineer’s relationship with society.  The code’s forward noted this transformation: 
“It is his duty to interest himself in the public welfare, and be ready to apply his special 
knowledge for the benefit of mankind.”194  The engineer should have “due regard for the 
safety and health of the public and employees who may be affected by the work for 
which he is responsible.”195   
                                                 
192.  H. B. Smith from Worcester served on this committee before his death.  See 
Statement of Principles of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers.  Board of Directors.  4 August 1950.  
193.  Ibid. 
194.  Ibid.  
195.  Ibid. 
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The new code still maintained the attitude that the public was not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to second guess the professional in the course of his normal duties.  The 
engineer was still advised to avoid publicly discussing engineering subjects unless fully 
apprised of all of the facts, to not allow non-technical persons to overrule his engineering 
determinations, and to “present clearly the consequences to be expected from deviations 
proposed” by the overruling of such calculations.196 The engineer was again expected to 
inform the responsible actors if he detected unsafe conditions, but at the same time it was 
anticipated that he would avoid commenting on public policy unless he indicated the 
interests he was speaking for.  While striving to inform the public, he would “discourage 
the spreading of untrue, unfair and exaggerated statements regarding engineering.”197  
Restraint should also be exercised when criticizing other engineers in public, leaving 
such discourse to professional journals and engineering societies.198  The public was not 
expected to either comprehend or handle the issues that the engineer had expertly 
mastered.    
Post War Expansion and Enthusiasm 
The operators of the electric power grid entered the postwar period with a large 
number of factors that influenced their actions.  They had been successful in creating a 
new technological system using the blueprint invented by Thomas Edison at his initial 
Pearl Street mini-grid in New York City.  The electric power grid of the 1950’s dwarfed 
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Edison’s plant in terms of power generated and customers served, but conceptually it was 
very similar in terms of power generation, transmission and distribution.  The Insull 
doctrine of “build and grow” was still perceived as a valid model as the increased energy 
efficiency of postwar power plants promised room for future growth.  The population 
could envision a better quality of life through increased electricity use and the postponed 
consumer demand from the war was finally being felt in the commercial realm.   
Technical and business problems that had arisen in the 1920s and 1930s had been 
analyzed and overcome.  The occasionally burdensome holding company structures had 
for the most part been discarded, allowing the utility companies to focus on doing what 
they performed most proficiently.  The managers and engineers of these enterprises were 
well aware of their past successes and failures, and considered their technical and 
commercial acumen sufficient to handle future problems.  Educated and trained that their 
method of solving problems was necessary as well as sufficient, the utility leadership felt 
secure in their level of technical expertise.  The utilities had survived the challenges of 
the Great Depression and had met the demands of the Second World War using these 
skills.  It is not unreasonable to assume that NEES had similar pride in surmounting the 
trials of the past decades with optimistic expectations for the future.   
Focused on building and growing, NEES expansion in the 1950s attempted to 
make up for lost time.  Some of the older plants were refurbished or expanded to increase 
the overall efficiency of the electric power grid.  Energy usage rates to run the electric 
generation stations declined by over a third as higher efficiency plants came on line.  The 
Manchester Street station in Providence gained two new 45 MW high pressure steam 
plants, while a smaller station in Worcester expanded with a 33 MW plant in 1950.  A 
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new station in Salem Harbor just north of Boston had two 75 MW plants with another 
150 MW plant added later in the decade.  When the last Salem unit came on line, the site 
produced over half of NEES’s total generating capacity.  To maintain the steady flow of 
fuel to the plant, the Army Corps of Engineers directed the dredging of Salem’s harbor 
channel, allowing the larger tankers and colliers to discharge directly to the site.199  Older 
less efficient plants were retired, such as the aged 25 Hz turbines at the Manchester Street 
that had powered the UER’s trolleys.  The South Street station in Providence was 
partially upgraded with a 2000 pounds per square inch (psi) boiler that ran a 55 MW 
turbine generator.  The low pressure steam turbines at the plant were retired.200  While the 
main hydroelectric plants on the Deerfield and Connecticut Rivers were maintained, 
smaller units that had silted up or been degraded over the years were shutdown.201  Two 
new hydroelectric plants were also constructed.  One at Wilder, Vermont in 1950, added 
33 MW to the electric power grid.  The Wilder station generated local resistance to the 
project as the citizens losing their farmland for the site did not appreciate NEES’s desires 
to add newer more reliable sources of electric power to its inventory.  Addressing and 
allaying the fears of excessive farm land loss, building fish runs past the dam, and 
                                                 
199.  The Salem plants could burn either oil or coal, whichever was less 
expensive.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 146-148. 
200.  Ibid., 148-149.  
201.  The water turbine at the Scituate Reservoir was maintained.  Only requiring 
four hours of daily power generation to run the water purification system, NEES could 
use the other 1800 KW at a low cost.  See Gary Kulik and Julia Bonham, Rhode Island, 
An Inventory of Historic Engineering and Industrial Sites (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 224. 
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convincing state and federal organizations to grant the necessary licenses took years and 
added to the project’s overall cost.202 A much larger station on the Connecticut River just 
down stream from the dam at the company’s Comerford Station was added in 1957 after 
a four year construction project.  When finished, NEES could generate up to 530 MW of 
electric power from its hydroelectric plants.203      
While capacity was growing, so was the demand for power, accelerated by the 
company’s advertisement campaigns.  Consumers were advised of the “virtues of electric 
living” while contractors were advised on the best ways to install new electric appliances 
for the expanding housing market.204  The increased household consumption of electric 
power exceeded the reduction used in industrial activity as the New England region and 
Rhode Island in particular suffered economically following the end of the war.205  In 
Providence, the remaining large scale textile firms were shuttered while other factories 
moved to the suburbs.  Almost 50,000 people left the city in the 1950s, a population 
decline of 16.6 percent.206 
                                                 
202.  A harbinger of future resistance to electric power generation projects, the 
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Problems with the NEES business model caused by external forces became more 
pronounced even as the growth of the decade continued.  The high transportation costs to 
the power plants in New England resulted in NEES paying greater costs for fuel, even 
factoring in the advantages of seaborne coal delivery transport for the tidewater plants.    
Stronger unions resulted in greater labor costs, winterizing transmission lines to 
handle the climate was more expensive, and higher local taxes than in other regions all 
added up to a lower net profit for the utility.  With the completion of the last plant on the 
Connecticut River in 1957, there was not another easily exploitable location to create any 
new hydroelectric station.   
Even within the NEES organization, local utility subsidiaries had divergent goals 
that were at odds with the corporate headquarters’ intent.  For example, the operators at 
Narragansett Electric, now a valued NEES subsidiary for over two decades, still had a 
stubborn streak that at times struggled against higher level direction.  This independence 
was not always inefficient; Narragansett pioneered business practices that diffused into 
the rest of the company.  Company leadership was typically content to let the Providence 
centered Narragansett Electric as its reliability made up for its other foibles.207  The net 
result of these issues, related to both the hardware of the system itself as well as the 
control of the organizations that supported the grid, resulted in costs of up to ten times 
that of other regions.208   
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Narragansett Electric was emblematic of NEES’ concerns of electric power 
demand growing faster than capacity, or at least faster than the company’s ability to 
profit from the increasing demand for electricity.  Increased commercial and consumer 
demand for electric power was calculated to increase more than one hundred percent by 
1972, a worrisome figure particularly when utility planners had to ensure that peak power 
loads could be met.209  Concurrently, the Public Utility Commissions were not excited 
about increasing the rate tariffs for the company.  In 1956, Narragansett Electric applied 
to the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission for its first rate increase in thirty years.  
Presenting their case for a raise in rates, the advocates for Narragansett Electric stressed 
the increased fuel costs, depreciation of assets, cost of new generating plants, and 
anticipated expenses compared to expected revenues.  While appreciative of these 
arguments, the commissioners were unpersuaded by Narragansett’s desires for a healthier 
rate of return.  The firm’s conception of the generating capacity required to meet peak 
loading during the largest demand periods was questioned by the regulator’s subject 
matter experts, who concluded:   
In a large measure the respective judgments of the engineers who prepared and 
submitted studies of separations of Narragansett plant between inter and intrastate 
business were predicated upon their interpretation of the nature of firm versus 
interruptible power and the degree which Narragansett’s surplus capacity 
constituted a reserve of power for the entire New England Power System.210   
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210.  The hearings on the proposed rate increase also included the first public 
discussion of building an electric generating station on land that Narragansett Electric 
owned at Rome Point in North Kingstown, RI on Narragansett Bay.  The Commission 
members did not find this part of the discussion enlightening as they considered that it 
was filled with more assumptions than factual analysis. See State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantation, Forty-Sixth Annual Report of the Public Utilities Commission of 
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The Public Utilities Commission rejected Narragansett’s electric rate increase in 
1957.  Such defeats were not taken well by NEES management or the shareholders.  
Despite a steady increase in overall plant efficiency and system reliability, the company 
was spending more money to build greater electrical generating capacity to meet the 
higher postwar demand for its product, fueled partly by the company’s own 
advertisement campaigns.  Household electricity consumption had more than doubled, 
increasing by almost 1000 kilowatt-hours (kWh) since the end of the war, yet the electric 
utility had not been able to profit at the same consumer rate of change.  Still, New 
England averaged higher costs than the nation, a fact understood by the Public Utilities 
Commission.211   
The Lure of Nuclear Power 
As a way out of this conundrum, NEES began to consider alternate methods to 
generate electricity.  In the 1950’s the appeal of nuclear powered electric generation 
plants began to entice the electric utility business.  This technology, rising from a portion 
of the research from the Manhattan Project during the Second World War, looked 
promising to the utility industry for a number of reasons.  The plants, powered from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Department of Business Regulation for the Year Ending December 31, 1957  
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fission of the Uranium 235 isotope, were estimated to result in a significant reduction in 
the cost of fuel burned per kilowatt of electricity generated.212   With fuel costs in New 
England already higher than the national average, this estimate was attractive.  Larger 
generating capacity nuclear powered plants might allow greater economies of scale for 
the utilities, particularly if the smaller companies pooled their resources to build the 
larger plants.  Using higher voltage transmission lines, these plants would be able to 
transmit more power with fewer line losses, again increasing the profitability of the 
venture.  Linked in to the other regional systems, these plants would provide greater 
reliability and stability to the electric power grid, particularly in peak power periods.  
While the initial cost of the plants would be high, pooling the capital required for 
construction would limit the risk to any one utility.213  Nuclear power was considered 
merely another heat source; a new way of boiling water to run the steam generators in the 
station.214   
The Federal government was willing and eager to support the repurposing of 
atomic energy out of its destructive mode into one more conducive for economic growth.  
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had been established in 1946 by President Harry 
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S. Truman to promote and manage the “peacetime development of atomic science and 
technology.”215 One of the members of the Military Liaison Committee to the AEC was 
William Webster.  A 1916 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, the Navy had 
sent Webster to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for graduate work in naval 
architecture.  He had served in the Navy for twelve years before resigning his 
commission and returning to the civilian world.  After departing the service, Webster had 
worked as the Vice President of Narragansett Electric, moving to NEES in the early 
1940s.  During the war Webster had served with the Office of Scientific Research & 
Development where his talents attracted the attention of senior leadership.216  Webster 
later served as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and 
Biological Defense Programs) and held other jobs in the Eisenhower Administration.  
Returning to NEES in 1951, Webster had become a firm advocate of the use of nuclear 
energy to power the electric industry.  Supported by NEES president Irwin Moore, 
Webster assembled a team of engineers and sent them to various military led nuclear 
projects to gain practical experience in harnessing the new power.217   
Webster also coordinated the efforts of other New England utility companies to 
examine the civilian uses of nuclear power.  In this respect he was running with the tide 
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of the era as the Federal government was promoting the use of this new technology 
through new legislation.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed the civilian ownership 
of nuclear reactors (though not the uranium fuel) as well as the sharing of technical 
information and generous licensing regulations, all of which opened the gates for the 
civilian nuclear power industry.218  Gaining support of other neighboring utility 
companies, Webster formed Yankee Atomic Energy Company in 1954 to take advantage 
of this opportunity.  NEES acquired a thirty percent share by contributing twenty million 
dollars in the company’s formation, though the other utility companies were willing to let 
NEES manage the nascent firm.  Webster helped synchronize the research efforts of the 
AEC, the Westinghouse Corporation, one of the nation’s leading nuclear technology 
firms, and NEES itself to assist the construction of the first atomic power plant in 
Shippingport, Pennsylvania. This design was a modified U.S. Navy submarine 
pressurized-water reactor and, though experimental, provided significant construction 
experience to all parties.  Additionally, the state governments all passed legislation that 
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paralleled the federal ordinances and were highly favorable to these endeavors.219  Thus 
by 1957 when Yankee Atomic Energy was ready to build its own nuclear power plant, 
the design and construction teams from the various companies involved in the 
Shippingport project were more capable of building it.  The nuclear power plant was built 
in Row, Massachusetts, not far from the NEES monitoring team at the Harriman Station 
and adjacent to important transmission lines.  Finished ahead of schedule and under 
budget in 1960, the station provided 145 MW of electric power to the regional grid, later 
increasing its capacity to 175 MW.220   
The future of nuclear power in New England looked bright following the success 
of this construction, but NEES did not follow it up with its own fully owned plant.  
Despite Webster’s success and optimistic predictions for nuclear power in the world, 
NEES did not push this initiative for another decade.221  Other nuclear power plants being 
constructed in New England gained financial and engineering support from NEES, but 
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the company did not attempt to build one for its own portion of the electric power grid 
during this period.  The company thought that the licensing process for the next 
generation of nuclear plants would be lengthy and other types of plants might be more 
profitable.222  NEES followed a course of action in the next decade that favored 
integration with other utilities as opposed to blazing a trail of technological innovation 
that its initial success in the nuclear power plants might have suggested.223  Instead, the 
company mimicked actions from its earlier successes, confident that the same actions in 
the future would guarantee growth and profits.   
Into the 1960s 
The actions of NEES during the 1960s belied any concern for future perturbations 
in their business model.  The Insull “build and grow” method of creating larger electrical 
demand from industry and consumers while simultaneously building larger and more 
efficient power plants was continued.  Marketing leadership in the company pushed their 
salesmen to advocate all electric heating in residences and commercial properties, 
providing lower rates for those dwellings.  With revenue from residential electrical loads 
growing at seven to eight percent per year, such marketing was both effective and 
profitable.  The national economic prosperity of the early 1960s also permitted industry 
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to spend more on electricity which added money to NEES’s bottom line and assisted the 
company’s stock valuation.224   
Increasing load still required an increased ability to meet the demand, which in 
turn required building plants of greater capacity and efficiency.  In the early 1960s NEES 
began construction of two new electric power plants on Brayton Point on Mount Hope 
Bay, an estuary of Narragansett Bay, near Somerset, Massachusetts.  The new facilities 
were designed to be the largest and most efficient electric generation plants in the NEES 
inventory.  The Brayton Point projects were lauded as cutting edge designs with 
numerous “firsts” in electric plant technology.225  When completed in 1964, each plant 
could produce 250 MW of electric power, eclipsing the Salem Station capacity by fifty 
percent.  The plants were ten percent more efficient as well, making them amongst the 
most efficient in the nation.  This new capacity allowed NEES to retire less efficient 
plants and to place the stations at Lynn and Worcester, Massachusetts in reduced status.  
Fuel transportation costs could also be reduced by bringing the coal in by sea from other 
parts of the nation or foreign sources.  In the mid 1960s a further addition was ordered to 
be constructed at the same location.  Brayton Point #3 promised much greater capacity 
(650 MW) and efficiency then the previous plants when it came on line in 1969 but 
reliability issues would significantly degrade the profitability of this facility.226   
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Other power plant construction began during the decade to provide the capacity 
required to keep up with the expanding demand though they were capital intensive would 
not be available until the early 1970s.  The Brayton Point #4 station and Salem Harbor #4 
station were designed to provide 430 MW of power to meet peak electrical loading using 
coal-fired boilers. A pumped storage hydroelectric station at Bear Swamp on the 
Deerfield River was licensed in 1969.  This station used relatively inexpensive electric 
power to pump water to an elevated reservoir at night when electric load on the grid was 
at a minimum.  During the day, the direction of water flow was reversed and the pumps 
acted as electric turbine generators, producing power for the hungry system.  When 
completed in 1974, the plant would provide an additional 600 MW of power to the grid.  
Finally new transmission lines were built to bring the power to the required locations for 
distribution.  Coordinating with other local and regional utilities, NEES assisted in the 
construction of 345 kV high voltage transmission lines linking the major generation 
stations in the area.  Interconnections with other utilities allowed the transmission of 
excess power out of or into the New England area as the demand varied.   These projects 
were important to NEES to meet demand, but cost overruns on these projects ate into 
corporate profits and construction delays impacted system reliability and flexibility.227  In 
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the meantime, in an effort to reduce fuel costs, the coal-fired plants were altered to burn 
oil instead.  With a surplus of oil on the market from the Middle East oil fields despite the 
turmoil from the Six Day War, the decision in 1967 by NEES executive Guy Nichols to 
shift to oil burning was highly beneficial to the company.  Oil was a cleaner fuel to burn, 
was easier to transfer and use in the electric power plants, and led to NEES having the 
least expensive fuel costs in the area.228       
Other methods were applied to increase the efficiency of the system.  Company 
management duties and responsibilities were reorganized in 1960 when Webster became 
the NEES president after Moore had moved up to chairman. The new organization was 
structured along functional lines with central control but authorized the regional retail 
power providers to take action to solve local problems.  This permitted standardized 
doctrine for the local service providers in the operation of the grid components.  Later in 
the decade, Webster empowered the NEES vice-presidents with greater authority and 
responsibility.  New faces rose to leadership positions during Webster’s shakeup.  Guy 
Nichols, a WPI graduate, was placed in charge of day-to-day operations in addition to his 
responsibilities for engineering, construction and labor relations.  The company began to 
use a new technology, the digital computer, to examine the efficient operation of its 
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components within the overall system.  At first, the company computers were used as an 
accounting tool for billing and inventory control, but as operators became familiar with 
the capabilities, other portions of grid operation were analyzed.  By the end of the decade 
NEES had moved its system headquarters to Westborough, Massachusetts, close to its 
computing facility.229   
Externally, NEES looked at possible mergers to increase its efficiency and 
profitability, efforts which were costly in time and ultimately unsuccessful.  As the 
company’s financial underpinnings improved during the decade, it looked at neighboring 
utilities as possible merger partners in the hope that such fusion would lower 
administrative costs and provide economies of scale that would increase overall profits.  
Initially NEES president Webster was more interested in promoting regional consensus 
on nuclear power plants, a delay which cost the opportunity to merge with adjoining 
Western Massachusetts Electric (WME).  Spurned in its initial courtship, WME 
executives turned to other Connecticut utilities, Hartford Electric Light and Connecticut 
Light & Power to form a new conglomerate, Northeast Utilities, in 1965.  NEES objected 
to this merger with the SEC and even countered WME’s plans with a lucrative offer, but 
the SEC denied NEES’s protestations and WME rejected NEES’s bid.230    
Defeated in its efforts to expand to the west, NEES looked east to the Boston 
metropolitan area and Cape Cod.  Boston Edison, a company with long term ties with 
NEES was attentive, and in turn generated interest from the new Northeast Utilities to 
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form a super company that would power the region.  After Northeast Utilities dropped 
out of merger talks in 1966, Eastern Utilities Associates joined in.  With service to 
northern Rhode Island and the Fall River area as well as Boston, Eastern Utilities 
Associates was a good fit with the other two companies.  Stockholders gave an initial 
approval to the merger and the Internal Revenue Service signaled their endorsement, but 
the SEC and local governments were not impressed by the proposed union.  The 
municipalities feared the loss of control over the local retail power companies from the 
new behemoth and filed numerous suits against the merger with the SEC.  The legal 
struggle lasted into the mid 1970s before the SEC would conditionally permit the merger. 
By then the interests and finances of the various signatories had diverged and the 
companies dropped the matter rather than renegotiate the deal.231    
System Catastrophe: The Great Northeast Blackout 
In the interim the electric grid and the companies operating it had received one of 
the largest shocks to the system.  In 1965 the electric power grid experienced the largest 
loss of power in its history.  Commencing at approximately 5:16 PM on November 9th of 
that year, an estimated 30 million people in Canada and the United States lost power for 
periods of a few minutes to more than half a day.  The outage covered 80,000 square 
miles in the greater northeastern area, including all of Rhode Island, New York, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and portions of New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey and Ontario.  The temporary power loss involved a total of 28 electric utility 
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companies in the United States and Canada which had various levels of connectivity to 
provide electric power in the area.232   
The proximate cause of the event was the opening of a single circuit breaker on a 
single high voltage (230kV) transmission line in Ontario, Canada that sent power into the 
United States.  The resultant electrical transient on the Canadian lines, as that portion of 
the grid attempted to regain equilibrium, caused additional circuit breakers to open, 
dropping over 550 MW of electric power from the system.  As the other electric 
generating stations in the United States attempted to pick up the load, the instability in the 
system triggered the automatic opening of further circuit breakers throughout the region.  
Within less than a minute the cascading electrical transients caused a loss of power being 
transmitted to New York City and Boston.  Operators in New York City at the Convex 
power station manually opened the transmission lines to NEES through Connecticut, 
causing some NEES plants to shut down.  By 5:21 PM most of the electric power grid 
under NEES auspices had lost power and, along with most of the northeast United States, 
went black.233    
Throughout the area, transportation systems were paralyzed as subways lost 
power and stop lights went out.  Hospitals lost commercial power and many did not have 
a backup power supply.  Communications, television stations and telephone systems were 
interrupted, and public services such as water and sewage systems were disrupted.  Even 
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national defense installations were affected, though these typically had additional sources 
of power to stay in operation.  In Massachusetts, prisoners at the Walpole State 
Penitentiary rioted, causing 75 thousand dollars worth of damage to the facility.234   
Rhode Island was deenergized with the rest of the northeast.  As power plant and 
system operators struggled to determine what had occurred, the state government 
responded with equal inertia.  The Republican governor of the state, John H. Chaffee, 
was on a plane over the Pacific Ocean, the lieutenant governor was in Boston and equally 
out of communication, the next in line, the president pro-tem of the senate, was in Puerto 
Rico, while the fourth individual in the line of authority was in Hawaii.  The first deputy 
secretary of state was in Rhode Island but was ignorant of the fact he was in charge.  
Eventually the governor’s executive secretary took charge and directed emergency 
actions on Chaffee’s behalf.235  
In New England, NEES operators worked rapidly to restore electric power to the 
area.  As operators were able to shut open circuit breakers, power was transmitted from 
the Harriman hydroelectric plant in Vermont down to Worcester, which permitted the 
restoration of the Webster Street station by 6 PM.  The plant was fully operational by 
7:33 PM.  At Brayton Point, both plants dropped off line during the initial surge 
conditions.  The #1 station was back on line by 6:25 PM but the #2 station was not 
                                                 
234.  Ibid., 37-40.  
235.  “Govt. Also Lacked Power,” Providence Journal, November 10, 1965. 
146 
 
restarted until the next day.236  In Providence, the lack of an emergency generator delayed 
the restoration of power until one could be sent in from Millbury, Massachusetts.  Other 
regional utilities had spare power and once the interconnecting links had been restored, 
the rest of the city was reenergized.  By 10 PM most of the electric power grid had been 
restored in Rhode Island, though Boston and New York City took longer to regain all of 
their power.237    
Calls for an investigation into what had gone wrong began even before the lights 
were restored in the northeast.  President Lyndon B. Johnson directed the Federal Power 
Commission to investigate the power outage and an advisory panel to the Commission 
delivered their report less than a month later. The panel members worked diligently with 
members of the utilities to identify the root causes of the power outage as well as draw 
the necessary conclusions from the events to make purposeful recommendations to 
prevent a recurrence of the event.  The investigators resolved both the technical and the 
human portions of the blackout, from the initial cause of the transient in Canada where a 
circuit breaker had tripped due to an incorrect setting to the poor response of the 
operators in New York City that had resulted in the complete shutdown of the system.238      
The investigation suggested that the reliability of the electric power grid was not 
as high as the utility managers desired.  The linking of numerous electrical generators all 
                                                 
236.  Federal Power Commission, Northeast Power Failure, November 9 and 10, 
1965.  A Report to the President by the Federal Power Commission December 6, 1965 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 6 December 1965): 32.  
237.  Ibid., 59-60. 
238.  Ibid., 17-20. 
147 
 
operating at the same voltage and frequency specifications was not sufficient to 
counteract the transients experienced on November 9, 1965, or that the electric power 
grid was likely to see in the future.  While the reserve capacity of the on line generators 
might have suggested an ability to meet the power demand when other generators began 
to drop off line, in reality these stations could not come up to speed in time to avert the 
casualty.  The “pooling” of power by the utility companies through interconnection of 
their individual systems did make the system more reliable but additional work was 
required.  Larger capacity transmission lines and larger plants were also desirable, 
particularly nuclear power plants, to provide greater flexibility to the system and permit 
automatic emergency assistance.239  The panel recommended that the utility companies 
take action to create an “integrated and coordinated power pool” by improving the 
transmission networks between the regional companies, led by a “unified planning 
group.”240  While more studies were required, the panel recommended that the utilities err 
on the side of reliability when balancing this against other economic factors.  The panel 
also made a number of recommendations regarding establishing back up power supplies 
for hospitals, transportation and communications systems as well as conducting 
additional training for electric power operators.241  
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Utility companies took these lessons to heart, as the electric power grid had failed 
in an unexpected manner and faster than the automatic safety devices or human operators 
could effectively counter.  The electric utility companies had considered the electric 
power grid to be too large with many diverse power generation sources to be threatened 
in the manner that caused the Northeast outage.  The alleged reliability of the system had 
been shown to be less than advertised and immediate actions were the order of the day.  
Additional automatic low frequency circuit breaker modifications were installed to 
protect the electric generators from overload conditions.  Emergency diesel generators 
were installed at the Brayton Point and Salem Harbor stations to permit those plants to be 
restarted independent of other grid facilities.  Regional utilities worked together to install 
higher capacity transmission lines to safely carry a greater load.  The new 345 kV 
transmission lines became the new standard for the area.242   
Perhaps more importantly, the regional utilities began to work more closely 
together to address the power pooling recommendations of the Federal Power 
Commission.  In the late 1960s the regional utilities began to develop procedures and 
technologies that permitted the more continuous monitoring of the electric grid operating 
parameters of electric load and frequency.  To some extent the utilities had always had 
this capability, but under the pressure from the federal government to prevent another 
regional black out, the companies were more amenable to both share information and 
electric power with their adjacent competitors.  New computer technology, connected 
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high voltage power lines and consolidated command post allowed the operators to shift 
power between the various utility companies to meet dynamic load conditions.243  In 
1967, the region’s utility companies established the New England Power Exchange 
(NEPEX).  NEPEX had the authority and responsibility to coordinate the power 
transmission of four subordinate dispatching centers.  Connecticut, Maine and New 
Hampshire each had their own dispatching center, while Massachusetts was divided 
between the Northeast Utilities’ Connecticut dispatching center and NEES’ center in 
Westborough, MA.  This station, known as Rhode Island-Eastern Massachusetts-
Vermont Energy Control (REMVEC), controlled electric power transmission in Rhode 
Island, Eastern Massachusetts and Vermont.244  
This new setup was initially open to possible abuse by the utilities contributing to 
the region’s electric power.  Companies avoided operations of lower efficiency plants to 
cover dynamic loads, preferring to let the other utilities pick up the costly requirements.  
Cost and financial transactions arguments bedeviled the leadership of the larger utilities, 
while the smaller ones attempted to play off the larger ones to their advantage.  While the 
operators at the regional dispatch centers could make local decisions on the grid, the 
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companies still had to balance the books and the load at the end of the day.  These 
concerns would lead to the formation of the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) in 
1971 with greater coherence amongst its members to deal with power transmission issues 
and decisions throughout the region.  NEPOOL had authority from the member electric 
utilities to direct the most efficient plants to be started up to meet emergent electric power 
demand.  Less efficient electric power stations would only be operated if demand 
exceeded supply.  This was more efficient than the previous NEPEX methods but still 
encouraged electric power utilities to minimize construction of any excess capacity 
electric power generation as this would be rarely used.245    
 End of Decade Concerns 
As the end of the 1960s approached, the operators and owners of the electric 
power grid in southeastern New England could look with some satisfaction on their 
accomplishments over the past decades.  Electric power was readily available to the 
population at a manageable price.  A wide range of electric power generating stations 
could provide safe and reliable power to all the commercial and residential loads 
throughout the region.  Whether the customer wanted to run a vacuum or a blast furnace, 
the power was available.  The compactness of the area allowed for relatively short 
transmission lines between the numerous power plants, and the hydroelectric plants and 
steam powered generators were ready to make up for each other’s advantages and 
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disadvantages.  The burgeoning interconnectedness between utilities promised to make 
the grid even more reliable and potentially even more profitable.   
Within the state of Rhode Island, a total of five electric utility companies had 
survived to reach the 1960s.  While the Narragansett Electric Company (a NEES 
subsidiary) was the largest company providing power to the greatest area and population, 
smaller companies such as the Newport Electric Corporation (supplying power to 
Aquidneck Island), and the Blackstone Valley Electric Company (providing power to 
communities in the Pawtucket area) were still viable companies though with smaller 
horizons.246  With its interstate assets from NEES, Narragansett Electric was still the first 
amongst equals.  The Blackstone Valley Electric Company was owned completely by 
Eastern Utilities Associates while Newport Electric was a private firm.  Even smaller 
companies provided power for niche markets.  The Block Island Power Company was 
responsible for that island’s electrification, while the Pascoag Fire District purchased 
power from Blackstone Valley and distributed it to customers in the Pascoag and 
Harrisville Fire Districts.247   
Rhode Island consumers could also take some satisfaction in the ready access to 
this power source.  Even if electricity costs in New England were higher than the national 
average they were not excessive.  A typical family living in Providence might pay 14.40 
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dollars a month to the Narragansett Electric Company for their electric bill, while a 
Newport resident would pay slightly higher (15.95 dollars) to the Newport Electric 
Corporation.248  With a median income in the state of $8,617, the electric bill was within 
the means of the average citizen.249   
On the other hand, there were rising economic, technical, and regulatory 
challenges to the standard methods of operating the electric power grid, issues that would 
threaten the normal mode of operation of the utility companies.  While previously any 
one of these issues would be detected, analyzed and resolved, the combination of forces 
would prove to be highly disruptive to the standard methods of operation that had been 
successful.  The effective doctrine of managing the new electrical generating or 
transmission technology, or surmounting the financial abyss of the Great Depression, or 
disruptive tendrils of federal regulation from the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 
was going to be tested in a new environment, and, like any doctrine, was going to be 
found lacking if strictly applied to scenarios that it was not designed to handle.  As 
always, perceptive and insightful analysis would be required to surmount the challenges 
and adapt to the new conditions.  Electric utilities with managers who could properly 
analyze the changing environment and adapt to the new conditions were better poised to 
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survive.  Those lacking this vital component, wedded to the past, were more likely to 
suffer.    
Economically, the combination of poor financial policies and the expensive 
stresses of the Vietnam War and domestic programs had caused a relative decline in the 
expansion of the national economy and an acceleration of the rate of inflation.  The 
nation’s gross national product expansion rate declined to a mere 2.6% as the decade 
ended from more torrid rates in the mid 1960s.  In the 1950s and through the mid 1960s 
the inflation rate had been slightly over 2%.  As the 1960s ended, the inflation rate had 
risen to 5%.  This led to higher financial costs for the capital intensive utility companies, 
costs that were hard to bear.  The prime rate from banks approached 8% in 1969 even as 
the economy was about to enter a recession.250  With long lead times between ordering 
and paying for expensive components of their power plants and those plants coming on 
line and actually producing a profit, industry managers found their bottom lines being 
squeezed even more tightly.251  Narragansett Electric had to pay these higher costs when 
it issued bonds in 1970 to meet its short term debts and pay for capital expenditures.  
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Smaller companies such as Blackstone Valley Electric and Newport Electric typically 
had to pay higher rates when they issued bonds as both had to in 1970.252     
 While inflation and recessions were national issues, they also affected the utilities 
in New England, particularly when combined with technical problems of the most recent 
advances in power generation technology.  Toward the end of the 1960s, the companies 
supplying the major electrical plant components to the utilities found that their research 
and development was not on par with their advertising.  Major suppliers such as 
Westinghouse and General Electric promised their customers that their latest electric 
turbine generators and steam plant components, though more expensive, would provide 
greater overall thermodynamic efficiency in the steam plants.  These components 
required higher operating temperatures and pressures to achieve these efficiencies and 
had more exacting tolerances for all components.  While such promises looked good in 
theory, and proved irresistible to the utilities throughout the country which were wedded 
to the doctrine of “grow and build,” in practice the new devices failed to deliver.  The 
materials the machines were constructed from could not withstand these higher 
temperatures and pressures, and often required costly shutdowns and repairs.253  Scaling 
up of previously effective technology, particularly in the turbine generators, also proved 
less effective than anticipated.  The manufacturers had replaced their conservative design 
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methods of “design by experience” with one of “design by extrapolation,” rapidly 
constructing up-scaled components of the older power plant models with little pre-
production testing.  This method had poor results with the newer machines failing at a 
much higher frequency than the more conservatively designed ones.254  Newer plants 
generating 600-800 MW of electric power required three to five times as much corrective 
maintenance and repair work than the smaller 200 MW plants.  These unplanned outages 
were due to both poorly designed components as well as the sheer complexity of the 
larger plants, neither of which were properly considered when the plants were 
constructed.255  NEES was not immune to these problems.  The Brayton Point high 
pressure electric turbine generators made by Westinghouse and installed in the number 
three plant proved particularly problematic, requiring expensive repairs and rarely 
meeting the advertised maximum performance.256    
The threat of new and more restrictive regulatory regimes also loomed on the 
horizon for the utility industry.  The growing environmental movement in the United 
States was generating its own impetus and beginning to cause concern within the electric 
utility industry.  Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring energized a new cohort of interested 
citizens who held divergent views on the benefits of capital intensive technological 
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enterprises.257  A series of highly publicized events maintained the pollution hazards of 
modern technological society in the national consciousness, from the detection of 
radioactive isotopes in the atmosphere from the fallout of nuclear weapons testing to the 
infamous fire on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio resulting from oil and chemical 
runoff from nearby industries.258  In southeastern New England, pollution in Narragansett 
Bay from Providence industrial activity, both from the city’s electric power plant and 
other firms, became more noticeable as people started to see it as less as the cost of 
economic progress and more as a health hazard to the community.259  An oil spill from a 
ship in 1960 deposited over 420,000 gallons of fuel oil south of Jamestown at the mouth 
of the bay.  Other water pollution from less drastic oil releases from ships bringing coal 
and oil to the Providence electric plants contributed to a rise of hydrocarbon sediment on 
the sea floor.260  The public became more cognizant of earlier industrial activity that had 
affected the watershed as well.  Investigators found high concentrations of chemical 
pollutants from the formerly vital jewelry and textiles industries as well as organic wastes 
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from poorly functioning wastewater facilities.261   Burning coal in the industrial facilities 
around the state also deposited pollutants in Narragansett Bay, as well as soot and 
particulate around the state.262   
As a national consensus emerged regarding the severity of pollution affecting the 
country’s atmosphere and waterways, legislation was passed by Congress to address 
these concerns.  A series of laws, starting with the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, the 
Clean Air Act of 1963, and the Water Quality Act of 1965 were positive indications that 
the population was interested in limiting the pollution associated with modernity.  In 
1970, Congress issued a more stringent series of amendments to the Clean Air Act, 
created the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and established the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as result of this continued interest.263   
Initially these concerns had been viewed as more of an anti-pollution regimen, 
anxieties that the utility companies were not averse to addressing.  Burning oil, as well as 
being more efficient, had less particulate air pollution.  NEES had incorporated noise 
reduction assemblies for its substations and had oil booms positioned around ships to 
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restrict any oil spills.264 NEES was less receptive to other local concerns.  Proposals  to 
run new higher voltage (345 kV) lines from the Brayton Point plant to a substation in 
Ayer, MA, northwest of Boston, ran into legal problems in 1965 when towns resisted 
NEES’s plan to build large towers on the rights-of-way.  The towns desired the utility to 
run the lines underground, which was feasible, but only at a much higher cost.  NEES 
balked and spent the next three years fighting the legal challenges before rejecting that 
design effort and building a different route through Millbury, MA.265   
While NEES took some action to resolve regulatory deficiencies associated with 
these new legal regimes, these issues appeared more as noise in the system than 
indications of a growing environmental awareness in the country.  To the engineers of the 
time, air pollution from industrial activity, and especially the generation of electricity, 
seemed to be a necessary cost to achieve the high standards of living the nation enjoyed.  
The demand for electric power was increasing every decade, in part to power the 
increased consumer use of new electrical appliances such as color television sets, 
dishwashers and air conditioners, even as electric heating was being installed in new 
homes.  The air pollution caused by burning fossil fuels as well as the “esthetic pollution” 
from more electric power transmission lines and electric substations caused angst from 
conservationists who attempted to limit their spread.266  Such electric power generating 
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plants did create smoke and soot, but previously these indications had accompanied 
economic growth and had been welcome.267  The smoke plume included toxins such as 
particulate matter containing heavy metals, carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
and various oxides of nitrogen, all of which were hazardous to human health.  Since the 
plants burned thousands of tons of coal or oil each day, the amount of such waste 
products produced was dramatic.  An efficient 1000 MW plant could easily produce 
30,000 tons of CO2, 600 tons of SO2 and 80 tons of NO2 each day.268  While electrostatic 
precipitators might limit most of the particulate exhaust from the smoke stacks, the 
enormous exhaust volume still meant tons of undesirable toxins would still be produced.  
None of the exhaust gases would be mitigated.269  Nuclear power plants were not immune 
to producing pollutants, though they discharged small amounts of low level radioactive 
effluent as well as large amounts of hot water that had to be cooled. 270   
The increasing public awareness of pollution as well as the pollution abatement 
technology required to minimize power plant exhaust products were known to the electric 
power grid operators.  Engineers, contemplating these issues using economic analysis, 
suggested technical solutions to the problems.  “Increasingly there is but one way into the 
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future - the technological way,” was a common theme when considering pollution 
issues.271  Since elimination of pollution was impossible regardless of the means of 
electric power generation, the public needed to use a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate 
what level of abatement they would be willing to pay for.  Thwarting the actions of 
individual polluters was not considered possible so society as a whole would be forced to 
respond to the problem.272   
Solutions were proposed, from better electrostatic precipitators on power plant 
smoke stacks to siting plants further away from population centers.  Philip Sporn, a 
former chief executive officer of the American Gas and Electric Company and insightful 
observer of the electric power industry, noted these changes but warned that pollution 
abatement would be expensive and take a long time to fully implement.  Natural gas was 
recognized to be a much cleaner fuel than coal in terms of toxic materials released into 
the atmosphere, though burning it would still generate CO2.  Nuclear power was 
generally considered to be a safe alternative with minimal pollution problems and worth 
the cost.  Niche sources of energy, such as tidal flows, geothermal, or the wind and the 
sun were dismissed as being too small and unreliable to support the current, let alone the 
future demand for electric power.273  Cleanup of existing polluted areas would take a 
decade or more and cost hundreds billions of dollars.  Any major deviation from the 
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current setup of electric power generation, transmission and distribution would take a 
generation to achieve and cost even more.  Such a drastic course change would require 
immense studies and a national effort to achieve such alterations in the construction and 
operation of the electric power grid.  With the prospect of continued growth and demand 
for electric power, such proposals were not considered seriously even as the utilities were 
on the verge of technological culmination.274   
Theory vs. Practice: Eighty Years of Progress for the Electric Power Grid 
Judging the over eighty years of progress and growth of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England as more indicative of either technological determinism or 
momentum is not simple.  Both theories of the development of advanced technology 
systems are able to take the presented data and fit the observations into the range of 
behavior the theories propose to explain.  Equally, there are events during this period that 
fall outside of either theories’ best fit curve resulting in some cognitive dissonance to 
accept that they are worthy of inclusion at all.   
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The narrative of growth of the electric power grid is often presented as a linear 
process, at least when viewed in terms of technology.  Here, the smaller firms led by 
creative entrepreneurs and insightful technicians built a progressively more capable 
system of generating, transmitting and distributing electric power throughout the region.  
As the technology improved to permit greater amounts of electric power to be transmitted 
longer distances, the local firms coalesced into a smaller number of regional electric 
power utilities.  The pinnacle of this evolutionary consolidation was the mammoth 
holding company, which directed the business activities of numerous electric utilities at a 
national level.  Eventually political concerns caused the break up of the electric utility 
holding companies, with the resulting businesses more focused on the maintenance, 
operation and construction of the electric power grid.   
The New England Electric System emerged from this period as a capable and 
efficient organization led by a cohort of individuals well tested in surmounting the 
extreme challenges of the Great Depression and powering the required industrial 
production of the Second World War.  Its underlying ethic of efficiency and engineering 
excellence was well inculcated in the membership of the company.  Infused with this 
ethic and with the experience of successive technological achievements, even harnessing 
the atom to energize the electric power gird, this confident veteran group could be 
excused some of their exuberance.     
Proponents of either model of technological development can claim this narrative 
falls within their respective theoretical construct.  Certainly Mumford would not be 
surprised by the development to this point.  Noting the electric power grid’s growth, 
Mumford observed that modern society’s functions were supported by new technological 
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networks, chief among them the electric power grid.  The unification of the various 
smaller and larger electric utility companies to power the collective system was a logical 
consequence of the technical limitations and advantages of the different facilities:   
The electric power grid, in contrast, is rather a network of power plants, some big, 
some small, some worked by waterpower, some by coal, scattered over a large 
area, often thousands of square miles.  Some of these plants by themselves could 
supply only their immediate community, others have greater range.275   
Mumford’s description of the electric power grid correlates well with NEES’s actions to 
build and buy a variety of electric power plants in order to attain greater system reliability 
and efficiency, and hence profitability.  Mumford was also reflexive on the ability of the 
electric power grid to transmit electric power to where it was desired, irrespective of 
preexisting urban structures.  Much like a large library system that allows users to borrow 
books from any authorized branch, users of the electric power grid could receive power 
from any power plant once they were connected to the system itself.276  This system 
construction permitted the diffusion of economic activity beyond the former urban 
locations, which corresponded to the reduction of Providence’s economy as the textile 
industry moved south. 
Mumford was less coherent on how the electric power grid would permit the 
decentralization of human control.  In his earlier works he conjectured that advanced 
technology systems might permit a “new urban order” including two-way political 
intercourse between the humans controlling these systems and those using them.277  
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While acknowledging that these systems could be “misused and perverted by the existing 
political systems,” Mumford exhibited some optimism regarding the continued 
development of the electric power grid and how it might help the human condition.278  
His later work was less hopeful.279  Now the electric power grid was a vital component of 
the smothering national megamachine that pursued material abundance for the population 
and the maintenance of efficiency.280  Admittedly that arrangement had provided any 
number of devices that provided short term benefits to the population’s quality of life, 
such as the electric powered refrigerators, television sets and washing machines.  In 
acquiring those goods the population had acquiesced to the cost-benefit analysis of 
technocrats and engineers without assessing what had been abandoned.  The trends were 
not favorable: 
These tendencies have already gone far enough to permit one to forecast their 
ultimate consequences in no counter-movement takes place.  The final triumph of 
technocratic society would be the consolidation of every human activity into an 
autocratic and monolithic system.  This would produce a mode of existence in 
which functions that cannot be canalized would be suppressed or extirpated.281       
Mumford saw the increased interaction between the operators of the electric 
power grid and national leadership as foreseeable based on the bargain the population had 
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accepted with the megamachine.  To maintain the large scale manufacturing processes 
perfected during the Second World War, mass advertising would be used to keep the 
population consuming the rationalized production of industry.  This cooperation might 
entail regulation by the government to maintain the continuity of power as evidenced in 
the investigation of the root causes of the 1965 Northeast power failure.  Sharing of 
nuclear technology to build electric power plants would be another predictable facet of 
this trend.  Moving towards a regional control of the electric power grid along the lines of 
NEPOOL would also be within the boundaries of Mumford’s anticipation for any 
advanced technology system.282  Given the development of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England towards greater centralization, Mumford’s later thoughts seem 
more aligned with reality.   
Jacque Ellul’s thoughts on the development of advanced technological systems 
are less specific for the electric power grid though he also stated that the smaller 
networks would coalesce:   
Electrical networks may remain for some time independent of one another.  But 
his situation cannot last when it is found that independence gives rise to general 
costs of no inconsiderable magnitude, difficulties in arranging the courses of the 
lines, and even practical difficulties in electrical technique.  The interconnection 
of electrical networks is demanded by all technical men.  Again, the only question 
is: who will execute it?  And it is immediately clear that only the state is in a 
position to do so.283   
While state control of the electric power grid had not been accomplished in New 
England, there were certainly greater regulatory efforts to manage the network.  The 
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federal government’s Public Utility Holding Company Act and amendments to the 
Federal Power Act all indicate that Washington was interested and more than willing to 
intercede to maintain the continuity of power.   
Members of NEES certainly personified Ellul’s adage that modern man was “so 
enthusiastic about technique, so assured of its superiority, so immersed in the technical 
milieu, that without exception they are oriented towards technical progress.”284 NEES 
provided electric power at a geometrically increasing rate to meet demand using a “Grow 
and Build” business model that worked for decades.  Mangers such as William Webster 
brought his fervor for atomic energy back to NEES following his stint in the government 
in the Second World War.  The leadership of AIEE created their own code of ethics of 
how electrical engineers should conduct their affairs while operating the electric power 
grid.   
Advocates of Thomas P. Hughes’ concept of technological momentum can also 
point out numerous examples that support this theory.  For this model of reality, the 
organizations that directly or indirectly support the electric power grid would take greater 
precedence than the overwhelming centralizing influence of technique or the 
megamachine.  While the actions of the organizations that eventually merged into NEES 
are important, of equal consequence are the actions of institutions such as the Rhode 
Island Public Utility Commission, the industries that made the wires for the electric 
utility transmission lines, and the universities that educated the operators of the electric 
power grid.  Advanced technology systems like the electric power grid spawned any 
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number of entities with their own vested interests, providing the “mass of technical, 
organizational, and attitudinal components that tends to maintain their steady growth and 
direction.”285  Improved technology to make more efficient turbine generators or 
transformers to increase the transmission line voltage were necessary for the growth of 
the electric power grid, but the supporting organizations were the ones that made growing 
and building more than a concept.   
All of the theorists profited from writing retrospectively on the development of 
advanced technological systems.  The electric power grid fits into the suggested theories 
as the electric power grid’s expansion was used to assist in the development of the 
respective theories.  Yet each of the theories has problems in fitting all of the data to the 
match the hypothesis.  Was the creation of the immense holding companies such as 
International Paper & Power necessary to fund the large capital investments required to 
build the electric power grid?  The name of the company suggests that its focus was not 
primarily on the electric power generation component of the business.  If technique was 
singularly important at driving all organizations toward efficiency, should not the 
portions of the company devoted to the production of paper been sloughed off in order to 
maintain the highest efficiency for the electric power production side?   Instead, it took a 
force of the magnitude of the Great Depression leading to the public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 to cause this divorce.  
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The case for technological momentum also requires some massaging to make the 
data fit the curve.  The case of International Paper & Power is again illustrative.  Hughes 
states that “forces analogous to those that killed off the dinosaurs are needed” to alter 
advanced technological systems.286  The Great Depression appears to be that apocalyptic 
event, but even after the dust from the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 had 
settled, the electric utility companies were performing the same operation.  Regardless of 
the ultimate authority in the business end of the electric power grid, the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity continued.  It appears that for the theory of 
technological momentum to be clearly established, the advanced technology system has 
to actually change its trajectory.  Merely generating momentum is not sufficient to 
distinguish the path from that of technological determinism.  Additional events would be 
required to establish which theory was more accurate.         
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONSERVATION TO ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE OCEAN STATE 
 
The arch-enemy of the Affluent Society would not be Karl Marx but Henry 
Thoreau.  
- Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon of Power 
 
During the development of the electric power grid, numerous smaller companies 
were established independently of one another.  Over time, as they expanded, they ran 
into the geographic boundaries of other similarly organized electric power grids that were 
constrained by the same physical laws.  The companies often merged or were subsumed 
in the business takeovers of the era.  In the end, only the most technically proficient and 
economically viable organizations adapted and survived.  From the myriad smaller 
electric utility companies, the New England Electric System (NEES) emerged as the 
main player in the southeastern New England area.   
The beginning of the environmental organizations in the same area during the 
concurrent period of electric utility growth followed a completely different model.   
Towards the end of the nineteenth century there were only a small number of 
conservationist minded organizations in the region.  Under the fertilization of the new 
ideas of the burgeoning environmental movement, these groups either adapted to the new 
landscape and grew, or failed to incorporate these new concepts and became less 
relevant.  New organizations with more fundamental ideas also arose, filling different 
niches in the landscape of civil society.  These different pedigreed groups were not 
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always aligned with one another but could use shared values and doctrines to coalesce 
around for particular issues.  Much like the electric power grid, the growth of these 
organizations was protracted.  Unlike the electric power grid, environmental ethics 
evolved faster than the organizations that were motivated by them.     
The Beginning of Environmental Thought in America 
The growth and development of the environmental movement in Rhode Island 
was similar to that in the rest of the country, though it often lagged or was out of phase 
with the national trends and was willing to strike out on independent paths.  The early 
Puritans in New England viewed the wilderness as something to be overcome to establish 
a New Jerusalem, not something to be retained or exalted.1  While later upper class 
individuals might view the wilderness as a novelty with an element of danger and as an 
alternative to the drudgery of civilized life, this was not the popular view of the masses.2  
Romantic views of the wilderness were fine for those not engaged in the toil of bringing 
civilization and progress to the New World.  The settlers were focused on slashing and 
burning their way through the forest to create civilization in their desired form.3   
Closer to Rhode Island, Massachusetts philosopher Henry David Thoreau was 
more strident in the defense of the natural landscape.  Perhaps the first environmentalist 
in the modern sense, at least in thought and word, Thoreau observed the approaching 
industrial revolution and was troubled with the coming “death of pastoralism in the 
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United States.”4  Thoreau’s writings are laced with many of the themes of the modern 
environmentalist movement, from despair of the corporation’s focus on profitability 
being the center of modern life, to the rejection of the increasingly materialistic, urban 
culture where human life was progressively becoming more specialized to meet the 
demands of factory production.5  Rejecting the fears of his Puritan forefathers, Thoreau 
viewed the wilderness as an expanse to balance these modern stresses and help maintain 
equilibrium for humans.  Instead of pacifying the wilderness to extend civilization, 
humans should become one with the natural world, just as they were with the human 
constructed one.  In this manner, they could achieve the best of both worlds by 
experiencing the blending of these antipodes.   
Thoreau’s writings defy easy reductionism to either pro- or anti- naturalism.  
Living in a spartan cabin in Concord, Massachusetts, Thoreau could avoid many of the 
harsher aspects of creeping modernity, while still be close enough to it to avoid 
absorption by the still powerful wilderness.   The moral worth of both was important to 
human spirituality.  “I would not have . . . every part of a man cultivated, any more than I 
would have every acre of earth,” Thoreau explained.6  Nature was due reverence for its 
own existence and not merely because it might be of some economic value.7  While 
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Thoreau was interesting as a philosopher, his ideas did not gain traction with the spirit of 
the era, that of Manifest Destiny and the pushing back of the wilderness.8   
Another New Englander, Vermont’s George Perkins Marsh, also advanced human 
thinking regarding the environment.  In his 1864 book, Man and Nature, Marsh proposed 
that nature is essentially in equilibrium until human activity disturbs it.  Even the most 
extreme natural forces of storms and seismic activity cause surface damage at best to the 
environment.  Man, with his rapidly expanding technological prowess, can do more lethal 
and longer lasting damage.  Extensive agriculture destroyed the forests and turned 
previously fertile land into deserts.  As humans generated greater power to alter the 
landscape, longer lasting damage might result.  Marsh believed in human agency and 
knowledge to restore the balance between civilization and nature, but worried that such 
knowledge might only be attained after it was too late to make a difference.9   
Limited federal action was taken to preserve land that had not already been 
acquired by the settlers rapidly collapsing the western frontier.  Congress had designated 
several important landscapes in the nation as nature reserves and then later as national 
parks, such as the Yosemite Valley (1864), the Mariposa Redwood Grove (1864) and the 
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Yellowstone National Park (1872).10  There was no national policy on the protection of 
these federal properties other than keeping the properties out of the control of private 
enterprise despite the concern of other citizens in conserving the area’s primordial 
attractiveness for “aesthetic, spiritual or cultural values.”11  In 1876, the Department of 
Agriculture, under President Ulysses S. Grant, created a special agency to assess the 
forests of the nation including the previously protected areas.  This office was expanded 
in 1881 to become the Department’s Division of Forestry.12  In 1891 the Forest Reserve 
Act allowed the federal government to create National Forests, though Congress did not 
specify the function of these newly protected areas.13  Few of these areas received any 
protection from the logging industry attempting to cut down the last branch in the areas to 
increase their profits.14   
Competing Visions: Gifford Pinchot and John Muir 
In 1896 the Secretary of the Interior, Hoke Smith, formed an advisory 
commission to counsel the government on the proper policy for managing federal 
properties.  Included in this panel were two of the leading voices of American 
conservation and environmental thinking, Gifford Pinchot and John Muir.  Their 
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cooperation and subsequent parting of ways would set the intellectual boundaries on how 
the nation would consider these ideas for much of the next fifty years.     
Gifford Pinchot, the paladin of efficient land use and the scientific management of 
natural resources perhaps best embodied the national the spirit of conservation.  Pinchot, 
the son of a well-off family, was a Yale graduate who later earned an advanced degree in 
forestry in Nancy, France.  In Europe, Pinchot observed the scientific management of the 
forests to provide long term lumber yield, as opposed to the United States, where the 
lumber industry was only interested in immediate profits.  Convinced that government 
control was essential to prevent the complete deforestation of the continent, Pinchot also 
realized that the ability to accrue continuous gain had to be demonstrated to secure 
popular support.  Pinchot worked in the lumber industry following his return to the 
United States, interrupted by stints in government service under Presidents Grover 
Cleveland and William McKinley, ending up as the head of the Department of 
Agriculture’s Forestry Department.  As the Department of the Interior managed the 
nation’s forests, this position was without real power and Pinchot spent years 
unsuccessfully attempting to convince the interagency apparatus that his department 
should control these resources.15    
While Pinchot personified the conservation movement of the era, describing 
himself as the “father of conservation,” John Muir would become the one of the true 
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founding members of the modern environmental movement.16  A Scot by birth, Muir’s 
family had emigrated to Wisconsin in 1849.17  There he spent a tough childhood under 
the watchful eyes of his severe father who emphasized hard work and learning the 
Bible.18  Following a short stint at college where he impressed the faculty with his 
mechanical and intellectual ability, Muir spent time hiking through Florida and from 
Indiana to the Gulf of Mexico.  In 1868 Muir went to California and set out for the 
wilderness of the Sierra Mountains.19  
Here Muir was able to translate his previous thoughts on nature from his youthful 
observations into a coherent gospel on how to view the natural world.  Muir’s thoughts 
were not dissimilar to previous thinkers, seeing elements of nature as direct exhibitions of 
God’s work on earth.  Observing nature allowed one to see the divine with the forests 
acting as “temples” in the terrestrial plane.20  Western civilization, based on Judeo-
Christian creeds, had tended to obscure this concept in its distinction between humans 
and nature.21  Muir felt that being alone in the wilderness allowed the perceptive human 
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to revel in its inspiring harmony and minimize civilization’s partition.  The wilderness 
was not only different from civilization, it was better.  Since humans had originated in the 
wilderness, they must periodically return to their roots to dissipate the physical and 
emotional stresses of civilization.22  Muir saw nature as having its own inherent value and 
not just as a function of its relationship to humans.23  Compared to Thoreau, who desired 
to keep one foot in each venue to achieve balance, Muir preferred to spend as much time 
as possible in the wilderness where even the reptiles and offensive flora and fauna had 
their own place and rights, no less than human ones.  Finally the interconnectedness of 
the natural world was highly complex with numerous unknown relations and influences.  
Reducing any one particular element out of the environment to propose as a root cause or 
insignificant factor was not possible.  Anticipating future environmental thinkers, Muir 
stated that “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything 
else in the universe.”24   
Upon selection to the Department of the Interior’s advisory commission, Pinchot 
and Muir found much in common with their appreciation of the forests they visited and 
struck up a friendship.25  They initially shared common goals in protecting the remaining 
verdant areas in the American west, but the two differed on the ultimate purpose of their 
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travel.  Muir and his faction of the commission wanted to decide which areas required 
preservation, while Pinchot and the rest were more interested in how to economically 
manage the designated areas.  The federal executive and legislative branches vacillated 
between these two views, initially supporting Muir’s position and putting aside 21 
million acres of forest reserves in 1897.  Muir editorialized that some leeway in the 
culling of mature growth for economic gain was permissible.  Later in the year Congress 
passed the Forest Management Act that was more favorable to commercial gain.  With 
this Muir ceased all his support for the legislation and broke with Pinchot who had 
always wanted to use the land, though with the proper management, to ensure it could be 
available for successive generations.26    
While Muir’s proposals had been rebuffed by Congress, his ideas gained exposure 
through his prolific writing and interaction with other concerned individuals.  In 1892, he 
and a group of like minded citizens formed the Sierra Club, with Muir as its first 
president, dedicated to the preservation of the forests and other aspects of the Sierra 
Madre Mountains.27  The organization was locally focused initially, but expanded its 
horizons as it gained greater stature.  Muir also became more involved in the political 
sphere as he attempted to influence the national discourse on conservation.  Here he was 
assisted by his relationship with the new President, Theodore Roosevelt, who had 
ascended to the office following the assassination of William McKinley in 1901.  In 1903 
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Muir and Roosevelt went camping in the mountains and Muir was able to captivate the 
President with his views on preserving the wilderness, at least for a short while.28  The 
subsequent balancing between Muir, the apostle for the rights of the wilderness, Pinchot, 
the advocate for the scientific use of nature to fuel civilization, and Roosevelt, the 
consummate politician of the progressive era was interesting in its own light.  Muir 
obscured his more extreme views on environmental equality between humans and other 
species to gain political acceptance, though using the full range of Old Testament scorn 
and derision to lambaste his opponents.  Pinchot appears as the technocrat of his era, 
ready to appropriate shares of the nation’s expanses to continue civilization’s 
development, though using scientific elements and design to prevent long term 
despoliation of any area.  Roosevelt valued each man’s views, though with Pinchot was 
in Washington, it was easier for him to catch the President’s ear.  Each of these 
viewpoints had their victories and defeats in the decades before and after the turn of the 
century.  Muir had been successful in cajoling Congress to create the national parks in 
Yellowstone and Yosemite; Pinchot’s faction had prevailed in the passing of the Forest 
Management Act of 1897 where other natural preserves would be open to some economic 
activity.29  Under Roosevelt’s direction, Pinchot had finally been able to engineer the 
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transfer of the Department of Agriculture’s Forestry Department to the Department of the 
Interior in 1905.30   
The greatest battle of these two views began in 1908 when Muir and other 
preservationists learned of the city of San Francisco’s application to use a portion of the 
Yosemite National Park in the Hetch Hetchy valley as a reservoir.  The federal 
government had earlier refused the application but after an earthquake had severely 
damaged the city in 1906, the city had resubmitted the request.  Despite the area being in 
a protected location, a waiver was granted for the city to build a dam in the Hetch Hetchy 
valley for a water reservoir and later, to generate electricity to help power the 
reconstruction of the city.31   
Muir and his followers took this decision as a call for action, protesting 
vigorously at the state and federal level against this intrusion into hallowed ground.  The 
resulting national dialogue on the preservation of the wilderness for its own sake 
energized large segments of the population.  Roosevelt was sympathetic to Muir’s 
viewpoints, but thought that the requirements of San Francisco prevailed over the desire 
to keep Hetch Hetchy untouched.  As Muir’s associates kept the issue alive in the press, 
they shifted from their talking points about the value of the pristine area to attacks against 
those organizations that would exploit Hetch Hetchy for profit.  This effort was more 
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successful in gaining support and even President Roosevelt stepped back from his prior 
position, despite Roosevelt’s friendship with Pinchot, who favored building the dam.  
The action shifted to Congress which eventually had to weigh the competing demands.  
Public support for Muir caused Congress to table the proposal in 1909.  The California 
delegation was not prepared to lose courteously and argued that the needs of San 
Francisco in quantifiable terms of water, energy and human health should not be upset by 
the commendable, but inestimable qualities of the wilderness.  Construction advocates 
even submitted that the resulting dam and reservoir would actually add to the beauty of 
the area.  Parochial arguments such as these fractured some of the wilderness groups 
defending Hetch Hetchy from human intrusion, with splinter segments of the Sierra Club 
willing to permit the construction of the dam.  In Congress, where the city’s application 
was to be decided, the effective lobbying by the Californian delegation was telling.  
Despite the strong dissent, politicians in both houses of Congress acceded to the 
Californian point of view and passed a statute in 1913 allowing the dam to be built.  
President Woodrow Wilson signed the law in December of that year.32    
Muir was deeply disappointed by the loss, but was somewhat soothed by the 
national outcry the issue had caused.  Certainly the more utilitarian point of view of 
Pinchot had prevailed, and the organizations that Muir had nurtured were wounded by the 
conflict.33  Muir himself would die a year later.34  Perhaps more important was the fact 
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that a debate on the merits of preservation had even been conducted, let alone at the 
highest levels of national government.  While Muir’s point had lost in this argument, his 
views had set markers that later environmental thinkers, leaders and politicians would 
adopt as they attempted to make reasoned decisions.  The dispute also showed that each 
group was willing to use the dialog and tactics of the other to advance their points of 
view.  The preservationists were willing to use the negative attacks in the popular media 
to undermine the dam’s conservationist advocates, while the conservationists attempted 
to promote the augmented beauty that the reservoir would portend.35  In the end, the 
political process prevailed.  Pinchot, more in line with the conservationist spirit of his 
times, got the dam and power he desired.  Muir empowered his vision of the rights of 
nature and sowed the groundwork for long term success.36   
The First Conservation Groups in Rhode Island 
The creation of the Sierra Club in California by Muir and his associates had 
occurred as the nation began to become more interested in protecting the remaining 
wilderness on the continent.  Small groups throughout the nation commenced organizing 
to protect the natural resources of the country.  Individuals in these new organizations 
were primarily interested in conserving or preserving these assets for the future:    
                                                 
35.  Ibid., 67.   
36.  Placing Muir as the paladin of the environmental movement and Pinchot as 
the champion of the harmful destruction of the wilderness is too simplistic.  In their own 
times, “Muir was considered the supporter of a shortsighted, elitist preservationist 
philosophy and Pinchot, the progressive conservationist whose views were in step with 
the prevailing public sentiment that natural resources should enrich the lives of all 
Americans, not just the wealthy.”  See J. E. de Steigeur, The Origins of Modern 
Environmental Thought (Tuscon, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2006), 12.    
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Conservation groups emphasized the efficient use and development of physical 
resources to combat inefficient land management.  Conservationists put forth a 
developmental strategy based on efficiency, scientific management, centralized 
control, and organized economic development.  This strategy was exemplified by 
management systems, which were created to emphasize the balance between 
immediate and long-term production necessary to sustain a continuous yield.37   
 
One of the first such conservation groups in Rhode Island was responsible for 
creating Roger Williams Zoo in Providence.38  In 1871, Betsy Williams, a descendant of 
the state’s founder, Roger Williams, left her 102 acre farm to the city in her will.  The 
city accepted the land, seeing the area where the citizens could relax and partake some of 
the natural sights of the state.  The next year a section of the park was used to display a 
small “menagerie” of “wildlife” including such species as “raccoons, guinea pigs, white 
mice, squirrels, rabbits, hawks, peacocks and anteaters.”39   The city of Cranston provided 
more land to the park in 1873, and in 1883 Providence began the construction of larger 
facilities to house more interesting flora.  When completed in 1890, the zoo could show 
off a tiger, a leopard and a pair of lions.40 
                                                 
37.  Stacy J. Silveira, “The American Environmental Movement: Surviving 
Through Diversity,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 28, no. 2 (2001): 
499. 
38.  Kelly Maree Nichols, “From Climate Justice to Green Business: A Rhode 
Island Case Study of Current Trends in the Environmental Movement” (Environmental 
Studies thesis, Brown University, 2009), 78.   
39.  Roger Williams Park, “History of Roger Williams Park Zoo,” Roger 
Williams Park, https://rwpzoo.org/103/history-roger-williams-park-zoo (accessed  June 
24, 2014). 
40.  The larger cats could presumably keep the white mice population in check.  
See Roger Williams Park, “History of Roger Williams Park Zoo,” Roger Williams Park, 
https://rwpzoo.org/103/history-roger-williams-park-zoo (accessed June 24, 2014) 
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In Boston, two prominent members of society, Harriet Lawrence Hemenway and 
Minna B. Hall, were responsible for initiating the Audubon Society, named after the 
renowned American ornithologist, John James Audubon.  Appalled by the seemingly 
wanton killing of numerous bird species to obtain feathers for fashion apparel, the two 
were able to persuade other Bostonians to sponsor them with financial and moral 
backing.  They coopted the Bostonian scientific community and other noted 
ornithologists to join their operation.  In 1897, the Massachusetts Audubon Society was 
created to formalize Hemenway’s and Hall’s bird protection and conservation mission.  
The Society grew rapidly and by 1905 the National Association of the Audubon Societies 
for the Protection of Wild Birds and Animals attained national prominence.41        
This vision of bird protection spread south to Rhode Island.  The Audubon 
Society of Rhode Island was established in 1897 by a group of interested citizens in 
Providence motivated by Hemenway’s and Hall’s concerns.42  While the Rhode Island 
organization followed the Massachusetts’ and later the national organization’s general 
guidance and intent, it remained out of the orbit of the larger association, preferring to 
remain independent.  The Rhode Island chapter also grew rapidly.  By 1907, two years 
after the national organization had been formed, the state chapter had 1300 members.  
                                                 
41.  Wayne R. Petersen.  Audubon Societies.  In The Encyclopedia of New 
England, ed. Burt Feintuch and David H. Watters (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2005), 544-545. 
42.  Ken Weber, A Century of Dedication, The First 100 Years of the Audubon 
Society of Rhode Island (Audubon Society of Rhode Island, 1997), 7.  
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The Rhode Island chapter focused on the education of local students on natural 
conservation.43     
In the Ocean State conservationist groups were less contentious than Muir’s 
Sierra Club, perhaps because there were so few of them.  From the turn of the century to 
1970 perhaps five new groups with conservationist agendas would be created.44  In 1921, 
the Narragansett Chapter of the Appalachian Mountain Club, itself chartered in Boston in 
1876, was formed.  Somewhat the East Coast compliment to the Sierra Club, the 
Appalachian Mountain Club focused its efforts on land conservation and trail 
construction for all members of society to enjoy.  Reaching a membership of 45 by the 
end of the year, the Narragansett Chapter concentrated on trail clearance in South County 
and lodge maintenance of its headquarters in Kingston, RI.  In the 1930s, chapter 
members worked to create a trail from the lodge to the western border of the state where 
it would connect with a similar Connecticut endeavor.  Other organizations such as the 
local Boy Scouts were engaged to both support the club’s work but also to be educated in 
                                                 
43.  Audubon Society of Rhode Island, “A Brief History,” Audubon Society of 
Rhode Island, http://www.asri.org/history/history-of-audubon-society-of-rhdoe-
island.html (accessed June 25, 2014).   
44.  This number is an estimate as groups that formed but later collapsed or were 
absorbed or superseded left few records.  Even more established groups, such as the 
Environment Council of Rhode Island (ECRI) have tenuous records.  See Kelly Maree 
Nichols, “From Climate Justice to Green Business: A Rhode Island Case Study of 
Current Trends in the Environmental Movement” (Environmental Studies thesis, Brown 
University, 2009), 78.   
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the club’s vision.  The paths’ purpose was not merely for exercise but to allow the hikers 
“to enjoy the rolling country, abandoned wood roads and wildest Rhode Island.”45        
In the 1920s, the Audubon Society of Rhode Island acquired its first two 
properties to act as bird sanctuaries, the Kimball Bird Sanctuary in Charlestown, RI, and 
the Parker Woodland Sanctuary in Coventry, RI.  The Society was active in expanding its 
educational program for schools and homeowners up to the Second World War, while 
maintaining visibility on the federal and local legislative efforts promoting conservation. 
The Society was not aggressive in promoting its views of conservation in the political 
sphere, concentrating more on grass root programs to gain acceptance and funding.46    
The next Rhode Island conservation group to be founded was the Norman Bird 
Sanctuary in 1949.  In that year, at the behest of her will, Mabel Norman Cerio provided 
a parcel of land in Middletown, RI “for the propagation, preservation, and protection of 
birds, and where birds and bird life may be observed, studied, taught, and enjoyed by 
lovers of nature and by the public generally so interested in a spirit of humanity and 
mercy.”47  Named after her father, the sanctuary focused on the education of people, 
                                                 
45.  Narragansett Chapter of the AMC, “Trail History 1921 to 2001,” 
Narragansett Chapter of the AMC, 
http://www.amcnarragansett.org/our_chapter/archives/a%20view%20of%20long%20pon
d%20page%201_1.jpg (accessed June 28, 2014). 
46.  Ken Weber, A Century of Dedication, The First 100 Years of the Audubon 
Society of Rhode Island (Audubon Society of Rhode Island, 1997), 14-16.  
47.  Norman Bird Sanctuary, “Our Mission,” Norman Bird Sanctuary, 
http://normanbirdsanctuary.org/about/our-mission/ (accessed June 28, 2014). 
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primarily children, through various programs at its site.  The site expanded to 325 acres 
over the years.48    
Nationally, the Sierra Club lapsed into a more conservationist mindset in the years 
following the Hetch Hetchy dispute, looking more like the Appalachian Mountain Club 
to the east with a focus on hiking and wilderness appreciation.49  There were some 
clashes with the federal government on the disposition of federal property, and the 
organization was adept at leveraging the conflicting guidance and seams between federal 
agencies to prevent Kings Canyon National Park from being dammed up for 
hydroelectric use in the 1930s.50  Otherwise the organization appeared more internally 
focused in building up its California support.51   
Another countrywide conservation minded organization that came into being in 
the 1930s was the National Wildlife Federation.  In 1934, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had named Pulitzer Prize winning cartoonist, Jay N. “Ding” Darling, as the 
head of the U.S. Biological Survey.  A practicing journalist, Darling was not a fan of 
                                                 
48.  Norman Bird Sanctuary, “Education,” Norman Bird Sanctuary, 
http://normanbirdsanctuary.org/education/ (accessed June 28, 2014). 
49.  Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire, Rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2003), 79.   
50.  The National Park Service, under the Department of the Interior, wanted to 
retain the land in a fallow condition.  The Forest Service, under the Department of 
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for Kings Canyon.  See.Tom Turner, Sierra Club, 100 Years of Protecting Nature (New 
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51.  Ibid., 90. 
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Roosevelt but he had accepted the President’s offer.52  An energetic leader and manager 
of the Biological Survey during his tenure, Darling appealed to the President and 
Congress to fund a number of conservationist minded organizations to study wildlife 
problems, propose practical solutions, and instruct classes on such matters at the 
universities.53  In 1936, Darling convinced Roosevelt to convene a meeting of 
conservation minded groups in Washington, DC, at the North American Wildlife 
Conference.  At this conference, the General Wildlife Federation was born.  Focused on 
protecting American wildlife, the association selected Darling, who had recently resigned 
from his federal post, as its first president.54  The General Wildlife Federation was 
quickly renamed the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) and was designed to provide a 
central forum for the consortium of hunting, fishing and other wildlife appreciation 
                                                 
52.  Darling, a committed waterfowl hunter, had been drawn to the conservation 
movement to ensure the duck population in the United States was not decimated by 
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Luke, “The Pleasure of Use: Federalizing Wilds, Nationalizing Life at the National 
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groups to work together on conservation issues and to influence policy.55  Backed by both 
hunting groups and the firearms and other industries, local societies, and conservation 
minded individuals, the organization rapidly expanded across the nation. 56  An Ocean 
State affiliate, the Rhode Island Wildlife Federation (RIWF) was founded in 1938.57   
These groups were generally unobtrusive, in line with most of the conservationist groups 
of the era.  Wildlife, and perhaps more importantly, game animals, and their habitat 
needed to be preserved so American hunters and wildlife enthusiasts could enjoy them, 
often down the barrel of a gun.  The NWF’s success was somewhat of an ever enlarging 
cycle of petitioning the federal government to acquire more land for wildlife.  Such 
acquisitions would also advance the interests of hunters and fishermen.  The NWF would 
then promote those victories to its membership to garner new contributions.  Such monies 
could then be spent on further lobbying efforts to advance organizational efforts.  By the 
end of the Second World War, the NWF was the largest national group advocating 
conservation issues in the country.58    
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Aldo Leopold and the Creation of a Land Ethic 
The establishment of the National Wildlife Foundation also advanced the career 
of Aldo Leopold, a former member of the Forest Service.  Leopold, a native of Iowa, was 
a committed hunter and nature lover.  Instructed in the ethics of honorable hunting by his 
father, Leopold brought these ideas with him into his professional life.59  Leopold 
attended Yale University, graduating in 1909 with a master’s degree from the 
institution’s Forest School.60  In the first decades of his professional career, Leopold 
spent most of his time working for the U.S. Forest Service with a short sojourn with the 
Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce.  Posted to the U.S. territories in the southwest, 
Leopold observed the decreasing amount of game animals in the prospective states of 
Arizona and New Mexico.61  Leopold organized associations of hunters, instructing them 
on the “protection and enjoyment of wild things” in order to maintain their future 
populations for human use.62  Noting his trusted subordinate’s initiative and enthusiasm 
for such ventures, the head of the District placed Leopold in charge of the area’s hunting 
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60.  This school had been established in 1900 with a financial assist from Gifford 
Pinchot’s family.  See Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind.  Rev. ed. 
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and recreation management, a job for which Leopold was admirably suited.  Here he also 
developed his writing skills, publishing journal articles and Forest Service doctrine on 
game management and protection.  As the territories’ populations expanded, greater 
pressures arose to develop federally owned land and convert it to private property, 
construction that would have significantly degraded the area’s ability to support wildlife.  
While appreciative of the fruits of civilization, Leopold was also convinced that the 
complete subjection of the wilderness was not desirable.  With this in mind he worked 
with the Forest Service to preserve portions of the Gila National Forest in New Mexico 
for wildlife preservation.63  In 1924, Leopold transferred to the Forest Service Forest 
Products Laboratory in Madison, Wisconsin, where he served as the assistant director.  In 
the early 1930’s, Leopold left the federal bureaucracy for academia, and was awarded a 
teaching position at the University of Wisconsin where he served as a professor of game 
management until his untimely death in 1948.64  Along with Darling, Leopold was 
considered one of the founding members of the NWF.65 
While Muir came to his concept of a moral equality of man and nature and later 
leveraged his writing and oratory skills to influence governmental policy on the 
preservation of the wilderness, Leopold grew into his beliefs while functioning as a 
member of one of the organizations Muir was attempting to influence.  Both men were 
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skilled authors but Leopold’s calm reasoning and balance, not unlike Thoreau’s, was 
perhaps more appealing to the public than Muir’s cool aesthetic.  Initially Leopold was 
more influential, affecting the ideals of the National Wildlife Federation and its national 
audience.  Muir’s writing was popular, but the Sierra Club had fewer members and less 
national penetration than the NWF.66   
Leopold’s evolution as a conservationist thus began as a hunter apprehensive 
about the diminishing numbers of game animals and what could be done to ensure their 
future presence.  Yet merely managing the land to ensure the survival of those species 
most interesting to humans, while perhaps necessary, was not sufficient.  In one event he 
described shooting a wolf and her pups to prevent them from culling the local deer 
population.  While the wolves were killed the effect was not beneficial to either humans 
or nature:   
Since then I have lived to see state after state extirpate its wolves.  I have watched 
the face of many a newly wolfless mountain . . . I have seen every edible bush and 
seedling browsed, first to aemic desuetude, and then to death.  I have seen every 
edible tree defoliated to the height of a saddle-horn.  Such a mountain looks as if 
someone had given God a new pruning shears, and forbidden Him all other 
exercise.  In the end the starved bones of the hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own 
too-much, bleach with the bones of dead sage, or molder under the high-lined 
junipers.67     
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While hardly unique, Leopold’s early writing and actions had suggested that the 
conservation of the federal lands was vital to maintain some portion of the wilderness in 
its primordial state.  After he had become a member of the University of Wisconsin 
faculty, his thoughts broadened to the interrelationships of humans and wildlife, and the 
human duties and responsibilities in this affiliation.68  Examining this association would 
indicate to humans that their environment was one with shared attributes and not only one 
with commodities to use at their leisure.  An ethical consideration of these issues would 
in turn impute greater value to the other elements of the wilderness.69     
Leopold’s most famous work was A Sand County Almanac, first published in 
1949 shortly after his death.  In this collection of essays, he proposed a different set of 
guidelines to promote ethical behavior by humans when interacting with the natural 
community.  Not as doctrinaire as the ethical behavior for electrical engineers that the 
American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) was concurrently revising, Leopold 
still attempted to place limits on human undertakings.  Leopold saw the relationships 
between man and the environment as an incredibly complex interaction that required 
great humility when attempting to regulate.  He proposed that this required a new ethical 
relationship that changed “the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow members, 
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and also respect for the community as such.”70  Leopold often examined these 
relationships in terms of energy exchange between the participants, but the actors were 
not simply loads that could be plugged into or removed from the circuit.  The members 
had expansive functions whose limits could not be easily determined.  In any case the 
environment was not a substrate for purely economic endeavors.  The protection of the 
environment required a personal commitment towards conservation as economic and 
political motivations were not sufficient.71  Leopold’s oft quoted adage that “A thing is 
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  
It is wrong when it tends otherwise,” should not be deconstructed to presume the total 
inviolability of nature.72  Leopold did not propose equal rights for animals and plants, but 
desired responsible and prudent interaction with the environment by mankind.  Leopold 
did emphasize the personal responsibility for change and saw conservation as an 
important human activity.  Still, the land and the wildlife on it were not to be abused for 
the sheer joy of human mastery.  A more harmonious interaction was the ideal with the 
species in the wilderness attaining some moral status.73  Leopold was opposed to 
damming up or polluting rivers as this disrupted the energy flow of the environment, 
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73.  J. E. de Steigeur, The Origins of Modern Environmental Thought (Tuscon, 
AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2006), 14-15.   
194 
 
though he did not explicitly inveigh against particular elements of the electric power 
grid.74  
Leopold’s Land Ethic was descriptive, not prescriptive as the AIEE standard was.  
It placed humans as a participant in the ecological system and not merely as an observer 
or manager of it.  The economic aspect of this view was also considered insufficient to 
deal with the enormity of the relationship.75  Land in Leopold’s view was not merely 
some volume of space filled with soil but included all of the biological organisms and air 
and water streams that maintained the energy levels at a self sustaining level.  Human 
activity had a greater and often incalculable effect on the land than natural selection and 
evolution ever had, particularly in highly populated areas, and thus they should tread 
lightly upon the land to prevent upsetting this energy balance.   Leopold rejected both an 
economic rationale and government regulation as the ultimate arbitrators to prevent 
unrecoverable damage to the land.  The former was an insufficient force to prevent land 
owners from abusing their property to attain short term profits; the latter might grow too 
large and onerous to be supported by the population.  Both made the effort of 
conservation too easy and thus “trivial.”76 
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Instead, humans needed to evolve an “ecological conscience” to achieve such 
coherence between land and nature.77  Such an “ethical obligation on the part of the 
private owner” was required to surmount the otherwise inadequate concern for the land’s 
health.78  This conscience was the result of not merely more training or education, but 
also a principled approach to the entire issue.  Man could no longer be the “conqueror” of 
the land; he must be the “biotic citizen of it.”79  Leopold was hopeful that such an ethic 
would prevail, though not through the normal economic or scientific training.  Instead, an 
evolving disapproval of the majority of the population for the harshness inflicted on the 
environment would eventually shame the offenders into more ethical behavior.80 
While Leopold’s proposals for the ethical treatment of land appear to be a step 
forward, his ideas do not seem to have gained great visibility in the minds of his 
countrymen.  Perhaps it was because of his untimely death just as his most 
comprehensive work was accepted for publication; perhaps because at the time it was 
initially published the rest of the nation was more interested in the post war issues of 
economic advancement untroubled by major war; perhaps the other conservationist and 
environmental groups were interested in different projects at the time.  In any event his 
writings appeared to hover in the consciousness of the time without being acted upon.  
The population was unwilling to accept any further limits to the normal models and 
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methods of growth that had previously been so successful and profitable in subduing the 
frontier.81   
Rachel Carson and Silent Spring 
It would take another decade until the next seminal work arrived to influence 
environmental ethics.  Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, published in 1962, was truly one of 
the most important works of the post war era.  Carson’s book inspired others to take 
action to alleviate particular problems more than it presented a precise formula that 
advocated additional ethical requirements for humans when dealing with the 
environment.82  Carson, a former teacher with degrees in zoology and biology, had 
entered federal service in 1935 to write radio scripts for the Bureau of Fisheries.  A 
talented writer, Carson moved up in the organization (later known as the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service) to become its chief editor.  Writing books on oceanographic natural 
history outside of her federal job, Carson became a well known and economically secure 
author; she left the government in 1952 to concentrate on her writing.83    
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Silent Spring was an impassioned narrative for Carson.84  She had researched the 
effects of the new classes of synthetic chemicals developed during and after the Second 
World War to eradicate undesired organisms and allow human mastery over the 
environment.  In their desire to get ahead of the problem, humans had applied such 
chemicals to kill insects that ate human crops, spread disease or harmed other more 
desirable organisms.  These compounds were used without great comprehension of their 
effects on the environment other than that of insect destruction; the subsequent effects 
were barely investigated.85   The compound dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (better 
known as DDT) particularly aroused Carson’s concern.  First used as an insecticide in 
1939, its use had grown dramatically; first to protect humans from lice, next to kill 
insects eating crops and then on to exterminate invasive gypsy moths harming trees in 
human occupied spaces.86  Such chemical applications were not effective at suppressing 
the insect population for long, as sufficient numbers managed to survive and pass on their 
resistance to the next generation.  Consequently, higher doses of toxins were needed to 
achieve the same effect of culling the next generation’s swarms.  Additionally, the toxic 
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chemical deposits took exceptionally long to decay, allowing the harmful residue to 
become concentrated in other portions of the food chain.  The buildup of DDT in the food 
chain affected small birds such as robins and even the American Eagle and could be as 
destructive as any direct attack on those populations.87  This subsequent accumulation of 
the chemicals could spread into the human food chain as well, leading to a long term 
accumulation of the toxic compounds in the human body.88  Perhaps worse than the 
realization by the population that some additional environmental damage was occurring 
was that the authorities responsible for the insecticide spraying were ignoring public 
concerns.  Citizens that asked not to be doused with DDT were often disregarded while 
animal residents were being extirpated.89  DDT was also lethal against other organisms in 
the affected area; collateral damage in the war against undesired fauna.  Quoting the 
description of the death throes of small mammals under this chemical barrage, Carson hit 
a nerve in the American public that Muir’s approval of cold blooded reptiles or Leopold’s 
of predacious wolves did not.90  Carson questioned the effect these actions had, 
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considering that by “acquiescing in an act that can cause such suffering, who among us is 
not diminished as a human being?”91  Leveraging this repulsion, Carson made the case 
for the attenuation of the human condition more than the raising of lower order organisms 
to the moral plane of humans.  Carson was also annoyed at the overweening arrogance of 
government agencies and companies as they attempted to destroy unwanted pests:   
Who has decided – who has the right to decide – for the countless legions of 
people who were not consulted that the supreme value is a world without insects, 
even though it be also a sterile world ungraced by the curving wing of a bird in 
flight?  The decision is that of the authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power; 
he has made it during a moment of inattention by millions to whom beauty and 
the ordered world of nature still have a meaning that is deep and imperative.92   
 
Carson suggested other means to control undesired insect populations without the 
chemical poisoning of the entire landscape.  Insect sterilization, sexual deception and the 
encouragement of other predatory species could limit damage and shift the biologic 
equilibrium more toward the human side without causing irreparable damage to the rest 
of the environment.  Merely using a simple chemical tool such as DDT to deal with the 
initial problem was neither elegant nor effective and caused more damage than the 
perceived insect scourge.  A much greater modesty was required to both comprehend the 
nature of the problem as well as propose solutions to it:  
The “control of nature” is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the 
Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature 
exists for the convenience of man.  The concepts and practices of applied 
entomology for the most part date from that Stone Age of science.  It is our 
alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself with the most 
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modern and terrible weapons, and that in turning them against the insects it has 
also turned them against the earth.93    
 
While Carson emphasized the dangers of unrestricted chemical warfare against 
insects, she was also concerned with the release of radioactive pollution into the 
watershed as well and the diffusion of air pollution from industrial activity.  Human 
created carcinogens arising from advanced technological manufacturing might also 
eventually affect as many as a quarter of the population.  While Carson did acknowledge 
that the increase in cancer rates in the First World nations may be more correlation than 
causation, the signs were disturbing.  It was far better to prevent the possible causes, 
Carson suggested, than to come up with a cure for cancer.94   
Reaction to Silent Spring was swift and severe.  While readers deluged Congress 
and federal agencies regarding Carson’s allegations, agricultural chemical companies 
threatened to sue the book’s publisher, trade journals accused Carson of poor science and 
antediluvian leanings, and the American Medical Association abrogated any 
responsibility to assess the potential dangers of the chemicals.  The popular press was 
more sympathetic.  Caron’s appearance on television discussing her findings cemented 
the public perception that the government and industry really did not comprehend what 
they were doing or the ramifications of what they had done with such powerful chemical 
tools.  In mid 1962 President John F. Kennedy directed the Department of Agriculture to 
investigate Carson’s claims, many of which were validated in 1963 by a U.S. Office of 
Science and Technology report on “Use of Pesticides.”  Later in the year Carson 
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appeared before Congressional hearings in both the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives advocating legislation to curb the unrestrained use of pesticides.  By then 
Carson’s health was failing from cancer and she died in 1964.95   
It is difficult to underplay the effects of Carson’s work on the growth of the 
environmental movement in the United States, even if her ethical suggestions were 
straight forward progressions from Leopold’s work.  Carson reiterated that the 
environment was much more complex than humans imagined and that it was appropriate 
to include it in the human moral calculus.  Every organism was worthy of inclusion, not 
merely the economically lucrative ones.  Like Leopold, she suggested that the entire 
ecosystem was deserving of protection.96   
In the political realm, Carson was much more important.  Leopold’s work was 
perhaps ahead of its time, or at least not in harmony with the spirit of the immediate 
postwar era.  Carson was, if not a catalyst for the concerns of the early 1960s, then 
certainly an indication of what lay ahead.  Carson’s book was the impetus behind public 
awareness of the harmful effects of imprudent chemical use.  Such knowledge and public 
action by the citizenry would propel Congress to create additional federal regulatory 
bodies to research and limit future chemical abuse.  These forces would lead to the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 and the transfer of the duties 
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and responsibilities of pesticide oversight from the Department of Agriculture, where 
commercial agricultural concerns held sway, to the new agency.97   
The United States in the early 1960s was more able to process and act upon the 
information synthesized by Carson, even if the ethical standards proposed still required 
some conceptual digestion by the public. Several factors were behind this increased 
interest.  The nation was economically more vigorous compared to the period of the 
Great Depression, but increased population growth accompanying this development 
placed pressures on the community that were becoming more noticeable.  Industrial air 
pollution was more visible than chemical overuse and the irritants to the population in the 
sprawling urban areas were equally apparent to the lungs and health of the residents.  As 
urban area populations grew, the waste products of human existence became larger and 
more concentrated.  Using the local environment as the ultimate waste pit or heat sink 
was no longer considered to be a viable alternative.98   
Carson’s work, which appeared as a practical discussion of a particular problem, 
thus struck a resonant chord with the population.  A problem had been discovered and 
answers had been proposed in terms the population could grasp, even if these solutions 
were only to not make the problems worse.  Carson’s compelling writing style further 
eased the penetration of the postulates of Silent Spring into the national consciousness, 
even as the ethical asides were less demanding.  Such a catalyst was felt at both national 
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and local levels in the conservationist and environmental groups, where previous 
concerns with protecting what natural resources remained started to metastasize into a 
desire to do more to protect what little endured, and perhaps, roll back the forces of 
progress.       
The Growth of Rhode Island Conservation Groups 
This desire eventually spread into the Ocean State, whose conservation efforts had 
been subdued during the Eisenhower Administration.  The only new conservation 
organization created in that period was the Rhode Island Beach Buggy Association 
(RIBBA).  Established in 1958, the RIBBA was perhaps the last of the old style 
conservationist organizations in the state.  As dune buggies grew in popularity, the group 
changed it name to the Rhode Island Mobile Sportsfishermen (RIMS) Club to prevent 
confusion with other, fossil fueled groups.  The people in this Charlestown, RI based 
organization were focused on family efforts to preserve the beaches in southern Rhode 
Island for future fishing activities.  In the late 1950s the group would bring down 
discarded Christmas trees to eroded beaches to help restore sand dunes for future use.  
The group continued with these efforts, later called OPERATION CHRISTMAS TREES, 
as a practical means to protect and preserve the sand dunes.99     
Carson’s admonitions had greater effect on the Audubon Society of Rhode Island 
(ASRI).  Alfred Hawkes, hired by ASRI in 1955 as an education specialist, became a 
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spearhead in moving the organization to address the issues raised in Silent Spring.  By 
1958 Hawkes had ascended to the organization’s management and promoted a more 
aggressive attitude to stop the worst cases of pollution abuse in the state.  As Silent 
Spring had described some of the instances of the worst effects of DDT pollution on 
birds, this seemed a natural fit.  Residents of the state however seemed more interested in 
protecting their trees from the gypsy moth infestation than protecting the local bird 
population.  Perseverance on Hawkes’ part and the accumulation of evidence on the 
effects of chemical insecticides resulted in the state outlawing the use of DDT in 1965.  
Hawkes was an effective advocate for pollution abatement, eventually triggering the state 
to rescind its policy of airborne mosquito spraying that was equally harmful to the area’s 
osprey population, suing industries that were polluting the waterways of the state, and 
creating greater awareness of the dangers of oil spills.100  The other Rhode Island wildlife 
organizations appear to have been less vocal, continuing to pursue the same goals of 
conservation and nature appreciation, leaving Hawkes and the Audubon Society as the 
only forces advocating limiting pollution in the state.101 
Lynn White, Jr. and the Religious Component of the Environmental Crisis 
As the decade progressed and further evidence was generated supporting Carson’s 
observations, other authors began to expand the conception of the environment as an area 
worthy of ethical consideration.  These thoughts were less practically or empirically 
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based than Leopold or Carson, but added to the overall depth of thought.  In 1967, noted 
medieval scholar Lynn White, Jr. published “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis” in which he considered why Western civilization in particular had proved so 
destructive to its environment.  The same culture that had developed the technology to 
subdue the natural environment had simultaneously failed to comprehend the destruction 
that it had wrought in the process:   
Our present combustion of fossil fuels threatens to change the chemistry of the 
globe's atmosphere as a whole, with consequences which we are only beginning 
to guess. With the population explosion, the carcinoma of planless urbanism, the 
now geological deposits of sewage and garbage, surely no creature other than man 
has ever managed to foul its nest in such short order.102   
 
For White, the religious component of Western civilization was a root cause in this 
development.  The religions of the West, Christianity and its Judaic precursor, had both 
positioned humans and nature as separate realms.  Humans, created in God’s image, held 
a favored and superior position.103  The rest of the world existed for humans to use for 
their benefit without any particular concern.  In White’s analysis, “God planned all of this 
explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose 
save to serve man's purposes.”104  With an acquiescent substrate upon which to act, 
Western culture’s call for individual action seemed divinely sanctioned.  Accelerated by 
the discoveries of the Industrial Revolution, humans were able to gain a decisive edge in 
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achieving domination of the environment in ways they had previously desired but had 
never truly fathomed reaching.  Such technological mastery had been a function of 
empiricism, not science.  Ethical concerns were less compelling than the ability to 
actually solve a problem, whether in ballistics or navigation.  Later, as science developed 
new methods for technology to exploit, the synergy between science, technology and the 
Christian theology devoted to comprehending God’s contemplations became more 
pronounced. 105  White doubted that more technology was the answer to the ills that 
current technology had produced, writing that “More science and more technology are 
not going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, or 
rethink our old one.”106  Since science and technology had found support from Christian 
theology, only a revision to that doctrine would suffice:   
Both our present science and our present technology are so tinctured with 
orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our ecologic crisis 
can be expected from them alone. Since the roots of our trouble are so largely 
religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or 
not. We must rethink and refeel our nature and destiny.107   
 
Saint Francis of Assisi’s ideals of human equality with nature as opposed to mastery over 
it was a better model for modern times, suggested White, even recommending that Saint 
Francis be named a the patron saint of ecologists.108   
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White’s article interjected the religious view into the expanding intellectual basis 
of the environmental movement, though not necessarily in a positive manner.  As might 
be expected, the theological reaction, as well as the popular one, was not always angelic. 
Pilloried as a Kremlin-inspired neophyte Antichrist, White absorbed a fair amount of 
criticism from enthusiastic church members and their leadership, who were at least 
willing to engage with him on his central thesis of the ecological guilt of Christianity.109 
Academic criticism was more muted, willing to accept White’s criticism of Christianity, 
though over time exposing many of the flaws of his hypothesis.  White’s work would 
engender many responses over the coming decade, but it served as an entry point for the 
theological community to engage with the ecological problems of the time.110    
Barry Commoner and the Laws of Ecology 
Another author, Barry Commoner, a Columbia and Harvard educated biologist, 
examined the ecological issues from a different perspective.  Commoner had served in 
the U.S. Navy during the Second World War.  In 1942, Commoner headed a group that 
designed a device allowing torpedo bombers to spray DDT on jungle environments to 
degrade the mosquito-borne pests that American soldiers were encountering.  First tested 
in Panama, the airborne spraying proved effective in killing both the primary target 
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insects as well as fish in the adjacent littorals.111  Following the war, Commoner first 
worked as the Navy’s liaison to the newly created Atomic Energy Commission where he 
gained insight into the connections between the scientific community and political 
world.112  Next he accepted a position at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri 
where he studied both science and its influence on national policy and politics.  
Commoner became concerned that the collaboration between the government and 
industry forged during the war had fatally compromised scientific integrity in the pursuit 
of financial gain and advanced weaponry.  American science needed to reframe itself for 
service to the public in order to redeem itself.113   
In the 1950s Commoner became involved in the actions to stop the above ground 
testing of nuclear weapons, following Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Schweitzer’s 
warnings of the dangers of radioactive fallout from these explosions.  In these endeavors 
Commoner was often ahead of the positions that the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS), with which he was affiliated, was prepared to endorse.  
Commoner was much more willing to accept ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the 
issue as he regarded the problem as much a social one as a scientific one.  To promote his 
viewpoints Commoner created a group of like minded individuals to broadcast 
information regarding the potential health hazards presented by the nuclear testing in 
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nearby Nevada.114  The scientific and political discourse regarding the safety hazards of 
above ground testing continued until the enactment of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 
1963 between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Commoner emerged from this 
confrontation as a persuasive author and an effective organizer of concerned citizens and 
researchers, but also as a besmirched scientist.  By taking positions outside the provable 
or accepted knowledge base, Commoner was decried to have suborned the objectivity he 
had earlier promoted.115   
These experiences also firmed up a number of ideas regarding the creation of 
science policy in a democratic society.  Primarily, Commoner thought that scientists 
should not be insulated from the social ramifications of their research.  Since science and 
technology were becoming more complex, scientists had a duty to assist society in 
comprehending the decisions they were making in the public realm.  Information had to 
be widely and freely disseminated to an educated citizenry, not merely the government 
officials making policy, and not tightly controlled by the government for national security 
or other reasons. 116  Lastly, scientists had to disabuse themselves of the notion that their 
specialized knowledge permitted them to promulgate ethical edicts.  The public and 
politicians had to make their own informed decision after weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of any science policy; scientists could merely assist with that procedure 
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and not subvert the process.  Doing otherwise would exacerbate the already numerous 
threats to scientific integrity.117      
Commoner’s conversion to an environmental mindset arose from the struggle to 
confirm the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  As Commoner viewed it, “The Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty should be regarded, I believe, as the first victorious battle in the campaign to save 
the environment – and its human inhabitants - from the blind assaults of modern 
technology.”118  He was not impressed with the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
protestations that the health risks to humans from nuclear fallout were acceptable, let 
alone that the effects of radiation on other organisms would be tolerable.119  Commoner 
promoted this new perspective throughout the rest of the decade, as he continued to 
author articles on the hazards of advanced industrial methods on the environment.  In 
1965 Commoner opened up the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems at Washington 
University.  This organization attempted to conduct a systems analysis of the effects of 
pollution on the environment.120  Commoner explained:  
Too often, today, we fail to perceive this system as a complex whole.  Too often 
has this blindness led us to exaggerate our power to control the potent agents 
which we have let loose in the environment.  Only too often in the recent past has 
our unperceived ignorance led to sudden hazards to life - contamination of our 
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streams with powerful but poorly understood biochemical agents; pollution of the 
air with powerful but poorly understood radiation.121   
 
Similar to the exploration of the problems of DDT use that had been exposed in 
Silent Spring, Commoner looked at other industrial byproducts and their effects, not just 
on humans, but on the other inhabitants of the polluted areas.  Mercury from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, particularly from coal-fired electricity generating plants was 
one of the problems Commoner considered, as the element was a hazard to both marine 
and human life.122  Commoner became a visible critic of such industrial practices that, 
while profitable to the industrial concerns in the short run, in the long run caused a 
significant harm to humans and other organisms.  He began a newsletter, Scientist and 
Citizen, which later expanded into the magazine Environment, exploring the issues of 
industrial pollution in the nation.123  A spirited lecturer and lobbyist, Commoner was 
energetic in spreading the word to the American people who he believed should be the 
final arbiter in deciding how to manage these risks.   
In 1971 Commoner published The Closing Circle on the emerging environmental 
crisis.  Partly written in response to other books that had identified overpopulation growth 
as the root cause of the emergency as compared to industrial pollution, Commoner’s book 
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was less ground breaking analysis than a careful synthesis of existing knowledge.124  In 
the volume, the author examined how technological society had literally missed the forest 
for the trees when assessing the environmental consequences of industrial production, 
particularly how the waste products of industry had to go somewhere when they were 
produced.125  There was no place beyond the environment to deposit such complex 
chemical waste without it eventually coming back to affect other life forms, often human 
ones:   
In sum, we can trace the origin of the environmental crisis through the following 
sequence.  Environmental degradation largely results from the introduction of 
new industrial and agricultural production technologies.  These technologies are 
ecologically faulty because they are designed to solve singular, separate problems 
and fail to take into account the inevitable “side effects” that arise because, in 
nature, no part is isolated from the whole ecological fabric.  In turn, the 
fragmented design of technology reflects its scientific foundation, for science is 
divided into disciplines that are largely governed by the notion that complex 
systems can be understood only if they are first broken into their separate 
component parts.  This reductionist basis has also tended to shield basic science 
from a concern for real-life problems, such as environmental degradation.126 
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Within the book Commoner proposed a set of cautionary postulates to assist 
humans when taking actions that might affect the environment.  These “laws of ecology” 
were not as exacting or precise as any in physics or chemistry, but they provided general 
guidelines to prevent human caused damage to the environment.  The First Law of 
Ecology stated that “Everything Was Connected to Everything Else.”127  The myriad of 
connections in any biological system, mostly unknown and unimagined by humans, 
allows great flexibility when permitted to reach its own equilibrium.  Upsetting that 
balance and forcing human desired outcomes into the system, was bound to cause 
disruptions and the possible collapse of the environment.128  Commoner’s Second Law 
read that “Everything Must Go Somewhere,” since in “nature there is no such thing as 
‘waste.’”129  The conversion of base materials into complex chemicals that had never 
been released into the environment before resulted in toxic concentrations in biological 
systems.130  In the Third Law, “Nature Knows Best,” Commoner submitted that any large 
scale human-generated change to a natural system is likely to be more detrimental than 
advantageous.131  Two to three billion years of evolution was unlikely to be bested by a 
few years of human research and development.132  Finally, in the Fourth Law, Commoner 
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enjoined that “There Is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch.”133  Every gain in the economic 
realm had a resultant environmental cost, often unrealized until the damage had accrued.  
The cleanup, if possible, was often more costly than the previous gain, suggesting that 
humans should be prudent prior to undertaking activities that might cause such 
damage.134  These precepts were not prescriptive but suggested that, like any natural law, 
violating them would eventually lead to significant problems. Over time these principles 
would be expanded upon but in 1971 they were ground breaking.   
 While a critic of American technological excess, Commoner was not proposing a 
new ethical standard of behavior for the population.  If anything Commoner suggested 
that the moral and social views of the technical experts were suspect.135  His analysis was 
firmly based on the scientific method to determine the magnitude of the problem, but 
required actions by educated citizens to make the democratic decision of how to proceed. 
Commoner also had little to say at this time about the electric power grid in any of its 
generation, transmission or distribution portions.  He did link the growth of affluence in 
the nation to its energy consumption and hence to its ability to generate electric power.  
The electric power generation to achieve this level of affluence, however, was the cause 
of: 
major pollution problems: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and dust emitted by 
fossil-fuel burning plants; radioactive emissions and the small but enormously 
catastrophic potential of an accident from the operation of nuclear power plants; 
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and the emission of waste heat to the air and nearby surface waters by both types 
of plants.136  
 
Commoner also suggested that the true costs of generating electricity from electric power 
plants were much greater than the values that the ledgers of any utility company might 
state.  Citizens needed to discern the hidden costs from pollution cleanup of the fossil fuel 
emissions or the increased health costs from lung cancer caused by pollutants when 
assessing the true expenses of a power plant.  These hidden costs might be worthwhile, 
but often the social costs of such problems were borne by the population without any 
knowledge they even existed.  The companies operating the industries that generated the 
pollution enjoyed the financial profits but avoided the cleanup costs.137    
 Commoner believed that science and scientists could help inform citizens on the 
risk versus gain calculus on such issues, but only so much.  Much of western science was 
reductionist in focus and the complex environmental systems resisted such facile 
analysis.  An interdisciplinary approach, Commoner believed, was required; “Life, as we 
live it, is not encompassed by a single academic discipline.  Real problems that touch our 
lives and impinge on what we value rarely fit into the neat categories of the college 
catalog, such as physical chemistry, nuclear physics, or molecular biology.138  Still, 
Commoner had some cause for optimism.  An awareness of the environmental crisis was 
the first step in altering the path towards destruction.  Since the environmental crisis was 
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a function of human social activity it was equally amenable to change at a rapid pace.  
Commoner proposed that “Since the environmental crisis is the result of the social 
mismanagement of the world’s resources, then it can be resolved and man can survive in 
a humane condition when the social organization of man is brought in harmony with the 
ecosphere.”139   
 Commoner would write more on energy, the electric power grid and the 
environment in the later part of the 1970s, but his role as a prophet of the environmental 
crisis was firmly established.  Such views as his, along with those of Paul Ehrlich and 
Ralph Nader to name but two, informed both the population and the politicians of the 
environmental hazards of the current industrial processes.  If Commoner’s prescriptions 
for socialist remedies were less palliative, his descriptions of the symptoms were 
sufficient to help maintain public awareness and legislative momentum.140    
Into the 1960s 
The environmental movement was one of many affecting society in the turbulent 
decade of the 1960s.  Certainly the resistance to the Vietnam War was the most apparent 
one, but the ongoing civil rights, feminist and anti-nuclear weapons movements all were 
buffeting American society.  Each of these movements learned from the victories and 
defeats of the others, sharing tactics and lessons learned.  Participants moved somewhat 
seamlessly between the movements, as membership requirements were nonexistent, 
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though depending on the issue of the day, one undertaking might have attracted more 
attention than another from the population.141  The protestors often looked at the moral 
response of the anti-nuclear discussions, appropriating those elements that were 
applicable.   
 In the nation’s capital a large amount of legislation designed to protect the 
environment against some of the more severe depredations was passed in the mid to late 
1960s due, in some small part, to the increasing awareness of the various environmental 
problems brought to light by the activists.  In 1964 Congress passed the Wilderness Act 
that protected a National Wilderness Preservation System of over nine million acres of 
land.  Following President Lyndon B. Johnson’s election, a new flurry of legislative 
action brought forth the Water Quality Act, the Noise Control Act, the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, and the Beautification Act in 1965.142  The Water Quality Act set the 
standards for water purity for federal or state regulation and enforcement.143  The other 
legislation consisted mainly of amendments to previous ordinances setting more stringent 
standards or providing greater authority to the federal and state governments to enforce 
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them.144  The next year the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Protection Act was passed 
requiring the Secretary of the Interior to take action to protect several species of 
threatened animals while the Clean Water Restoration Act appropriated the funds to help 
states and local communities meet the technical standards of the 1965 Water Quality Act.  
The Endangered Species Act of 1966 was the first attempt to protect species threatened 
with extinction, while other ordinances added to the land in the National Wilderness 
Preservation System.145  Subsequent legislation strengthened the Air and Water Quality 
Acts even as the Johnson administration’s legislative efforts were culminating under the 
wilting stress of prosecuting the Vietnam War.146  All of this legislation expanded the 
duties and responsibilities of the federal and state governments to monitor and take action 
to maintain the standards as set forth by the agencies of the federal government.  The 
obligations were divided between the various departments, with Agriculture and the 
Interior having the lead for water standards.147   
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 The national and local environmental organizations mirrored this incremental 
approach in the mid decade.  The Sierra Club continued to lobby for greater amounts of 
land to be set aside for wildlife, while the National Wildlife Foundation seemed to 
parallel the concerns of the conservationist hunters and nature lovers by lobbying 
Congress to pass the various laws expanding pollution cleanup and environmental 
standards.148  In Rhode Island, there was greater interest in the actions of the Audubon 
Society of Rhode Island, but no new organizations rose to ameliorate public anxieties.  
Only one new group, the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), established in 1966 in 
Boston, Massachusetts, would have any effect in the Ocean State.149  Created to oppose 
the construction of a ski resort on Mount Greylock, the highest point in Massachusetts, 
the CLF expanded its interests to consider other environmental problems.150  Its initial 
director, Benjamin Nason, led a volunteer group of attorneys to provide legal and tax 
recommendations to other local conservationist organizations as well as provide input on 
pending state environmental legislation.  Here they were more successful and the 
organization expanded to the other New England (with the exception of Connecticut) 
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states.151  By the early 1970s they were actively coordinating with other New England 
environmental groups to take advantage of the federal tax code regarding charitable 
contributions to the organizations.152   
The Creation of Earth Day 
As the 1960s ended, a fresh wave of environmental legislation was considered.  
Legislators and members of the executive branch were pressured by the public, who 
considered that the enforcement of the new environmental standards was too slow and 
that the existing pollution abatement efforts were taking a long time to resolve.153  An 
increase in the number of television sets across the nation and a corresponding increase in 
the reporting of environmental incidents, such as the oil spill in January 1969 in southern 
California or the Cuyahoga River fire in Cleveland, Ohio brought the images of 
environmental damage to the living rooms of a greater numbers of citizens, who shared 
their concerns with their representatives.154    
In Washington, Senator Gaylord Nelson, a Democratic Senator from Wisconsin, 
had made a reputation as an advocate for the new environmental issues and legislation.  
                                                 
151.  Conservation Law Foundation, CLF 40 Years, Protecting New England’s 
Environment (Boston, MA: Conservation Law Foundation, 2006): 2-4. 
152.  Kelly McClintock, Conservation Law Foundation to Messrs. Bogfinger, 
Goodall, Hawkes, Kunz, Morgan and Webber, October 25, 1972, Audubon Society of 
Rhode Island Archives, Smithfield, RI.    
153.  Claudia Copeland, Clean Water Act: A Summary of the Law (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 2.  
154.  Xin Liu, “The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, A Historical 
Perspective on Its Role in Environmental Protection” (PhD diss., University of Munich, 
2010), 63. 
221 
 
Nelson had earlier recommended to President John F. Kennedy that he help resolve 
environmental problems, but Kennedy’s efforts had been cut short by his assassination in 
1963.  Nelson had observed the numerous demonstrations against the Vietnam War and 
thought that this method might be an appropriate way to educate and motivate the 
population regarding environmental concerns.  In September 1969 while at a conference 
in Seattle, Nelson  
announced that in the spring of 1970 there would be a nationwide grassroots 
demonstration on behalf of the environment and invited everyone to participate.  
The wire services carried the story from coast to coast. The response was electric. 
It took off like gangbusters. Telegrams, letters, and telephone inquiries poured in 
from all across the country. The American people finally had a forum to express 
its concern about what was happening to the land, rivers, lakes, and air – and they 
did so with spectacular exuberance.155   
 
The national response to Nelson’s idea swamped his staff’s ability to coordinate, and the 
Senator quickly shifted the responsibilities and authorities for coordination to the local 
levels.  Nelson looked at various days in the spring to launch this demonstration.  
Eventually the 22nd of April was chosen, a date which would become known as “Earth 
Day.”156   
The new administration of Republican President Richard M. Nixon noted this 
public concern and proposed new solutions for some of these issues.  Nixon’s first 
attempts to create a high level federal coordinating body to deal with environmental 
issues were not well received by the Democratic controlled Congress.  In December 
1969, Nixon attempted to deflect criticism by accepting Congress’s National 
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) legislation, signing it into law on the first of January 
1970.  NEPA stipulated that all federal agencies would use “a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social 
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which 
may have an impact on man’s environment.”157  The statute also established the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to evaluate environmental concerns as well as 
economic and technical ones when making decisions.  Finally, all federal legislation or 
actions affecting the environment were now required to submit an environmental impact 
report to investigate possible “adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if 
the proposal be implemented.”158 
The passing of NEPA accelerated many of the emerging environmental activities.  
At both the federal and the local grass roots level things happened very rapidly, meeting 
many of the objectives of both politicians and environmentalists.  In his first Annual 
Message to Congress on the State of the Union, Nixon touched on many of the issues that 
the previous environmental writers had touched upon: 
The great question of the seventies is, shall we surrender to our surroundings, or 
shall we make our peace with nature and begin to make reparations for the 
damage we have done to our air, to our land, and to our water?  
We have been too tolerant of our surroundings and too willing to leave it 
to others to clean up our environment. It is time for those who make massive 
demands on society to make some minimal demands on themselves. Each of us 
must resolve that each day he will leave his home, his property, the public places 
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of the city or town a little cleaner, a little better, a little more pleasant for himself 
and those around him.159  
 
Nixon followed up this speech with a 37-point environmental action program issued in 
February 1970 that provided additional strengthening of the federal programs dealing 
with water and air pollution, just in time for the upcoming “Earth Day.”160   
“Earth Day” as it came to be known throughout the country was a resounding 
success. Perhaps twenty million Americans across the nation participated in the peaceful 
demonstrations for environmental actions to clear up the worsening environmental 
conditions in the nation on the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970.161  The response 
astounded Nelson and other politicians struggled to keep up with the flourishing 
movement. 
In Rhode Island, over one hundred activities were planned for the entire week 
encompassing Earth Day.162  The Providence Journal asserted that “All over Rhode 
Island, college students and others will be engaged in activities aimed at making 
reparations for man’s savages against his environment” as part of the state’s Earth 
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Week.163  At the University of Rhode Island, Dr. John Rock, co-designer of the birth 
control pill, warned of the perils of overpopulation, while other students attacked the oil 
spill residue and debris at Fenner Pond in Cranston.164  While April 22nd was partly 
cloudy with temperatures in the mid 50s, Earth Day itself was star studded in the state.   
At URI the former Republican governor, John H. Chafee, then the Secretary of the Navy, 
urged the over 800 assembled students to “make a fuss” about cleaning up the 
environment.  Thomas L. Kimball, the executive director of the National Wildlife 
Federation, admonished the students that while concern for the environment was 
currently exciting, it risked the loss of interest among the population.  Political action by 
concerned citizens was required but it could easily devolve into indulging the political 
parties by unscrupulous operatives.  Other speakers at URI urged an increase in spending 
by the federal government to protect the environment, though Secretary Chafee urged 
caution on overspending in this area.165     
At Brown University in Providence, Barry Commoner attempted to harness the student 
energy into environmental activism.  Noting that they were the first generation in human 
history to have radioactive isotopes from nuclear fallout and DDT in their bodies, 
Commoner exhorted them to reexamine the basis of their technological society as 
“Environmental pollution is not to be regarded as an unfortunate, but incidental, by-
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product of the growth of population, the intensification of production, or of technological 
progress.  It is, rather, an intrinsic feature of the very technology which we have 
developed to enhance productivity.”166  Radioactive fallout, no less than the pollutants 
from the combustion of fossil fuels or toxic chemicals, was another indication of this 
problem.  Yet the situation was not beyond repair, even if the complex problem of 
environmental contamination would take a long time to fix, let alone to understand the 
proximate causes.167  “Ecological victories” were still possible by informed action, 
Commoner suggested, citing the work of Rachel Carson to influence government 
response on toxic chemicals.168  
At Salve Regina College in Newport, a board of faculty members discussed the 
environmental crisis.  One suggested that industrial pollution was a side effect of the 
means of production required to allow the population sufficient leisure to send students to 
colleges such as Salve Regina.  A theology professor, Father Richard Mandeville, opined 
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that the root cause of the problem was individual attitude, something that no change in 
technology or business could affect.169 
Some discussion on the responsibilities of the electric power utilities to the 
current pollution levels and the environmental crisis took place during Earth Week.  At a 
panel discussion at Brown University, John Lebourveau, a New England Electric System 
engineer, stated that the utility was attempting to limit the amount of pollution it was 
creating with its Providence power plants by installing pollution monitoring devices and 
procuring a supply of low sulphur content oil to burn on days where the weather was 
conducive to serious air pollution problems.  Other panel members suggested that the 
problem was essentially a political one to resolve.170  Students at Brown University 
created an altercation with a member of the state air pollution control division when the 
official’s discussion of Narragansett Electric’s self monitoring of pollution proved 
unsatisfactory to the audience.171  An editorial in the Providence Journal conjectured 
about the ability of Narragansett Electric to spread the costs of eliminating air pollution to 
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its customers, though it recommended that cleaning up the pollution in the state was the 
responsibility for all citizens.172  
Even the state government participated in the activities.  Governor Frank Licht, a 
Democrat, signed into law a new bill strengthening the authority of the state’s health 
director to address water pollution in the state.173  As one of the numerous bills dealing 
with pollution in the state, this was seen as a small step for public health and addressing 
the crisis. Continued pressure by the citizenry under the guidance of the growing number 
of environmental groups in the state would be required for further progress.174   
Founding the Environmental Protection Agency 
The Nixon Administration was interested in exploiting the popular interest in 
environmental issues. Acceding to the recommendations of the Council on 
Environmental Quality, Nixon proposed the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in July 1970, combining the functions of the other federal departments 
under one new agency.  The EPA’s mission was to “establish and enforce environmental 
protection standards, conduct environmental research, provide assistance to others 
combatting environmental pollution and assist the CEQ in developing and recommending 
to the President new policies for environmental protection.”175  William D. Ruckelshaus, 
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a 38-year-old Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice, was confirmed by 
the Senate in December as the EPA’s first director.     
Ruckelshaus acted rapidly to establish the EPA as an aggressive federal agency 
committed to addressing the problems of pollution in the nation.  Within the first three 
months of the agency’s existence, he had threatened to sue the cities of Cleveland, Detroit 
and Atlanta for their failure to address their water pollution problems, and firmly stated 
that the new organization was not going to act to promote economic activity in the 
country at the expense of addressing environmental difficulties.  Instead, Ruckelshaus 
desired the EPA to act as the government’s watchdog for environmental improvement 
and to assist in the "development of an environmental ethic" among all members of the 
nation.176 
Other legislative activity followed the creation of the EPA.  Congress passed an 
essentially entirely new and improved Clean Air Act and established the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) in 1970, while the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (amending the Clean Water Act), the Coastal Zone Management Act, the 
Ocean Dumping Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act were enacted in 1972.177  
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 substantially altered the precepts of the 
earlier Clean Water Acts: 
It set optimistic and ambitious goals, required all municipal and industrial 
wastewater to be treated before being discharged into waterways, increased 
federal assistance for municipal treatment plant construction, strengthened and 
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streamlined enforcement, and expanded the federal role while retaining the 
responsibility of states for day-to-day implementation of the law. 
The 1972 legislation declared as its objective the restoration and 
maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s 
waters. Two goals also were established: zero discharge of pollutants by 1985 
and, as an interim goal and where possible, water quality that is both “fishable” 
and “swimmable” by mid-1983.178 
 
Congress banned DDT in 1972, following that up in 1973 with the Endangered Species 
Act before pausing in the wake of the Watergate scandal that was demanding the 
attention of the national legislature.179   
Continued Environmental Action in Rhode Island 
This acceleration of environmental activity was replicated at the local levels.  
Rhode Island, which had seen four conservation/environmental groups formed in the 
preceding fifty years, experienced the birth of nine new groups in the first two years of 
the 1970s.180  Most of these new groups were focused on altering the environmental 
policies and procedures of the state and local governments.  Many were initially very 
small.  Save the Bay, created in October 1970, was in the beginning a three man team run 
by its executive director, John Scanlon.  The group was originally focused on the effects 
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of developing energy facilities on Narragansett Bay.181  The group’s mission was to 
protect the watershed and coastal areas of the bay “through an ecosystem-based approach 
to environmental action; defends the right of the public to use and enjoy the Bay and its 
surrounding waters; and fosters an ethic of environmental stewardship among people who 
live in or visit the Narragansett Bay region.”182  Many other groups were narrowly 
focused on particular niche interests that paralleled the growing environmental mentality 
in the nation.  The Block Island Conservancy, founded in 1972, was originally devoted to 
protecting a portion of land near Rodman’s Hollow; greater aspirations would arise 
later.183  The Narrow River Preservation Association, formed in 1970, acted to “preserve, 
protect, and restore the natural environment and the quality of life for all communities 
within the Narrow (Pettaquamscutt) River Estuary and Watershed.”184  Other groups were 
state affiliates of larger national organizations, such as Clean Water Action, established in 
1972.  The national organization was engaged in lobbying Congress for the passage of 
the Clean Water Act in the early 1970s, an objective that was achieved in 1972.185   
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The creation of the National Wildlife Foundation’s new Rhode Island affiliate, the 
Environment Council of Rhode Island (ECRI), was perhaps the most important of the 
new organizations as it was an indicator in the direction of where the state’s 
environmental movement was heading.  In the late 1960s, members of Rhode Island 
Wildlife Federation (RIWF), the state affiliate of the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF), had become dissatisfied with the direction of the organization.  Some members 
of the RIWF wanted to embrace the political activism that was having some success in 
motivating Congress to create new standards for clean air and water.  Other members of 
RIWF were not interested in becoming more vocal in their pursuit of state and local 
policy changes that were required to protect the state’s environmental resources. When 
the national organization directed that state affiliates would be required to become more 
politically active to maintain their membership, the stage was set for a change in state 
environmental guidance.186   
Alfred Hawkes, the director of the Audubon Society of Rhode Island, was 
instrumental at redirecting this unrest towards a more positive course.  Hawkes had spent 
much of the later portions of the 1960s and early 1970s shifting ASRI towards an 
environmental mindset.  He had focused on primary education, coordination between 
other New England conservation and environmental groups and editing ASRI’s 
publications.  The ASRI monthly journal had published numerous articles investigating 
the effects of pollution in the early 1970s, including the role of electricity generating 
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plants in creating threatening wastes.187  In 1971 Hawkes and a group of other education 
experts had written a campaign plan for the development of environmental education at 
the University of Rhode Island for use in elementary and secondary schools.  The 
syllabus contained both classroom and field work to cement the education.  While based 
on the scientific method, it required an interdisciplinary approach to be effective: 
The committee conceives of environmental education as a means to inform 
students about the nature of the environment, both natural and man-made, and to 
suggest processes by which the environment can be managed in the interests of 
the society.    This conception removes environmental education from the 
exclusive context of the natural sciences and prevents it from being considered as 
merely another discipline which should be added to established curricula along 
with existing subject matter.  At bottom it perceives of environmental education 
as primarily devoted to affecting people’s attitudes towards the environment and 
its management.188  
  
With this mindset, Hawkes became instrumental in affecting change in the Rhode 
Island constellation of environmental groups.  In 1972, under the leadership of Hawkes, 
the Environment Council of Rhode Island was established as a state non-profit 
corporation.189  ECRI, which was disposed to advocate governmental action to protect the 
environment along the lines of the National Wildlife Federation’s guidance, was 
recognized as the state affiliate of the NWF.  The Rhode Island Wildlife Federation was 
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disaffiliated from the national organization and ECRI took its place.190  Building a new 
organization with a similar mindset to Hawkes would assist building pressure on the 
state’s agencies to address environmental problems.191  This would be similar to other 
actions Hawkes had taken to create new venues to educate and interest the public in 
environmental concerns. 
From its birth ECRI was a different organization than its predecessor.  Its bylaws 
incorporated environmental precepts and the requirements for action:   
ECRI is hereby established to coordinate, to initiate, to promote and to unify 
efforts of Rhode Island organizations concerned about the problems of our natural 
environment consistent with the right of the people to a clean, healthy and 
productive environment in which to live, work and play, and to lobby and 
advocate for that right.192 
 
While its influence was small in its first years, ECRI grew to become an important 
clearinghouse where the other state environmental groups could coordinate their efforts 
and learn of the important legislation affecting the environmental health of the state.  The 
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organization was also committed to harnessing the citizens of the state to assist ECRI in 
its efforts, using education and volunteer assistance to help achieve their objectives.193   
The start of the 1970s provided many indications that environmental 
organizations would project a greater force in the decisions that might affect the state’s 
natural resources.  There were an expanding number of organizations which, while small, 
were connected to one another to exchange information, ideas, and best practices.  
Nationally the environmental movement had achieved significant legislative victories that 
energized the local memberships.  While the ethical basis of many of these organizations 
were often limited to addressing specific problems related to their whereabouts, such 
ideas were rapidly diffusing and creating fertile ground for the next generation of  
environmental thinkers.  If the actual accomplishments of these local organizations 
appear slight, the preconditions for greater and more effective action were present.  All 
that was required was the necessary spark to energize the rest of the population out of 
their apathy.  It was about to come.       
Environmental Thinking and Efficiency 
 Environmental thinking in the United States took over a hundred years of 
evolutionary discussion and analysis to reach the 1960s fervor of protecting nature and 
the wilderness.  Conceptualizing the wilderness as some expanse to subdue, or at least 
exploit for human desires, slowly changed into interests for conserving this area and its 
resources for future generations.  This ambition to preserve the wilderness was more for 
utilitarian reasons than aesthetic desires, but still led to important portions of the country 
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being insulated from human development.  This attention for conservation diffused into 
the national consciousness, only to be trumped by a greater apprehension regarding the 
pollution caused by the very engines that propelled the country’s technological society.  It 
was no longer sufficient to merely seclude small segments of the nation to provide a 
wilderness reprieve for the population.  Instead, the environment of the entire country if 
not the world had to be protected to prevent harm occurring to humans.   
 In parallel with these apprehensions, the ethical standing of the environment also 
progressed.  The abject destruction of any species was no longer considered as an 
acceptable course of action, particularly if the animal was considered visually appealing.  
The entire inventory of plants and animals in a given area was now seen as a collection of 
living organisms that had some value based on their existence and not simply how 
humans might use them.  Some of these ideas were still developing, but they were at least 
present in the conversation within the human population.         
This new perspective for the environment was the sum of the work from 
important writers, conservationists and wilderness management practitioners who built on 
the efforts of their predecessors, as well as from independent authors who investigated 
different designs.  Pinchot impacted Leopold who influenced Carson who inspired 
Commoner, while Muir and White proposed their own concepts of how humans should 
interact with the environment.  The net result was not one coherent ethic or doctrine, but 
a critical mass of ideas that suggested human actions in this realm had not been prudent 
and needed to change in order to maintain human survival if not improve human virtue.    
The evolution of environmental thinking was reflected in the different 
organizations interested in promoting conservation and then later environmental designs.   
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As the conservation mindset changed to an environmental one, the interests of the 
national and local groups altered as well, though often lagging the developing attitudes.     
The influence of these organizations varied with the national organizations such as the 
NWF having more political clout in Washington than the state level organizations, for 
example ASRI, had in Providence.  These groups typically had peripheral concerns 
regarding the electric power grid, being more interested in opposing the overall effects of 
pollution or preserving specific areas than increasing the efficiency or effectiveness of 
any particular technology, including the electric power grid.  Compared to the changes in 
society being made by the electrification of industry and the home, these groups might 
well be considered to have had comparatively little influence.  The organizations were 
often focused on one particular issue that motivated their members and until the 1960s 
were only intermittently successful in shaping policy.  Unless one was a member, the 
efforts of the groups might easily be lost in the noise of other events.   
 Certainly Lewis Mumford was not impressed by their activity.  His major works 
do not consider the efforts of conservationists or the evolution of environmental thinking 
in the United States.  While professing optimism that the human spirit would resist the 
forces of the growing technocracy, Mumford did not show any appreciation that the 
environmental movement might provide it.194  Unable to consider how or who might 
resist the expanding megamachine, Mumford left his faith in miracles and saints without 
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looking about to see if any living humans might be capable of handling the mission.195  
From the perspective of the sweep of thousands of years of human civilization, Mumford 
might not have considered the most recent environmental activity important compared to 
the centuries of increased centralization enabled by advanced technology.   
Similar to Mumford, Jacque Ellul had little to say about the conservation and 
environmental movements.  Much of Ellul’s work occurred before the rise of the 
environmental movement and like Mumford, he did not appear to be impressed by the 
work of conservation groups despite his brief membership in an organization opposed to 
the French government’s land development plans.196  Compared to techniques actions to 
desacralize all aspects of human life, conservation and later environmental efforts would 
probably be considered as less futile than irrelevant.197  The preservation of a portion of 
the environment for any aesthetic reason would not be considered an efficient use of 
resources.  Even Carson’s application of science to prevent pollution from harming 
human life and proposal to elevate the ethical standing of the environment was not 
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important compared to technique.198  All that the environmental groups had accomplished 
in this era might be considered a minor irritation affecting the efficient use of resources. 
The conservation and environmental groups and their ethical concerns do not 
appear to be a major component of either Ellul’s or Mumford’s theories.  These 
organizations and concerns are equally negligible in Thomas P. Hughes’ work.  
Conservationists were essentially non-existent, with the exception of Gifford Pinchot, 
who is mentioned more for his views and work on the electric power grid when he was 
Governor of Pennsylvania than for his work in the Forestry Service.199  Rachel Carson 
and Barry Commoner receive only a passing mention.200  While the environmental 
thinking and groups might eventually create a change in values in the rest of the 
population, by the beginning of the 1970s the technological momentum of the electric 
power grid had yet to be affected.  This state of affairs would not be continued.          
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     CHAPTER 4  
RHODE ISLAND GOVERNMENT AND REGULATORY BODIES 
 
An honest voter is one that stays bought. 
- Charles R. Brayton 
 
The evolution of the Rhode Island state polity from a government dominated by a 
single party, the Republicans, to a government dominated by a single party, the 
Democrats, is well deserving of its own study.  The corruption of the state’s political 
processes, regardless of the party in power, was a steady state narrative.  Suffice it to say 
that the ability of either of the political parties to control the political activity within the 
state had important regulatory effects on Rhode Island’s businesses, including the 
operation and maintenance of the electric power grid.  The polarity of these effects could 
be positive or negative, depending upon the desires of the political party in charge.  It was 
incumbent on the electric power grid ownership to enhance the positive ones while trying 
to short-circuit the negative ones.   
Parallel with this development, Rhode Island created several regulatory bodies to 
conserve the state’s natural resources for future generations.  The initial purpose of these 
regulatory organs was the maintenance of foodstuffs and recreation areas for the citizens 
of Rhode Island.  Such human focused actions tended to be unmindful to the preservation 
of the environment unless such actions directly contributed to a human need or desire.  
This was a common trait of the period, but did little to engender any ethical concern for 
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other species, unless they were considered tasty.  Such neglect would lead to real 
problems with contamination of the state’s natural areas, and in time a popular reaction 
against real or perceived polluters, including those that operated the area’s electric power 
grid.   
The Republican Machine in Rhode Island 
 As has been previously discussed, the introduction of the electric power grid in 
Rhode Island was assisted by the close relationship between the state government and the 
financiers and proprietors of the local electric power companies.  It is not an exaggeration 
to suggest that the differences in membership and mindset of the two groups were rather 
small.  Certainly when Marsden Perry began the expansion of the Narragansett Electric 
Light Company in the 1880s his interactions with the Republican controlled state 
government were such that one might reasonably conclude he was at least the power 
behind the government, if not the owner of the legislature itself.  The Republican Party 
leadership ably assisted his company’s expansion and absorption of his competitors, even 
as he was filling the coffers of the party treasury.201   
In this respect the highly efficient party machine run by Charles R. Brayton 
proved decisive.  As the bicameral state legislature’s senate apportionment was based on 
location, not size of the municipality, Brayton could use the contributions of Providence 
businessmen such as Perry to buy up the votes in the smaller Rhode Island towns, 
particularly in the southern areas of the state.  Using party funds to pay the voters for 
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their time on Election Day, Brayton was able to assure Republican control of the senate, 
and hence the General Assembly.  “An honest voter is one that stays bought,” Brayton 
opined in a 1905 interview with Lincoln Steffens, who would describe the government 
as, “Rhode Island: A State for Sale.”202  Using the well disciplined party machine, 
Brayton was able to control government appointments, manage the legislative 
deliberations in the Assembly and punish his political enemies.203  Even when the 
opposing party showed some life and ability to reform the system, Brayton used the 
derisively named “Brayton Act of 1901” to subvert the power of the governor by 
allowing the senate to rescind the governor’s patronage appointments with their own.204   
While the state government was decidedly corrupt and only somewhat 
democratic, it was also capable of taking action to solve issues, at least when “General” 
Brayton thought it profitable enough to do so.  The University of Rhode Island was 
established during this period even as Marsden Perry was electrifying the Providence 
lighting and banking industries and Brayton was bringing “the Republican party to its 
peak of corruption.”205  The ability of the state government to make deals with the myriad 
smaller electric utility companies of the era was probably overall beneficial to the future 
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of the grid.  The legislature or town governments could decide which company’s 
proposals looked the most promising and allow specific monopolies to be established, 
permitting long term planning by the winning business.  This allowed the acquisition of 
the necessary capital required to build the power plants, dams and transmission lines by 
the electric utilities.  This also permitted standardization of the electrical systems in the 
state, though this was probably not a major concern for the party leadership.  The same 
utilities were also more than happy to provide some overhead to keep the politicians 
satisfied.  When the Republican Party suffered internal conflict in the first decade of the 
century, Brayton struggled to maintain his grip on the levers of power, but eventually 
regained his balance and authority.  It was only his unexpected death in 1910 that broke 
Brayton’s control of the party machine.206  
The Republican machine was not run merely for the sheer joy of exercising 
political power.  Brayton’s “Machinests” were concerned that the influx of immigrants 
from Ireland, Italy and Quebec threatened the Yankee Protestant political supremacy in 
the state.  Appealing to the Irish and German immigrants by waving the “bloody shirt” of 
Democratic Party perfidy in the American Civil War and using the control of the 
economy in Rhode Island to entice the new immigrants with promises of employment, 
the Republican Party was able to influence the electorate to vote as directed.  Brayton 
was sufficiently astute to select a French-Canadian candidate for governor in 1908, Aram 
                                                 
206.  Patrick T. Conley, “Charles R. Brayton” in Rhode Island in Rhetoric and 
Reflection (East Providence, RI: Rhode Island Publications Society, 2002), 409. 
243 
 
J. Pothier, further diluting the immigrant Democratic vote.207  This was Brayton’s last 
success although his less colorful and less brazen successors were able to maintain 
Republican control of the state government until the 1930s.208     
The Establishment of the Public Utilities Commission 
The election of Aram Pothier as the Rhode Island governor maintained much of 
the continuity of the bankers’ and public utility owners’ control of the state government.  
Pothier was a well established Woonsocket banker and politician with ties to the Perry 
financial empire.209  First elected as state governor in 1908 under the guidance of the 
Brayton political machine, Pothier initially showed little appetite for reform or regulation 
of the electric utility companies that assisted funding of the Republican Party.  By 1911, 
in his third term, Pothier changed his mind, urging that “This General Assembly enter 
upon a serious and thorough consideration looking to the enactment of a law creating a 
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State Board of Public Utilities, with the powers of supervision over gas, electric light and 
power companies.”210  In due course the state legislature approved his proposal and 
established the Public Utilities Commission in 1912.211   
The Public Utilities Commission was initially structured along the lines of the 
state Railroad Commission that had been incorporated into the new organization.  The 
commission had few members, little expertise, and resolved to settle disputes through 
informal meetings of the interested parties whenever it was possible.212  The commission 
did have the power to call witnesses and hear testimony if the disputes required formal 
consideration, though a lack of personnel significantly limited the power of the regulatory 
body.213  Almost immediately, the three commissioners, appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the senate, began to petition the state government for more resources to 
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better examine how the public utilities were conducting business in the state.214  The 
commission’s attention was initially focused on the state’s railroads and trolley 
companies allowing the electric utilities more freedom to conduct business, both 
commercial and political.215   
The Public Utilities Commission showed great continuity in its first decades of 
existence.  There was no turnover among the senior commissioners and the commission 
was fairly liberal in granting electric rates (known as tariffs) to the numerous electric 
utilities.  Although they had regulatory authority over the state’s water, gas, railroads and 
electric companies, the commission usually spent more time resolving problems with the 
railroads.  As an example, in 1919, the Rhode Island Company, the city of Providence’s 
trolley company, petitioned the Public Utilities Commission to relocate a section of its 
track with the assistance of the Union Railroad Company.  The commission accepted the 
application submitted by the company’s advocates, including future Rhode Island 
governor, Theodore Francis Green, and approved the track relocation.216  In 1921 the 
commission approved the merger of the United Electric Railways Company and Rhode 
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Island Company, the latter having fallen on hard times despite Green’s direction and 
political connections.217  The Public Utilities Commission did receive some 
supplementary authorities.  In 1918 the Rhode Island General Assembly granted the 
commission the right to suspend any utility rate increase until such time that the body had 
time to review the proposal.218  This power was almost immediately used on the 
perennially financially troubled Rhode Island Company.219   
In 1924, the Public Utilities Commission became involved in the Narragansett 
Electric Lighting Company’s contractual dispute s with the Attleboro Steam and Electric 
Company over the sales of electric power across state lines.  Public hearings were 
initially delayed while the Narragansett Electric Lighting Company gathered more 
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information to support their case.220  This accumulation of information caused a delay of 
a year before the Public Utilities Commission was ready to make a decision.  The 
analysis of the Narragansett Electric Lighting Company’s claims against the Attleboro 
Steam and Electric Company was extensive and indicated a much higher degree of 
professionalism than previous work conducted by the commission.  Prices charged over a 
full year were analyzed, as was the generating capacity of the firm, the costs of fuel and 
upgrades to the system, and a host of other issues.  Having accomplished a rigorous 
review of the cost issues, the Public Utilities Commission found for the Narragansett 
Electric Lighting Company.221  This decision precipitated a judicial appeal from the 
Attleboro Steam and Electric Company that soon reached the U. S. Supreme Court.  In 
1927 the Supreme Court would decide against the Rhode Island firm, not on technical 
grounds, but because the state of Rhode Island did not have the authority to regulate this 
commerce.222   
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Seemingly unconcerned  by this rebuff, the Rhode Island Public Utilities 
Commission returned to regulating the jitney trade in the state, while the bond sales, tariff 
requests and acquisitions of the electric utilities garnered little actual resistance from the 
regulators.223  The takeover of the Narragansett Electric Lighting Company and the 
Union Electric Railways by the New England Power Association (NEPA), International 
Paper & Power’s electric utility subsidiary, using the support of the state Republican 
political leadership was thus unsurprising.  It may have been a political issue in the 1926 
gubernatorial election, but to the political elite of the state, both Republican and 
Democrat, it was a business opportunity to take advantage of.  When the dust had settled 
from the takeover and the election, the Public Utilities Commission approved the bond 
sales necessary to clean up the residue of the deal.224     
 The “Green Revolution” 
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The 1926 election may have been the high-water mark of the Republican Party 
and electric utility company concordance.  In 1928 Green became the Democratic state 
chairman while Aram Pothier, the popular Republican governor, died in office in 
February.  With the departure of Pothier from the political landscape, the Rhode Island 
Democratic Party was able to harness the immigrant and religious voting blocs to 
displace the Republican political control of the state.225 
Green had a difficult task ahead of him.  Despite the increasing numbers of 
immigrants entering the state in the 1920s who generally were willing to vote for the 
Democratic Party candidates, the Republican Party machine perfected under “Boss” 
Brayton was still powerful.  Fees collected by the Republican Party government 
appointees were often not recorded in the state ledgers, leaving a large sum to finance the 
party operations or at least enlarge the functionary’s salary.  While the Democrats might 
win the state Governor’s post, the ability of the Republican controlled senate to frustrate 
efforts for reform was substantial as the Brayton Law ensured a veto capability for the 
Republicans to keep the state bureaucracy manned by party loyalists.  The Republicans 
used the funding stream from the Providence tax base to fund political operations in the 
rural areas, maintaining their electoral advantage in the General Assembly.226 
Green slowly and sometimes painfully assembled his growing coalition to 
overturn the “one-party rule and party patronage by the Republicans for the same kind of 
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single-party patronage system by the Democrats.”227  Green’s initial attempt to forge this 
new political alliance was not successful; he lost the 1930 gubernatorial election to the 
incumbent Republican governor, Norman S. Case.228  Two years later the combination of 
the economic effects of the Depression, national dissatisfaction with the Republican 
Party, stronger support from the French Canadian immigrant and Roman Catholic voters, 
and better organization of the state Democrats, led to Green’s election and ascent to the 
governor’s mansion.229   
Merely holding the governorship was not sufficient to break the Republican hold 
on the state legislature and hence the state bureaucracy.  Without majorities in either the 
state House or Senate, Green was unable to get many of his appointees confirmed by the 
Senate to run the regulatory bodies of the government or pass any but the most pressing 
legislation.  While Green’s political clout was enhanced by his close relationship with 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Green’s control of the federal monies flowing into 
the state, his first term was one of consolidation of his political base rather than 
involvement with launching new schemes.230  
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Green’s reelection in 1934 was essentially a foregone conclusion, but the real 
drama was focused on the General Assembly.  The initial returns brought an eight seat 
Democratic majority in the House, but the Republicans still retained an advantage of 
twenty three to nineteen in the Senate.  A subsequent recount of the vote in Coventry 
under the watchful eyes of a bipartisan group shifted that race to the Democratic 
candidate, with the Senate now tilted to a twenty two to twenty seat Republican 
advantage.  Convinced that the Republicans had destroyed ballots that would have tipped 
their narrow victories in South Kingstown and Portsmouth to the Democrats, Green and 
the Democratic Party leadership secretly planned a devastating response.   
On the first of January, 1935, Lieutenant Governor Robert E. Quinn, a Democrat, 
opened up the first session of the Senate.  Quinn declined to recognize the Republican 
Senators from South Kingstown and Portsmouth, stating that a protest had been lodged 
regarding the veracity of the election returns from those communities.  With the Senate 
now evenly split, Quinn called for a voice count authorizing a recount of the now 
disputed returns, surprising the remaining Republican senators.  Before the Republicans 
could react, the measure passed, Quinn acting as the tie breaker.  The House rapidly 
approved the measure and Green signed the new law within minutes of its authorization.  
The subsequent recount on the grounds of the Senate later that afternoon led to narrow 
victories for both Democratic candidates.  With the Senate now under their control, 
twenty two to twenty, the Democrats rapidly exercised their new power.  The state 
Supreme Court was purged of its previous five Republican members and a new group, 
with three Democrats and two Republicans, was selected.  Eighty state commissions were 
merged into ten new departments, with the previous office holders released.  The 
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“Bloodless Coup” or the “Green Revolution” took less than twenty four hours.  Later that 
month the notorious Brayton Law was repealed and the Republican lock on the state 
government was irrevocably broken.231         
The Democratic Machine in Rhode Island 
Having supplanted Republican power, the Democrats preceded to use their 
political power to reward the party faithful with the fruits of patronage.  At the Public 
Utilities Commission, the three superannuated Republican commissioners were quickly 
replaced by a new Division Chief.232  Yet with a surplus of ambitious party stalwarts to 
fill the newly opened patronage positions, Green struggled at times to maintain party 
discipline under his leadership.  Thomas P. McCoy, the politically powerful Irish 
Democrat from Pawtucket, proved to be one of Green’s largest opponents.  In the early 
1930s when McCoy was the mayor of Pawtucket, he had been convinced by the 
Pawtucket Public Works Commissioner, Albert J. Lamarre, that the local electric utility, 
Blackstone Valley Gas and Electric Company, was overcharging its customers, McCoy’s 
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constituents.  In 1933 McCoy and Lamarre requested Blackstone Valley to lower its rates 
but their requests were rebuffed, whereupon the utility’s property evaluation for taxes 
was increased by one million dollars.  The same tactic was repeated in 1934 and would 
have been in 1935 but, by then, the utility president David Daly had recognized the threat 
and made a counter offer to appease McCoy.  The Democrat rejected Daly’s offer to 
lower commercial rates by almost two hundred thousand dollars and upped the ante, 
promising to sue if the company did not also end its practice of increasing the rates 
charged to consumers in arrears on their ledger.  This the utility rejected and the matter 
festered until after the “Green Revolution” played out in January 1936.233     
During the campaign of 1936, Green’s Democratic platform endorsed the public 
ownership of utilities, much as was being accomplished in the Tennessee Valley 
Authority under President Roosevelt’s direction.  McCoy supported this and desired to 
build a municipally owned power plant in Pawtucket to help pressure Blackstone Valley 
to lower its rates.  The financially stressed Manville-Jenckes mill had its own power plant 
and was eyed by McCoy as a possible acquisition to create a new publically owned 
electric utility.  After Green’s election, the governor had appointed McCoy as the state 
budget director, a position that McCoy ably filled.  When Green acted to select one of his 
own political followers to be the state’s Public Works Director, he and McCoy had a 
falling out as McCoy wanted Lamarre to serve in this new position.  Adding to the 
acrimony, Green short circuited McCoy’s push to establish Pawtucket’s own municipal 
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electric utility and pressured Daley, the president of the Blackstone Valley Gas and 
Electric Company to propose a 10% rate reduction, a tariff change that the state Public 
Utilities Commission rapidly accepted.234 
McCoy responded by having his followers in the state legislature obstruct Green’s 
proposed legislation.  He publically attacked Green for backing away from his campaign 
platform for municipal ownership of the utilities and suggested Green’s unethical linkage 
to the Republican affiliated companies.  “If support measures designed to force the utility 
companies of Rhode Island to grant just rates to all of the people of the state is treason to 
the aims and purposes of this administration, then I say to Governor Green, make the 
most of it,” McCoy charged, ironically using Green’s own words from his inaugural 
address to make a point.235     
Green was unwilling to accede to McCoy’s demands and worked to diminish 
McCoy’s political influence.  With the power of patronage under his control, Green was 
able to buy out McCoy’s base by appointing these legislators to state jobs, a method that 
the Republicans had taken advantage of and Green had decried in his election campaign.  
Green also traded patronage for Republican support on other legislation, but yielded on 
the Democratic Party’s long desired goal to hold a constitutional convention to end the 
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senate apportionment rules.  By the summer of 1936 McCoy’s political base had been 
deflated, leaving little for him to do except snipe at Green for the governor’s 
abandonment of his principles. At the convention to select a Democratic Party candidate 
for the special election to fill the congressional seat recently vacated by Green’s 
promotion of Representative Francis Condon to the State Supreme Court, McCoy and 
Lamarre lambasted Green, calling him under the control of the public utilities.  McCoy’s 
candidate was not selected at the convention, although a resolution pledging the 
candidate’s endorsement of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act that had recently 
been passed by Congress was adopted.  McCoy’s last jab at Green was ineffective.  With 
McCoy refusing to endorse the Democratic Party candidate, Antonio Prince, the 
Republicans managed to regain the congressional seat.236  Perhaps McCoy’s only 
productive accomplishment was the Rhode Island legislature’s passing of a law requiring 
“the appraisal and inventory of all electrical properties” of the electric utilities to examine 
their true financial status and profitability.237             
With this episode, the political momentum for reform also subsided.  Green went 
off to Washington as a Senator in 1937.238  McCoy became embroiled with charges that 
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he was profiting from the proposal to build a municipal power plant in Pawtucket and 
that he was promoting criminal elements at the Pawtucket Horse Race Track in 1937.239  
Lamarre and scores of McCoy’s supporters were implicated in a voter fraud scandal in 
the 1938 Pawtucket elections.240  Interparty feuding over patronage, control of the 
funding streams from Washington’s Depression era works programs, and ethnic bloc 
competition derailed many of the Democratic Party initiatives.  The lobbyists for the 
industrial and financial concerns were able to prevent other regulatory legislation by 
playing these power centers off against one another.   It became apparent that the citizens 
of the state had exchanged one party machine for another, though less disciplined, one.241  
This is not to suggest that the “Green Revolution” was unnecessary or unproductive.  
Green’s close relationship to Roosevelt and his own political acumen led to a more 
democratic political organization in the state, though not necessarily a more transparent 
and ethical one.242     
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It is difficult to conclude that the New England Power Association (NEPA) or its 
Rhode Island subsidiary the Narragansett Electric Company was very concerned by the 
political wrangling in Providence.  Admittedly most of the local political attention was 
focused on the McCoy’s promotion of the Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Company, 
the economic consequences of the Depression were enormous, and NEPA was occupied 
determining the effects of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act.  In 1936 NEPA 
bought up several smaller electric utilities in the area belying any true unease.  The 
Bristol County Gas & Electric Company, the South County Public Service Company and 
the East Greenwich Electric Company were taken over in June while portions of the 
South Gloucester Light & Power Company were bought in October.  All other requests 
by the firm for property swaps, mortgage adjustments and bond issuance were authorized 
by the Public Utilities Commission, now under secure Democratic control.  The firm did 
lower its rates in September, but by then the furor over McCoy’s proposals had 
diminished.  The political authorities in Providence may have changed parties, but the 
normal business model was still being followed by the Narragansett Electric Company 
and its ostensible regulatory oversight body.243   
The Public Utilities Commission continued its normal business during the rest of 
the 1930s with little indication that the political party controlling its actions had changed.   
                                                                                                                                                 
which could have easily spread over to its subsidiary Narragansett Electric.  The role of 
Green in preventing either of these suggests further investigation is warranted.    
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The commission monitored public utility financial performance, permitting some utilities 
to refinance their debt while not allowing others.  Newport Electric Corporation’s 
requests for bonds were disapproved in 1937, but Blackstone Valley Gas And Electric 
Company’s request was approved in 1938.244  In 1939 the Public Utilities Commission 
was moved into the new Department of Business Administration.  The new administrator 
requested assistance in the fields of public utility accounting as he felt this division did 
not have the technical expertise to adequately examine the utilities’ work.245  That year 
the Public Utilities Commission ordered rate reductions by Narragansett Electric 
Company, Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Company and the Newport Electric 
Corporation following the completion of the “appraisal and inventory” of the utilities that 
had been directed in 1936 by the legislature.  The companies were generally willing to 
accede to the recommendations of these reports regarding rate reductions.  Narragansett 
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Electric did request some relief based on the damages suffered during the 1938 hurricane 
that caused significant damage in the state.246 
In 1938, the Republicans regained the governorship of the state under William H. 
Vanderbilt as well as a majority in both houses of the legislature.  Vanderbilt was 
strongly opposed to the standard state corruption and graft.  His administration was short 
lived after it was discovered he had hired a private investigator to wire tap the phones of 
possible election fraud suspects in Pawtucket.  The Democrats recaptured control of the 
government in 1940 under J. Howard McGrath, an early supporter of now Senator 
Green.247   
The Second World War lessened the Public Utilities Commission’s interest, never 
that great, in electric utility regulation.  The combination of the relief from the economic 
woes of the Depression and the exigencies of industrial warfare tended to dampen 
political friction with the electrical utilities.  In 1942 the Public Utilities Commission did 
recommend a number of changes for legislation affecting the public utilities.  Companies 
would be required to file with the commission a list of their rules and regulations 
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affecting their service to the public.  Any changes would not be permitted unless 
authorized by the commission.  Utilities would also be required to conduct periodic safety 
inspections of their facilities and would not be required to extend services into areas 
unless a return of twenty percent of the initial investment would be guaranteed.248   The 
request was repeated in 1943 with similar results.249  The Commission also noted the lack 
of spare parts and personnel to conduct maintenance on all of the utilities during the war 
though the only interruptions in electricity supply were due to “storms, hurricanes and 
blizzards,” all of which were rapidly repaired.250   
The end of the war allowed the Public Utility Commission to return to peacetime 
operations even as the state economy was shifting.  The war had propped up the anemic 
industries in the state but the completion of the conflict was another shock to the teetering 
businesses.  Naval base construction had resulted in millions of dollars in assistance to 
the state while the Navy retained a considerable footprint in Narragansett Bay area after 
the war.  Economically the demographic shift to the suburbs from the urban areas of the 
state was more important.  The return of service members to the state after the war and 
the previously dampened demands for housing outside of Providence led to considerable 
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growth in the suburban areas of the state.  Concurrently union membership remained high 
as the population benefited from the welfare state policies of President Harry S. Truman.  
The citizens continued to support Democratic governments in the state under Governors 
J. Howard McGrath, John O. Pastore, John S. McKiernan and then Dennis J. Roberts, but 
the lack of a manufacturing base hindered state economic growth.  Even a shift to a more 
tourist based economy, as evidenced by the state’s new nickname, “the Ocean State,” was 
insufficient to stem the decline.251   
John O. Pastore became governor in 1945 when the standing governor, J. Howard 
McGrath, stepped down to accept a position as the United States Solicitor General in the 
Truman administration.  Deftly playing off the various other political leaders against one 
another, Pastore was able to gain the Democratic Party nomination for governor in 1946 
and win that election handily while McGrath returned to the state to run for a vacant 
Senate position, an election that he also won.  As Governor, Pastore proposed issuing 
state bonds to bring the state’s antiquated infrastructure up to date and control the 
pollution in Narragansett Bay, but little came of these proposals.252  Pastore won 
reelection easily in 1948 emphasizing a continuation of Truman’s economic policies.  
After McGrath was named as Truman’s Attorney General in 1949, Pastore gained the 
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Democratic nomination for the once more vacant Rhode Island Senate seat and was 
elected as one of the state’s two senators during the 1950 general election.253 
As Senator, Pastore became involved in the Senate’s committees on 
communications and nuclear power.  Pastore became a member, and later chairman, of 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the combined Senate and House organization 
founded to oversee the nation’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).  The AEC, created 
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, was responsible for the regulation and research of all 
atomic endeavors in the country.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis was on matters 
pertaining to nuclear weapons, their construction, their testing in the atmosphere and the 
prevention of their proliferation.  Pastore supported the efforts to stop nuclear weapons 
testing in the atmosphere that led to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet 
Union in 1963, but he was generally an advocate for a strong nuclear deterrent force for 
the nation.254    
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Pastore was more interested in the peaceful applications of atomic energy, though 
that was a small subset of the AEC’s concerns.255  Pastore supported passage of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, legislation that permitted the possibility of civilian 
ownership of nuclear power plants.  Later in 1956 he backed federal funding of 
demonstration reactors to spread nuclear technology.256  Pastore’s influence in nuclear 
issues spread back to his home state, along with federal dollars.  In 1955, the General 
Assembly passed a bill creating the state’s Atomic Energy Commission, with a five 
member board staffed with appointees from the Governor.257  As an influential senator in 
the nation’s capital, Pastore was able to direct some of the federal government’s research 
budget back to his home state.  One of the research reactors Pastore advocated building 
was constructed at the Nuclear Science Center in Narragansett, RI, under the control of 
the University of Rhode Island and supervision of the state Atomic Energy Commission.  
The research reactor first went critical in 1964.258   
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With both Green and Pastore in Washington and the Democratic Party in full 
control in Providence, party stalwarts could evince some satisfaction.  Yet the party was 
blind to some of the fundamental changes that were straining the state’s social fabric.259  
Population migration to the suburbs increased Democratic membership and 
representation in the General Assembly from these locations but was not followed up 
with party organization of the newly acquired districts.  Election victories were thus 
based more on the strength of the candidate than party discipline.  Even the “long count” 
gubernatorial election of 1956, where the Democratic incumbent, Dennis J. Roberts 
narrowly defeated the Republican challenger Christopher Del Sesto, failed to alter the 
dynamics of political action.  In that election, the closeness of the voting machine count 
required numerous inspections of the incoming absentee ballots.  This took time and 
when it appeared that these would swing the election to Del Sesto, the Democrats 
challenged the constitutional validity of the ballots cast before Election Day.  The State 
Supreme Court eventually ruled in Roberts favor but not until Inauguration Day of 1957.  
Nearly five thousand votes were disallowed, permitting the reelection of Roberts.260   
As the public furor over the rejection of these ballots subsided, the seamy side of 
Rhode Island politics continued, with a strong bipartisan stance.  The ability to use the 
state offices for personal or organizational advantage appeared too great a temptation for 
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individuals, let alone political parties, to resist.  “You never can tell what the companies 
might do.  They will be around to see you,” explained one senior legislator to a less 
experienced General Assembly member when asked if a proposed bill’s requirements 
were too onerous on the regulated company.261   
There seems little evidence that rigorous supervisory practices transferred over to 
the regulation of the electric utilities.  Bond issuance, stock sales and tariff adjustments 
were almost always approved by the Public Utilities Commission in the 1950s.  It was not 
until 1957 that the Commission disapproved Narragansett Electric Company’s rate 
increase requests.  This rejection was couched in terms of dueling engineering analyses:   
In a large measure the respective judgments of the engineers who prepared and 
submitted studies of separations of Narragansett plant between inter and intrastate 
business were predicated upon their interpretation of the nature of firm versus 
interruptible power and the degree which Narragansett’s surplus capacity 
constituted a reserve of power for the entire New England Power System.  In 
arriving at his decision in this case the Administrator has given careful 
consideration to all of these factors.262  
 
The commission reprimanded the company for its poor forecasting efforts, though the 
commission did allow Narragansett Electric to resubmit its rate increases with a different 
fuel cost basis.263   
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Environmental Regulation in the Ocean State 
Theodore F. Green’s tenure as governor resulted in the reorganization of many 
portions of state government.  In 1935 the Department of Agriculture and Conservation 
was created by an amalgamation of the older Department, Divisions and Commissions.  
The former Department of Agriculture was divided into two new Divisions, the Division 
of Animal Industry and Milk Control and the Division of Entomology and Plant Industry.  
Added to the new Department were the old Bureau of Forestry and the old Metropolitan 
Park Commission, now renamed as the Division of Forests, Parks and Parkways.  The 
Commissions of Shell, Inland Fish and Game were combined into the new Division of 
Fish and Game.264   
The issues the Department of Agriculture and Conservation focused on appear 
similar to those discussed by Aldo Leopold and later Rachel Carson in their writing.  The 
regulatory body was interested more on the economic betterment of the state through the 
propagation of sound agricultural practices and the elimination of insect menaces then the 
long term nurturing of the environment.  The suppression of the gypsy moth infestations 
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and mosquitos were one of the department’s main efforts from its inception.265  The 
subordinate components of the department had differing visions of the overall mission.  
Conservation, as proposed by the Division of Forests, Parks and Parkways appeared more 
as the careful management of the state’s woodlands for stable lumber production than 
protection of all of the species of flora and fauna that resided there.  Parks were 
appreciated for their ability to generate funds for the state and human recreation sites, not 
for their mere presence.  The Division of Fish and Game was more concerned with 
expanding opportunities to hunt the state’s land dwelling wildlife or harvest its numerous 
marine life; lobsters, oysters and quahaugs, then maintaining these populations for their 
own sake.  Much like other conservation organizations, the Division cooperated with the 
Rhode Island Wildlife Federation and the Audubon Society of Rhode Island to promote 
recreation and wildlife conservation in the state.266 
In 1939 the Department Agricultural Divisions were reshuffled into the Offices of 
Animal Husbandry and Dairying and the Bureau of Markets while the other Divisions 
were renamed as Offices.  Despite the name change, the focus of the organization 
remained the same; the efficient economic utilization of the state’s natural resources for 
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human consumption and enjoyment.267  Insects were to be battled against so “That 
Mankind and his works May not perish from the Earth!” 268  An insectary was established 
at the University of Rhode Island for the “rearing, studying, cataloging and mounting of 
insects” afflicting the state.269  Parks were maintained to allow the citizens of the state to 
experience the “open air and sunshine, to exercise his muscles, and for the proper 
functioning of all other organs of the body.”270  This experience would reinforce the 
normal virtuous behavior that was suppressed by urban living. Even juvenile delinquency 
could be reduced.  The state had a responsibility to thus develop and maintain a series of 
facilities to foster human flourishing.271  Such conceptions of conservation were typical 
for the era.  Conservation might well include the preservation of animals and plants, but 
the basis for such action was human centric.  “Without the three primary elements of 
land, water and vegetation in a natural balance we can have neither game, wild flowers 
nor trees, labor nor capital, nor sustaining habitat for humans,” proclaimed Jay N. 
Darling, then President of the Wildlife Federation, a thought echoed by the Department 
of Agriculture and Conservation.272   
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Other activities of the Department were less friendly towards the attainment of 
such a balance.  In 1941 the Office of Fish and Game authorized a bounty of three dollars 
for foxes taken legally within the state.  The fund was rapidly exhausted by the 
enthusiastic hunters, just as the spring season began when farmer’s children would have 
been ready to dig them out of their burrows.  The state’s starfish eradication program, 
designed to assist the production of oysters, was a similar program.273  The state’s other 
efforts to maintain viable populations of game animals and fish resources appear to have 
been driven by the desire to sustain a steady flow of these resources to the dinner table.274   
The Second World War curtailed the efforts of the Department of Agriculture and 
Conservation as well in order to support wartime production, but even these reductions 
were not disastrous to humans or any other species in the state.  There was still sufficient 
food in the region to keep the population well fed.  The desire to maintain stable game 
populations and lumber resources tempered any rush to completely subdue the earth in 
support of the industrial production required to win the war.  Labor in the state may have 
been scarce, but the war against the gypsy moth and mosquito was not ended, merely 
reduced in magnitude.  Even post-war planning was conducted in anticipation of the 
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future desires and needs of a predicted population increase.275  Such plans also included a 
robust education program, allied with the Rhode Island Wildlife Federation, to instruct 
teachers and youth leaders on the value of conservation in the state.276    
The Department of Agriculture and Conservation also enjoyed a rather low 
visibility period following the Second World War.  As early as 1945 the Department 
recognized the declining sea food production from Narragansett Bay and suggested that 
pollution, or at least the effects of human activity, might be the cause.  The Director of 
the Department, Dr. Raymond G. Bressler, proposed further investigation to determine 
the causes.277  The Department resumed its struggle against the gypsy moth, now using 
DDT sprayed from trucks to combat the threat.278  Even at this stage there was some 
concern of the use of this chemical, though the Department was convinced of its safety:   
The Division uses DDT only after carefully weighing the good it will do by 
killing harmful insects against the possible destruction to wildlife.  The more 
serious the insect pest, the more justification for its use.  When DDT must be 
used, careful observations are made as to its effect and the application is timed to 
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avoid as much as possible bird migrations, nesting periods, and times when honey 
bees could be poisoned.279   
 
By 1949, the Department could look back on fifty years of gypsy moth control 
with some pride as the use of DDT had significantly reduced the defoliation of the state’s 
forests by the insect.280  Sexual attractant traps were used but DDT remained the primary 
weapon in the Office of Entomology’s fight against this insect.281  The death of the 
Department’s Director, Raymond J. Bressler, in 1949 initiated a general decline in the 
quality of the department’s annual reports.  While still clearly written, the amount of 
information and the subsequent director’s overall perceptions on the important issues 
affecting his organization were not as direct or illuminating as Bressler’s had been.282  
The 1950s also brought new ways to fight the mosquito and gypsy moth infestations in 
the state.  The Division of Entomology used helicopters for aerial spraying of affected 
areas, noting that “The machine is able to penetrate areas and put down a cover spray 
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where there is no feasible means of access.”283  The use of DDT continued throughout the 
decade, from almost five thousand gallons sprayed in 1950 to sixty five hundred in 
1960.284  The Department also used other chemicals to eliminate invasive species in state 
ponds.  The Division of Fish and Game sprayed sodium arsenite to kill weeds in ponds as 
well as rotenone to kill club suckers in Ashville Pond in 1956, though both efforts were 
unsuccessful.285   
By the start of the 1960s some concern of the diffusion of pesticides into the cattle 
feed and hence into human food was noted by the Department but dismissed as media 
induced “consumer hysteria.”286  Otherwise the Department entered the decade with 
much the same mindset as it had when it was created.  The natural resources of the state 
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were to be conserved in order to provide a steady stream of products for human economic 
use.  Forests were managed for lumber and recreation.  Wildlife was protected and 
preserved for hunting and meeting the discerning palate of the state’s population and not 
for its own value.  Troublesome insects were to be managed through chemical attack to 
dampen their depredations on trees considered attractive by humans.  The secondary 
effect of the use of different chemicals does not seem to have been investigated.  The 
Department of Agriculture and Conservation would have seemed very familiar to readers 
of Rachel Carson or Aldo Leopold.  It was human focused and not particularly concerned 
with the environment beyond its ability to be used by and for humans. With the exception 
of coordination with the Narragansett Electric Company to assist in the state’s forest fire 
response plans, there also does not seem to have been any concern with how the area’s 
electric power grid might affect the conservation of natural resources in the state.287     
Into the 1960s 
By the start of the 1960s, the generation long domination of Rhode Island politics 
by the Democrats was beginning to wane as the Republicans started to regain their 
appeal.  A Republican, the Italian-American Christopher Del Sesto, won the governorship 
in 1958, only to be defeated in his reelection attempt in 1960 by Democrat John A. Notte, 
Jr.  Notte’s tenure was to be equally short lived as Republican John H. Chaffee displaced 
him following the 1962 election.288  Chaffee would remain in office for six years, 
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winning reelection in 1964 and 1966, before losing in 1968 to Democrat Frank Licht.  
During this period the power of the Providence base of the Democratic Party was 
declining as more party members moved out into the suburbs, paralleling the erosion of 
party discipline within the state.  Union defections or at least failure to support 
Democratic candidates in the 1958 and 1962 elections were also detrimental to 
Democratic electoral efforts.  By running popular candidates such as Del Sesto and 
Chaffee, the Republicans were able to outflank the Democratic Party organizational 
strength and win statewide elections.289     
The Public Utilities Commission spent most of the 1960s operating as it had done 
in the 1950s.  There were six electric companies in the state. Narragansett Electric, a 
completely owned subsidiary of the New England Electric System (NEES) was the 
largest company in terms of sales and electric power production.  Blackstone Valley 
Electric Company and the Newport Electric Corporation were the next largest, though 
their combined sales were much smaller than Narragansett Electric.  The smallest 
companies, Island Light and Power Company, which provided electricity to Block Island, 
Prudence Island Utilities, which powered Prudence Island, and the Pascoag Fire District, 
which bought electric power from the Blackstone Valley Electric Company and delivered 
it to its customers in the Pascoag and Harrisville Fire Districts, had almost negligible 
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effects on the electric power grid compared to the larger companies.  All went about their 
operations in a predictable manner.290   
The surveillance of the electric utilities had by now eclipsed all of the other ones, 
including water, transportation and communications, in the Commission’s ledger.  Like 
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the quality of the reports of the 
Public Utilities Commission appeared to decline during this decade, with less information 
and analysis.  Few attempts to shift the utilities’ operations were noted.  In 1962 the 
Commission approved Narragansett Electric Company’s request to exercise the right of 
eminent domain to run transmission lines to the new power plant at Brayton Point in 
Somerset, Massachusetts as this was the most “economical” method of bringing the 
electric power to Rhode Island.  Objections to the proposed construction were primarily 
directed against damages to the owner’s property from the construction the power 
lines.291  Island Light and Power Company experienced financial difficulties in the latter 
half of the decade due to fuel costs and the nature of the electric loads on Block Island, 
requiring a large tariff increase to remain in business.292  The Newport Electric 
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Corporation bought up the shares of the Prudence Island Utilities company in 1968, as 
the latter required extensive modernization that was too expensive to accomplish and 
remain in business.293   
The Public Utilities Commission also authorized Narragansett Electric Company 
and Blackstone Valley Electric Company to join other Massachusetts and Vermont 
electric utilities in the Rhode Island-Eastern Massachusetts-Vermont Energy Control 
(REMVEC) organization.  This structure had been established in response to the 1965 
Northeast blackout in order to enhance coordination and cooperation between the 
regional utilities and prevent another large scale outage.  REMVEC also entailed the 
creation of the New England Power Exchange (NEPEX) to accomplish this coordination.  
As this organization was a non-profit one, the Commission approved it without the 
normal public hearings.294  As the 1960s ended and the new decade began, both 
Narragansett Electric and Blackstone Valley Electric Companies petitioned the Public 
Utilities Commission to issue new mortgage bonds as well as raise the rates they were 
able to charge their customers.  Both companies attempted to pass on their financial 
strains to their customers.  The Public Utilities Commission approved the bond requests 
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but rejected the rate increases; the companies would require better justifications to 
convince the Commission that the customers should accept a higher burden than the 
utilities’ stockholders.295   
The Department of Agriculture and Conservation no longer existed by the start of 
the 1970s.  In 1965, under the direction of Governor John H. Chaffee, the department had 
been reorganized and renamed as the Department of Natural Resources.  The Department 
consisted of a Division of Conservation, a Planning and Development Division, an 
Agriculture Division, a Division of Parks and Recreation, a Division of Harbors and 
Rivers and an Enforcement Division.296  The new department had a slightly updated list 
of duties and responsibilities.  It was to “supervise and control the protection, 
development, planning and utilization of the natural resources of the state,” as well as 
coordinate with the Department of Health regarding the consequences of water pollution 
affecting birds, marine life and recreational activities.297  The Department was also tasked 
to work with the Department of Community Affairs in any planning effort affecting 
agriculture, recreation and fisheries.  Finally, the reconstructed department was required 
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to cooperate with the local conservation commissions that were simultaneously 
created.298   
The Department also established a new Advisory Council on Natural Resources to 
advise the Department director.  The first secretary of that council was Alfred L. Hawkes, 
director of the Audubon Society of Rhode Island.299  Later members included other 
important members of the conservation societies of the state, including Donald J. Zinn, a 
professor of zoology at the University of Rhode Island and former president of the 
National Wildlife Federation.300   
Despite these outward alterations, the Department of Natural Resources lagged 
the changes that the blooming environmental consciousness was bringing to the nation’s 
conservation groups.  The Rhode Island Pesticide Control Act had eliminated the use of 
many toxic insecticides, but aerial and truck mounted spraying using less harmful 
chemicals continued.301  Many of the activities of the Department appeared to continue 
on the trajectory of the old Department of Agriculture and Conservation, that of 
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maintaining the land, forests and wildlife of the state for its continued use by the human 
population in the future.  Only the Department’s new Division of Planning and 
Development evinced a trace of any environmental ethical consideration in its proposal to 
set aside forty thousand acres of open space to protect wildlife against the expected 
pressures of an expanding state population.302  The continuing reduction of analysis in the 
Department’s reports indicate that while such tendencies may have been taking root in 
the organization, the overall bureaucracy was less supportive of a new way of thinking.303   
The new department was also energized by the passage of the state’s “Green 
Acres Land Acquisition Act of 1964.”  Concerned that the predicted expansion of the 
state’s population would have insufficient space to enjoy for recreation and the 
conservation of natural resources, the General Assembly authorized the purchase of 
suitable land for the purposes of preservation.  The act authorized the state to work with 
local governments to purchase this space.  The program director was tasked to discover 
exceptional natural areas for recreation and conservation, though the acquisition should 
be focused on open areas that were less expensive.  Land acquired by this act could not 
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be diverted from the intended use of recreation and conservation without the approval of 
the program director or governor for state lands.304      
A conflict between this aspiration to preserve land for recreation and conservation 
and the requirement to use land for the electric power grid soon arose.  In 1971, the 
Blackstone Valley Electric Company petitioned the Public Utilities Commission to 
support a new exercise of eminent domain to run high voltage power lines.  Burrillville, 
Rhode Island was the new location required by Blackstone Valley Electric Company to 
run 345 kilovolt transmission lines to connect into the larger New England power loop.  
This linkage would permit greater flexibility of the grid during dynamic electrical loading 
conditions and assist “the reliable uninterrupted transmission of the power supply.”305  
Most of the required land had been purchased or rights of way negotiated with the owners 
for the company to proceed with construction.  One owner, William S. Fort of North 
Smithfield, Rhode Island protested the use of his land by the utility.  Fort did not argue 
with the Blackstone Valley Electric Company’s analysis of the requirements of the 
transmission lines to support the grid’s reliability and flexibility.  Instead, Fort argued 
that the construction of the transmission lines across his property would “destroy its value 
for conservation purposes.”306  Building the transmission lines would disrupt the “scenic 
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development of his property,” and as pristine property in the state was a diminishing 
resource, exercising the right of eminent domain would not be an overall benefit to the 
state’s citizens.307  After a careful examination of Fort’s property, the Commission was 
not convinced.  While the land was being organized by Fort to support wildlife, the 
Commission did not think that Fort’s actions met the mark for “scenic development.”308   
Alfred L. Hawkes, Executive Director of the Audubon Society of Rhode Island 
interceded for Fort.  Hawkes testified that “placing of the lines would deprive children of 
the opportunity to appreciate nature at its purest, untouched by man or civilization.”309  
This argument also failed to sway the Commission:   
The Commission found some difficulty appreciating this position since nature in 
the raw was already disturbed by Mr. Fort’s vacation residence on the parcel and 
the Commission’s awareness that the United States Government has been 
spending billions of dollars to bring civilization, including power lines, to what it 
had considered the poor, unfortunate, benighted and backward people who but for 
the United States beneficence would continue to reside in areas untouched by 
what we consider the benefits of civilization.310 
 
The Commission authorized Blackstone Valley Electric Company to condemn the land 
and construct the power lines.311 
The Blackstone Valley Electric Company decision is of note for a number of 
reasons.  It was the first one where environmental concerns were used to help frame the 
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dimensions of the problem that was being addressed, reference frames that were not used 
or perhaps even understood by all of the decision makers.  The utility company and the 
Public Utilities Commission were interested in the continuity of power, electrical and 
political, in determining whether to approve the construction of the high voltage 
transmission lines.  While Fort may have been also interesting in keeping the power lines 
off of his property, both he and Hawkes couched their arguments in terms that an 
environmentalist of the early 1970s would recognize.  The ears of the Commissioners 
were more tone deaf than indifferent to Hawkes’ talking points.  As time progressed the 
Commissioners would hear this tune again.   
The state of Rhode Island entered the 1970s aware of the growing environmental 
movement in the state and the nation, but not particularly influenced by its precepts, at 
least not where the electric power grid was concerned.  Senior leadership in the 
government in Providence and Washington were influenced or partial to the desires of the 
electric utility companies to provide stable and reliable electric power to the region.  The 
regulatory body tasked to supervise those companies was supportive of meeting the 
requirements of the utilities and the demands of their political masters.  The regulatory 
body that might have altered this synchronization of government and technologically 
focused business was only slowly divesting itself of an older philosophy of viewing 
nature as a resource and not as having its own inherent value.  Much like Muir’s loss 
during his struggle to prevent the damming of the Hetch-Hetchy Valley, the skirmish in 
Burillville between the two analytical systems was a precursor for future conflict.    
Regulation, Efficiency and Momentum 
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Much of the state of Rhode Island’s regulatory effort over this period, particularly 
the work of the Public Utilities Commission, seems to support the theories of both 
technological determinism as well as technological momentum.  This is unsurprising, as 
the Public Utilities Commission was designed to monitor and regulate the privately 
owned companies that owned and operated the electric power grid.  The utility companies 
were allowed to achieve a reasonable rate of return on their investments while 
maintaining their natural monopoly in return for their acceptance of the government 
supervision.  Whether that transaction was self generated from the pull of the 
authoritarian megamachine, the demands for efficiency by technique, or provided by one 
of the “reinforcing institutions” arising from the momentum of the electric power grid 
may not be crucial.312  However, since the executives of these companies often occupied 
the offices of the political leadership of the state, the distinction between assisting the 
operation and efficiency of the advanced technology system and promoting the finances 
and political fortunes of the owners can be difficult to glean.   
Certainly proponents of technological determinism would not be surprised at the 
increased government involvement with the electric power grid.  As this advanced 
technology system became ever more vital to the normal functioning of society, it 
became ever more intertwined with larger numbers of the population.  The continued 
development and application of the technology became more expensive and the 
corporations applying it became subsequently more powerful.  The problems resulting 
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from this technology became larger still as the Public Utilities Commission had to 
balance the desires of the electric utilities against the needs of the population.  Only the 
intervention of the state with its wealth and authority had the ability to resolve these 
differences.313  Ellul wrote that “These problems all exceed the powers of private 
individuals.  Technique, once developed to a certain point, poses problems that only the 
state can resolve, both from the point of view of finance and that of power.”314  Only the 
state could determine the requirement for a large reservoir in the state and force the 
people living in the condemned land to leave their homes.  The state had the necessary 
talent to carefully evaluate the electric utilities’ requests for higher electric rates or 
transfer of land.  In this respect the actions of the state to regulate the electric utility 
companies’ operation of the electric power grid supports the model of technological 
determinism.   
Curiously, the development of the state’s environmental regulatory bodies would 
be seen as equally necessary as the utility commission.  The problems of the pollution of 
the air and water supplies necessitated the intervention of the state “if they are to be 
solved at all.”315  On the other hand, technique would not require the elevation of the 
value any other species to motivate humans to take some action.  These were technical 
problems; appeals to anything other than efficiency were of little concern.    
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Lewis Mumford would also have approved of the state’s influence on the 
companies operating the electric power grid.  An advocate of regional planning to meet 
the demands of modernity, Mumford supported “the building of appropriate structures – 
dwellings, industrial plants, markets, water works, dams, bridges, villages, cities – to 
house the activities of a community and to assist the performance of all of its needful 
functions in a timely and orderly fashion.”316  How much the Public Utility Commission 
or the Department of Agriculture and Conservation planned for the future is arguable; 
however the concept of government interaction with private industry was commendable 
to Mumford.    
The regulatory agency of the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission falls 
precisely within Hughes’ theory of technological momentum.  This type of organization 
acted to reinforce the behavior of utility companies that operated the electric power grid.  
From its inception, RIPUC acted to permit the electric utilities, particularly Narragansett 
Electric, the NEES local electric power distributor subsidiary, to effectively exercise their 
monopolies within the state.  Tariffs were evaluated by RIPUC and usually approved.  
Bond and stock sales were reviewed and authorized while property was condemned and 
transferred as required.  One has to look hard to find instances where the commission 
opposed the desires of the electric utility companies. 
The activities of the politicians also tended to reinforce the actions of the electric 
utilities to grow and build.  Charles Brayton and Marsden Perry supported the 
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development of the electric utilities in part because they could use the utilities as a cash 
cow to support their political empires.  T. F. Green profited from the absorption of UER 
and prevented the ever contrary Thomas McCoy from establishing his own power base 
from a publically run utility in Pawtucket.  A desire to protect the monopolies of the 
electric utility companies was the more pressing factor in keeping electric cooperatives 
away from the area than increasing the reach of electric power transmission during the 
Great Depression.  Senator Pastore’s promotion of nuclear research and the development 
of nuclear reactors for electric power generation further reinforced the natural 
inclinations of the companies operating the electric power grid.  Many of these actions 
and decisions do not appear predicated on increasing the efficiency of the electric power 
grid.  Even after the passage of decades it is challenging to infer the motivations of these 
individuals behind their decisions.  Perhaps the differences between personal ambition 
and professional actions to assist their communities were negligible, at least from their 
perspective.  The influence of these and other individuals in the political realm who 
profited politically and personally from their decisions is less well presented in Hughes’ 
analysis.317        
Hughes is less persuasive in considering the parallel development of regulatory 
agencies such as the Rhode Island Department of Agriculture and Conservation.  
Technological momentum postulates the creation of organizations that strengthen the 
tendencies of advanced technology systems.  The theory is silent on the development of 
                                                 
317.  Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power (1983; repr., Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 464-465.   
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agencies in reaction to the negative effects of that technology.  While Hughes discusses 
the organizations that arise to profit from and assist the development of the advanced 
technology systems, organizations that might dampen the momentum are not considered.  
By the 1970s some of the effects of pollution from fossil fuel burning electric power 
plants had been observed, if not fully understood.  Yet the emergence of organizations 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Conservation Law Foundation that 
acted to reduce air or water pollution caused by industrial activity would be unexpected 
by  adherents of this model.     
From the perspective of the beginning of the 1970s, both theories of the 
development of advanced technology systems appear to cover past events with some 
accuracy.  As one might expect with a general theory of this magnitude, the precise 
nature and correlation of every event with the models is not achieved.  The overall trend 
and tendencies of the electric power grid seem to match with the descriptions of all of the 
theorists.  Proceeding farther into the future should suggest which model of reality better 
describes the development of the electric power grid in southeastern New England in 
particular and advanced technology systems in general.  
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CHAPTER 5  
ALTERED MOMENTUM: THE CHARLESTOWN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
 
The more you know about nuclear power, the more sense it makes.  
- Narragansett Electric Company Advertisement 
 
I knew nothing of nuclear power but was really outraged that the federal 
government did not involve the general public in making a decision about their 
own community.   
- Claudine Schneider 
 
Over the almost ninety years of operation of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England, the New England Electric System (NEES) had become fully 
conversant with the advantages of operating a mature technological system.  With a 
professional cadre of committed engineers and businessmen, NEES could look 
backwards at generations of success solving the most challenging technical problems the 
construction, operation and maintenance of the grid had generated.  Along the way the 
company had survived organizational restructuring, hostile takeovers, adverse Supreme 
Court decisions and even the actions of the federal government to break it asunder.  For 
many good reasons, the organization exhibited a culture that extolled technical expertise, 
practical problem solving and business acumen.  While the future challenges might be 
significant, the corporation exuded confidence in its ability to preserve and flourish.  
Certainly the electric utilities were not alone in this mindset.  NEES and the smaller 
electric utilities in the area had acquired allies in the senior leadership of the Rhode 
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Island government, the regulatory bodies of the state bureaucracy, the local industries and 
unions, and perhaps most importantly, the population that used its product.  These leaders 
and organizations had invested no small amount of financial and emotional capital in 
maintaining the status quo and were unwilling to entertain objections to the standard 
business model that had been so successful.   
NEES Nuclear Plans 
With its historical background of success and the underlying organizational 
attitude of engineering problem solving mastery, NEES believed it was ready and able to 
handle the future technical problems in order to promote the reliability and profitability 
of the electric power grid.  At the start of the decade one of those technical challenges 
was the construction of a nuclear power plant to provide a new source of electric power 
for the region.  NEES had acquired experience constructing and operating nuclear power 
plants under the direction of William Webster who had overseen much of the company’s 
work with Yankee Atomic Energy at the Row, Massachusetts nuclear power plant.   
While NEES had not built its own plant, NEES had acquired financial interests in other 
New England utilities’ nuclear power plants, allowing NEES to buy power from these 
plants for its own customers.1  Some members of the NEES leadership were hesitant 
about building the larger scale plants being advertised by nuclear power industry despite 
being impressed with the promised overall economic benefits to the system.  The 
                                                 
1.  The advent of the New England Power Exchange (NEPEX) and than later the 
New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) in the early 1970s made this easier to accomplish.  
See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth 
of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 182.     
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consensus opinion was that the risks were warranted given the engineering and economic 
considerations.2      
Rome Point in North Kingstown, Rhode Island had previously been proposed as a 
location for a conventional electric power plant, though friction with the state 
government over tariff increases had thwarted that scheme.  The new NEES plan for 
Rome Point was more ambitious.  The company planned to build two 1150 MW nuclear 
plants on the site, with a possibility of two additional 850 MW plants in the vicinity.3  
Building two nuclear plants at the same site would save the company up to fifteen percent 
of the total cost of construction.  Since the plants would take upwards of eight years to 
build, this savings was an important consideration.  Located close to the major electrical 
loads and customers in Providence and able to use the waters of Narragansett Bay for 
cooling, the plants would be able to meet the expected increases in electrical demand in 
the area.4  Company officials from the NEES subsidiaries were strident regarding any 
outside interference with their proposals.  The company rejected any need for any 
external ecological studies regarding the safety of their proposed nuclear plants.  The 
president of the Narragansett Electric Company, T. Dexter Clarke, was dismissive about 
                                                 
2.  Guy Nichols, soon to become the president of NEES, had reservations about 
the cutting edge designs capable of generating 1150 MW compared to the proven designs 
that could only generate 850 MW.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From 
the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East 
Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 222.     
3.  “Electric Co. Denies Planning of 3 Plants,” Providence Journal, February 5, 
1971.   
4.  Irwin Becker and Robert C. Fredericksen, “Electric Firm has 2nd Rome Pt. 
Plan,” Providence Journal-Bulletin, May 18, 1971.  
291 
 
involving local environmental organizations such as Save the Bay in the company’s 
planning process.  Ecological concerns were undesired in the company calculus; Clark 
noted that “It just hasn’t worked.  It is like writing an ordinance by referendum.”5  Delays 
in the construction of the plants would only drive up the costs and make non-nuclear 
plants more economically viable, even if they did produce greater air pollution.  The 
company representatives also rejected the notion that consumer advertising to use more 
of their product was actually causing additional pollution.6    
Popular reaction against the proposed nuclear power plants was tentative at first.  
Organizations accepted NEES’s assumption that electric power demands would continue 
to increase and that additional capacity in the state was required to meet it.  The president 
of Save the Bay, Irving G. Sheldon, opined that “there is a definite need for more power, 
but there are other avenues to be studied before Narragansett Electric decides on Rome 
Point as the site for a nuclear power plant.”7  Other concerned citizens noted that the 
plant’s design would result in a twenty degree temperature rise in water circulated from 
                                                 
5.  While a 1932 Brown University graduate and a lawyer, Clarke sounded similar 
to what any electrical engineer might propose using the IEEE standards of conduct.  See 
Irwin Becker and Robert C. Fredericksen, “Electric Firm has 2nd Rome Pt. Plan,” 
Providence Journal-Bulletin, May 18, 1971.   
6.  The officials being interviewed, T. Dexter Clarke, president of Narragansett 
Electric, Lawrence E. Minnick, president of Yankee Atomic Electric, the group of 
construction firms that would build the plants, and John Lebourveau, manager of 
environmental research for NEES all promoted an attitude of certainty that the plants 
could be built safely and that concerns with radioactive emissions from the plant were 
small compared to the “other social costs of radioactivity we’re exposed to.”  See Irwin 
Becker and Robert C. Fredericksen, “Electric Firm has 2nd Rome Pt. Plan,” Providence 
Journal-Bulletin, May 18, 1971.  
7.  “Rome Point Nuclear Plant Draws Debate,” Rhode Island Audubon (August-
September 1971): 5.  
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Narragansett Bay through the plant’s condensers.  This would affect the local 
environment by killing off small organisms that were part of the food chain in the area.  
Narragansett Electric officials downplayed these concerns: 
There have been no adverse effects as far as the ecology and marine biology is 
concerned as yet created by the thermal discharges of either a nuclear power plant 
or a fossil fuel plant.  This is the overall ecology of a body of water into which the 
discharge flows.  You have to take the overall ecology.  This is what we are 
concerned about.  We’re not concerned about killing these small micro-organisms 
as they come through the condensers, because they’re part of the food chain and 
somewhere along the line, they’ll be absorbed anyway.8 
    
This point was precisely the area of concern by some citizens.  Unwilling to 
accept the concept that the “overall ecology” would be able to handle such perturbations, 
citizens pointed out that the thermal effects on local marine life might be drastic.  People 
were also concerned that the chlorine discharged to clean the plant’s heat exchangers 
might also be harmful to wildlife in the region.  Echoing the words of Barry Commoner, 
the Audubon Society displayed concern that even minor stresses in the local ecology 
might cause greater unexpected effects due to the interconnectedness of the environment.  
NEES’s offer to clean up any ecological damage proven to have been caused by the 
plant’s operation was not seen as well thought out.9      
Rhode Island political reaction to the plant was muted.  Democratic governor 
Frank Licht said that the state would not authorize construction of the plant until “it is 
fully satisfied that such a project will not hurt the bay or the people of Rhode Island.”10  
                                                 
8.  Ibid. 
9.  Ibid. 
10.  “Rome Point Nuclear Plant Draws Debate,”   Rhode Island Audubon 
(August-September 1971): 5. 
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Senator John O. Pastore, the Democrat Senator who was the chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy in Washington and a strong supporter of the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy, withheld a final verdict on Narragansett Electric’s plans.  “The burden 
of proof is upon the industry and government, and those in responsibility, to prove that 
it’s safe.  It is not up to the public to prove that it’s unsafe,” Pastore warned.”11  Pastore 
said more studies were required prior to any decision being made, though also noted the 
nuclear industry’s safety record, particularly compared to the number of oil spills at other 
energy facilities.12  
NEES pressed ahead with its proposal, spending over a million dollars in 
preparatory work and planning by the summer of 1971.13  Despite NEES’s previous 
strong words against involving recalcitrant environmental groups in its planning process, 
it did attempt to at least limit some of the negative reactions from this direction.  In the 
spring of 1972 representatives from Narragansett Electric met with Alfred J. Hawkes, the 
executive director of the Audubon Society of Rhode Island, to discuss the biological 
impacts of the Rome Point plants.  These talks were later expanded to include other local 
environmental groups such as Save the Bay, Ecology Action for Rhode Island, and 
                                                 
11.  “Pastore Withholds Judgment On R.I. Nuclear Plans,” Providence Journal, 
March 2, 1971. 
12.  Ibid. 
13.  “Utility Has Spent A Million At Rome Pt.,” The Evening Bulletin, July 1, 
1971.    
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Rhode Island for Safe Power in attempts to continue a “dialogue” with the organizations 
that were opposed to the power plant project.14   
By this time the new federal organization, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) had become involved.  Citing the newly passed amendments to the Water 
Pollution Act as its authority to intervene, the EPA rejected Narragansett Electric’s 
permit requests for plant construction.  The EPA stated that Narragansett Electric was not 
using “the best practical control technology” in its water cooling design to minimize 
harm to the environment. Narragansett Electric’s design was not “consistent with 
maintaining a balanced, indigenous population of marine life in the West Passage of 
Narragansett Bay.”  The proposed cooling system would cause an increase in the water 
temperature there, adversely affecting the “sensitive nursery area” and “beautiful 
breeding grounds” of the bay. 15  Noting that even a fossil fueled plant using the same 
cooling system would be affected, Narragansett Electric officials reconsidered the Rome 
Point area.  To build a cooling system without affecting the thermal balance of that area 
of Narragansett Bay area would require building alternate and more expensive cooling 
systems.  The President of Narragansett Electric, Dexter Clarke, considered that future 
technology advances might make the Rome Point site economically permissible, but in 
                                                 
14.  Edward E. Mulligan, Vice President of The Narragansett Electric Company 
to Alfred J. Hawkes, Executive Director of The Audubon Society of Rhode Island, April 
19, 1972, Audubon Society of Rhode Island Archives, Smithfield, RI.   
15.  “Bay Power Plant Unlikely,” Providence Journal, Claudine Schneider 
Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.   
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the interim the plan was put on hold.16  Instead, NEES ordered several oil fired plants to 
be built at its sites at Brayton Point and Somerset in Massachusetts.  These plants were 
not as large, efficient or costly as the proposed nuclear plants, but they could be 
constructed much more rapidly.  The #4 Salem Harbor plant was operational by 1972 
while the #4 Brayton Point plant came on line in 1974, each with 430 MW of electrical 
generating capacity.17   
The Vietnam War Peace Dividend in Rhode Island 
While the Rome Point location may not have been the optimal location to build 
nuclear power plants, NEES still believed that nuclear power was a good fit for the region 
and would help to lower electric costs compared to the national average.  With other 
regional electric utilities building nuclear power plants, the cutting edge of electric 
generation technology, NEES was still desirous of building its own plant.  All that was 
required was a place to build it.18  Ownership of a nuclear electricity generating facility, 
                                                 
16.  Landry and Cruikshank suggest that delays in the licensing process, rather 
than the EPA’s rejection, led NEES to forgo the Rome Point site.  Dexter Clarke, the 
President of Narragansett Electric, suggested that the immense cooling towers required 
would be “as bad as any system can be.”  Thirty years later a similar system would be 
erected at Brayton Point.  See “Bay Power Plant Unlikely,” Providence Journal, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and John T. 
Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New 
England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 182. 
17.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 182-183. 
18.  Ibid., 183.  
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while expensive, would provide greater control over their portion of the New England 
power grid.19   
A new location fortuitously became available in Charlestown, RI, approximately 
twenty miles down the coast towards Connecticut.  In 1970, Charlestown was a sleepy 
commuter town of roughly 4,800 inhabitants.  The area had been occupied by the Niantic 
and Narragansett Indian tribes when European colonists had first arrived in the New 
World.  These settlers had steadily encroached upon these lands, finally breaking the 
Indian hold during King Phillip’s War (1675-1676).  The refugees of the defeated tribes 
maintained a presence in the region, although taxes and debt forced most of the former 
members off of the sanctuary of the “tribal lands.”  Incorporated as a town in 1738, 
Charlestown residents had focused on agricultural activities throughout its history.  While 
the economic forces of the American Revolutionary War negatively affected the 
“plantation” style farms along the coast, Charlestown was relatively untouched by the 
war or any other activity of the next century.  Some mills were created in the area, but the 
town remained somnambulant to the forces of the industrial revolution taking place in the 
rest of the state.  In the late nineteenth century, the town’s beaches were developed for 
recreation during the summer months, even as the community farms continued to wane.  
The town population experienced further declines in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, though the increased numbers of automobiles allowed more people to travel to 
                                                 
19.  Ibid., 223.  
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the town’s beaches.20  During the Depression, the federal Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) constructed fire trails, thinned out the forested areas to prevent forest fires, and 
probably constructed the campground log cabins at Burlingame State Park.21   
Along with Quonset Point and Newport, Charlestown, also saw extensive military 
construction during the war.22  The federal government purchased approximately 600 
acres of land there in 1942.23  The Navy built three runways on the property to serve as 
auxiliary airfields to assist in the training of Naval Aviators at the main base of Quonset 
Point.24  The Navy also constructed barracks, hangers and fuel facilities at the base.  The 
station was heavily engaged with training night capable air crews.  By the end of the war, 
                                                 
20.  Walter Nebiker, Historic and Architectural Resources of Charlestown, Rhode 
Island: A Preliminary Report (Providence, RI:  Rhode Island Historical Preservation 
Commission, 1981): 5-15. 
21.  Ibid., 17. 
22.  In 1938 Senator T. F. Green had convinced the Navy to build a new Naval 
Air Station at Quonset Point on Narragansett Bay as well as the Seabee base at 
Davisville, RI.  The Rhode Island legislature ceded land to the federal government while 
Green was instrumental in passing legislation to fund land acquisition and base 
construction.  Political allies of Green received the majority of the subsequent contracts 
to build the base.  Green was also a driving force in getting the Navy to establish a Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Course at Brown University in 1940 despite the institution’s 
tardiness in submitting all of its applications.  Green was more effective with the 
University of Rhode Island, working with the General Assembly to apportion funds to 
create a Department of Marine Biology in 1936.  See Erwin L. Levine, Theodore Green, 
The Washington Years, 1937-1960 (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1971), 94-
97, and Herman F. Eschenbacher, The University of Rhode Island (New York: Meredith 
Publishing Company, 1967), 253. 
23.  Walter Nebiker, Historic and Architectural Resources of Charlestown, Rhode 
Island: A Preliminary Report (Providence, RI: Rhode Island Historical Preservation 
Commission, 1981): 17.  
24.  U.S. Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy’s Bases in World 
War Two (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947): I: 238. 
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the Naval Auxiliary Air Station had a complement of 246 officers and enlisted men. 
Demobilization of the armed forces at the end of the war reduced manning at the air 
station, though experimentation with electronic air navigation kept the base open until 
1950.  By then the facilities had become redundant and only a minimally manned crash 
crew was retained.25 
Following the war, the Charlestown resumed its beach resort focus.  Growth in 
the area concentrated more on suburban dwellings.  Winterized summer homes permitted 
year long residence for the retirees and other urban commuters able to take advantage of 
the area’s improved roads.26       
At the start of the 1970s, Rhode Island was faced with another reduction of 
military bases that backstopped the region’s economic activity.  On April 17, 1973, the 
Secretary of the Navy, Elliot L. Richardson, announced that as part of the overall military 
drawdown following the end of the Vietnam War, the Navy’s Quonset Point Naval Air 
Station and the Newport Naval Station would be closed by year’s end.  The Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt stated the base closures were predicated on 
the Navy making the most efficient use of its allocated budget while other defense 
                                                 
25.  Paolo E. Colette, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic, ed. 
Paolo E. Coletta and K. Jack Bauer (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood  Press, 
1985), 104. 
26.  Walter Nebiker, Historic and Architectural Resources of Charlestown, Rhode 
Island: A Preliminary Report (Providence, RI:  Rhode Island Historical Preservation 
Commission, 1981): 14-18. 
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officials proclaimed the importance of moving the ships and aircraft of the fleet to a 
central location in Norfolk, Virginia.27   
At the time, others saw raw political motives behind the move.  The Navy was 
also closing bases in Massachusetts, the only state that had cast its electoral votes for the 
Democratic candidate, George McGovern, in the 1972 presidential elections, and New 
England politicians looked for evidence of political retribution from the Nixon 
administration.  Rhode Island Senators Pastore and Claiborne Pell, both Democrats, 
exchanged verbal salvos with John H. Chaffee, the former Republican governor who had 
served as the Secretary of the Navy and was widely expected to run for Senator in 1976.28   
Regardless of the rationale, the economic effects on the state were immense.  
While the vast majority of the Navy’s ships and facilities were moved out of Rhode 
Island, the Newport Naval Station was not completely closed down.  The net effect of the 
transfer of the Navy personnel and their families eliminated three hundred million dollars 
                                                 
27.  John B. Hattendorf, “The Decision to Close Rhode Island Bases in 1973,” in 
What a Difference a Bay Makes (Providence, RI: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1993), 
104-106.  
28.  Since the political connections between Greene and Roosevelt had been 
important in establishing and expanding the Rhode Island military bases, it is not 
surprising that politicians looked to a political calculus for their closing.  While 
conspiracy theories and political accusations flew between the parties, the evidence is 
sparse.  John H. Chaffee had served as the Secretary of the Navy from 1969 to 1972, and 
Richardson had family ties to the area (his wife’s family included members of the Rhode 
Island General Assembly) while Senators Claiborne Pell and Pastore, both Democrats 
lobbied to maintain the facilities.  Perhaps more interesting is that the branches of the 
federal government even allowed the Navy to make the decision at all.  See John B. 
Hattendorf, “The Decision to Close Rhode Island Bases in 1973,” in What a Difference a 
Bay Makes (Providence, RI: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1993), 104-106 and G. 
Wayne Miller, An Uncommon Man, The Life and Times of Senator Claiborne Pell 
(Hannover, NH and London: University Press of New England, 2011), 190-191.  
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of civilian and military salaries, Navy purchases and construction, and matching federal 
aid to the Rhode Island economy in the first year after the bases were shut down.  Retail 
sales and business volume declined and the state tax revenue suffered a loss of seven to 
eight million dollars.  Over the next few years the unemployment rate in the state would 
rise from six to nineteen percent, with the Aquidneck Island area seeing almost a thirty 
percent jobless rate by 1979.29   While the Senators in Washington protested the 
Department of Defense’s decisions, the politicians back in Providence worked with the 
Navy to take advantage of the soon to be vacated facilities.  Efforts concentrated on 
methods to find jobs for the discharged civilian employees, ways to seek the maximum 
benefits from the locations the Navy had left, and techniques to establish new procedures 
and organizations to monitor the progress.  Most of these actions failed, although the 
Rhode Island Air National Guard was relocated to the airport at Quonset Point and the 
Electric Boat division of General Dynamics eventually expanded its facilities there.30    
One of the properties that the Navy declared surplus was the Naval Auxiliary Air 
Field (NALF) at Charlestown.31  Typically, property owned by a federal entity that had 
been declared surplus was required to be first offered to other federal organizations for 
their usage with the General Services Administration acting as the broker for such 
                                                 
29.  Glenn Kumekawa, “The Navy, The Bay, and the State of Rhode Island,” in 
What a Difference a Bay Makes (Providence, RI” Rhode Island Historical Society, 1993), 
106.   
30.  Ibid., 107.   
31.  The Navy declared the NALF surplus to the GSA on November 9, 1973.  See 
Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 397 F. Supp. 41 
(1975). 
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property.  When executives at NEES learned that this property was going to become 
available, they determined that this would be a superior location to build their desired 
nuclear power plants.  The site at the Charlestown Air Station offered a low population 
density location adjacent to a tidal pond that offered sufficient cooling water to operate 
the plant.  Whether NEES learned of the property’s upcoming availability from 
Democratic Rhode Island Governor Philipp Noel or through the offices of Democratic 
Senator Pastore, a nuclear power advocate and former Narragansett Electric Company 
employee, or the former Republican Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chaffee, is debatable.  
Regardless of the source of the information, NEES was interested in the property.32   
With oil prices rising dramatically following the Arab Oil Embargo caused by the 
Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, NEES officials felt the pressure to act to safeguard 
the economic underpinnings of the company.33  It appears that NEES officials interacted 
                                                 
32.  Landry and Cruikshank state that Democratic Rhode Island Governor Philipp 
Noel brought the Charlestown property to the attention of NEES.  This is plausible, 
though both Chaffee and Pastore would have also been cognizant of the base closure 
details.  Certainly the town council of Charlestown was in contact with the General 
Services Administration as early as April 1973 to acquire the property, and the Rhode 
Island Senators and Representatives had been informed of the town’s interest.  See John 
T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the 
New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 223, and 
Jean M. Clarke, Town Clerk and Probate Clerk, Charlestown, RI to GSA Regional 
Administrator, April 24, 1973, Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, 
Kingston, RI, and “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1, Claudine 
Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.   
33.  Oil prices rose fourfold over the next few months, from $5.40 a barrel in mid 
October 1973 to over $20 a barrel in November before leveling out at $11.65 a barrel in 
December.  Such volatility was a new variable in the calculations of energy dependent 
industries.  NEES, which had converted several of its coal fired electricity generating 
plants in the late 1960s was adversely affected.  See Daniel Yergin, The Prize, The Epic 
Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 615-626, and John 
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with the Charlestown town board in anticipation of the property becoming available, 
requesting zoning changes to permit the construction of the two nuclear power plants on 
the land they expected to be able to acquire at the Air Station.34   Simultaneously, NEES 
negotiated with state and federal officials on methods to acquire ownership of the 
property before other federal, state or local organizations had a chance to apply for the 
facility.35  With local, state and federal officials assisting their expansion, NEES looked 
optimistically towards future construction of the plants.  In December of 1973, they 
announced their plans publically to the citizens of Charlestown, confident that the 
population would embrace the proposal.36     
Claudine Schneider and the Local Reaction 
Concurrently, environmentally motivated groups were organizing to resist 
NEES’s plans to build the nuclear power plants in Charlestown.  The catalyst for their 
                                                                                                                                                 
T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the 
New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 223. 
34.  The changes were allegedly authorized by a secret session of the town 
council after NEES lawyers had written the desired zoning changes.  The Advocate, a self 
published newspaper in Providence, RI, used numerous documents coming from the 
discovery phase of the Schneider lawsuit against the GSA for this article.  See “Memo to 
GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1, Claudine Schneider Papers, University 
of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and and John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From 
the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East 
Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 223.   
35.  See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1., and “An 
Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Rhode Island 
Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 397 F. Supp. 41, (1975). 
36.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 223. 
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actions was a newcomer to the state.  Claudine Cmarada was born in Clairton, 
Pennsylvania in 1947.37  Clairton was the site of the Clairton Coke Works, and Cmarada 
grew up in one of the most polluted areas in the nation.38  After graduating from 
Windham College in Vermont with a liberal arts degree in 1969, Cmarada went to 
Washington, DC to take the Foreign Service exam.  While waiting for the exam results, 
she worked for Concern, Inc., an environmental group focusing on education.  She also 
met Eric Schneider, a prospective employee of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), to whom she became engaged.  When Schneider accepted a job as a research 
scientist for the EPA at the University of Rhode Island’s Center for Ocean Management 
Studies, she altered her career plans.  In Rhode Island, Claudine Schneider was diagnosed 
with cancer with only a fifty percent chance of survival.  Schneider beat the odds and was 
galvanized to achieve some important purpose in her life.39    
                                                 
37.  United States House of Representatives, “Schneider, Claudine,” United States 
House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives, 
http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21306 (accessed 9 October 2014). 
38.  Schneider recalls dusting chores in her house to remove the pollution residue 
as well as dead fish in the nearby streams and neighbors with respiratory disease and 
cancer.  See Claudine Schneider, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, April 18, 
2014, and Matt Stroud, “Cleaning Up One Of America's Most Polluted Cities, A 
Pittsburgh-Area Steel Town Fights For Clear Skies,” The Verge, 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/16/4748776/cleaning-up-one-of-americas-most-
polluted-cities (accessed October 9, 2014). 
39.  Schneider suspected that the pollution from the industrial activity in her home 
town might have been the cause of her cancer.  See Claudine Schneider, telephone  
interview by author, Newport, RI, April 18, 2014, Chris Black, “A Striver Keeps on 
Striving and Wins,”  Boston Globe, December 28, 1980, and United States House of 
Representatives, “Schneider, Claudine,” United States House of Representatives, History, 
Art & Archives, http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21306 (accessed October 9, 
2014). 
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This drive for accomplishment led Schneider to assist the formation of the Rhode 
Island Committee on Energy (RICE) in 1973.  RICE was a coalition of four other smaller 
environmental groups with a common objective of preventing the nuclear power plants 
from being constructed.40  The RICE members were interested in the possible nuclear 
power plant construction but were not knowledgeable on how the assembly and operation 
of the facility might affect the area.  Under Schneider’s influence, RICE began to 
investigate these issues, eventually proposing that a lower energy use society would be 
better for the general health and welfare of the population.  The accelerating use of finite 
energy sources was seen as being unsustainable as well as having a negative effect on the 
environment.  To achieve some balance between human desires for economic growth and 
protection of the environment, RICE advocated the education of the citizens on the 
energy challenges of the nation, as well as greater conservation and efficiency in energy 
consumption.  Nuclear power was seen as problematical.  The possible misuse of 
uranium for nuclear weapons, the potential safety issues with the nuclear power plants 
and the health concerns from nuclear radiation and contamination all suggested that other 
sources of energy, such as solar or wind power, should be investigated.41  Schneider was 
outraged by the undemocratic decisions that the government and utility leaders were 
making that would affect the environment and possibly the health and safety of the 
                                                 
40.  The groups were Ecology Action for Rhode Island, Rhode Islanders for Safe 
Power, Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island, and the New England Coalition on Nuclear 
Pollution.  See Karen Ellsworth, “Four Groups United in Atom Plant Study,” Providence 
Journal, October 19, 1974. 
41.  Rhode Island Committee on Energy, Policy Statement, Claudine Schneider 
Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.  
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population.  Much like Rachel Carson’s critical question of who was empowered to 
decide to use harmful chemicals without informing the citizens about the other effects of 
their use, Schneider thought the public should also have a voice in determining their 
future.42  
The initial efforts of RICE to sway public opinion and policy makers were not 
effective.  The town members were not concerned by the safety and health arguments, the 
community leaders in Charlestown had already been coopted by the utility, the state 
leaders were struggling to avert an economic catastrophe due to the Navy’s withdrawal 
from the state, and federal leadership was strongly on the side of encouraging additional 
sources of energy production.43  In Washington, President Nixon, in the throes of the 
Watergate scandal, penned a policy memo to all federal departments to consider the 
national effort to achieve energy sufficiency in all endeavors, including the disposition of 
surplus federal properties.44  With this Presidential direction, the General Services 
Administration (GSA) moved to sell portions of the surplus Naval Air Station to NEES, 
                                                 
42.  Chris Black, “A Striver Keeps on Striving and Wins,” Boston Globe, 
December 28, 1980. 
43.  Interviews with residents of Charlestown and adjacent towns indicate some 
support or at least ambivalence, for the nuclear power plant construction.  Many residents 
were less appreciative on the lack of transparency of local town politics in South County.  
The concept of protection of the environment appears to have diffused into the 
consciousness of the people being interviewed.  See Yankee Ingenuity: Can the 
Government It Forged Survive? (Wood River Junction, RI: Rhode Island Committee for 
the Humanities and Chariho Regional High School, 1976), 13, 37-40, 55-57, 73-75, 88-
90, 93-95, 104-105, 112-113, 125-127, 135-136, 165-167, 179-180, 186-187, 197-199, 
207, 211, 225-228. 
44.   See The White House, Memorandum For Heads of Departments and 
Agencies, April 19, 1974, in “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.   
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coordinating with the Navy and the state of Rhode Island to erect a meteorological tower 
on the base to collect data for future licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 
the power plants.  The Noel Administration in Providence announced that nuclear power 
was the most inexpensive way to produce electricity for the area, throwing its support to 
the NEES design.45   
Opening Moves in Charlestown 
As the momentum to build the nuclear power plants grew, other groups that had 
interests in the Naval Station were quieted or kept at arms distance.  The Department of 
the Interior, which as a federal department should have been informed of the surplus 
property by the GSA, only learned of the new status of the Charlestown Naval Air Station 
when informed by a Charlestown resident.46  In May 1974 the Fish and Wildlife Service 
of the Department of the Interior put in a request for 367 acres of the over 3,000 available 
for a migratory bird refuge.  The town of Charlestown desired to use portions of the area 
for recreation and mixed use, Providence College was interested in the area for ecological 
research, and the Narragansett Indian Tribe requested their own parcel for education and 
recreation purposes.47  This caused some consternation in the state offices which were 
                                                 
45.  See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1, Claudine 
Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.   
46.  Ibid., 5.  
47.  The Department of the Interior’s official request for the property was delayed 
by their unintentional discovery of the surplus property, this despite the fact that the GSA 
and Department of the Interior shared the same building in Boston.  See “Memo to GSA: 
Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1.,  and “An Outline of the History of the 
Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, Claudine Schneider Papers, 
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. 
General Services Administration  
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concerned with smoothing the path for NEES and was unwilling to countenance the 
concerns of other groups. The state continued to coordinate its efforts with GSA and 
NEES to prevent the Department of the Interior or the town of Charlestown from 
becoming the predominant force in the redistribution of the Naval Station assets.48          
Thus far NEES’s actions had followed the time tested doctrine of grow and build 
with a strong assist from the local government officials to bypass some of the confining 
legal restraints.  While the proposed nuclear power plants at Charlestown were very 
expensive, the promise of lower future operating costs and enhanced system reliability 
enticed the company management to promote the project.49  NEES’s subsequent actions 
advocating this project make it appear as an organization that lacked the ability to 
comprehend the dynamic environment in which they were operating.  While there were 
compelling technical and economic reasons to build these plants, the challenge of 
creating a new technological edifice seems to have captured the engineers and planners 
running the organization.  The rationale behind building more reliable and less expensive 
electric power generation sources to meet increasing electric power demand was trumped 
by the indulgence of a technological desire that could only be satiated by the construction 
of the nuclear power plants. The town government was too small to do much more than 
                                                 
48.   See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1.,  and “An 
Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Rhode Island 
Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration,  397 F. Supp. 41 (1975). 
49.  The proposed plants at Charlestown were estimated to cost NEES $1.9 
billion, then almost the net worth of all other components of the grid under their control.  
See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth 
of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 223.    
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acquiesce to the demands placed upon them by the state government and the utility, 
particularly when the prospect of higher tax revenues from the power plants beckoned.  
The state government was concerned with the current economic crisis and accustomed to 
allowing the utility companies to have their way.  The federal government, dealing with 
the international energy crisis, wanted to increase energy production as well as take 
advantage of the costs incurred from nuclear research during the Cold War.  Local 
businesses, manufacturers and labor unions all looked toward the construction of the 
plants as a means to replace the lost revenues from the Navy bases.  To alter such a 
juggernaut of institutional and technological vested interests would have been more than 
these organizations were perhaps cognitively capable of considering.50      
Both NEES and the Rhode Island state government attempted to accelerate the 
construction of nuclear power plants at Charlestown by initially prevaricating regarding 
their intentions, even as NEES was negotiating with the state and the GSA to purchase 
the surplus property.  On 8 March 1974, the GSA informed Ecology Action for Rhode 
Island that an Environmental Impact Statement would be required if the land was 
transferred to non-federal agency and promised to hold public hearings for outside 
                                                 
50.  Hughes’ writing suggests that this is not merely a Rhode Island characteristic 
but a national characteristicc.  See Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of 
Invention and Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 
459-460.   
309 
 
organizations to state their concerns.  Other inquiries were met with responses that 
suggested that no decisions had been made regarding the disposition of the property.51   
In August 1974, representatives from the GSA, Department of the Interior, 
Federal Energy Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission met to discuss the 
disposition of the surplus property.  The consensus from the meeting was that an 
Environmental Impact Statement would not be required to sell the property to NEES.  
The Department of the Interior’s objections were overruled, and its requests for the land 
rejected.  In October, the state met with Charlestown officials and pressured them to 
accept the impending sale to NEES, with the promise that the town might receive fifty 
acres for their own use.  Other environmental and historical concerns for the significance 
of the property were brushed aside in the rush to grant NEES title to the property to build 
the nuclear power plants.52  Pushing hard to finalize a deal for the land, the state, NEES 
and the GSA eventually came to an understanding that NEES would put a deposit of 
$330, 000 for the surplus property, though the town of Charlestown might receive 150 
acres from NEES’s largesse.  On October 25, 1974, NEES mailed its deposit to the GSA, 
thanking the Noel administration for their help in sealing the agreement.53   
                                                 
51.  See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1.,  and “An 
Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.  
52.  See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 1.,  and “An 
Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Rhode Island 
Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration,  397 F. Supp. 41 (1975). 
53.  Such alacrity may have been to complete the agreement prior to Congress 
coming back into session. See “Memo to GSA: Don’t Write Any!!,” The Advocate 2, no. 
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Environmental Groups Respond 
 
Such actions were not fast enough.  By November less appreciative members of 
Congress had been apprised of the agreement and acted to stop the transaction, citing a 
lack of legal authority for the GSA to make such a sale to a private company.  
Representative Jack Brook (D-Texas), chairman of the House Government Activities 
subcommittee, proclaimed that the GSA had exceeded the President’s intent by 
promoting the sale of the land in Charlestown to NEES.54    
More importantly, the local Rhode Island environmental groups had also used this 
time to gain strength through organization and education, though compared to the 
government and electric company assets their resources were almost insignificant.  A 
small number of new groups had been created which opposed the construction of the 
nuclear power plants in Charlestown.  The members had diverse backgrounds, including 
Claudine Schneider with a liberal arts background, though many supporters had advanced 
scientific or legal degrees.55  The membership of these groups had studied the details of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1., and “An Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 
1978, Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.  
54.  An Outline of the History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 
5, 1978, Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.  
55.  For example, Samuel Seely of the Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island was 
an electrical engineering professor at the University of Rhode Island with a PhD in 
physics; Barbara Heavers had a Phd in Biological Sciences; Jeanette Bliven was a 
graduate of Bradford Junior College in Haverhill, MA.  See Stan DeCoster, “Battling a 
Power Plant,” New London Day, June 21, 1980, Rhode Island Obituary and Death Notice 
Archive, “Jeanette Bliven,” Rhode Island Obituary and Death Notice Archive, 
http://www.genlookups.com/ri/webbbs_config.pl/noframes/read/7, (accessed  October 
14, 2014), and Charlestown Citizens Alliance, “Barbara A. Heavers - Planning 
Commission,” Charlestown Citizens Alliance, 
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the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and had interacted 
with other anti-nuclear activists and organizations in the New England region.  They had 
come to the realization that the utility and local, state and federal governments were 
acting in concert with little concern for environmental matters compared to the pressing 
issues of energy reliability and economic development.  Stymied by numerous rebuffs 
and perceived actions by governmental fiat with little to no popular consent, Claudine 
Schneider looked for a law firm to help RICE oppose these activities.  This proved 
impossible as the local law firms all had ties to the Rhode Island government that they 
were unwilling to strain.  In the fall of 1974, Claudine Schneider attended the “Critical 
Mass ‘74” meeting in Boston, a conference led by Ralph Nader.  There she met Myron 
Cherry, a lawyer from Chicago with a background in anti-nuclear litigation, who was 
willing to take up RICE’s legal action against the proposed sale of the surplus Naval Air 
Station to NEES.56     
On 4 December 1974, Claudine and Eric Schneider, acting for RICE and in 
affiliation with several other environmental groups, filed suit in federal court in 
Providence, RI to stop the sale of the land to NEES.57  The suit alleged that the GSA had 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://charlestowncitizens.org/2014/06/25/barbara-a-heavers/ (accessed  October 14, 
2014). 
56.  Schneider stated she was looking for a lawyer who “eats glass for breakfast 
and nails for lunch.”  See Claudine Schneider, telephone interview by author, Newport, 
RI, April 18, 2014, and W. Edward Wood, “Anti-Nuclear Group Hires Top Lawyer,” 
Providence Journal, November 21, 1974.   
57.  The other groups were Rhode Islanders for Safe Power, American Littoral 
Society, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, and Ecology Action for Rhode 
Island.  See Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 397 
F. Supp. 41 (1975).  
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collaborated with NEES subsidiary companies New England Power Company and 
Narragansett Electric to “circumvent the mandates” of the National Environmental Act of 
1969.  The Schneiders claimed that NEES had failed to conduct an environmental impact 
statement prior to sale of the property and had violated the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 by not allowing other federal agencies access to the 
surplus Naval Station.58  Judge Raymond J. Pettine heard further testimony on the case on 
the 11th of December, after which he issued a temporary court order staying the sale until 
such time as he could offer a decision.59   
With this lawsuit, the legal struggle against the construction of the Charlestown 
nuclear power plants began.  On one side were the assembled forces of the federal, state 
and local governments and the utility company with extensive monetary resources and a 
cadre of highly trained lawyers.  One the other side was a very small band of highly 
motivated, environmentally minded citizens but with very few resources and limited 
                                                 
58. The New England Power Company was the NEES subsidiary that would be in 
charge of constructing the nuclear plants.  Narragansett Electric was the retail distributor 
of electric power in Rhode Island.  Since both companies were wholly owned subsidiaries 
of the New England Electric System, the nomenclature of NEES is used to represent the 
activities of all of the corporation’s activities. See Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. 
General Services Administration, 397 F. Supp. 41 (1975).  
59.  Most of the evidence submitted came from Schneider’s acquisition of records 
from the GSA obtained previously under the Freedom of Information Act.  See Hamilton 
F. Allen, “Pettine Delays Ruling on A-Site Sale Block,” Providence Journal, 12 
December 1974, and Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services 
Administration, 397 F. Supp. 41 (1975). 
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expertise in negotiating the legal systems supporting the electric power grid.  To NEES, 
RICE and its affiliates appeared as minor irritants that could be easily brushed aside.60   
Judge Pettine’s initial decision on the RICE lawsuit prevented an early acquisition 
of the Charlestown Naval Air Station land by NEES.  RICE used the proffered time to 
generate the money, organizational contacts, grass roots interest, and political support 
necessary to resist the seemingly irresistible momentum of technological progress.  This 
the leadership of RICE accomplished over an approximately four year period in a manner 
reminiscent of any classic insurgency aimed at subverting the power of the ruling class.  
The efforts were not always successful, but over time they increased the cost of NEES’s 
actions until the utility was willing to submit to the environmental group’s demands.    
Schneider worked hard to educate other groups of interested citizens regarding the 
possible dangers of radioactive contamination from the proposed power plant.  Another 
group, the Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island (CCRI), with a comparable outlook as 
RICE, was created by similarly minded residents of southern Rhode Island to oppose the 
nuclear power plants.  Like RICE, CCRI had a small cadre of committed leaders and 
would eventually claim four thousand members supporting their efforts.61  The 
Conservation Law Foundation, with a central location in Boston, would also expand into 
the adjacent New England states, forming a Rhode Island branch to examine compliance 
with environmental rules and legislation. Focused on acting as a “public overseer for 
                                                 
60.  Claudine Schneider, telephone interview by author, Newport, RI, April 18, 
2014. 
61.  Some claimed that CCRI consisted of only 25 individuals who performed 
most of the actions.  See Stan Decoster, “Battling a Power Plant,” New London Day, June 
21, 1980.  
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environmental and land use controversies,” the Conservation Law Foundation would 
provide important legal assistance to RICE in the conflict.62  Its Rhode Island chapter 
followed the original intent of the Boston branch.  The membership was comprised of 
accomplished members of local universities and experienced lawyers.  The chairman of 
the Rhode Island branch was Dr. Harold Ward, a Brown University professor of 
chemistry who also had a law degree.63  In addition, the Audubon Society of Rhode 
Island (ASRI) would eventually work to oppose the construction of the plants.  Alfred 
Hawkes’ leadership of ASRI would influence the membership of the Environment 
Council of Rhode Island (ECRI), which had recently displaced the Rhode Island Wildlife 
Federation as the state’s representative to the National Wildlife Federation.64 
                                                 
62.  See “Bylaws of the Conservation Law Foundation of Rhode Island, Inc.,” and  
Conservation Law Foundation of Rhode Island advertisement, Claudine Schneider 
Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI. 
63.  Ward added technical competence to the organization.  Alfred Hawkes was 
also a member, as would be Sister Ann Nelson, chairman of the History Department at 
Salve Regina College.  Claudine Schneider, with a bachelor’s degree from Rosemont & 
Windham College was the least credentialed of the board members.  A future member 
was Sister Arlene Violet, a Salve Regina graduate fresh out of law school.  Noticeably 
absent are any members with an electrical engineering degree or experience with the 
electric power grid.  See Sister Arlene Violet, telephone interview by author, Newport, 
RI, July 17, 2013, “Board Members of the Conservation law Foundation of Rhode 
Island,” and “Vitas,” Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 
RI. 
64.  See Audubon Society of Rhode Island Press Release of  May 30, 1975, 
Audubon Society of Rhode Island Archives, Smithfield, RI, Rhode Island Committee on 
Energy Working Directory, December 14, 1974, Claudine Schneider Papers, University 
of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Guy N. Lefebvre and Rick Laferriere, “History,“ 
Environment Council of Rhode Island, 
http://environmentcouncilri.org/content/history(accessed July 6, 2014). 
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All of the groups were involved in some method of educating the public on the 
potential safety issues of nuclear power plant construction and operation.  CCRI 
organized petitions to send to Governor Noel opposing the plants.65  The Schneiders gave 
talks at different public gatherings to generate a higher level of knowledge among the 
state’s residents as well as opposition to NEES.  The Audubon Society publically 
opposed the construction in its pronouncements, echoing the concerns of the other groups 
that the environmental degradation caused by the plants would not be justified.66   
Claudine Schneider seems to be the common denominator in many of these 
groups.  She was a charter member of RICE and the Conservation Law Foundation of 
Rhode Island, and acted as the executive director at various times in all of these groups.67   
A highly energetic and organized member of the leadership element of these 
organizations, Schneider was tireless in guiding and coordinating activities that would 
enhance the effectiveness of the opposition to NEES.  One of the problems that the 
environmental groups faced during the early years of opposition was funding.  Many of 
the RICE and CCRI members were technically or scientifically educated, but few were 
lawyers.  Myron Cherry, the lawyer hired by Schneider to advocate against the sale of the 
surplus Charlestown lands to NEES, was not inexpensive.  Cherry often corresponded 
with Schneider to obtain reimbursement for his work, pay which was often in arrears.  
                                                 
65.  Chairman of CCRI Fundraising to Concerned Citizens, January 1975,  
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.  
66.  Audubon Society of Rhode Island Position Paper on Nuclear Powered 
Electric Generating Facilities, May 14, 1975,  Audubon Society of Rhode Island 
Archives, Smithfield, RI. 
67.  Stan Decoster, “Battling a Power Plant,” New London Day, June 21, 1980.  
316 
 
Schneider coordinated fund raising activities as well as investigated available grants from 
private foundations to keep the organization solvent.  CCRI ran tag sales in a large tent 
off of Route 1 in Charlestown as well as flower and bake sales to help raise the money to 
fund Cherry and other activities.68  
Cherry proved to be worth his salary.  In July of 1975 Judge Pettine ruled against 
the GSA in RICE’s suit against them.  While dismissing the Schneider’s standing to 
prevent the sale of the surplus land to NEES under the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act, Pettine did hold that the GSA was required to submit an 
Environmental Impact Statement meeting the requirements of the National 
Environmental Protection Act prior to conducting any sale of the property to a non-
federal agency.  The legal proceedings had uncovered the fact that the GSA had never 
attempted to determine if other federal agencies or state or local polities were appropriate 
recipients of the surplus Naval Air Station.  The GSA had accepted NEES’s data 
submissions without ever conducting an independent analysis of whether the property 
was even suitable for a nuclear power facility.  GSA assertions that an Environmental 
Impact Statement would be filed in the future were not accepted by the judge.  Pettine 
was not impressed with the  
utter disregard of environmental concerns by GSA despite its knowledge that the 
prospect of a nuclear power plant was unquestionably of environmental 
significance and wholly apart from the equally significant fact that a number of 
                                                 
68.  See Cherry correspondence to Claudine Schneider, Claudine Schneider 
Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, and Stan Decoster, “Battling a Power 
Plant,” New London Day, June 21, 1980. 
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radically different uses for the NALF had been proposed by serious contenders for 
the property.69  
 
The urgency of the energy crisis was not sufficient to circumvent the law and the GSA 
was enjoined from taking any further action to sell the property until a satisfactory 
Environmental Impact Statement had been accomplished.70  
Despite the positive results of these findings, RICE appealed the results, 
requesting that the GSA conduct an Environmental Impact Statement prior to any transfer 
of any of the surplus property to any agency, not just the non-federal ones.  As the 
litigants battled it out in court, NEES attempted to rally the government and economic 
agencies that had been important allies in the past.  Rhode Island Governor Philip Noel 
attempted to gain popular support for the nuclear power plants as well as pressure the 
GSA that the state supported its transfer to the electric utility.71  No fan of the 
environmental groups upsetting the sale of the land to NEES, Noel was more concerned 
with creating jobs and economic opportunities than worried about possible pollution or 
environmental degradation from the nuclear power plants.  Noel consciously excluded the 
environmental groups from state plans for economic development.  “The 
environmentalists were left out not by accident, but by design,” Noel declared.72  The 
                                                 
69.  Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 397 
F. Supp. 41 (1975). 
70.  Ibid. 
71.  Governor Phillip W. Noel to  Albert A. Gammal, Jr., Regional Director, 
General Services Administration, November 24, 1976, Claudine Schneider Papers, 
University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.    
72.  “Noel Scores Environmentalist Spokesman,” Providence Journal, May 1, 
1974.  
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state’s bureaucracy acted to assist the utility in gaining the property so that the nuclear 
power plants could be built.73   
Anticipating some of the subsequent fervor over conducting a study on the 
environmental impact of nuclear plant construction, the Noel administration had 
contracted the Coastal Resources Center at the University of Rhode Island (URI) to 
perform one.  The subsequent work was conducted over a three month period in the 
summer of 1974 by an interdisciplinary group of senior members of the URI faculty and 
graduate students from engineering, biology and ecology, physical oceanography, 
resource economics and wildlife management.74  While limited in the time allowed to 
study and prepare the report, the group did provide an overall opinion on the challenges 
of construction and operation of the nuclear power plants at Charlestown, including 
economic, social and biological effects.  The report also examined the requirements of 
the additional electrical distribution network that would be required to bring the electric 
power from Charlestown to the rest of the state and tie in to the other portions of the 
electric power grid in the state.  The report provided an overall positive assessment of the 
nuclear plants, concluding that:   
                                                 
73.  The Public Utility Commission was bypassed in this issue and failed to 
attempt any informal resolution with the parties as it had in past decades.  The state’s 
economic development agencies were equally complicit or at least acquiescent.   
74.  The report is full of charts and figures, but did not attempt to place a value on 
the possible damage that the plant would cause the local flora and fauna in the littoral 
pond where the plant would discharge its cooling water or the limits of possible damage 
from radioactive discharges from the plant.  See The Coastal Resources Center, An 
Environmental Study of a Nuclear Power Plant at Charlestown, Rhode Island, Marine 
Technical Report 33, (Narragansett, RI: University of Rhode Island, 1974), Forward.      
319 
 
Within the scope of this study, it has been found that the proposed large scale 
development can be constructed and operated without causing serious ecologic 
damage to the Charlestown pond complex and offshore waters provided that the 
planning and engineering options discussed in this text are instituted by the power 
company.75 
 
Unsurprisingly, none of the litigants would find this document convincing.   
Noel sent a letter to Claudine Schneider in her role as the executive director of the 
Conservation Law Foundation of Rhode Island, imploring her organization to recognize 
the potential economic gain that the nuclear power plants would provide the state in the 
midst of the economic stresses.  “I am deeply concerned that you and the members of 
your organization are captives of a misguided zeal for the upholding of selected federal 
statutes,” Noel wrote.76  In reality, the groups were more concerned about the 
environmental impact of the plants than the most recent federal statutes, but such 
concerns were incomprehensible to the political elite of the state.   
NEES conducted its own efforts to win popular support, passing out information 
that the legal wrangling with the environmental groups had delayed construction of the 
plants and hence any economic gain in the state.77  The company piloted its own 
campaign to educate the community on the benefits of nuclear power, buying 
commercials on the local television stations and advertisements in the newspapers.  This 
                                                 
75.  The Coastal Resources Center, An Environmental Study of a Nuclear Power 
Plant at Charlestown, Rhode Island, Marine Technical Report 33, (Narragansett, RI: 
University of Rhode Island, 1974), 4.   
76.  Governor Phillip W. Noel to  Mrs. Claudine Schneider, January 14, 1976, 
Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI.   
77.  W. Edward Wood, “Utility Blames Court for A-Plant Study Delay,” 
Providence Journal, March 19, 1975.    
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action generated a complaint from RICE to the state Public Utilities Commission that the 
costs of advocating for the nuclear plants should not be passed on to the consumer.  The 
subsequent inquiry from the Public Utilities Commission was neatly deflected by NEES, 
though the commercials ended shortly thereafter.78  NEES was also willing to use “high 
pressure tactics” and a liberal bank account to convince town governments and property 
owners to give in to the utility’s demands and sell their property for access to run the 
transmission lines to connect the future nuclear plants to the rest of the electric power 
grid.79  The GSA’s return of the initial 330,000 dollars deposit on the land to NEES failed 
to generate much support for the proposal even as the Notice of Excess Property in 
Charlestown was reissued.80 
The Legal Front 
What these actions could not do is protect the utility’s critical vulnerability in the 
courts that RICE had exposed in their suit against the GSA.  By using the normal 
operating procedures of coopting local and state politicians and governments to acquire 
favorable business opportunities in exchange for economic development that provided 
jobs for constituents, NEES and the Rhode Island government had bypassed the new 
                                                 
78.  See Ralph Weymouth, Chairman of the Steering Committee, Rhode Island 
Committee on Energy, to Archie Smith, Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, 
February 7, 1975, and Edward E. Mulligan, President, Narragansett Electric Company, to 
William W. Harsh, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission, October 20, 1975, Claudine 
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federal legal requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.  Motivated 
by environmental concerns and comprised of highly energized members, RICE could 
effectively challenge the power of the federal and state governments and the utility 
company in a manner that these groups were less experienced at meeting.  Admittedly, 
the implications of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 were poorly 
understood in the early 1970s, but the governments and utility were relatively ineffectual 
in predicting these ramifications compared to RICE.   
Meanwhile RICE was acquiring new allies in the citizens of the state from its 
publicity and education outreach programs.81  RICE continued to question and badger 
Charlestown town council members on their previous decisions to allow the construction 
on the nuclear power plants.  A succession of voter referendums indicated dwindling 
support for the project in the town, and council members that had championed the 
construction were gradually replaced in local elections by opponents of the plants.82   
Contacts with local political groups and governments were important as the 
struggle against the construction of the nuclear power plants now diverged into two 
different tracks.  The first involved the legal suit by RICE against the GSA on whether 
                                                 
81.  Not all interactions were positive ones.  One Charlestown resident 
complained that CCRI’s presentations were less than “fair and unbiased” and that the 
organization might change its name to “Citizens Against the Nuclear Power Plant” in 
order to spread “fear.”  See Peter W. Arnold to Robert Bettinger, Chairman, “Concerned 
Citizens,” January 21, 1974, Claudine Schneider Papers, University of Rhode Island, 
Kingston, RI.   
82.   See Associated Press, “R.I. Town Votes Against Building Nuclear Plant,” 
Boston Globe, February 1, 1976, Karen Ellsworth, “Outlook Bleak for A-Plant, Election 
Results Indicate,” Providence Journal, November 7, 1974, and “An Outline of the 
History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, Claudine Schneider 
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GSA had the authority to sell the surplus property to NEES even with the 
accomplishment of an Environmental Impact Study.  With the updated Notice of Excess 
Property by the GSA, additional federal, state and local organizations all indicated that 
they were interested in various portions of the surplus Naval Air Station.  Eighteen 
organizations, including the Department of the Interior, Environmental Protection 
Agency, State of Rhode Island (essentially holding the land for future sale to NEES), the 
town of Charlestown, the Narragansett Indian tribe, RICE, and others submitted 
proposals that would eventually require GSA adjudication.  Most of the proposals had 
significant portions of the surplus Naval Station parceled off for wildlife preservation, 
while other lots were envisioned for mixed commercial and residential areas, recreation 
facilities or senior citizen centers.  Only the Rhode Island government proposal 
envisioned the construction of the nuclear power plants.83   
As a federal agency, the Department of the Interior’s request for a portion of the 
surplus property to use as a wildlife refuge should have received priority.  The 
Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service failed to press its claims as it 
desired to first see the results of the anticipated Environmental Impact Statement, after 
which it would be better able to assess the compatibility of the nuclear power plants with 
the wildlife refuge.  The GSA denied that the Department of the Interior’s claims were 
valid, but the latter refused to join RICE’s suit against the GSA citing a desire to maintain 
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solidarity of federal executive branch organizations.84  In April 1976 Judge Pettine kicked 
the suit back to these agencies for further information before he would make any 
additional decisions on the validity of RICE’s protests against the GSA sale to NEES.  
Pettine stated that he would not order the federal government to perform an 
Environmental Impact Statement as it might not even be required if the Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s claims were given priority.85  Several months later Pettine would offer that the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPAS) did allow some flexibility in 
who the GSA determined would receive the property, but that the Environmental Impact 
Statement was “an appropriate pre-decision step which was consistent with the FPAS.”86  
In view of the GSA’s proclamation that it would produce a study, the court refused to 
place a permanent injunction on the sale.87   
RICE again appealed this decision.  Cherry took the case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals where finally on August 16, 1977, close to three years from the start of the legal 
procedures, Judge Levin H. Campbell placed the matter to rest.  Campbell upheld the 
lower court’s decision that the GSA did have the ability to sell the land to NEES, but it 
                                                 
84.  Judge Pettine found the Department of the Interior’s position “consistent 
though not necessarily logical.”  See Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General 
Services Administration, 411 F. Supp. 323 (1976). 
85.  Judge Pettine did not seem impressed with the ability of the federal agencies 
to maintain ‘interdepartmental "unity."’  This request for additional information would 
again shift the final decision on any sale to NEES that much farther in the future, further 
tying up resources that NEES could not apply to other projects.  See R. I. Committee on 
Energy v. Gen. Services Admin. Civ. 411 F. Supp. 323 (1976). 
86.   Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 561 
F.2d 397 (1977). 
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could not sell it without an Environmental Impact Statement.  Other anomalies between 
the GSA and Department of the Interior were interesting, but not germane to the final 
decision.88  The GSA subsequently hired a Boston firm, Harbridge House, to conduct the 
study.89   
 While this legal challenge was being resolved, the licensing process by NEES 
with the federal Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) for construction and operation of the 
plants was just beginning.  As part of the long sequence of construction permits, NEES 
was required to submit a licensing request to the NRC for the nuclear power plants.  
NEES submitted the initial request to the NRC on 30 July 1975.90  Interested parties were 
invited by the NRC to comment on the utility company’s proposal.91  The grass roots 
work that Schneider and RICE had accomplished in the previous years paid off as she 
was able to assemble a coalition of concerned and energetic organizations, both local 
government and citizen groups, which were interested in being part of the process.   
                                                 
88.  Campbell chided Pettine for getting involved in the Executive Branch’s 
internal squabbles on who should receive priority for the excess property.  See Rhode 
Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 561 F.2d 397 (1977). 
89.   This was done on August 3, 1977 apparently in anticipation of the decision.  
Apparently the previous URI study was not considered adequate.  See “An Outline of the 
History of the Charlestown Land Controversy,” November 5, 1978, Claudine Schneider 
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Eric and Claudine Schneider’s request to participate in the licensing process was 
perhaps the most illustrative of the numerous groups’ rationale for opposing the utility’s 
plans.  Their request disputed the electric utility’s calculations and assumptions on a wide 
range of issues.  The utility was assailed on its calculations of human population density 
in the area, on the impact on the biological, physical and recreational aspects of the 
beaches from plant construction, and the social and economic effects of plant operation 
on the area.  The Schneiders were critical of NEES’s assessments of plants’ cost, future 
requirements for electric power in the region, and the effects of transmission line 
construction and high voltage line operation on humans in the area.92    
The Schneiders were particularly concerned with the effects of low level radiation 
and radioactive contamination emanating from the plants. Combined with the concern 
over where the expended uranium fuel would be stored, the request suggested great 
unease with the utility’s ability to manage radioactive waste without affecting the health 
of the nearby population.  The request demanded additional analysis by NEES to 
compare and contrast increases in the rate of cancer and birth defects on the populations 
adjacent to other nuclear facilities.93    
Other biological effects were disputed.  The effluent water temperature from the 
power plants’ cooling water was questioned for its effect on plankton species. The use of 
biocides to inhibit condenser fouling was protested for its unknown effects on local 
                                                 
92.  Eric and Claudine Schneider, Petition for Leave to Intervene, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Docket No. STN 50-568, STN 50-569, Claudine Schneider 
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wildlife.  The possible requirement to build large cooling towers if the EPA would not 
allow the use of the tidal pond areas as a heat sink was faulted.  Perhaps most galling to 
NEES was the questioning of the overall economic rationale of the plants.  The 
Schneiders rebuffed the necessity for the facilities, the utility’s failure to consider 
alternative power sources such as solar or wind power, and the costs that Rhode Island 
consumers would have to pay to construct the plants.94    
These statements were reminiscent of Rachel Carson’s work protesting the use of 
pesticides.  In the case of the Charlestown nuclear power plants, the long lasting agents 
were radioactive isotopes from the fission of uranium or from the radioactive waste 
generated at the sites that might be released into the environment.  The Schneiders 
critically questioned the models that the NRC used to calculate the biological effects of 
such radioactivity on the environment, suggesting that their models underestimated the 
possible biological damage.95  Given the history of various government and scientific 
agencies misjudging the effects of numerous chemical agents on the environment, such 
concerns seemed reasonable.  The Rhode Island government had consistently allayed any 
fears of the use of DDT during the 1930s and 1940s; protestations that possible minor 
radioactive discharges would not be harmful to the public were not convincing.96  Finally, 
the perception that the government and the utility were willing to risk the health of the 
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population, both human and other species, without allowing any of the possible victims to 
have a say in the decision, offended the democratic sensibilities of the Schneiders.97   
Written submissions by local organizations to be included in the NRC licensing 
process paralleled the Schneider rationale.  The Conservation Law Foundation of Rhode 
Island requested to participate based on health concerns for the local population, the 
environmental effects of plants’ construction and operation on the marine organisms, 
particularly the larvae of lobsters and fish, the concerns on radioactive wastes and the 
economic rationale of the plants.98  Such concerns echoed Barry Commoner’s laws of 
ecology that everything had to go somewhere, in this case the “somewhere” being the 
Charlestown tidal pond.99  Local towns wanted to participate based on concerns that the 
plants “may pose threats to the health safety and property” of the residents.100  The 
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99.   Another member of the Conservation Law Foundation, Arlene Violet, 
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“common ecosphere” of the south coast of the state and the town itself were liable to be 
adversely affected in the advent of a “minor nuclear accident (if there exists such a 
thing).”101  The town of West Greenwich requested to intervene in the process based on 
concerns that NEES was not being transparent in their plans for the construction of the 
connecting power lines through their community to the Charlestown power plants.102  
Other submissions read as if they were liberally copied from the Schneiders’ request.  
The South Kingstown request echoed West Greenwich’s concerns of the power line 
construction but also included questions on the environmental impact of the plants.103  
Other groups such as the Physicians Concerned About Nuclear Power, CCRI, and the 
Point Judith Fisherman’s Cooperative also joined the process, all interested in various 
issues regarding the nuclear power plant construction.104 
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  Not all participants were opposed to the construction of the plants.  The state of 
Rhode Island requested to participate, as did local construction unions that believed “an 
adequate and reliable supply of electricity is essential to the continued well-being of the 
residential, educational, governmental, business, and industrial communities of Rhode 
Island.”105  Other groups interested in the economic opportunity the nuclear power plants 
might provide, such as the New England Council on Economic Development, or lowering 
their local taxes, such as the Taxpayers and Voters of Charlestown, all desired to be a part 
of the process.106 
With so many petitioners and additional environmental groups desirous of joining 
the opposition to the nuclear power plants’ construction, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission desired to combine many of the groups into similar concerns for ease of 
response.107  With seven municipalities and eleven local private groups, seven of which 
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were motivated in some manner by environmental concerns, this appeared the most 
efficient and effective manner to resolve the claims.108  This was not in the interest of the 
opposition petitioners who contested such actions as a manner to accelerate the licensing 
process.  CCRI opposed the consolidation, suggesting that over time, normal attrition in 
the licensing process would limit the petitioners.  Early consolidation would merely 
negate the information gained during the discovery process of the licensing process.  The 
numerous groups had different objectives, and forcing premature consolidation would 
interfere with the relationship between the various petitioners and their counsel.109  More 
importantly any time lost by the utility in processing the requisite license was beneficial 
to the opposition.110   
                                                                                                                                                 
50-569, Order Directing Consolidation of Intervenors, Claudine Schneider Papers, 
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Power, Eric and Claudine Schneider (RICE), CCRI, Physicians Concerned About 
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 NEES was not dormant during this period.  The company bought several hundred 
acres of land near the Charlestown-Westerly border that might serve as an alternate 
location for its nuclear power plant construction if the Naval Air Station surplus property 
purchase was thwarted.  NEES officials kept such purchases concealed, later protesting 
that the acquisitions were “insurance” as a “backup site.”111  CCRI seized upon this to 
request the NRC to suspend their licensing work for the Charlestown site until such time 
as the actual construction site could be accurately identified.  The NRC refused this 
request, but it was one more legal issue that had to be handled in order to continue the 
licensing process.112  NEES continued to insist that it was still interested in the 
Charlestown site, stating that it would be an excellent location from which to provide 
electric power to the rest of the state.113   
Nuclear Catastrophe and NEES Culmination  
 
Every action to resolve the legal issues took time, and time was running out for 
NEES’s nuclear plans.  In April 1978 the draft Environmental Impact Statement for the 
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GSA was released.  The draft reached the initial conclusion that construction and 
operation of a nuclear power plant in the surplus property at the Naval Station would be 
safe and have minimal environmental impact on the surrounding area.  The report 
received mixed reviews, with the proponents of the nuclear power plant suggesting it was 
“fairly comprehensive” while opponents criticizing it as a repetition of NEES’s initial 
data collection and not providing “any encouragement that the final version will be well 
done.”114  The GSA was less effusive for other proposals for the land use, submitting it 
would take decades to achieve the mixed use facilities that RICE had recommended 
earlier.  NEES was more circumspect but sensed that they had achieved an important goal 
in the campaign to achieve an important economical source of electricity to maintain the 
reliable supply of electric power for the grid in southeastern New England. 115  Public 
hearings on the draft were held in June 1978 at Providence and Charlestown to gather 
feedback to the report, which would be incorporated into the final product.116   
Other events were moving to thwart NEES’s plans.  Throughout the New England 
area popular discontent against building new nuclear power plants was simmering and 
often overflowing in large scale demonstrations at the construction sites.  In Seabrook, 
New Hampshire, a massive demonstration in May 1977 resulted in the arrest of over a 
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thousand protestors and required the use of the state National Guard to maintain order.  A 
larger but less disruptive demonstration there in 1978 attracted 20,000 participants.117  
Ralph Nader was leading demonstrations across the nation with support from 
environmental groups such as the Sierra Club.118  Nader showed up in Providence in 
February, 1977 to speak against the construction of the Charlestown nuclear plants, a 
speech that was interrupted by other demonstrators from local construction unions.119   
The 1978 political election results were at most ambivalent to the utility nuclear 
options.  Rhode Island Governor Noel was replaced by another Democrat, J. Joseph 
Garrahy, who also supported the nuclear construction plans.  Claudine Schneider had run 
for Congress but had been narrowly defeated by the incumbent Democrat, Representative 
Edward P. Beard.  Initially a Democrat, Schneider had switched to the Republican Party 
as that organization was “the party of alternatives and opportunities.  The Democratic 
party seemed very entrenched and predictable and status quo.”120  Schneider used the 
publicity she had gained in the fight against the nuclear power plants to make inroads 
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with the electorate.  While she lost to Beard by 9000 votes, it appeared that Beard and the 
Democratic Party had been seriously wounded by Schneider’s campaigns.121   
The beginning of 1979 appeared to be more hopeful for NEES’s prospects.  The 
final Environmental Impact Statement from the GSA was released on January 29th.  The 
three volume report had incorporated the comments and response to the public hearings 
conducted the previous summer, but overall did not preclude the construction of the 
nuclear power plants on the surplus property.  It did contain “projections which 
demonstrate a negative effect on the environmental values of this unique ecological 
resource which could perhaps not be sustained by this property without permanent 
damage.  The increase in total environmental burden during construction and operation 
will not be positive.”122  The report also suggested that the town of Charlestown was not 
capable of handling the support services required to safely operate the plants and building 
them would “adversely impact a resource which is rapidly becoming very scarce, a refuge 
of natural beauty, harmony and quiet.”123  These indications were not favorable ones, but 
NEES choose to interpret them positively and continue with its plans.  From the utility 
point of view, the issuance of the GSA Environmental Impact Statement met the 
requirements of the previous court decisions; the surplus property could now be 
apportioned off to the state of Rhode Island that could be expected to approve the nuclear 
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power plants’ construction.  After a four year delay it appeared that NEES would be able 
to continue with its designs.     
An event far away from Rhode Island and Washington would deflect this final 
burst of momentum by the utility.  “On Wednesday, March 28, 1979, 36 seconds after the 
hour of 4:00 a.m., several water pumps stopped working in the Unit 2 nuclear power 
plant on Three Mile Island, 10 miles southeast of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Thus began 
the accident at Three Mile Island.”124   The subsequent combination of equipment failure 
and operator error resulted in serious damage to that nuclear power plant’s reactor core 
and a small release of radioactive isotopes into the surrounding area.125   
The nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island was well publicized and 
further reinforced the concerns of a large segment of the population regarding the use of 
nuclear power as a safe means to generate electric power.  As the extent of the accident 
became more fully known, additional demonstrations erupted around New England.  
Protestors rallied outside the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant at Vernon, VT, at the nuclear 
plant in Plymouth, MA, and on the Boston Commons.126   In Providence, two hundred 
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people gathered at the Rhode Island State House to demand a “total ban on all nuclear 
plant construction.”127  While a NEES spokesman cautioned “restraint” by government 
officials until the accident was better understood, local politicians were more proactive.  
Governor Garrahy in Rhode Island stated he would act to block any nuclear power plant 
in Charlestown, RI, until “safety” could be demonstrated.128  Representative Beard, who 
had just survived an election scare from Claudine Schneider, altered his position and 
stated he would no longer support the proposed nuclear power plants in Charlestown.129   
Before the furor over the additional safety concerns could decay away, the GSA 
placed a final obstacle in the path of NEES.  On 20 June 1979 the Acting Administrator 
of General Services, Paul E. Goulding, issued his final decision on the disposal of the 
surplus property at the Naval Auxiliary Landing Field at Charlestown.  Weighing the 
competing “socio-economic and environmental benefits to be derived from any of its 
potential uses,” Goulding rejected the majority of the proposals for the use of the land, 
including the state of Rhode Island’s for possible future resale to NEES for the nuclear 
power plants.130  The GSA transferred 307 acres to the Fish and Wildlife Service of the 
Department of the Interior for inclusion as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System, 
noting that the land was situated in a “unique ecological area with a long history of 
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migratory waterfowl use on the East Coast flyway.”131  The EPA received sixty acres to 
use for its Environmental Research Laboratory, while the town of Charlestown  received 
the remaining 237 acres for recreational and wildlife protection.132   
Goulding considered the possibilities of nuclear power plant construction on the 
site but ultimately rejected them despite the desire for greater regional energy production.  
Instead, the disadvantages of negating the popular will of the local residents who had 
opposed the plants and the attendant challenges of nuclear waste disposal proved more 
convincing.  With this decision the possibility of NEES acquiring the surplus land was 
dashed.133     
NEES officials stated they were “disappointed” with the decision but would 
review the decision with the company lawyers.  “Our current plans are obviously to 
continue with nuclear power.  Where that will happen, who knows?” stated a company 
spokesman.134  The company subsequently sued the GSA in August requesting an 
injunction against the disposal of the property as allocated by Goulding.135  This request 
was rejected by the court, and on 4 December the suit was decided against NEES.136  This 
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proved to be the breaking point for the utility.  On 18 December NEES announced that it 
was cancelling its plans to build the nuclear power plants in Charlestown due to its 
inability to gain title to the property.  After spending thirty million dollars and five years 
to turn its nuclear dreams into reality, the leadership of NEES made a business decision 
and turned off the project.  Nuclear power in Rhode Island for the generation of 
electricity was dead.137 
Root Cause Analysis of the Failure of NEES 
The reasons for the failure of NEES to achieve its technological dream of building 
a nuclear power plant were varied.  The ability of the environmental groups to delay the 
construction of the project for years added additional costs that NEES was unwilling to 
stomach.  Guy Nichols, now the chief executive officer of NEES, was less committed to 
stretching the technological boundaries of electric power generation than he was at 
improving the financial performance of the company.  When the nuclear construction 
project seemed to drag on with no endpoint in sight, especially after the GSA 
disapproved the sale of the surplus land at Charlestown to the utility, he was willing to 
end the efforts and concentrate on other problems.138   
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While the economic rationale for quitting the very expensive project is 
compelling, it does not seem sufficient.  NEES would later lose far more money in its 
limited investments in other regional nuclear power plants.  Suffering through the 
economic downturns of the 1970s and the energy crisis that saw oil prices increase 
dramatically, NEES might still have tried to persevere and attain the coveted nuclear 
facility and profited from the economic generation of electricity for the electric power 
grid.  The length of time that the process had taken also saw the slow but steady decay of 
political support in Rhode Island for the project.  While Governor Noel had backed the 
utility’s efforts to acquire the property, from the point of view of NEES, this was 
insufficient to overcome the dogged resistance of RICE, CCRI and other environmental 
organizations.  The accident at Three Mile Island does seem to have catalyzed 
governmental support against NEES’s plans.  The subsequent GSA decision, the public 
disquiet with the project, and the loss of political support seemed insurmountable at 
corporate headquarters.139   
Somewhat ironically, NEES probably was left in better financial condition by 
failing to construct the plants.  Nuclear power plant construction during the period was 
fraught with delays, above and beyond those resulting from the legal challenges of 
disproving environmental organizations.  The accident at Three Mile Island caused the 
NRC to shift portions of its personnel that had been supporting plant licensing to accident 
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investigation, interrupting the already lengthy procedure.140  With the other technical 
problems arising from the production of similar nuclear power plants, it is likely that the 
construction of the power plants at Charlestown would have been delayed.  Rhode Island 
had also resisted shifting any of the cost overruns associated with an expanding 
construction schedule to the consumers.  With the other problems that NEES was 
handling during the 1970s, including a lengthy strike by its line workers in 1975, 
declining stock prices, increasing interest rates and unstable fuel costs, NEES was 
fortunate to avoid the potentially destabilizing losses of its own nuclear power plants.  
Indeed, the partial shares that NEES owned in other regional nuclear facilities were costly 
enough.  NEES incurred losses of 100 million dollars on its small portion of the Seabrook 
number 2 nuclear power plant.  While the electric power grid in southeastern New 
England would have survived, NEES as an independent company might not have.141   
Technological Momentum Exemplified 
The prevention of the nuclear power plant construction at Charlestown stands in 
stark contrast to what the theories of technological autonomy might suggest should have 
happened.  At the time the large scale nuclear power plants as envisioned by NEES were 
seen as the most efficient method in generating electricity for the electric power grid.  
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The plants were capable of maintaining a near constant output immune to many of 
vagaries of plant operation that affected hydroelectric power plants and were less 
susceptible to the dynamic fuel price shifts that cut into the profit margins of 
conventionally powered plants.  Once started up, the plants could run for long periods of 
time to meet the steady state power requirements of the electric power grid, with 
operators only running the other more expensive plants to meet transient loading 
throughout the day.142  Particularly during the nation’s first energy crisis in the midst of 
an economic downturn, one would have expected that the demands of efficiency might 
even be magnified.  With the additional political forces of a Presidential memo insisting 
on all federal agencies making efforts to improve the nation’s energy sources, a governor 
trying to prevent an economic catastrophe in his state, and the state and local agencies 
accustomed to meeting the electric utility companies’ demands, it appears that the nuclear 
power plants should have been built.  That they were not appears to fly in the face of 
Jacques Ellul’s postulate for technique, that of efficiency trumping all other factors in 
society.  “Technique has only one principle; efficient ordering,” Ellul enjoined.143   If 
Ellul’s precepts had been valid, four reactors would have been constructed at 
Charlestown, not merely the two initially planned for, as well as a plutonium breeder 
reactor next door to provide the fissile material to run them. 
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Not only was this drive for efficiency deflected, it was denied its victory by 
groups organized behind emerging ethical concerns, in this case, for the environment.  
This defeat suggests problems with Ellul’s characterization of technique, “its refusal to 
tolerate moral judgments.  It is absolutely independent of them and eliminates them from 
its domain.”144  Groups such as the Concerned Citizens of Rhode Island and the 
Conservation Law Foundation had numerous reasons to oppose the construction of the 
nuclear power plants in Charlestown, but chief among them were concerns that the 
construction and operation of the plants would harm the environment and numerous other 
species, not merely humans, that inhabited it.  This apprehension was similar to Rachel 
Carson’s discussion of the effects of DDT on the environment.  While Carson was more 
descriptive than prescriptive, her “plea for restraint rests on the triple foundation of 
human health considerations, the moral considerability of nonhuman beings, and the 
value to humans of preserving wild nature.”145  Following in the steady progression of the 
earlier conservationists and environmentalists, the members of the Rhode Island 
environmental groups exhibited aspects of all of these concerns.  They were not only 
interested in the possible side effects of exposure to radiation and contamination from the 
plants on humans.  They also protested the construction of the plants based on the effects 
they might have on local wildlife, from the larvae of marine invertebrates forced through 
the condensers of the plants to the effects on aquatic life in Ninigret Pond adjacent to the 
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Charlestown construction site.146  Setting up a new electricity generation source was not 
an adequate trade off when balanced against the environmental damage the plants would 
cause.   
If Ellul’s theory of technique seems ill suited to explain the events in Rhode 
Island in the 1970s, Lewis Mumford’s discussion on the progress of the megamachine 
also appears flawed.  The electric power grid seems well suited as one of the components, 
if not the most important, of the megamachine of modern society.  Such a centrally 
controlled technological system based on power appears as the quintessential 
megamachine:   
The results is that a monotechnics, based on scientific intelligence and 
quantitative production, directed mainly towards economic expansion, material 
repletion and military superiority, has taken the place of polytechnics, based 
primarily, as in agriculture, on the needs, aptitudes, interests of living organisms, 
above all on man himself.147 
    
NEES executives would be unlikely to use such vocabulary, but their actions certainly 
supported Mumford’s theory.   
While the construction of a new power source may fit in well with Mumford’s 
propositions, the opposition to it was also envisioned.  Mumford allowed that the 
technology of a culture was potentially shaped by the society’s values, and not simply the 
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ultimate drive for efficiency.148  Changing values could lead to altering the operation of 
the megamachine.  Even as early as 1970 Mumford was attuned to the possibilities of 
segments of the population not overawed by the benefits of the “power complex” of the 
megamachine: 
There already are many indications, though scattered, faint, and often 
contradictory, that a fresh cultural transformation is in the making . . . Whether 
this change is as yet sufficient to arrest further disintegration, still more whether it 
can successfully dismantle the nuclear megamachine before it brings on a total 
human catastrophe, are matters that may long remain in doubt.149   
 
Mumford was less prescient on what these indications might be.  He did see that 
modernity had led to the greater power of the megamachine, such that it was now able to 
affect the environment in ways that were previously impossible:   
Thus while Mumford could observe that the modern megamachine did affect the 
environment in ways that preindustrial ones did or could not, he did not comprehend the 
growing environmental movement as a reaction to the damage that technology might 
inflict.  Values might change, but the conservation and environmental concerns were 
more opaque to Mumford.  Principled opposition to actions that might harm non-human 
species was not part of Mumford’s narrative.150   
                                                 
148.  Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and 
Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 450.   
149.  Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon of Power, The Myth of the Machine Volume 
Two (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964, 1970), 429. 
150.  As the volumes of the Myth of the Machine were published in 1967 and 
1970, Mumford might be forgiven for missing this emerging trend.  As an advocate of 
planning to take advantage of the available natural resources, Mumford might have been 
more attuned to other aspects of human culture (art and religion) than nature for nature’s 
sake alone.  See Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1995), 64-69.  
345 
 
The inability of NEES to gain its own nuclear power plant at Charlestown may 
not have been a “turning point in the history of the system,” but it certainly appears as an 
inflection point in the technological momentum of the electric power grid in the region.151  
This inflection point provides particular credence for the concept of technological 
momentum.  All three of Thomas P. Hughes’ possible system altering influences could be 
detected during this episode.  A shift in economic forces, a system catastrophe, and a 
change in the belief system of the population using the technology were evident in the 
prevention of the power plants’ construction.  The convergence of the world wide energy 
crisis following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 with the economic crisis in Rhode Island as 
the Navy departed the area as part of the Vietnam War drawdown placed immense stress 
on the normal mode of system operation for the electric power grid.  Fuel prices 
increased rapidly and became much more dynamic, characteristics that prevented the 
system managers from slowly adapting the existing system to these new economic inputs.  
Concurrently the top management and technical experts of the company had become 
accustomed to steady technical progress of increasing efficiency in power generation 
equipment as well as constant and predictable increases in the demand for electric power.  
The divergence of the expected (and comfortable) problems associated with this model of 
reality and reality itself inserted additional friction in the system. 
Far more important in the case of the nuclear power plants at Charlestown was the 
change in values of the population regarding the benefits of the system compared to its 
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inherent disadvantages.  The growth and spread of an environmental ethic had paralleled 
the growth and evolution of the electric power grid in the area.  Initially the small groups 
had been focused on the conservation of natural resources for the future enjoyment by 
successive human generations.  Protecting non-human species based on their own 
inherent value appeared evident to only a few idealists.  Later, as conservation 
practitioners examined some of the contradictions of this mindset and the pollution of the 
environment from modern technological society, a new value system began to emerge.  
Here the subjugation of the earth for the benefits of humans was not sufficient, 
particularly if the decisions to extirpate lower ordered organisms were poorly analyzed 
and led to results that could also harm the humans in the same area.  A more practical and 
more democratic doctrine was required that both protected the environment and all of the 
species in it.   
In Rhode Island this evolution from a conservation to an environmental mindset 
was hardly punctuated by constant success.  Opposition to the industries that caused the 
greatest environmental damage was often brushed aside by the exigencies of commercial 
progress, particularly in a state that was struggling economically.  This was especially 
apparent when groups opposed the electric power utilities, enterprises that had a history 
of close cooperation with the state and federal governments.  Only in the early 1970s 
when federal legislation required all commercial and governing bodies to consider the 
environmental effects of their actions did a means arise for the environmental groups to 
successfully restrict the electric power utilities’ actions.  Hence, when Rhode Islanders 
for Clean Energy sued the General Services Administration in court to prevent the sale of 
surplus federal property in Charlestown to the New England Electric System for the 
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construction of nuclear power plants, one can note the effects of changing value systems 
on the operation of the immense technological systems, or the megamachine in 
Mumford’s terms. The actions of the groups of dedicated individuals may not have been 
completely indicative of the thoughts of majority of the population as the organizations 
were small.152  The leadership was very motivated however, in no small amount by the 
nascent environmental ethic that was still being shaped by the thinkers, writers and 
practitioners of the time.   By constantly opposing the actions of the federal, state and 
local governments acting in concert with NEES, the environmental groups were able to 
significantly delay the construction of the plants in the utility’s desired site and ultimately 
to prevent it completely.    
One can argue whether the technological catastrophe at the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant in March, 1979, was the final nail in the coffin preventing the 
construction of the plants, or whether the previous actions of the environmental groups 
were sufficient to prevent this by themselves.  The timeline for construction had been 
pushed back by years by the numerous court suits and hearings as the GSA researched 
the Environmental Impact Statement necessary to conduct the sale of the property.  With 
the reactor meltdown in Pennsylvania, political support for nuclear power in Rhode 
Island experienced a prompt drop.  Politicians, wary of public outcries against possible 
nuclear dangers, withdrew their support for the project.  The population may have been 
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less filled with concern for the environment than the reality of nuclear contamination 
affecting their own health, but that mindset might develop in time.   
While Hughes’ premise of technological momentum does appear more pertinent 
to the Charlestown nuclear power plants study in showing how numerous forces might 
alter the trajectory of the electric power grid, one data point does not confirm a theory.  
Other forces were acting simultaneously and it is difficult to separate out their 
components to determine which was the largest.  It is by no means apparent that this 
decade of struggle over one element of the electric power grid, in this case a means of 
power generation, was important compared to the overall operation of the system.  
Perhaps this time period is too small a sample size to promote technological momentum 
or discard technological determinism.  To determine which theory has greater application 
one must examine the next steps in the evolution of environmental ethics and how it 
affected the electric power grid.    
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CHAPTER 6  
ALTERED TRAJECTORIES 
 
The rat has to smell the cheese. 
 
- John Rowe, President, New England Electric System 
 
Immense technological systems such as the electric power grid have considerable 
institutional impetus.  The numerous electric utilities making up the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England had evolved over the course of their existence from their 
beginnings as small companies leveraging the strength of a new and desirable 
technology.  Over almost one hundred years of operation the companies had solved 
frequent problems to ensure the reliable and economic production of electricity for their 
consumers.  The companies had required a dedicated cadre of professional engineers, 
businessmen and other creative individuals to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the electric power grid.  These individuals generated their own ethical code of conduct to 
guide their actions.  Other agents and organizations had assisted in this progress.  
Colleges and universities educated new system operators on the theoretical underpinnings 
of the technology comprising the electric power grid.  Government regulators attempted 
to resolve the stresses arising from the operation of the electric power grid.  Other 
businesses profited from the electric power grid’s easily accessible energy.  The 
subsequent goals and objectives of the electric utilities, the companies that operated the 
machinery, strung the transmission cables and connected the homes and factories to the 
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grid, provided the main direction for the momentum of this advanced technology 
system.153 
The relationship between the electric utilities and the Rhode Island government 
was typically close during this period.  The government acted to assist the various 
utilities, especially the New England Electric System (NEES), to provide safe and 
reliable electric power to the population, even as the government attempted to maintain 
safe and secure political power over the state.  Having attained a critical velocity the 
technology spread throughout the region affected by external forces such as the 
requirements of wartime production and the costs of fuel from foreign shores.  As the 
electric power grid became larger and more intertwined with the rest of society, greater 
interaction with the political and financial powers were necessary to resolve problems 
and maintain system operations at the desired levels of efficiency and effectiveness.  
Longer lead times were required to construct larger and more complex system 
components to drive the electric power grid, construct interconnecting power lines and 
acquire the local authorizations to make the entire system profitable.154  This in turn 
placed a greater emphasis on planning for these long term projects, with the careful 
determination of all of the factors that might affect the construction of the ever more 
costly ventures.  Typically the population was not involved in this planning process and 
showed little inclination to participate as long as their electric rates were low and the new 
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electric powered appliances were available to improve their standard of living.155  The 
“build and grow” doctrine for system development, pioneered by Samuel Insull, worked 
well for the utilities in southeastern New England as well as the political parties, 
government regulators, businesses and consumers for almost one hundred years.  Only 
the resultant forces of technical overreach from inadequate equipment research and 
design, rising fuel prices from foreign sources, poor modeling of the business 
environment and the new environmental consciousness of the citizenry acted to alter the 
trajectory of the advanced technology system.  Some of these forces might have been 
anticipated by more perceptive critical thinkers in the industry and the government, but 
the combination of issues in a relatively short period proved more than the operators of 
the electric power grid could surmount.  These trials were not unique to the New England 
area as utilities across the nation struggled to come up with actions to cope with the more 
dynamic challenges after the tried doctrines proved insufficient.156     
These contingent forces of technological stasis, rising fuel costs and poor business 
acumen in a more dynamic situation might easily be viewed as the primary causes for the 
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utility travails in the 1970s, particularly in southeastern New England.  Under the 
pressures of all of these forces the electric utilities had shown tremendous progress, even 
during some very challenging periods.  The stresses of the 1970s were certainly difficult, 
though not as severe as the Great Depression.  Against such a history, the failure of 
NEES to build its nuclear power plant at Charlestown, Rhode Island could be regarded as 
a minor setback that could be waved off as a single example of poor timing and bad luck 
by the organization.  The willingness of NEES management under Guy Nichols to cut the 
firm’s losses and not waste additional resources chasing the mirage of technical desires 
could provide some satisfaction to the stockholders and grid managers.  Still, business 
empires are not created by such victories and NEES would have been well advised to 
more carefully examine how the growing environmental ethic and the environmental 
groups would affect its future operations.  The increased national and regional 
environmental consciousness would lead to greater political influence for the 
environmental groups, allowing them to add additional resistance to the electric utilities’ 
actions and the operation of the electric power grid.  No longer would the operators, 
managers and regulators of this advanced technology system be able to make decisions 
outside of the visibility of other interested parties.  The interactions of these 
environmental groups with the electric utilities tended to impede the momentum of the 
electric power grid in ways that none of the groups would probably have anticipated.  The 
net result of all of these forces was that the nominal managers of the electric power grid, 
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industrial and political, began to lose control of the backbone of modern technological 
society and the momentum of the advanced technology system began to change.157 
PURPA and its Effects 
One of the first new stresses introduced to the standard way of operating the 
electric power grid became evident even as the final throes of the Charlestown nuclear 
power plant were being litigated.  In 1977 President Jimmy Carter had submitted 
legislation to Congress to improve the conservation of energy use in the nation, 
particularly by reducing the burning of imported oil.  Despite some Congressional, 
energy industry and public resistance, the Democratic majority in the House and Senate 
addressed the President’s requests.  Industry officials were against the emphasis on 
conservation and the additional regulatory power that federal utility regulators would 
accrue and extensively lobbied Congress to dilute the legislation.  The different portions 
of the President’s proposal were disaggregated by the Senate, though the House, under 
Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neil (D-Massachusetts) retained Carter’s construction.  While 
the bill was decried as being the most substantial federal intrusion into the electric utility 
industry since the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, little of the 
Congressional drama from that legislation appears to have been evident.  Eventually the 
two houses of Congress were able to meet agreement on the legislation, though not until 
significant portions of the bill had been eliminated.158  When finally passed in October of 
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1978, the National Energy Act contained the Natural Gas Policy Act, the Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act, the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, the Energy Tax 
Act, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).159   
Lost in the excitement of passing new legislation designed to increase domestic 
fuel production and limit energy consumption through conservation in the country were 
some important details regarding electric power generation by “cogeneration and small 
power” production facilities.160  Section 210 of PURPA required the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) to create rules regarding the sale and purchase of 
electric power from such sites.161  A cogenerator facility used the waste steam produced 
for one industrial activity (typically to heat up some material) and instead of exhausting it 
into the atmosphere, used it to generate electricity.  This had been common in the early 
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part of the 20th century but as the efficiency of specially designed electric power plants 
had improved and the cost of electricity had decreased, most factories had given up this 
activity.  For example, the Cranston Print Works in Cranston, RI, had operated a small 
steam engine for the direct mechanical drive of its machinery as well as to generate 
electricity.162  PURPA added new authorizations for electric power production by “small 
power production facilities” which “included smaller hydroelectric dams or any other 
method of producing electrical power.”163  This section of the new law also required the 
electric utilities to both buy and sell power to these types of facilities at prices based on 
what the utility would have to pay “which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or 
small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another source.”164   
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easily controlled by the grid operators.  This had been a good business model for the 
electric utility industry, though not necessarily for anyone else, and the entrenched 
utilities were not excited about changing their mode of operation.  See Public Utility 
1978 Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Public Law 95-617, U.S. Statutes at Large 92 
(1978): 3144-3147 and Richard F.  Hirsh, Power Loss, The Origins of Deregulation and 
Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1999), 81-84. 
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This small portion of the larger bill would in time help crack the natural 
monopoly of the electric utility companies in their operation of the electric power grid.  
In the future any qualifying organization producing electric power would be allowed to 
sell power for transmission and eventual distribution.  It would not matter who or how the 
power was produced, only that it was available for use.  This feature would require some 
technical problem solving to allow other sources to plug in to supply power as well as 
new types of regulatory actions, but the opening was now available for other 
organizations to participate.  The policy of “grow and build” as proposed by Samuel 
Insull was now under a new assault.165    
The end of the 1970s had not been favorable to the major operators of the electric 
power grid in southeastern New England.  NEES, as the largest owner and operator of the 
electric power grid in the area, had the greatest technical requirements to meet the 
demands of being an efficient custodian of the system.  The combination of rising fuel 
costs, labor unrest, increasing federal regulation of the electric utility industry and the 
failure to build the nuclear power plant in Charlestown all placed strain on the utility’s 
profits and general stress on the company.  During the height of the energy crisis in 1973-
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1974, backup oil supplies had to be delivered to NEES by the federal government to keep 
all of the electric power plants in operation.166  Guy Nichols had led the efforts to convert 
the company’s coal-fired power plants to burn oil in the 1960s.  Now as the Chief 
Executive Officer of NEES, Nichols had to reconsider and directed the restoration of the 
plants to their earlier configuration.167  Brown-outs occurred when the temperamental 
Brayton Point Plant suffered one of its numerous shutdowns during the peak power 
requirement period in the summer, while regulators complained about the pollution from 
its smoke stacks when it was operating.168  The smaller utilities were also affected.  The 
Block Island Power Company was so strained by the fuel shortage that it applied to the 
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission to deny service to any new customers, a 
request that was rejected.169   
The electric utility officials attempted to pass the rapidly rising fuel costs from the 
Middle East oil embargo down to the consumer.  Initial efforts hit road blocks as the state 
public utilities commissions rejected many of the requests for raising the price structure 
for electric power.  The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission often overruled the 
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increased tariff requests as it did not concur with the financial analysis of the utility 
companies, though it would later mandate smaller rate hikes after some negotiations with 
the utilities.170  This disrupted the ability of the utilities to plan out their own cash flow to 
meet the fuel increases and other dynamic costs.  The federal regulators typically 
authorized the electric utilities to charge higher rates.  Since NEES was an interstate 
producer and distributer of electric power, it fell under federal authority in terms of the 
profits it could legally attain.  Narragansett Electric, the NEES subsidiary, subsequently 
sued the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission to permit the higher rates.  The Rhode 
Island State Supreme Court sided with the electric utility whereupon the Public Utility 
Commission appealed.  The appeals were all denied by higher level courts, though the 
process reached the U.S. Supreme Court before the suit was upheld.171    
The subsequent “Narragansett Doctrine,” was important for a number of reasons.  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the Public Utilities Commission “may 
choose to adjust Narragansett's existing retail rates to reflect the changed cost of interstate 
                                                 
170.  All of the Rhode Island electric utilities attempted to gain tariff rate 
increases.  The Public Utilities Commission was generally dismissive of their claims, 
noting in one in 1974 that Narragansett Electric “has not sustained its burden of proof to 
show that a situation exists which justifies the Commission or the Administrator in 
exercising emergency powers to grant temporary rate relief.”   See State of Rhode Island 
and Providence Plantations, Biennial Report of the Public Utilities Commission and the 
Division of Public Utilities and Carriers for the Years 1973 and 1974 (Providence, RI:  
1971): 60-80, 82-99, 101-116, 125-128, 159-168, Part II, 26-27, 37-42, 46-56, 72-73, 80-
84. 
171.  This harkens back to the initial Supreme Court decision in 1927 regarding 
such matters.  See The Narragansett Electric Company v. Edward F. Burke et al., 381 
A.2d 1358 (1977) and John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, From the Rivers, The 
Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan 
Printing, 1996), 204. 
359 
 
power, but it need not do so.”172  Instead the Public Utilities Commission could 
“investigate the overall financial structure of Narragansett to determine whether the 
company has experienced savings in other areas which might offset the increased price 
for power.”173  Fuel price increases by themselves were not sufficient reason to require 
automatic rate increases.  The state regulators could tighten their estimates of electric 
utility efficiency to reject attempts to pad the accounts by the company.174  On the other 
hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decision and subsequent cases in other states 
established the primacy of federal regulation of electric power interstate commerce and 
that public utility commissions should not interfere in the federal domain.175  Federal 
regulation, both from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and from FERC under 
PURPA was soon to dominate the price structuring of electric power, a shift in authority 
to which the states and electric utilities would have adjust.176   
NEESPLAN and Conservation 
While the utilities attempted to stabilize the perceived short term transient costs 
due to the energy crisis, it was the consumer that had to ultimately absorb most of the 
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price increases.  NEES attempted to educate their customers why the additional 
environmental regulations, new federal power pricing rules, and most importantly, the 
increased price of fuel, had resulted in the dramatic increases in electricity bills.  
Advertising campaigns, information on the monthly electric bills and numerous 
interactions between company executives and media outlets failed to sway public 
opinion.  Having been regularly informed that the engineers and company leaders of the 
electric utilities understood the technical requirements of the electric power grid better 
than anyone else, the population reacted negatively toward perceived excuses by this 
same group of executives.  A NEES public affairs director later summarized that 
perception as “customers were saying ‘Stop whining and do something!’”177  
Other contingent financial and technical challenges affected NEES during this 
period.  In the late 1970s interest rates had almost tripled, eventually reaching a high of 
21.5 percent in 1982.178  At these rates it became more difficult to justify the construction 
of costly new electric power plants, particularly when the newer plants took longer to 
build due to the time it took to meet the evolving federal environmental impact and 
pollution abatement regulations.  Yet, the electric utilities could no longer depend on the 
increased efficiency of newer machines to overcome the construction costs.  The most 
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recently built plants suffered from poor reliability compared to the older ones.  The steam 
turbines in the latest constructed facilities operated at higher pressures and temperatures 
than the previous ones.  Unfortunately the turbine designs in the new plants were beyond 
the ability of the manufacturers to build and the larger turbine generators often failed to 
meet the advertised performance.179   
At the same time environmental groups throughout the nation were pressuring 
regulatory bodies to limit the construction of new electric power plants.  Nuclear power 
plants engendered the greatest negative feedback similar to the reaction against the 
proposed Charlestown plant.  However different environmental groups opposed 
conventionally powered plants as well.  In California, the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) had contested the planning assumptions that the state’s public utilities commission 
and the regional electric utility, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), were making to estimate 
future power requirements.  Often showing greater technical comprehension of how the 
electric power grid operated in the region than the PG&E operators, EDF had argued with 
the state regulators to prevent the construction of any new power plants.  The EDF 
contended that conservation and the use of renewable energy sources such as wind and 
solar power would not only be better for the environment, but would actually be sounder 
financially for the company and consumers.180  Similarly, other national environmental 
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groups such as the Sierra Club were active, lobbying federal and state officials to 
minimize nuclear plant construction.181   
These trends spread to New England, where both the electric utilities and the 
environmental groups had noted the arguments and efforts of the other companies and 
advocacy organizations.  The electric utilities had already begun to experiment with other 
methods of generating electricity using wind and solar power but these early attempts 
were not very successful.  NEES conducted a solar hot water heating demonstration in 
1975 with one hundred households in its retail area, determining that the technology was 
not sufficiently mature to operate effectively during the often inclement New England 
weather.182  On Block Island, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) built a 110 foot tall wind turbine to generate electric power for the island 
residents.  Designed to power thirty five homes, the turbine suffered from lightning 
strikes, cracked turbine blades, and interfered with the island’s television reception.  It 
was torn down after three years of operation and sold for scrap.183  Such efforts gained 
the utilities some positive good will, but little compared to the irritation caused by the 
rising prices of electricity.  Indeed, the utilities had to fight off an attempt in 
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Massachusetts to establish a state owned and operated electric utility in 1976, though the 
voters optioned for the “graft at the bottom” once more and rejected the proposition.184     
NEES required a more effective method to lower its costs and still meet expected 
electric power demands in a period where the new construction of power plants was 
going to be very expensive, if even possible.  Guy Nichols assigned four capable 
engineers and managers from the company’s primary departments to reexamine the 
assumptions on which the company operated, particularly that of load management of the 
electric power grid.  Finding a way to reduce the utility’s peak power requirements could 
reduce some of the problems the company faced due to the abandonment of the proposed 
nuclear power plant construction.  The “Gang of Four” considered the current operating 
conditions of high fuel costs and technological stasis as the entering assumptions for 
future operations of the electric power grid.  The planners rejected the traditional method 
of suggesting new construction of more efficient power plants as a solution to the long 
term challenge of maintaining a safe, reliable and economical supply of electricity.  
Instead, efforts to limit the growth of electric power demand would be pursued.185   
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Looking forward fifteen years, the NEES planners wanted to avoid building any 
new electric generation plants, other than those that had been already been paid for, and 
to reduce the use of foreign produced oil as a fuel.  To accomplish these objectives, 
NEES considered converting its oil-burning plants to burn coal, supporting the search for 
domestic oil and gas sources and developing alternative sources of electric power 
generation.  More promising to the company’s profit margins was the idea of cutting 
costs by limiting the consumption of electric power.  The firm should expend a greater 
amount of time and vigor on electric power load management and conservation, to drive 
down the need for additional power plants to support peak electrical loading 
requirements.186  Energy conservation actions included the education of consumers 
regarding attic insulation, efforts to improve electric appliance efficiency, and housing 
energy audit programs.  The load management issue appeared more vexing as it required 
other organizations to participate.  NEES preferred to reduce the overall electric power 
demand on the utility by prescribing against the use of electric heating in new residences 
and using other energy sources to reduce the electric power demand for residential air 
conditioning and heating of water.  NEES desired the use of renewable energy sources, 
including the construction and operation of “small hydroelectric facilities, wood-fired 
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generators, solid waste-fired generators and wind generators,” but only if the devices 
incurred no additional costs for the consumers.187   
The shift back to coal as a fuel source was perhaps the largest variable in the 
proposal.  NEES planners were concerned as “Backfitting to meet environmental 
requirements represents the single largest area of uncertainty and capital cost 
exposure.”188  While the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality 
Engineering and the Environmental Protection Agency had initially authorized the 
conversion of the Salem Harbor and Brayton Point plants back to burning coal, NEES’s 
Rhode Island power plants still required further analysis by state and federal authorities.  
To bring the additional coal required to run the plants, NEES should authorize the 
construction of a specially configured collier to supplant the normal rail lines bringing the 
fuel to the plants.  NEES also needed to monitor the performance of this proposal using 
the company’s new computer modeling capabilities and a state of the art communications 
system which was able to converse between major electric power sources.  By adopting 
these recommendations, which came to be known as NEESPLAN, NEES determined that 
it could avoid costly plant construction and the associated interest payments.  The net 
cost avoidance would save consumers 1.3 billion dollars and reduce capital expenditures 
by 2.6 billion dollars, making the company more financially secure even as the safety and 
reliability of the electric power grid was maintained.189   
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Not all organizations were satisfied with the utility’s concepts.  By eschewing the 
construction of new plants with greater capacity, NEES appeared to be abrogating its 
duties as a member of the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) to provide electric power 
reserves in times of exceptional demand and conduct common planning and operations to 
increase system reliability and efficiency.190  Other utilities questioned NEES’s planning 
assumptions and resented the larger company’s actions that made them appear behind the 
times.191  In Rhode Island, the Public Utility Commission was already pushing its own 
conservation program for the state’s electric utilities that was in line with NEES’s, so 
little additional friction was generated.192   
NEESPLAN was announced approximately one year after PURPA was passed by 
Congress.  Portions of NEESPLAN’s promotion of alternate sources of electric power 
appeared to be in consonance with Section 210 of PURPA, though NEES would have 
difficulty in promoting renewable energy sources in the near term.  While NEESPLAN 
envisioned the production of one million megawatt hours (MWH) of electric power by 
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1996, efforts to economically generate this were problematical.193  A wind turbine farm 
in New Hampshire failed to provide reliable power, small scale garbage incineration to 
make steam declined when trash recycling became more intensive, and small scale 
hydroelectric dams were limited by location.194  With the technology of the time, it was 
probably unreasonable to expect that small scale producers of electric power would be 
able to seamlessly plug into the existing electric power grid architecture.  The large scale 
plants such as the four units at Brayton Point each produced over 500 MW of power.  The 
independent producers were orders of magnitude smaller than this and did not produce 
power at the voltage and frequency standards that the grid required.195  Nor were 
electrical utility operators excited about incorporating these independent operators into 
the system and reducing their own share of the benefits and profits from the control of the 
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electric power grid.196  In this instance legislation was ahead of the technological ability 
of the system to deliver. 
Even as the federal government was gaining new authority to regulate electric 
power distribution and sales, the state government of Rhode Island was in the midst of its 
own reorganization.  In 1977 the General Assembly passed legislation combining the 
Department of Natural Resources with the sections of the Department of Health that had 
focused on environmental health services.197  The resultant union was renamed the 
Department of Environmental Management (DEM).  Much like is predecessor, the DEM 
contained an advisory Council on Environmental Affairs while also creating an 
Environmental Standards Board.198  The duties and responsibilities of the director of the 
new agency stressed protection of the state’s natural resources as well as their utilization.  
By emphasizing the human health aspects of environmental issues, such as water and air 
pollution, the department continued to use the approach of Rachel Carson and not act as a 
bulwark to support the rights and privileges of other non-human species.199  The DEM 
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was not specifically tasked to monitor the operation of the electric power grid in the state.  
However, since numerous electric power plants burned fossil fuels and exhausted waste 
products into the air or used the waters of the state as a heat sink, the department acquired 
powers to scrutinize the electric utilities’ operations.  The DEM also possessed its own 
enforcement division that it could use to arrest individuals suspected of violating the 
state’s environmental ordinances.  These officers had been more focused towards the 
protection of the state’s fish and wildlife but were now available to investigate and help 
bring to trial violators of the state’s environmental laws.200   
The Department of Environmental Management’s establishment in Rhode Island 
occurred in parallel with amendments to the Clean Air Act being enacted in Washington.  
The changes to the law made the car exhaust emission standards more stringent, extended 
the deadlines for the states to attain the previous federally mandated requirements for air 
quality standards, and created a new program, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 
to protect atmosphere that was already at a higher quality than the designated values.  
This last program established specifications for exhaust particulate and sulfur dioxide 
SO2, issues that would be of particular concern from the burning of coal to generate 
electricity.201   
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A New Wave of Environmental Thinkers: Arne Ness and Deep Ecology 
This period produced a number of environmental writers who proposed novel 
ways of thinking about the environment and how the electric power grid might affect it.  
The older environmentalists had not disappeared; for example Barry Commoner was 
busy decrying President Carter’s Energy Plan and denouncing the designs for any nuclear 
power plants.202  This new crop of thinkers profited from the work of earlier 
environmentalists and offered novel perspectives on how humans fit into the world.  
These authors would in time affect the manner in which the electric power grid was 
conceived, operated and maintained, though not necessarily in the same way as the 
previous critics.     
Arne Naess was a Norwegian philosopher who was born in 1912.  At the age of twenty 
seven he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, a position 
that he occupied for the next thirty years.  During the Second World War he nonviolently 
resisted the German occupation yet survived to continue similar protests against postwar 
economic developments in Norway that degraded the environment.  In 1972 following 
his early retirement he gave a speech at the third World Future Research Conference in 
Bucharest, Rumania, where he first publically postulated his theory on ecological 
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philosophy.  Later in 1973 the contents of his remarks were published as “The Shallow 
and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary.”203   
Naess built on the work of Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, Jacque Ellul and 
others, but he rejected the use of human scientific reason to suggest a new view of the 
world and the human place in it.  For Naess, “Shallow Ecology,” based on the protection 
of human life and the prevention of natural resource depletion in the developed world 
was an insufficient perspective despite its then current popularity.  Instead, a new 
movement, “Deep Ecology,” was required to address the more salient global concerns of 
diversity, complexity, autonomy, and decentralization.204  In Naess’ five page missive, he 
proposed seven new objectives for the next step in the environmental movement.  Firstly, 
humans were not to be considered as distinct independent elements in a separate 
environment, but as part of the entire mixture of organisms on the planet.  Neither 
humans nor other elements could be considered discretely or only in relation to one other 
element.  All the elements were in play.  In this regard, though Naess realized that some 
interspecies dominance was inevitable, “the equal right to live and blossom (italics in the 
original)” was an entitlement to every form of life.  Anthropocentrism was rejected as it 
was harmful to human flourishing as well as deleterious to other life forms.  Naess 
explained that “This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we 
receive from close partnership with other forms of life.  The attempt to ignore our 
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dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of 
humans from themselves.205  The concept of mutually assured survival, Naess further 
suggested, was more appropriate than a predator-prey relationship with humans at the top 
of the food chain.  Such recognition of non-human species would in turn foster an 
acceptance of other human cultures as coequals and not belligerents.  This 
acknowledgement of the diversity of life and human culture would tend to break up the 
class exploitation within a culture, while the ecological precepts acted to display 
prudence and caution against any overweening plans.206    
Ecologists were cautioned that mere resistance to pollution or conservation of 
resources was insufficient.  In Naess’ mind, ecologists should be the gadflies of society, 
publicizing environmental concerns other than the stresses that only affected humans.  
The environment was far too complex for simple solutions given the level of human 
ignorance on the character of interactions between all the members of the environment.  
Hard technological projects such as large scale electric power plants were seen as a poor 
choice for the future.  New technologies to support environmentally responsible policies 
would be required; ones not currently funded by the research and development organs of 
the nation state.  In that respect, while such concentration of power of the state might 
assist technological innovation, decentralization was required to focus on the problems at 
                                                 
205.  Ibid., 95-96.  
206.  Ibid., 96-97.  
373 
 
hand.  Too large a centralized bureaucracy insulated the problems from the decision 
makers, who often would not make an environmentally suitable judgment.207   
Taken together, these new objectives suggested alternative manners of thinking 
about how humans should interact in the environment and with one another.  It suggested 
new norms of behavior that transcended simple cost benefit analysis.  Naess 
acknowledged this, proposing that such a new philosophy centered on ecology, or 
“ecosophy,” would be necessary to establish the norms required for global harmony.  
Regional procedures might be more important in the near term, but a global approach was 
essential.208 
Naess’ proposal was nothing less than striking in that he attempted to create a new 
perspective on ecological comprehension that was informed by ecological science but not 
limited by it.  It proposed ethical equality amongst all life forms, not only the ones 
humans found convenient at that particular moment in time, and it clearly stated that the 
practical nature of previous writers was immature.  By creating a new “ecosophy,” Naess 
attempted to circumvent the older languages of conservation and preservation that he felt 
were inadequate to address the pressing issues.209  A new philosophy to match the 
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concept to Deep Ecology, ecosophy was Naess’ guide for human actions in the modern 
world.   
Naess wrote his article in the early 1970s but it did not gain much attention in 
America until the next decade when other authors began to explore the ramifications of 
his thoughts.210   George Sessions and Bill Devall would later push Naess’ biological 
equality to its limits, proposing that humans do not have some greater privilege to take 
more from the environment than is required for survival.  Traditional conservation was 
flawed in that it retained the concept of human stewardship and mastery over nature.  
Human self interest to maintain natural resources for future generations was decried as 
being insufficient to protect the environment.  The rights of all species and habitats were 
as important as any human ones.  This more radical calling was not necessarily as popular 
as the more traditional conservation canon, which may have limited its transmission into 
the mainstream of environmental movement.211   
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Amory Lovins and the Strategy of Energy 
Amory B. Lovins was another environmental thinker who considered the effect of 
the electric power grid.  Lovins, an American who was educated at Harvard and Oxford 
Universities, had left academia when he lost interest in pursuing his doctorate in physics.  
After a stint with a British environmental group, the Friends of Earth, Lovins began to 
specialize in energy policy, writing two books, World Energy Strategies and Non-
Nuclear Futures, The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy.212  In the latter book, Lovins 
suggested that the choice of using nuclear power to generate electricity should not be 
determined only by technical specifications, but that the ethical concerns of the 
population were also important.213   
In 1976 Lovins penned a new article that focused some of his thoughts.  His 
magazine article “Energy Strategy: A Path Not Taken?” looked at the recent conundrum 
of the escalation of energy costs and suggested that the current problem solving 
methodology was insufficient.  The official policy of expanding domestic energy 
resources while minimizing the importation of oil was self defeating:   
Conservation, usually induced by price rather than by policy, is conceded to be 
necessary but it is given a priority more rhetorical than real.  Unconventional" 
energy supply is relegated to a minor role, its significant contribution postponed 
until past 2000. Emphasis is overwhelmingly on the short term.  Long-term 
sustainability is vaguely assumed to be ensured by some eventual combination of 
fission breeders, fusion breeders, and solar electricity.  Meanwhile, aggressive 
subsidies and regulations are used to hold down energy prices well below 
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economic and prevailing international levels so that growth will not be seriously 
constrained.214 
 
Using these energy sources to generate electricity in large scale plants was risky as the 
technology for such endeavors was vulnerable to failure, with incalculable social, 
economic and environmental costs.  Building the larger and more complex electric 
generation plants also distorted the social relationships where the plants were 
constructed:   
Moreover, the money and talent invested in an electrical program tend to give it 
disproportionate influence in the counsels of government, often directly through 
staff-swapping between policy and mission-oriented agencies. This incestuous 
position, now well developed in most industrial countries, distorts both social and 
energy priorities in a lasting way that resists political remedy.215 
 
Such large scale plants were also inherently wasteful.  Heating water to thousands of 
degrees to make steam only to lose two thirds of the input energy to waste heat seemed a 
poor method to generate electricity.  Other remedies, such as conservation and renewable 
energy production were not pursued due to a lack of interest amongst the operators of the 
electric power grid or arcane policies that encouraged consumption and waste.216 
All told, such a “hard path” towards energy sufficiency was not sustainable.  
Instead, Lovins proposed a “soft path” for electric energy generation.  Rather than 
building larger and more complex power plants, smaller, less technically demanding 
devices should be constructed, particularly those that produced electricity from solar or 
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wind power.  These smaller scale systems would reduce the overhead required by larger 
scale plants, lower the construction costs for large distribution systems, minimize 
transmission losses by being closer to the sites requiring the power and be more easily 
maintained than the more complex power plants.217     
A more important issue was reducing energy waste.  Lovins argued that 
consumers did not want electricity per se; they wanted spaces that were well lighted and 
warm.  How this was attained was immaterial and ways to reach this goal that were not 
energy excessive were readily attainable.  Moreover many of the technologies to fix such 
problems were readily available and relatively inexpensive.  Greater insulation for living 
spaces, increased automobile engine effectiveness, and solar powered home heating could 
provide an almost immediate return on energy savings without breaking anyone’s budget.  
Improving the public’s ability to attain these products, either though education or 
subsidies while limiting the capital expended for larger scale electric power generation 
would accelerate the “soft path” energy strategy as well as limit the possible 
environmental damage that the “hard path” technologies might create:   
The hard path entails serious environmental risks, many of which are poorly 
understood and some of which have probably not yet been thought of.  Perhaps 
the most awkward risk is that late in this century, when it is too late to do much 
about it, we may well find climatic constraints on coal combustion about to 
become acute in a few more decades: for it now takes us only that long, not 
centuries or millennia, to approach such outer limits. The soft path, by minimizing 
all fossil-fuel combustion, hedges our bets. Its environmental impacts are 
relatively small, tractable and reversible.218 
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While Lovins admitted that either approach produced social and technological stresses, 
he stated that the soft path approach alleviated some of the social ones by minimizing the 
concentration of power required to operate and maintain the complex electric energy 
systems.  Regardless of the concern of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear 
power was a poor choice to alleviate those stresses while the soft path was more in 
concert with local values and concerns.219  Lovins believed that this switch from the hard 
to a soft path of energy production would take a generation to accomplish, but could be 
attained if the United States devoted the resources and motivation to this goal.  Bridge 
technologies would be required, such as more efficient automobiles and better home 
insulation material to minimize energy wastage, but these were still a preferred solution 
to the excessive support for the hard path technologies.220     
Unlike Naess whose work took some time to diffuse across the Atlantic, Lovins’ 
ideas received more immediate praise and criticism.  Not unexpectedly, advocates of the 
“hard path” decried Lovins’ ideas as being out of touch with the real world of electric 
power generation and transmission, though other bureaucrats and politicians were more 
impressed with his ideas.221  While it does not appear that Lovins’ ideas influenced 
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federal energy legislation, his thoughts certainly paralleled some of PURPA’s allowances 
for energy generation, particularly the concept of allowing new sources of electric power 
generation to plug into the grid.  Lovins’ work was another blow to the Insull strategy of 
centralization and increased effectiveness through ever larger and more efficient power 
plants.  Instead Lovins was a proponent of a greater number of power sources that would 
not be as efficient as a fossil fueled plant, even if the overall system would be once 
transmission losses were accounted for.  More importantly, such plants would not 
produce the environmental damage that the larger plants did with respect to both air and 
water pollution.  Decentralization of electricity generation, and forswearing nuclear 
power earned him accolades amongst the environmental movement and others.  A clear 
and cogent writer and an energizing speaker, Lovins gained greater acclaim than might 
have been expected for a public intellectual of his background.222    
New and Veteran Environmental Groups in the Ocean State 
When all of these contingent events were placed in context, they helped establish 
a particularly fertile setting for the creation of a new cohort of environmentally minded 
organizations in southeastern New England.  The older conservation and nascent 
environmental thinkers had shown why public action was required to protect the 
                                                                                                                                                 
& His Critics, The Energy Controversy, Soft Path Questions & Answers, ed. Hugh Nash 
(San Francisco, Friends of the Earth, 1979), 1, and Richard F.  Hirsh, Power Loss, The 
Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 143-144. 
222.  Lovins was only 28 when his article was published in Foreign Affairs and 
was educated as a physicist.  See Steven Stoll, U.S. Environmentalism Since 1945. 
(Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 114, and Richard F.  Hirsh, Power Loss, The 
Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 142. 
380 
 
environment.  The newer environmentally focused thinkers proposed fresh ways to assess 
human activity in the world and how that might affect all life, not merely human health.  
The process of preventing the construction of the nuclear power plant at Charlestown, 
Rhode Island had shown how these groups might affect public policy.  Coincident with 
the passage of new legislation such as the Clean Air Act and PURPA, the number of 
citizen organizations grew in response to public concerns regarding the environment and 
the opportunity to change activities that negatively affected it.   
In the next decades a relative explosion in the number and influence of Rhode 
Island environmental groups was seen.  This eruption of environmentally focused civic 
mindedness followed no single theme except perhaps an American characteristic of 
forming groups to promote their interests in civil society.  In the 1970s fourteen new 
environmentally focused groups were formed, with approximately three new ones per 
annum in the successive years.223  The early 1980s saw a surge in groups associated with 
land preservation with groups such as the South Kingstown Land Trust (1983), the Block 
Island Land Trust (1986) and the Cumberland Land Trust (1989) being established.  The 
missions of these groups were similar; “to conserve and protect the natural resources and 
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open spaces of our town for the enduring benefit of our community.”224  Other groups 
were concerned with watershed protection such as the Narragansett Bay Estuary Program 
(1986) and The Committee for the Great Salt Pond (1987).  The latter’s mission 
statement again struck a common chord; “To protect and enhance the environmental 
quality of the Great Salt Pond and its Watershed, including its shoreline and wetlands, 
and to promote appropriate and productive uses of the Pond’s resources by residents, 
visitors and local businesses.”225  
While these groups sounded more in concert with older, conservation themes, 
associations emphasizing environmental justice also began to arise.  Organizations such 
as Ocean State Action (1988) began to push for new achievements above and beyond 
preservation of property for future generations.  Ocean State Action was a “proudly 
progressive coalition of community organizations, environmental groups, professional 
associations, and labor unions working together to win public policy and political 
victories for economic, social and environmental justice.226   
More important than the increasing number of smaller groups which were 
typically focused on one particular environmental  issue (and arguably a conservation one 
at that), was the maturation of the Environment Council of Rhode Island (ECRI) as the 
coordinator of these diverse organizations for action at the state level.  Having displaced 
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the Rhode Island Wildlife Foundation to become the Rhode Island affiliate of the 
National Wildlife Foundation, ECRI was institutionally well positioned to act as a 
champion for many of these smaller groups in their dealings with the state government.  
With Alfred Hawkes as the guiding light of ECRI in the late 1970s, ECRI was also 
connected with the new Department of Environmental Management due to Hawkes’ 
previous work with the Department of Natural Resources and as the head of the Audubon 
Society of Rhode Island.  In the late 1970s ECRI was able to influence state policy 
regarding waste water treatment and invigorating the upkeep of the state’s parks and 
beaches.  In the 1980s the organization continued to work with the DEM on water 
treatment, recycling and protection of the state’s wetlands.227   
ECRI was not the only environmental group to grow during this period.  The 
larger environmental organizations in the area, such as the Audubon Society of Rhode 
Island (ASRI), the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), and Save the Bay were also 
strengthened.  These organizations became more professional with consistent funding 
streams and salaried employees with expert credentials well versed in both federal and 
state environmental legislation.  They were connected to other similarly minded 
organizations that shared all or portions of their vision to protect the environment.228  
Having successfully prevented NEES from building a nuclear power plant in 
Charlestown, the organizations realized that passionate amateurs were hard pressed to 
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maintain the diligence required to carry out the protracted legal challenges that had been 
necessary to prevail.229  This increased professionalism was not inexpensive so the 
organizations had to devote time and energy for fund raising activities.  These were 
aimed at the local population and businesses as well as national foundations to provide 
revenue streams to support their operations.230  Rising membership and budgets allowed 
the groups to achieve some additional successes even if the deeper pocketed electric 
utility companies were better connected politically and funded.  Networking with other 
similarly environmentally minded organizations to protest nuclear plants being 
constructed in Seabrook, New Hampshire, Waterford, Connecticut (Millstone) and the 
existing ones at Plymouth, Massachusetts (Pilgrim) and Vernon, Vermont (Vermont 
Yankee) the Ocean State organizations gained experience if not additional victories.231  
While the groups spent most of their effort on issues only tangentially affecting the 
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electric power grid (for example, the CLF sued in Federal Court to prevent offshore oil 
drilling along the coast of Massachusetts), the organizations continued to develop 
influence with the local governments and industries.232   
This new sway became more apparent when the Conservation Law Foundation 
began to contract for its own studies on the technical requirements of the electric power 
grid in New England.  Partnering with professional engineering consultants, the group 
questioned many of the assumptions that the electric utilities had used for their future 
planning and operations of the region’s electric power system.  In 1987, the group 
published “Power to Spare, A Plan For Increasing New England’ Competitiveness 
Through Energy Efficiency.”  The report proposed that investment in energy efficiency 
would obviate the need to build expensive new plants that added to industrial pollution 
and damaged the environment.  CLF noted in the report that a dearth of information on 
recent technological advances in energy conservation and generation limited utility and 
consumer actions, while a lack of capital to invest in these developments prevented the 
smaller consumer or business from taking advantage of these benefits.  The conservative 
utilities failed to see the advantage from such actions as their managers would rather 
build new power plants than invest in energy efficiency.  CLF advocated for additional 
investment in energy efficiency by the utilities to help decrease the region’s peak energy 
demands.  State regulatory bodies should additionally help the utilities see the benefits 
from such actions, including requirements for the utilities to engage in “least-cost” 
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planning, changing building codes to improve energy efficiency and reconsider electric 
power grid operations on a regional basis.233  While the report emphasized the economic 
advantages of such actions, the environmental benefits were not forsaken, as “Virtually 
every form of electricity generation – oil, coal, wood, nuclear, hydroelectric, wind – 
requires some trade-off of our air, water, or scenic resources.  Efficiency improvements 
entail no such sacrifices.”234  
Further studies enhanced the organization’s reputation of providing rigorous 
technical analysis of the electric power grid, though with the intent to limit the 
environmental damage resulting from the electric power generation, transmission and 
distribution.  In August of 1989, “Rhode Island’s Options for Electric Generation” was 
issued by the Rhode Island Energy Coordinating Council, a coalition of state agencies 
(including the Department of Environmental Management and the Public Utilities 
Commission) and members of the public, local business and the legislature, to emphasize 
these values.  The document indicated that energy efficiency should be the “energy 
option of the first resort,” with a reduction of peak demand of twenty percent envisioned 
by 2000.  “Renewable fuel” use was the next priority, while the report simultaneously 
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called for any regional electric power needs be met in a “timely, economical and 
environmentally sound manner.”235  The report also promoted the use of a wide range of 
fuels and the use of a siting board for any power plant exceeding 40 MW of electric 
power generation.  The council was equally interested in preventing environmental 
damage from any new facility.  In order to limit any injury to the environment, new 
generation sources should “minimize the solid waste stream; minimize emissions which 
contribute to acid rain; minimize emissions of carbon dioxide . . . do not use substantial 
amounts of high quality water . . . [and] minimize waste water discharge.”236  The 
Council believed that Ocean State residents were willing to pay an additional price above 
and beyond that of the cost of power generation and utility profit to meet these 
environmental goals.237   
The 1990s were much less dynamic for the Ocean State’s environmental groups, 
though not any less successful even if the intense confrontations of the Charlestown 
nuclear power plant were absent.  Smaller less dramatic events occurred that showed that 
the local environmental groups could influence state policy.  Prodded by these 
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organizations, Rhode Island instituted a recycling program to help reduce the 
accumulation of waste in the state’s landfills, the Department of Environmental 
Management banded together with the conservation groups to purchase land important 
for the region’s environment, and fresh water supplies for the state were protected against 
industrial pollution or were cleaned up.238   In 1994 a proposal to build three coal-fired 
power plants in Rhode Island and Massachusetts failed to get past the initial 
announcement after public protests (with the support of environmental groups such as the 
Conservation Law Foundation) aborted the scheme.  A rising environmental 
consciousness and the desire to avoid having these pollution sources in their towns 
motivated the protestors.239  Plans to construct a new fresh water reservoir in West 
Greenwich and Coventry were squashed due to poor economic forecasting by Rhode 
Island combined with federal concerns that the project would harm sensitive wetlands in 
the state.  Save the Bay also cajoled the state to invest over 100 million dollars in the 
early 1990s to study and then take measures to remedy some of the worst pollution 
sources feeding into the Narragansett Bay, efforts that significantly lowered the toxins 
entering the watershed.  Conservation actions also resulted in rising deer and fish 
populations in the state, although some bird and fish species proved resistant to human 
attempts to increase their numbers.240   
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Backing for these initiatives in the state budget was not persistent.  Governor 
Bruce Sundlun, the Democratic governor of the state from 1991 to 1995, disregarded a 
study on reorganizing the Department of Environmental Management and reduced the 
funding for the organization in 1994.  The director of the DEM, Louise Durfee, protested 
these actions and was replaced.  Other environmental proposals were set aside due to 
reduced financial support.241   
Land conservation policies continued to attract attention amongst the Rhode 
Island environmental groups during this period.  Over one third of the new environmental 
groups created in the 1990s in Rhode Island were focused on local land conservation.  
These groups, often acting in concert with one another and the state Department of 
Environmental Management, attempted to preserve portions of their communities for the 
current and subsequent generations of inhabitants.  The land trusts often concentrated on 
areas to maintain the rural nature of their communities, focusing on “open space, streams, 
ponds, working farms, wetlands, significant historical properties, scenic, and natural 
sites.”242  For example, in 1996, the Audubon Society of Rhode island, on its way to 
becoming the state’s largest private property owner,  placed 235 acres out of the reach of 
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future development  in the Florence Sutherland Fort & Richard Knight Fort Nature 
Refuge in Smithfield.243   
The larger environmental groups in the state continued to focus on environmental 
education for the school age population as well as their teachers.  The Audubon Society 
of Rhode Island instructed 15,000 children in its various programs in the late 1990s.244  
Save the Bay worked across all levels of the state education system.  The organization 
worked with University of Rhode Island’s Graduate School of Oceanography to plant 
eelgrass as a method to protect the other species living in the estuaries of Narragansett 
Bay.  The group published educational literature to pass out to the schools, set up its own 
website for more current material, provided instructor training and curriculum for the 
schools, and even set up its own summer camp for children.  The group was instructing 
10,000 people annually towards the end of the decade.245  The main points of such 
education were in line with Rachel Carson’s admonitions of protecting the local 
environment, though the larger area of the Narragansett Bay required a more expansive 
perspective.  Kayaking and snorkeling in the bay as well as planting eelgrass in the 
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moonlight were more attractive to Save the Bay’s members than calculating the 
subsequent addition to their electric bill.246   
The environmental groups continued to make inroads with the state’s Department 
of Environmental Management, which often funded the groups’ instructional programs.  
In 1993, the department established the Alfred L. Hawkes Award for Conservation and 
Environmental Accomplishment.  This accolade was used to note people who had 
“immeasurably advanced the preservation, protection, and enhancement of the natural 
resources of our state.”247   Other actions with various government agencies appear 
limited, particularly the Public Utilities Commission.  With the utilities acting in concert 
with many of the Conservation Law Foundation’s principles, the smaller environmental 
                                                 
246.  Save the Bay was interested in all streams of pollutants entering 
Narragansett Bay and not merely the pollutants already there.  Thus the group acted to 
limit or eliminate drainage from the worst polluters in the state, protect fish larvae from 
the suction of the Brayton Point power plants, limit sewer sludge streams, etc.  See Save 
the Bay, “Our History, 1970,” Save the Bay, http://www.savebay.org/history (accessed 
August 9, 2014). 
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former Executive Director of the Audubon Society of Rhode Island; The Champlin 
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Jane Sherman, Director of the Woonasquatucket River Greenway Project, and John T. 
Campanini, Jr., Providence city forester and chairman and founding director of the Rhode 
Island Tree Council.” The inclusion of Louise Durfee is interesting given the manner in 
which she left her position as the Director of the Department of Environmental 
Management.  See State of Rhode Island, Department of Environmental Management, 
“DEM To Honor Peter Merritt With Alfred L. Hawkes Environmental Award,” News 
Release, RI Department of Environmental Management, 23 May 2000, 
http://www.dem.ri.gov/news/2000/pr/0523003.htm, (accessed  April 4, 2015),  Save the 
Bay, “Our History, 1970,” Save the Bay, http://www.savebay.org/history (accessed 
August 9, 2014), and Guy N. Lefebvre and Rick Laferriere, “History,” Environment 
Council of Rhode Island, http://environmentcouncilri.org/content/history (accessed July 
6, 2014). 
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groups may not have seen this as an important effort compared to other areas of concern 
and acquiesced to CLF’s suggestions regarding the electric power grid.248 
Balance of Power in Rhode Island: NEES and the Environmental Groups 
NEES was willing to consider these ideas and pressures from the environmental 
groups despite its previous struggles with these organizations.  Having surmounted the 
challenges of the 1970’s energy crisis, the sluggish economy of southeastern New 
England, labor strife and the ending of its technological dream to own and operate a 
nuclear power plant, NEES had emerged with some vigor in the later part of the 1980s.  
Company earnings during the 1980s were usually solid, based on its proactive efforts to 
lower its costs using less expensive coal as a fuel and conservation efforts resulting from 
NEESPLAN.249  Its core leadership was accomplished and appeared to have learned from 
the conflict in Charlestown, RI.  NEES leadership was no longer wedded to the old 
mantra of “build and grow,” though old habits were hard to remove from the collective 
thought of the organization.   
NEES was still able to persuade the political organizations in the areas where it 
provided electric power, though its influence was not as pronounced as it had been in 
previous periods.  At times the company had to balance the concerns of different portions 
                                                 
248.  Certainly NEES had reached some level of modus vivendi with the 
Conservation Law Foundation with the various NEESPLANs, thus limiting the slings and 
arrows it might otherwise have had to absorb.  The smaller environmental groups were 
more interested in local affairs, while the Rhode Island government members were 
concerned with economic issues, statewide and personal.   
249.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 232-233. 
392 
 
of the Rhode Island government.  The state had taken longer to recover from the 
economic slow down in the 1970s, due in no small part to the Navy’s departure from the 
bases along Narragansett Bay.  NEES’s attempts in the 1980s to promote business growth 
by offering rate discounts to new industries and discounts to unemployed residential 
customers were less effective, as was permitting customers to cut down trees on NEES 
property for firewood.  While the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission approved 
these plans, other groups in the state bureaucracy were concerned that the utility’s 
“Narragansett Plan” would unduly affect the poor and the conservation of NEES lands.250  
The state Attorney General filed suit against the NEES subsidiary, Narragansett Electric, 
alleging “that there is a complete lack of any competent evidence that would indicate that 
the plan, even considering it as a two-year experiment, was in the public interest or cost 
justified.”251  The Rhode Island Supreme court rejected this plea and NEES continued 
with its design, though not before time and energy was expended to deal with the state’s 
concerns.252   
As the regional economy improved in the 1980s, the demand for electric power 
increased with it.  This placed the electric utilities in a bind.  Having cut their losses by 
abandoning nuclear power plant construction projects and passed those costs on to the 
                                                 
250.  Ibid., 250. 
251.  The suit was filed during the Joseph Garrahy administration with Dennis J. 
Roberts as the state’s Attorney General.  When the suit came for adjudication by the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, Arlene Violet, formerly of the Conservation Law 
Foundation but now the state’s Attorney General, argued against the electric company.  
See Violet v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 1149 (1986).   
252.  Violet v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 1149 (1986). 
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consumers, NEES was now faced with the dilemma of how to provide the required 
electric power without building new power plants to generate it.253  NEES attempted to 
alleviate these looming shortfalls in a number of ways.  The regional electric utility in the 
province of Quebec, Canada, HydroQuebec, had a surplus of power that it was willing to 
sell.  This required the construction of extensive transmission lines between Canada and 
New England, mainly through Vermont and New Hampshire, to bring the power south.  
Surprisingly there was little resistance to the construction of these transmission lines to 
connect the Canadian power plants to the NEEPOOL electric power grid, permitting 
NEES to yearly obtain upwards of three billion kWh of energy starting in 1986.254      
Conservation and power generation from alternate energy sources appeared as 
another method to limit the potential power supply deficiency.  As part of NEESPLAN, 
NEES had pledged to buy 200 MW of power generated by alternate means while 
supporting efforts to conserve energy waste.255  In the mid 1980s the new president of 
                                                 
253.  As the Rhode Island Attorney General, Arlene Violet had filed suit against 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to prevent the utilities recovering 
their costs of the nuclear plants (in this case the Pilgrim II plant in Massachusetts) that 
had not been constructed on the back of the consumer.  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument saying the companies’ decisions appeared prudent based on the 
information that was known at the time.  Sheldon Whitehouse, a future Rhode Island 
Senator, assisted on the case.  See Arlene Violet, Attorney General of the State of Rhode 
Island and the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, Petitioners, v. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent, New England Power Company, 
Intervenor, 800 F.2d 280 (1986).   
254.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 235-38. 
255.  R. O. Bigelow and J. T. Foryman, “NEESPLAN, Long Range Corporate 
Strategy for a New England Utility,” IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and 
Systems 101, no. (8 August 1982): 2954.   
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NEES, Samuel Huntington, issued an updated strategy to accentuate these actions.256  
NEESPLAN II was developed with input from the Conservation Law Foundation to 
continue cost avoidance through electric power conservation while continuing to 
emphasize electric power production from cogeneration, small scale hydro electric plants, 
wind turbines and other sources.  The economic viability of these small scale power 
plants was always tenuous.  The declining fuel costs of the early 1980s made many of 
these plants too costly to operate, yet NEES had to bid for their services when the 
economy began to expand in the late 1980s.257   
In some ways the actions by NEES were counterproductive.  By 1989 the budget 
for Conservation and Load Management (C&LM) at NEES had risen to 40 million 
dollars and was threatening to limit the company’s profits.  The President of NEES, now 
John W. Rowe, coordinated with CLF to propose an increase in the company’s efforts, 
but with the proviso of the company being able to recoup a greater portion of the savings 
as future profits.258   Despite previous friction regarding the construction of nuclear 
                                                 
256.  Huntington, a lawyer by education, had ascended to the position following 
Nichols retirement in 1984 to become the Chairman of the Board of the Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institute.  Huntington had been on the team that had defended the Rhode 
Island State Supreme Court’s decision supporting the state Public Utilities Commission 
to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From 
the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East 
Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 237, 281, and Obituary of Guy A. Nichols, 
Boston Globe, June 22, 2014.  
257.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The 
Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan 
Printing, 1996), 238. 
258.  Huntington had died in 1988 when he was hit by lighting while hiking in 
Colorado.  He had been “attending the annual energy policy forum at the Aspen Institute 
for Humanistic Studies.”  Rowe was a lawyer that had been selected to become the 
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power plants in New England, the combined position of the electric utility and the 
environmental group was convincing to state regulators.  The Rhode Island Public 
Utilities Commission stated that the NEES plan was “innovative, comprehensive and 
bold in its expectations in reducing energy consumption and consequently avoiding or 
deferring the need for new generation facilities.  The Commission reiterates its support 
for C&LM programs. . .”259  Massachusetts and New Hampshire regulators concurred 
and NEES planned to double its spending on conservation and load management to 85 
million dollars, leading to up to 150 million dollars in expected savings by 1993.260   
While these actions did serve to limit the need for new power plants that would 
pollute the environment, and, hence, were a positive feature for both environmentalists 
and regulators, such actions were not without risks and upfront costs.  They tended to 
raise electricity costs for all consumers, limited opportunities for businesses to exploit, 
reduced revenues for the utilities and subsequently the tax streams to the state and local 
                                                                                                                                                 
President by a board of NEES executives.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. 
Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and Growth of the New England Electric 
System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 1996), 225, 239, Obituary of Samuel 
Huntington, “Executive for Utility,” New York Times, July 28, 1988, and Exelon, 
“Exelon's John Rowe Receives EEI's First-Ever 'Distinguished Leadership Award' for 25 
Years' Service,” Exelon, http://www.exeloncorp.com/Newsroom/pr_20090107a.aspx 
(accessed January 23, 2015).    
259.  R. I. Pub. Util. Comm,, Report and Docket No. 1939, 16 May 1990, quoted 
in John W. Rowe, “Making Conservation Pay: The NEES Experience,” The Electricity 
Journal 3, no. 10 (December 1990): 19.  
260.  John W. Rowe, “Making Conservation Pay: The NEES Experience,” The 
Electricity Journal 3, no. 10 (December 1990): 19. 
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governments, and were difficult to explain to stockholders if they were not profitable.261  
In order for conservation to work it had to be profitable for the electric utility; “the rat has 
to smell the cheese” as the NEES president, John Rowe, liked to state.262  The utility had 
to be able to plan for a set profit percentage based on these avoided costs from 
conservation, or it would not be worth the effort.263  Without such incentives, neither the 
utility nor the consumer of electricity would be motivated to try and achieve some greater 
good, no matter how noble.  Rowe cautioned that “A utility with an opportunity to earn is 
far more effective – particularly in novel areas – than one wincing under new 
interpretations of the duty to serve.”264  Only if incentives were properly focused and 
proportionate to the public gain and utility risk could new social policies be 
implemented.265   
State utility regulators were uneven in their response to Rowe’s notices.  While 
supporting NEES conservation actions, Rhode Island required that half of the electric 
utility actions be taken without any profit before any incentives would take effect.  
Massachusetts and New Hampshire were more uneven, limiting NEES’s ability to take 
                                                 
261.  Rowe also suggested that “Few businesses or bureaucracies wish to shrink 
their opportunities.  (Yes Virginia, it is really is un-American.)”  See John W. Rowe, 
“Making Conservation Pay: The NEES Experience,” The Electricity Journal 3, no. 10 
(December 1990): 19. 
262.  Ibid. 
263.  Ibid., 22. 
264.  Ibid., 25. 
265.  Ibid. 
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full advantage of the proposed savings.266  Regardless of the regulatory response to the 
NEES and CLF proposal, the electric utility still had to efficiently operate the existing 
electric generation stations in order to meet the new conservation and demand goals.  
This proved more difficult than any organization could envision as the confluent stresses 
of technological stasis, action by environmental organizations, economic uncertainty and 
regulatory changes prevented a long lasting solution to the problem.  With the assumption 
of NEESPLAN II that replacing conventional power plants with newer designs would be 
cost prohibitive, keeping the older plants running became vital.267 
The Travails of Brayton Point 
The units at Brayton Point should have been the easier part of the solution to 
maintain the electric power gird in southeastern New England running with high 
reliability and efficiency.  There were four separate plants at the site in Somerset, 
Massachusetts that had been built in the 1960s and 1970s.  The plants were designed to 
provide a total of 1500 MW of electric power to the states of Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts.  Units 1 and 2 had been constructed to burn coal as their energy source 
while unit 3, constructed in the 1974, was initially built as an oil burning power plant.  
Unit 4 could burn either oil or natural gas.  In the 1960s units 1 and 2 had been converted 
to burn oil when the price of that fuel was low. 268  In the 1970s when oil prices had 
                                                 
266.  Ibid., 23. 
267.  John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins 
and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 238. 
268.  See 1993 New England Electric System Securities and Exchange 
Commission Report, Washington, DC, Securities and Exchange Commission, March 28, 
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increased rapidly and unexpectedly, plans to convert units 1, 2 and 3 to burn less 
expensive coal were incorporated as part of NEESPLAN.269  During the first years of the 
1970s the plants did burn coal but ceased in 1974 after the end of the Arab oil embargo 
and NEES was fined by the EPA for numerous pollution violations.270  Finding some 
method to burn inexpensive coal while meeting federal and state air quality standards to 
keep the plants running at their optimum efficiency became a long running challenge of 
immense difficulty for the NEES directorate to solve.    
This proved much more challenging than expected for a number of reasons.  The 
actual conversion of the plants was relatively easy.  Units 1 and 2 had burned coal before; 
all that was required was to bring the boilers back into service using updated coal feed 
systems.  This conversion did require more coal to be supplied to Brayton Point.  
Bringing coal to the location was possible using rail or sea transport, and NEES 
contracted the construction of a new collier, the SS Energy Independence, to bring this 
fuel to the site.271  
                                                                                                                                                 
1994, and John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The Origins and 
Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan Printing, 
1996), 180. 
269.  R. O. Bigelow and J. T. Foryman, “NEESPLAN, Long Range Corporate 
Strategy for a New England Utility,” IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and 
Systems 101, no. (8 August 1982): 2951-2954. 
270.  Jerry Ackerman, “Easing of Pollution Standards is Urged,” Boston Globe, 
February 13, 1979.   
271.  The ship, launched in Quincy, MA, in 1983, was christened by Mildred 
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The transportation of fuel and conversion of the plants were complicated 
problems but well within the business and engineering expertise of the utility to solve.  
Getting the required regulatory permissions to burn a different fuel was more difficult, 
particularly with the new pollution requirements of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts 
and the EPA’s enforcement of these regulations.  The state regulatory bodies, the 
Department of Environmental Management (DEM) in Rhode Island and the Department 
of Environmental Protection in Massachusetts were also concerned with how the electric 
utility planned to burn coal.272  NEES would spend much of the next decades in conflict 
with federal, state and local government agencies and local environmental groups over 
the allowable levels of air pollution from Brayton Point while attempting to ensure the 
continuity and reliability of the electric power grid.    
Depending upon the state of the economy and which administration was in power 
in Washington, the EPA could weigh in for either side of the engagement.  In the mid 
1970s NEES gained waivers to Massachusetts’ regulations on emissions standards to 
burn coal at the Brayton Point plants, though not for the duration requested.273  Later the 
Massachusetts Division of Air Quality Control set up sensors around the coal burning 
plants in the state to monitor sulfur emissions.  When the sensors detected out of 
specification readings, the electric utilities had to switch to lower sulfur content fuels.  
                                                 
272.  Thomas Oliphant, “NE Utilities' Shift to Coal Not as Simple as Federal 
Officials Had Hoped,” Boston Globe, 10 February 1974. 
273.  NEES wanted a five year waiver but this was denied.  The Massachusetts 
Public Health Council and Environmental Protection Agency also disproved the request 
to burn coal at the NEES plants in Salem, MA, though would acquiesce later.  See “N.E. 
Power Gets Nod To Burn Coal At 1 Plant,” Boston Globe, May 17, 1974.    
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Brayton Point was not permitted to burn the less expensive higher sulfur content fuels, 
which affected the NEES bottom line.274  With the arrival of the Carter administration in 
1977, the Federal Energy Administration advocated the use of coal to help reduce some 
of the nation’s dependence on foreign oil.  This was proposed even with the knowledge 
that coal would cause greater air pollution when burned and stress the air quality of the 
region.  Federal authorities looked to the electric utilities to pay for the additional 
pollution abatement devices and the alterations necessary for the power plants to burn 
lower sulfur content (and less polluting) coal.   
The utilities were not averse to such matters, but disagreed with the federal cost 
estimates, arguing that being ordered to burn coal instead of oil was not economical.  
“We want to be flexible, and right now, it doesn’t seem to us that environmental 
considerations would allow economic use of coal,” argued one NEES official.275  On the 
other hand, the EPA declared the air quality around the Fall River, MA area to be a 
hazard to public health, a decision which precluded the use of coal and also undercut the 
other federal agencies’ desire to burn coal as a domestic fuel.276   The two federal 
agencies struggled to find a solution to this impasse for two years.  While local residents 
complained that ash from the plants damaged their property and utility officials lobbied 
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for less stringent air pollution standards, the federal and state bureaucrats tried to come to 
some compromise that would allow the units at Brayton Point to use coal as a fuel.  In 
1979, federal and state authorities came to the conclusion that NEES would be permitted 
to burn coal at the Brayton Point plants if the utility would install electronic precipitators 
on the smokestacks to remove ash from the smoke and alter the plant boilers to limit air 
pollution.  NEES also agreed to only burn low sulfur coal to limit pollution, precluding 
the requirement to install 100 million dollar “scrubbers” on the smokestacks.277   
This agreement should have been sufficient for NEES to attain the most efficient 
alterations to the Brayton Point power plants to meet the air quality requirements of the 
EPA and still be able to use the most economical fuel source.  However, not everyone 
was satisfied with the agreement.  Some environmental groups were concerned that the 
creation of carbon dioxide gas from the plant would accelerate the “green house” effect 
on the world.  Others were worried that the lack of sulfur-dioxide abatement equipment at 
the plants was as poor an idea as burning coal.  Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas 
wrote that "Given what we know about the short- and long-term environmental impacts 
of coal, that option should be avoided."278  When NEES attempted to attain a waiver to 
burn coal at its Salem plants, the Conservation Law Foundation threatened to sue, stating 
                                                 
277.  Units 1, 2 and 3 were converted.  Unit 4 was “technically unsuited” to burn 
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Brayton Point Gets Coal OK,” Boston Globe, March 3, 1979. 
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that the application was “totally contrary to the intent of the law.”279  Eventually both 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts rejected NEES proposals to burn coal in its other power 
plants, as the federal decision to permit coal burning at Brayton Point did not cover the 
utility’s other facilities.280  Even the use of higher sulfur content coal at Brayton Point 
was challenged by CLF in 1981 after the plant had violated air quality specifications.281   
NEES could manage the litigation against Brayton Point while maintaining 
efficient and effective operation of the electric power grid as long as the power plants 
were operating.  This was also a problem during the 1980s as several of the power plants 
required extensive modification or repair, apart from the alterations to burn the least 
expensive fuel.  In 1983, the turbine blades in the high pressure turbine generator at unit 3 
broke off, causing significant damage to the generator.  This took six months to repair 
amidst recriminations between NEES, the turbine manufacturer, the Westinghouse 
Corporation, and the public utility commissions of Rhode Island and Massachusetts.  In 
the meantime, NEES had to spend almost 20 million dollars to buy electric power from 
other NEPOOL members to make up the difference, with the consumers paying for the 
repairs.282  A coal silo accident shut down unit 3 in 1985 for another six months, costing 
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slightly less than 2 million in substitute energy payments while the silo was examined 
and repaired.283  Then in 1986 the turbine generator in unit 3 had to be secured once again 
after the huge machine began making “unusual noises.”284  Even the sea lines of 
communications required for the coal supply to Brayton Point proved tenuous.  In 1983, 
one supply ship sunk in transit to the site and the SS Energy Independence, NEES’s 
custom built collier, broke down in port in 1984 requiring extensive repairs.285     
As these shutdowns occurred primarily in the summer months when peak electric 
power demand was stressing the electric power grid, the loss of ten percent of NEES’s 
generating capacity was difficult to replace.  Heat waves stressed the system as customers 
turned on their home air conditioners, causing voltage reduction “brown outs” when 
demand exceeded the electric power grid capacity.286  Since the expected nuclear power 
plants had not been built and the remaining older plants suffered dependability problems, 
this was a difficult problem to solve.  NEES engineers and contractors attempted to keep 
Brayton Point unit 3 running, but “Breakdown Point” reliability was problematical.  
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Eventually, NEES had to completely redesign the plant, institute new maintenance and 
training standards and even operate the unit at a lower capacity to keep it running.287  
NEES still was profitable during this time period due to the conservation efforts of 
NEESPLAN and lowering fuel costs from burning coal and smart business practices.  
The company was not able to produce new sources of electric power in the manner it 
preferred, that of building newer and more efficient power plants.  This was a concern for 
NEES officials as the company management believed that electric power demands would 
continue to expand in southeastern New England without a method for NEES to meet 
them.  With power plant construction taking a decade or longer, new plants had to be 
planned for and started soon to meet expected demands.288   
Preventing the Next Energy Crisis 
A number of factors prevented this looming “crisis” from occurring.  The first 
was a technological development.  The 1980s saw the maturation of gas combustion 
turbine technology applied for use as electric power generators.  Gas turbines had 
previously been used as a means for propulsion both in aircraft and ships.  Government 
and industrial research led to technical advances that increased turbine efficiency and 
overall generator capacity.  Combining natural gas burning turbines with steam plants 
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allowed designers to reuse the exhaust gases of the gas turbine to heat steam and power 
another steam driven turbine in a “combined cycle” unit.  Injecting some of the steam 
into the exhaust gas of the gas turbine caused the unit to produce fewer nitrogen oxides, 
limiting the pollution from the plant and making it easier to meet the EPA standards.289  
Such cogeneration plants were easier to construct, but high natural gas fuel costs limited 
construction until the late 1980s.  Combined with the relaxations from PURPA for 
cogenerators, this technology now seemed poised to be used as a method to supplant the 
aging electric power plants in the northeast.290   
NEES was not the first company to exploit this possibility.  In 1987, a new 
company, Ocean State Power, began negotiations with the town of Burrillville, Rhode 
Island, to build a 250 MW cogeneration plant.291  Far away from the Narragansett Bay 
watershed, this design did not require the waters of the bay to cool the exhaust of the 
plant, a convenient heat sump that had been used extensively by other power plants with 
subsequent environmental damage to the bay.  Designers would later double the size of 
the plant’s generating capacity by adding an additional gas turbine steam plant 
                                                 
289.  By 1990 General Electric Corporation gas turbines had reached 50% energy 
conversion efficiency while the combined gas turbine steam turbine plants were operating 
at over 60%.  See Vaclav Smil, Transforming the Twentieth Century, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 75-79. 
290.  Richard F.  Hirsh, Power Loss, The Origins of Deregulation and 
Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1999), 105-108. 
291.  Thomas S. Brown, “Hearing Set On Plan To Limit Power Plant Taxes $21.7 
Million Proposal Would Stretch Over 10 Years For Energy Project,” Providence Journal, 
November 16, 1987.  
406 
 
cogeneration unit. 292  NEES took notice of Ocean State Power’s activities, later buying a 
20% interest in the company.293   
NEES also looked at the opportunities from gas turbine technology to meet the 
need for new power plants to replace the aging, less efficient and more polluting plants it 
did own.  Previous attempts by NEES to identify sites for new electric power plants had 
not been encouraging.  Numerous pollution problems at its existing plants had resulted in 
negative reactions by state government and environmental groups.  The Rhode Island 
Department of Environmental Management had cited NEES for violating pollution 
standards at both of its electric power plants in Providence.294  The Audubon Society of 
Rhode Island had resisted NEES efforts for long term waivers to burn high sulfur content 
oil at these plants, concerned that the emissions would further contribute to acid rain 
pollution in the region.295  New construction proposals, including several coal burning 
power plants, had languished as the state leadership in the regulatory bodies demanded 
additional assurances that the new plants would not be harmful to the environment.  
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293.  “New England Electric System,” Securities and Exchange Commission 
Report, Washington, DC, Securities and Exchange Commission, March 28, 1994, 25.   
294.  Peter Lord, “Pollution Of Waters In R.I. Attributed To Lazy Enforcement,” 
Providence Journal, January 15, 1985.   
295.  Scott Mackay, “Narragansett Electric wants to keep burning high-sulfur oil 
at plant,” Providence Journal, April 22, 1986.   
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NEES continued to examine the possibilities, looking at four potential sites in its 
distribution region to build new plants to meet the rising power demand.296  
In 1988 NEES had concluded its analysis and applied to construct a “new” 
electric generation plant in Providence, Rhode Island.  In this case, the utility planned to 
build a new plant at one of its oldest sites.  The Manchester Street station in Providence 
had been used to generate electric power for over seventy years, initially powering the 
trolley cars of the city for the United Electric Railways (UER).  NEES had selected the 
site based on governing factors of “limited environmental and social impact, access to 
sufficient water supplies and good transportation, proximity to transmission line 
corridors, ability to use multiple types of fuel supplies, and cost effectiveness.”297  NEES 
proposed shutting down the plant’s older steam powered turbines and replacing them 
with three combination steam/gas turbine plants similar to the ones being constructed in 
Burrillville.  The reconfiguration would increase the site’s capacity by a factor of three.  
The new plants burned cleaner natural gas though they would also be able to burn oil as 
well in the case of an emergency.  The site required additional cooling water from the 
Scituate reservoir as well as new transmission lines to handle the greater plant output.   
                                                 
296.  Demand had been predicted at 1.3 % per year but had risen by 4-5% despite 
the efforts to conserve power use.  See Bob Wyss, “Utility Company Eying Plant Sites 
New England Power Wants 2 More Stations To Help Meet Demand,” Providence 
Journal, June 3, 1987.   
297.  “More Electrical Capacity For An Expanding Economy,” Providence 
Journal, April 7, 1988. 
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The engineers and managers of NEES estimated the plant could begin construction by 
1992 with a completion date in 1995.298       
Rhode Island political leadership was enthusiastic with this proposal. The 
governor, Republican Edward D. DiPrete and the mayor of Providence, Democrat Joseph 
Paolino, both proclaimed that the new plant would assist economic growth in the state as 
well as support the tax revenue of the city.299  Many complicated construction issues took 
time to resolve.  NEES officials worked with state and city officials to alleviate 
community concerns regarding the construction of larger natural gas lines to power the 
plant.  The Environmental Protection Agency investigation of exhaust pollution from 
plant stacks had to be conducted.  A new law to permit the electric utility to fill in some 
of the shoreline near the plant for construction, finding water sources to cool the plant, or 
dealing with the rise in temperature in the Providence River from the cooling water all 
occupied the planners’ timetable for resolution.300  The Conservation Law Foundation 
                                                 
298.  The Manchester Street station had a maximum output of approximately 140 
MW while the nearby South Street station could generate another 110 MW.  The plants 
used 200,000 gallons of cooling water per day from the reservoir and would require 
600,000 as the water from nearby Narragansett Bay was considered unsuitable.  See Bob 
Wyss, “Utility to Propose Constructing New Electric Generating Plant in Providence,” 
Providence Journal, April 5, 1988, Bob Wyss, “Despite Hurdles, Key Officials Are In 
Favor Of Power Plant Plan,” Providence Journal, April 6, 1988, “More Electrical 
Capacity For An Expanding Economy,” Providence Journal, April 7, 1988, and 1993 
New England Electric System Securities and Exchange Commission Report, Washington, 
DC, Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 March 1994, 20, 39-40.   
299.  Bob Wyss, “Despite Hurdles, Key Officials Are In Favor Of Power Plant 
Plan,” Providence Journal, April 6, 1988. 
300.  See Ken Mingis, "State Law May Delay Proposed Power Plant," Providence 
Journal, April 28, 1992, and Bob Wyss, "Plan to Build Gas Pipeline Stirs Debate," 
Providence Journal, April 22, 1989, “Plant’s Impact Outlined in Plan,” Providence 
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worked with NEES for conservation efforts, including the utility’s partnership with the 
Rhode Island government to install energy efficient lighting systems to reduce the overall 
load on the grid.301  Opposition to the plant licensing over the next four years before 
construction began was very limited.  Unlike the proposed Charlestown nuclear power 
plant, no coalition of the community opposition and veteran legal firms rose to oppose 
the construction.  NEES was able to satisfy all of the state and federal agencies that their 
new plant would meet or exceed all environmental regulations.  Construction of the new 
Manchester Street power plant began in 1992 and was completed in 1995.  Once the gas 
turbines at the plant came on line, they were more efficient and powerful than their 
design specifications while putting fewer pollutants into the environment.302    
With the similar combined cycle power plant coming on line in Burrillville, over 
1000 MW of new generating capacity was added to the electric power grid in Rhode 
Island, sufficient to keep up with expected power demands to the late 1990s.303  At the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal, December 3, 1989, and “Utility Wants Unrestricted Use Of Oil As Backup,” 
Providence Journal, June 25, 1990. 
301.  Bob Wyss, "Utility, Activists Plan Ahead Proposal would Save Up to 300 
Megawatts by '91," Providence Journal, January 24, 1989. 
302.  The adjacent South Street Station was decommissioned in the process.  See 
Joanna M. Doherty, and Matthew A. Kierstead, “South Street Station,” National Register 
of Historic Places, National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior, July 
2004 / August 2005, and Taylor Moore, “Repowering As A Competitive Strategy,” EPRI 
Journal (Sept/Oct 1995): 6-13, and Power Engineering, “V84.2 Turbines Exceed 
Guarantees,” Power Engineering, 1 November 1996,  http://www.power-
eng.com/articles/print/volume-100/issue-11/field-notes/v842-turbines-exceed-
guarantees.html (accessed February 15, 2015),. 
303.  Additional power from Hydro Quebec and other nuclear power plants 
coming on line assisted this power surplus.  See William J. Donovan, “Power Supply 
'Adequate' Until '95,” Providence Journal, March 7, 1990.   
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same time that these large scale electric power plants were coming on line, Energy 
Management, a Massachusetts firm, also took advantage of the “cogeneration and small 
power” production facilities allowances from PURPA to construct a new facility.  In 
1988 the firm announced plans to build a natural gas fired 55 MW plant in Pawtucket that 
would generate electricity as well as provide steam to Colfax Inc., a company that 
produced cooking oil.304  The firm gained its permits from the Department of 
Environmental Management as well as a contract to sell its electricity to New England 
Electric System.305  The Public Utility Commission supported the plant due to its high 
efficiency.306  The company did require additional water mains to be built to supply the 
cooling water for the plant condensers, but that feature was approved by the state 
agencies as well.307  There appears to have been little opposition from any of the state 
environmental groups, perhaps again because the plant was located away from 
Narragansett Bay.  When the plant was completed in 1990, it was able to provide power 
for up to 30,000 homes.  Since the plant burned natural gas, it was much less harmful to 
the atmosphere than the larger coal-fired plants.308   
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305.  Gerald M. Carbone, “Gas-Fired Power Plant Sails Toward Approval In 
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308.  Thomas McCoy would have been pleased that Pawtucket finally got its own 
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Disturbing the Equilibrium 
The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a large number of power plants 
being proposed for construction in the Ocean State.  These applications varied from the 
tried coal burning steam powered plants, to trash burning facilities, wood chip fired 
boilers and combined gas turbine steam plants generating from less than 10 MW to over 
500 MW.309  "Why these are all appearing in Rhode Island is a question that I don't have 
any direct answer for, but I can tell you it is not, in any shape or form, because Rhode 
Island has lower standards or is an easier place to get sited," stated the Rhode Island 
Public Utility Commissioner, James J. Malachowski.310  Within the boundaries of the 
PURPA regulations, any company could now propose new electric generating facilities 
and still connect into the electric power grid.  These facilities were often more efficient 
and less polluting than the ones they replaced, allowing the utilities and the 
environmental groups to find common ground.  The less expensive electricity assisted 
other economic activity in the state and the subsequent tax revenue increases dear to the 
political realm.  Most of the proposed power plants were not constructed (only three of 
                                                                                                                                                 
by the RI Public Utilities Commission.  Without a monopoly status, the parent company 
escaped some of the regulatory oversight of the state.  See Scott Freeman, “Plant That 
Will Generate Electricity, Churn Out Steam Is Half Complete,” Providence Journal, May 
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309.  See U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Rhode Island, State Profile 
and Energy Estimates,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
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the seventeen being considered in 1989 were ever built though several existing facilities 
were upgraded) but it appeared as if a new equilibrium between the electric utility 
companies, the state government and the environmental organizations was being 
established.  The utilities learned to interact with the professional environmental groups 
that could recite industrial requirements and environmental regulations as well as the 
electrical engineers in the electric utilities.  Environmental standards were viewed as 
simply another set of regulations to be met by the utilities, and not a calling from a higher 
moral authority.  Conservation could even be profitable, as long as the “rat” did get its 
“cheese.”   
Other contingent aspects of the period, particularly the political leadership of the 
state, should be considered regarding the relative lack of friction between the three 
groups.  Republican Edward D. DiPrete replaced J. Joseph Garrahy as the state governor 
following the 1984 election.  DiPrete was viewed as being more favorably inclined to 
assist the siting and construction of new electric power plants.  Along with the state 
legislature, DiPrete established a new Energy Facility Siting Board in 1985 to expedite 
the licensing of electric power plants with a greater than 80 MW capacity.  Together with 
the Energy Coordinating Council that had been created in 1979 by Garrahy, the Rhode 
Island government bureaucracy was able to do the necessary work to accredit the 
construction of the new power plant in Burrillville and the refurbished one in 
Providence.311  DiPrete was able to get the Public Utility Commission, the electric 
                                                 
311.  Not all proposals were successful.  A design for a 300 MW plant in East 
Providence was eventually scrapped after a lengthy licensing process that failed to 
convince the state’s Coastal Resources Management Council that it could be operated 
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utilities and the environmental organizations to meet the environmental expectations of 
the communities as well as the state and federal environmental regulations to ensure the 
continued reliable operation of the electric power grid.312   
This new equilibrium was not to last as the state inclination for corruption 
intruded.  DiPrete was routed in the 1990 gubernatorial election by Democrat Bruce 
Sundlun after a series of fraudulent occurrences came to light.  DiPrete was eventually 
charged with bribery, racketeering and extortion while awarding state contracts for the 
construction of the Jamestown Bridge and for work at the Olney Pond in Lincoln Woods 
State Park.313  In Providence, Democrat Mayor Paolino had been replaced by Republican 
turned Independent candidate Vincent Albert "Buddy" Cianci, Jr. in 1991.314  Cianci’s 
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DiPrete v. Richard W. Morsilli et al., 635 A.2d 1155 (1994). 
314.  Cianci’s first period of being the Mayor of Providence, from 1974 to 1984 
had ended following his resignation after his conviction of felony assault of a Providence 
businessman.  After some years in the Rhode Island political wilderness, Cianci had 
returned to politics as an independent and won the mayoralty again.  The Mayor’s office 
was widely believed to be for sale during both of his terms in office.  See Mike Stanton, 
The Prince of Providence (New York: Random House, 2003, 2004), 168-186.   
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vision of rejuvenating downtown Providence required cash infusions to the city’s coffers 
and the refurbished Manchester Street Station was an important part of his plans.315  
Cianci was not above pressuring his “friend” Edward Mulligan, the President of the 
Narragansett Electric Company to accomplish his objectives during this period.316  
Investigations of DiPrete, the Governor, and Cianci, the Mayor of Providence, led to their 
convictions and departure from public office.  Additionally, the Chief Justice of the state 
Supreme Court, Thomas Fay, and the Mayor of Pawtucket, Brian J. Sarault, were 
convicted of corruption charges in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  It seems unlikely that 
the successful electric power plant construction projects were immune from the effects of 
the corruption swirling around the highest levels of state government.317    
Updating PURPA: The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
The leadership in Providence was not the only factor that was changing.  In 
Washington, the federal regulatory agencies were rethinking the assumed natural 
monopoly model of the electric utilities operating the electric power grid.  The Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 had cracked the surface of this model 
by permitting independent operators to connect to the grid and sell the electricity they 
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generated.  In the years since PURPA had been passed, Congressional and industry 
leadership became concerned with some of the problems associated with that law, as well 
as previous federal code concerning the electric power grid.  Technology appeared to be 
changing more rapidly than the ability of the regulators to provide meaningful operating 
procedures while older legislation no longer seemed relevant.318  In the 1980s and early 
1990s, under the direction of federal bureaucrats, new legislation was envisioned to 
address some of the perceived shortcomings of the older regulations.  The authors of this 
legislation assumed that the United States would continue to be dependent on foreign 
energy supplies for the near future and the possible disruptions to that supply required a 
national level effort to balance the economic effects of any price fluctuation.  Introduced 
in 1991 in the wake of the American military intervention in Kuwait, the proposed 
legislation also included President George H. Bush’s priority for letting free market 
forces instead of government regulation promote the reliability and efficiency in the 
electric power grid.  This was particularly evident in the Bush Administration’s 
willingness to amend the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, a cornerstone of 
electric utility regulatory policy.  Increased access for new electric power generation 
                                                 
318.  In particular the efficiency of long range power transmission had increased 
allowing electric power generation sites to be located farther away from the consumer of 
the power.  See Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, “Electricity Restructuring: 
Deregulation or Reregulation?,” Regulation 23, no. 2: 46-47.  
416 
 
companies to the grid would additionally encourage competition and drive down the cost 
to consumers, as well as promote efficiency.319 
With the exception of a rapidly discarded proviso authorizing drilling for oil in 
the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge, the proposed law failed to excite notable 
resistance compared to PURPA or the Public Utility Holding Company Act.320  However, 
the bill failed to make it out of committee in the Senate in 1991, necessitating its 
reintroduction in 1992.  The new proposal deleted any mention of oil exploration in 
Alaska and added provisions for increased access to the electric power grid for new 
power generating companies as well as a small subsidy for wind generated electricity.  
Structured in this manner, the legislation passed both houses with strong bipartisan 
support and was signed into law in October 1992 by President Bush as the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992.321   
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The Energy Policy Act of 1992 introduced important new changes to the 
regulation of the electric power grid, modifications that were rapidly transmitted to 
Rhode Island.  Firstly the statute made a major change in how new electric power 
producing companies could operate.  These new facilities, the Exempt Wholesale 
Generators (EWG) as they were defined in the law, could now sell power to the rest of 
the electric power grid regardless of their plant’s efficiency, a factor that had been 
important in PURPA.  Public utilities could own these new facilities, regardless of their 
location, and sell their power to domestic or foreign consumers.  Utilities were also 
authorized, contingent upon state regulatory approval, to sell power to consumers through 
other company’s transmission lines.322  Some disadvantages were noted in the new 
regulations.  The electric utilities feared that opening up the electric power grid to these 
new electric power generation sources might lower overall system reliability and 
stability.323  The loss of monopoly control of the system that the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 had codified was also seen as problematic.  State regulatory bodies 
were still empowered to make siting decisions and enforce environmental standards 
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associated with electric power generation and transmission, even if their policies might 
interfere with the overall efficiency of the system.324  
Finally, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 enjoined energy producers and consumers 
to conserve this resource not only for economic and national security reasons, but also 
from a desire to expand environmental protection for the nation and the world.  The Act 
contained directives for regulatory bodies to include the direct and indirect effects of 
pollution in their decision making process.  The Department of Energy was tasked to 
“reduce the air, water, and other environmental impacts (including emissions of 
greenhouse gases) of energy production, distribution, transportation, and utilization, 
through the development of an environmentally sustainable energy system.”325  The 
department was also required to set standards for greater efficiency in appliances such as 
hot waters heaters with the thought that any increased efficiency would reduce the overall 
need for electric power generation and its associated pollution.  Reductions in the 
production of CO2 from fossil fueled plants would limit the buildup of this green house 
gas in the atmosphere.  This was a growing concern in the environmental movement as it 
was feared that a potentially catastrophic change in the planet’s climate due to the 
increased concentration of green house gases in the atmosphere was probable.  Subsidies 
for generating electricity by “solar, wind, biomass, or geothermal energy” were also 
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included in the desire to both limit the creation of additional green house gases and limit 
the nation’s dependence on foreign fuels.326   
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was thus important for a number of reasons.  It 
enlarged many of the opportunities from the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 and further expanded access to the electric power grid to additional classes of 
electric power generation facilities and companies.  By reducing the strictures of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, it also permitted the selling of electric 
power by non-contiguous entities, something that had previously been prohibited.  These 
changes were often made for the purpose of improving the efficiency of the grid, yet the 
environmental concerns were also evident in the new regulations.  In this respect, the 
Energy Act was not just focused on local concerns of concentrated pollution from a 
particular energy source, but was willing to take action based on the environmental well 
being of the entire planet.  This was a large step in federal regulatory policy for the 
electric power grid, and coincident with the strands of environmental thought that had 
developed since Rachel Carson.  This mindset appeared attentive to Barry Commoner’s 
general guidelines that everything was connected to everything else and thus action to 
prevent damage to the environment everywhere on the earth was necessary.  Similar to 
Arne Naess’ concerns over the global environment, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 looked 
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at least one aspect of environmental damage, the production of green house gases, with a 
worldwide perspective.  Even Amory Lovins might applaud the proviso to increase the 
subsidy for sustainable energy generation.  Thus while efficiency might be extolled as a 
virtue, the indirect forces of preventing environmental harm from electric power 
generation were not absent.   
Rhode Island Reaction to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
Just as NEES had taken the lead for conserving electrical energy as a means to 
promote efficiency, reliability and profitability in the 1980s, the company also worked to 
take advantage of the new opportunities that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided.  
Coordinating with other interested parties of the Rhode Island Electric Industry 
Restructuring Collaborative, NEES representatives negotiated an agreement that 
essentially shattered the previous model of electric utility monopoly in the Ocean 
State.327  The group resolved that in keeping with the deregulatory intent of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the electric utilities should act to dissolve the 
previous system that had existed since Marsden Perry had set up his electric power 
company.  No longer would the electric utilities own all electric power generation, 
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transmission and distribution facilities.  By divorcing ownership of the electric power 
generation plants from the rest of the system, greater efficiency for the entire electric 
power grid could theoretically be achieved.  Using a model comparable to the phone 
companies that competed for service using the same wiring system, the new owners of 
the electric power plants would compete to sell electric power to the operators of the 
electric power grid.  This competition would lead to greater efficiency in the system with 
lower costs for the consumer.  The continued reliability of the grid was a factor that was 
acknowledged by all parties, as were the environmental groups’ desires to lower the 
polluting emissions from all of the electric generation plants.328  The largest unknown 
variable resulting from the agreement was how the electric utility debt, estimated at 1 to 3 
billion dollars, might be paid off even as the electric generation plants were sold off.329   
While electricity costs had often been a political issue in the Rhode Island 
government, the Public Utilities Commission, the legislature and governor moved with 
uncharacteristic verve to turn the recommendations of the Electric Industry Restructuring 
Collaborative into actual law.  Efforts in 1995 to permit the deregulation fell apart due to 
                                                 
328.  See Rhode Island Electric Industry Restructuring Collaborative, “Report and 
Set of Independent Principles to the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission from the 
Electric Industry Restructuring Collaborative,” May 12, 1995, and Dr. Richard Rosen, 
Tim Woolf, Dr. Bill Dougherty, Bruce Biewald, Dr. Stephen Bernow, and Regulatory 
Assistance Project, “Promoting Environmental Quality In A Restructured Electric 
Industry,” The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (Boston, MA: 
Tellus Institute, 1995): B-1 to B-2. 
329.  This debt included those incurred for the nuclear power plant in Seabrook, 
NH.  Interestingly, this debt estimate was proposed by the Conservation Law Foundation.  
See Bob Wyss, “Alliance Agrees: Deregulate Electricity in R.I.,” Providence Journal, 
May 13, 1995, and “Innovative Electric-rate Plan Faces Long Road,” Providence 
Journal, May 30, 1995. 
422 
 
a squabble between the Democratic majority legislature and the Republican governor, 
Lincoln Almond, following the governor’s veto of a bill that would have permitted the 
construction of an electric power plant at Quonset Point, run by the state’s Port Authority.  
The General Assembly had rewritten Almond’s initial proposal to allow this new plant to 
sell electric power throughout the state and not just to the manufacturing facilities at 
Quonset Point.  NEES had protested this threat to their monopoly, leading Almond to 
veto the proposed legislature.330   
The resulting rancor soured relations between the government branches until the 
next year when the desire to lower electric rates overcame political resistance.  The 
General Assembly leadership then made electric utility deregulation a major issue and 
devoted the necessary focus to make the required progress.331  In February 1996, 
following months of stealthy negotiations with the electric utilities, the Rhode Island 
House Majority Leader, Democrat George D. Caruolo, introduced legislation to 
deregulate this industry.  The Utility Restructuring Act of 1996 state would allow direct 
access for consumers by 2001 and “require utilities to unbundle rates, including a rate for 
demand-side management (DSM) and renewables.”332  Some industrial consumers would 
be permitted direct access beginning in 1998.  The new law would also allow a large 
                                                 
330.  Russell Garland, “Electric Battle Shorts out in Senate,” Providence Journal, 
August 05, 1995. 
331.  Ken Mingus, “Legislators Set Priorities For The 1996 Assembly In 
Providence, A Need For Healing Rifts,” Providence Journal, January 08, 1996. 
332.  Office of Power Technologies of the U.S. Department of Energy, “Rhode 
Island, Restructuring Legislation Introduced,” State Renewable Energy News 5, no. 1 
(Winter 1996): 2. 
423 
 
percentage of the recovery of utility "stranded costs," that is, the infrastructure 
expenditures that had become redundant, to be passed on to the consumers.333   
Caruolo proposed that the deregulation would lower the overall costs of electricity 
in the state as well as the amount of government oversight of the industry.  He did admit 
that the proposed legislation could lead to increased air pollution as the new power 
generation companies might attempt to burn more coal due to its lower costs.334  Some 
environmental groups supported the proposed legislation.  "We should embrace 
deregulation," the Conservation Law Foundation of New England’s Armond Cohen told 
the Environment Council of Rhode Island while speaking at the Audubon Society of 
Rhode Island facilities.  The deregulation would lead to newer electric power plants being 
constructed, such as the one at the Manchester Street Station in Providence.  Burning 
natural gas, this plant emitted less pollution into the environment and used less cooling 
water, lowering the environmental damage in Narragansett Bay.335  
Despite the support of the utilities and the environmental organizations, it took 
another six months for the legislature to pass a bill to deregulate the electric utilities.  
Some legislators were concerned that the ordinance would not lower costs sufficiently to 
make it worth the effort while others were not convinced that the federal government 
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would permit such a radical restructuring of the industry in the state.  Simultaneously, 
public concerns that the Department of Environmental Management would not perform 
its role and dismay that the utilities would be rewarded by allowing them to retire their 
debt by charging the consumers for their poor business decisions limited enthusiasm for 
the new scheme.336  The Public Utilities Commission and some consumers, as well as the 
Blackstone Valley Electric and Newport Electric companies, wanted direct access for 
everyone starting in 1998, as opposed to the later date that NEES had negotiated.337  By 
March the bill was stalled in committee and Caruolo acknowledged that this debt or 
“stranded cost” needed to be better defined less taxpayers be saddled with excessive costs 
when the utilities sold off their power plants.338   
Caruolo would eventually convince the House to pass the bill in June of 1996 
following a reduction in the amount that the consumers would have to pay for utility debt 
servicing.  The bill then languished in the state Senate for two months as negotiators 
attempted to smooth out the differences between the two houses.  Once passed by the 
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Senate on August 1st, the House then took issue with some of the changes in the bill.  A 
fair amount of horse trading on other bills ensued before the both houses could approve a 
final version of the bill on August 2nd.339  Governor Almond subsequently signed the bill 
on August 6th and Rhode Island had leaped to the forefront of electric utility deregulation 
in the nation.340    
Rhode Island’s Utility Restructuring Act of 1996 was noteworthy in that it 
upturned one hundred years of the natural monopoly of the electric utilities.  By requiring 
the electric utilities to break up their generation, transmission and distribution capabilities 
into separate businesses, and permitting new electric power generation companies to plug 
into the electric power grid to sell to any consumer, the old model of a state regulated 
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power monopoly had been fractured.341  On the environmental front, “due regard for the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment, the conservation of natural resources, 
including scenic, historic, and recreational assets, and the strengthening of long-range, 
land-use planning” was a major reason given for the policy change.342  Electric power 
producers were advised to cooperate with state officials to lower power plant emissions, 
though the costs to meet the new clean air standards from the EPA could be passed on to 
consumers.343   
Brayton Point Woes (Continued) 
The Utility Restructuring Act of 1996 had recommended electric power producers 
should act in concert with state authorities to limit power plant emissions even though the 
law’s authors realized that Rhode Island’s electric power plants were among the least 
polluting in the nation.344  The coal burning Brayton Point units at the northern end of 
Narragansett Bay were just the opposite, and were considered to be amongst the worst 
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polluters in the region.345  Despite numerous upgrades to the plants during the 1990s the 
aging plant was still a major contributor to the air pollution in the area.  The station was 
not as efficient as the newer natural gas powered plants in Providence or Burrillville, 
Rhode Island.346  NEES’s efforts to make environmental amends by planting trees in 
South America to offset some of the CO2 being generated by the Brayton Point units was 
not considered a substantial improvement considering the environmental damage being 
created, particularly when consumers were being charged for this remediation.  “I find it 
hard to believe people are going to slap more costs on the rates to deal with a problem 
that I don't believe will help the environment in Rhode Island," stated the leader of 
Energy Council of Rhode Island, Roger Buck.347  The head of the Rhode Island 
Department of Public Utilities was also unconvinced on the program.  Even the chief 
executive officer of NEES, John W. Rowe was skeptical, adding that such efforts would 
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not be easy.  Rowe suggested that "Over the long run, I think a cleaner world will be a 
more expensive world."348 
Tree planting operations were one attempt by NEES to address the growing 
concern regarding anthropomorphic global warming. With increasing evidence that the 
earth’s climate was changing and that CO2 emissions from industrial activity might be a 
major contributor to the acceleration of this global environmental problem, 
environmentalists attempted to act to limit this pollution.  Since NEES was using coal to 
generate 42% of its electricity, primarily at the Brayton Point and Somerset, 
Massachusetts’ plants, the utility was a large contributor to the production of CO2.  To 
help reduce the use of coal as a fuel, environmentalists desired to include the cost of such 
pollution in assessing electric utility rates.  Utility executives and public regulators who 
were already being taken to task on the high cost of electricity in New England were not 
enthusiastic. “My position has moved from one of interest to one of being opposed to it 
because of the potential for increasing electric costs. We're talking about imposing costs 
above what federal and state environmental agencies require,” stated the head of the 
Rhode Island Public Utility Commission, James J. Malachowski.349   
Deregulation of the Rhode Island Electric Power Grid 
With such external resistance to burning the most cost efficient fuel, aging plants 
that were often stressed to stay operating, and increasing regulatory pressure, NEES 
                                                 
348.  Ibid. 
349.  Massachusetts was more aggressive in assessing the utilities to address the 
environmental externalities of their pollution.  See Bob Wyss, “Utility Generates Stir 
With Tree-Planting Plan Critics Of 'Offsets' To Global Warming Say Only Rates Will 
Grow,” Providence Journal, February 16, 1992. 
429 
 
moved to take advantage of the new Rhode Island electric utility deregulation to divide 
up their electric generation, transmission and distribution businesses.350   Following the 
state of Massachusetts passing similar legislation to Rhode Island’s Utility Restructuring 
Act of 1996 Act, NEES announced in October 1996 that it would sell all of its power 
generation facilities, including its newly overhauled station in Providence as well as the 
aging coal-fired plants at Brayton Point and Somerset.  Consumers would pay a surcharge 
during the first three years following the sales of the electric power generation plants, but 
the subsequent increased competition was expected to lead to a 10-17 percent overall 
reduction in prices.351  Promises of lower prices and lower emissions were repeated.  The 
Conservation Law Foundation praised the decision, proclaiming that "In our view this is 
a model for restructuring the electric industry nationally. . . We think it's a big 
environmental win."352  The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission was less effusive.  
Its chairman, James J. Malachowski, was annoyed that NEES was willing to be more 
flexible with its divestiture schedule with the state of Massachusetts than with Rhode 
                                                 
350.  Brayton Point attracted interest from all sectors, from the local community 
members who complained about excessive soot on their homes from coal burning to the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection that sued NEES for failure to use 
proper chlorination equipment while using industrial chlorine to clean its seawater 
cooling systems.  See John T. Landry and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. From the Rivers, The 
Origins and Growth of the New England Electric System (East Greenwich, RI: Meridan 
Printing, 1996), 214, and "N.E. Power Company Settles Suit," Boston Globe, July 31, 
1992. 
351.  Brian C. Jones, “New England Electric To Sell Power Stations Providence, 
Somerset Landmarks Included,” Providence Journal, October 1, 1996. 
352.  Peter Lord, “Lower Electric Bills, Cleaner Air Foreseen. Experts Believe 
Monday's Decision By New England Electric Systems To Sell Its Generating Plants Will 
Benefit The Region,” Providence Journal, October 2, 1996. 
430 
 
Island.  "They came before us and said they were offering us the best they could do. They 
were very sure of that," stated Malachowski. "So now I'm questioning their credibility, 
their sincerity." 353  
The sale of Brayton Point could not happen rapidly enough to prevent new 
regulatory challenges.  Later in October 1996 the Environmental Protection Agency 
announced that it would revoke the site’s water discharge permit two years before it was 
scheduled to expire.  The EPA stated it was taking this action based on studies by the 
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management showing that the plants’ 
seawater effluent temperature and large water use was adversely affecting the marine life 
in Narragansett Bay.  In some instances a reduction of 86% in flounder, tautog and other 
species’ population levels correlated strongly with Brayton Point water use.  The plants’ 
large water circulation killed off fish larvae that spawned in the Mount Hope Bay region 
in the northern part of Narragansett Bay, resulting in lower fish populations.  Save the 
Bay applauded the EPA’s response even as NEES scrambled to determine how the plants 
could be operated in a more restrictive environment.354  By early spring of 1997, with up 
to 25 bids for its power plants, NEES struck a deal with the EPA.  It would lower the 
amount of water it used at the Brayton Point plants from 1.4 billion gallons of water a day 
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to 925 million, though the EPA permitted an increase of water flow in the summer 
months if required to meet high electrical demands resulting from heat waves.355   
NEES attracted numerous buyers for its inventory of power plants, valued at 1.1 
billion dollars.  Interested bidders including Duke Energy from North Carolina, 
CalEnergy of Nebraska and Southern Co. from Georgia all showed interest now that 
federal regulation permitted multistate ownership.356  Even the Conservation Law 
Foundation submitted a bid for Brayton Point in an effort to gain control of the site to 
shut it down.357  In August 1997, U.S. Generating Co., an affiliate of Pacific Gas & 
Electric Corporation of San Francisco, California, bought the collection of NEES power 
plants for 1.59 billion dollars, 500 million dollars more than NEES had valued the 
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plants.358  Politicians and NEES executives lauded the sale and the state’s nation leading 
efforts to deregulate the electricity industry.  By selling the plants for more than 
anticipated, NEES could lower the “stranded costs” being passed on to the consumers in 
Rhode Island, an earlier sticking point in passing the Utility Restructuring Act the 
previous year.  State Senator William V. Irons, D-East Providence, chairman of the state 
Senate Corporations Committee, regarded the sale as "an example of courage where a 
little state like Rhode Island is leading the nation. . . . This will be a major statement of 
what this state is about."359  The final sales of the power plants took over a year to 
finalize, with U.S. Generating Co. taking control of the plants in September 1998.  The 
completion of the deal was announced at media events in both Boston and Providence 
and was heralded as “a milestone in the transformation of New England's electric utility 
industry.”360 
The Blackstone Valley Electric and Newport Electric companies took longer to 
sell off their respective power plants.  Agreements were not reached until April of 1998 
for the sale of the utilities’ last generation plants.  All of their electricity would now be 
purchased from other electric power generating companies.361  Only the Block Island 
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Power Company did not sell off its diesel generators as it lacked an electric power 
transmission line connection to the mainland and was dependent on fuel transported to 
the island.362 
Concurrent with the divestiture of its power plants, the southeastern New England 
electric utilities also moved to take advantage of regional opportunities resulting from 
federal regulatory policies.  In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had 
opened up the conduction of electricity across the electric power grid’s transmission lines 
to promote the competitive sale of wholesale electric power.  NEPOOL had responded by 
suggesting a new organization be formed to act as an Independent System Operator (ISO) 
for the grid in the New England area, ISO New England.  On July 1, 1997 ISO New 
England was established to “operate regional power system, implement wholesale 
markets, (and) ensure open access to transmission lines.”363  ISO New England would 
function almost as a super NEPOOL, acting to regulate the dynamic operations of the 
grid amongst the expanding number of generating and transmission companies.  The 
regional synchronizer operated over the expanse covering most of the New England 
states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
portions of Maine).  Its mission was similar to NEPOOL, that of safe and reliable electric 
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power grid operation, long term planning for the power and transmission requirements 
for the area, and the administration of the wholesale electricity market for the region.364   
Even as the old model of an electric utility company was being reconfigured, the 
old model of regional electric power grid organization was being strengthened.  At the 
same time as this transition, the number of electric utilities in the state was diminishing.  
Rhode Island previously had five electric utilities (Narragansett Electric (the NEES 
subsidiary), Newport Electric, Blackstone Valley Electric, Block Island and Pascoag Fire 
District).  In 1999, in the aftermath of the utility divestiture of all generation facilities, 
NEES filed a petition with the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission to merge with 
the parent holding company of the Blackstone Valley Electric and Newport Electric 
companies to create one distribution company.  The new distribution company would 
retain the name of NEES’s subsidiary, the Narragansett Electric Company.  NEES 
pledged that the new company would create “savings and efficiency gains” beneficial to 
the consumers.365  The merger would allow the company to react more rapidly in the 
event of natural disasters, increasing the reliability of the grid.  Combining the companies 
would also allow cost savings by reducing service costs between separate companies.  
Finally the merger would aid the evolution of the competitive electric power market that 
had resulted from the legislature’s previous actions.  While concerned of the job losses 
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resulting from the merger, the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission approved the 
merger in February 2000.366  With the exceptions of the minor enclaves of the Pascoag 
Fire District and Block Island, NEES had thus finally achieved complete dominance of 
the Rhode Island electricity market, though with the elimination of its generation 
capacity, it was limited to the transmission and distribution side of the electric power 
grid.   
Such local control was short lived.  Even as NEES was acting to absorb Newport 
Electric and Blackstone Valley Electric companies, a larger firm was interested in 
acquiring NEES.  National Grid, a British based electric utility company, had announced 
its desires to purchase NEES as early as 1998 in order for the “U.K. electricity company 
to grab a piece of the fast-consolidating U.S. electricity industry.”367  The sale required 
the approval of United States Securities and Exchange Commission to move forward, a 
process that took several years to acquire.  A review of the Public Utilities Holding 
Company Act of 1935 was required to determine if National Grid, a foreign company, 
could acquire NEES.  The Act also required a subsequent trend “towards the economical 
and the efficient development of an integrated public-utility system" for any merger to be 
authorized.368  While some financial concerns had to be addressed, the SEC approved the 
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merger on March 15, 2000, ending over a century of local ownership and leadership of 
the electric power grid in southeastern New England.369   
Change in Momentum or Reversion to the Mean?  
 By the end of the millennium, it was not clear if operation of the electric power 
grid had reverted to the pre-1970s manner of close coordination between the electric 
utility executives and the branches of the Rhode Island government or if the influence of 
the growing number of environmental organizations was accelerating.  There were 
certainly conflicting data points as opposed to the period where the environmental groups 
had successfully prevented the construction of the Charlestown nuclear power plant.   
On the one side, the environmental groups had certainly influenced the electric 
utilities in their avoidance of new electric power generation plant projects.  The ability of 
the groups to delay construction of any new oil- or coal-fired plant through lawsuits 
encouraged the utilities, particularly NEES, to promote conservation efforts in the region 
at the cost of increased sales.  It is doubtful if any of the NEESPLANs would have been 
suggested let alone implemented if the concern of lengthy delays in plant construction 
had not permeated the NEES executive mindset.  NEES was able to defuse much of the 
criticism that it might otherwise have been required to respond to by working with the 
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environmental groups.370  When natural gas burning plants were proposed in the 1990s 
for Burrillville and Providence, the utilities were able to get the plants licensed and 
constructed in a timely manner, perhaps because the newer plants were less polluting than 
the ones that otherwise might have been required.  The environmental groups could thus 
alter the standard trajectory of the electric utilities that had previously followed the “grow 
and build” model.   
The electric utilities were also able effectively use public relations to garner at 
least some public sentiment that they were concerned with the environment.  In 2001 the 
Narragansett Electric Company presented its parcel of land at Rome Point to the state of 
Rhode Island.  The land had previously been considered as a site for both conventional 
and nuclear power plants.  The state turned the land over to the Department of 
Environmental Management, which promptly created the “John H. Chafee Nature 
Preserve” out of the area.371  This gift earned Narragansett Electric the “John H. Chafee 
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Outstanding Conservation Project/Program” award from the Environment Council of 
Rhode Island in 2002, an added, though perhaps unexpected benefit for the company.372   
As well as limiting new construction and encouraging energy conservation, the 
environmental groups could hinder some of the operations at the most polluting electric 
power generation plants.  State authorities could be lobbied and politicians persuaded 
with effective arguments and campaign contributions.  These legislators and executives 
might then take action to pressure the Public Utilities Commission to limit electric utility 
operations and future plans.  Legislation favoring or discouraging the electric utilities 
might be passed.  The electric utility might even be sued by the state.  These direct or 
indirect actions could affect plant operations and the overall efficiency of the electric 
power grid.  Even when dealing with the demands of the New England heat waves during 
low capacity periods, efficiency and effectiveness were considered less important criteria 
than the stress that plant operations were placing on the environment.   
On the other hand the utilities were also able to take advantage of new federal 
regulatory policies, perhaps in unintended ways.  The Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA) of 1978 and The Energy Policy Act of 1992 started to fracture the natural 
monopoly that the electric utilities had previously exercised.  PURPA allowed new 
organizations to plug into the electric power gird, facilities that might have been 
overlooked in previous attempts to reach the highest levels of efficiency by the system 
                                                 
372.  The Pascoag Utility District earned the award in 2013 for their conservation 
education program.  No other utility was earned this accolade from ECRI.  See John H. 
Chafee Outstanding Conservation Project/Program, Award Lists, Environment Council of 
Rhode Island, http://www.environmentcouncilri.org/award-lists (accessed July 1, 2015). 
439 
 
operators.  Later, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 would lead to the divestiture of the 
generation section of the electrical utilities, leaving only the transmission and distribution 
portions under their control.  While this new policy promised greater competition in the 
generation of electricity, one must also note that this led to a fissure of the standard 
model of electric utility operation.  Any company capable of building and efficiently 
operating a suitable power plant could now provide electricity to the electric power grid.  
In the process a more efficient system could be created through competition.  If this was 
correct, then the previous model of attaining maximum efficiency through monopolistic 
operation of the grid must have been flawed in some manner.  Where previously the 
larger and more technically complicated plants had been extolled as paragons of 
efficiency, now the less expensive and demanding gas turbine plants were taking the 
largest portion of electric power generation.  One, if not both, of the models must have 
been incorrect.  Whether the new policies or models were more environmentally friendly 
than the old ones was yet to be determined.373 
Another possibility is that the technological momentum of the electric power grid 
was influencing decision making bodies in ways that were not always in parallel with 
attaining maximum efficiency.  As the electric utility and regulatory body executives 
struggled to comprehend the economic and technical issues of the period, decisions were 
made based on how these organizations had previously achieved success.  The actual 
exigencies of the era were disregarded in favor of the historical lessons learned and 
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electric utility cultural biases.  Rather than retiring the Brayton Point plant after it proved 
to be a drag on system performance, decades of time and millions of dollars were spent to 
try to make it work according to its design specifications, parameters that were 
continually being reduced.  The concept of a technical problem that could not be 
overcome seemed anathema to the utility managers.  The notion that the problem was due 
to technical overreach appears to have taken a long time to sink in.  The new parameters 
of preventing environmental damage did not appear in this calculus, suggestive that the 
momentum of doing things the old, familiar way still dominated over any concern of 
environmental damage.   
The twenty year period following the cancellation of the nuclear power plant at 
Charlestown, RI, thus saw a slightly new direction for the electric power grid.  This 
vector change was the result of the political forces that the environmental groups could 
apply to all of the branches of the state and federal governments.  Motivated by an 
evolving concern for the environment, these organizations were effective at altering the 
momentum of the electric power grid.  Where the concerns of the environmental groups 
and the electric utilities overlapped, the change in momentum could be noticeable.  
Where the desire to protect the environment was in opposition to the demands for 
efficiency, the acceleration might be negligible.  Whether the force to preserve the 
protection of the environment could be maintained against the prevailing powers for 
enhancing efficiency for the electric power grid was still indeterminate.   
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CHAPTER 7  
ETHICAL ENERGY IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING 
 
These choices may seem abstract, but they are sharp, imminent and practical. We 
stand at a crossroads: without decisive action our options will slip away.  Delay in 
energy conservation lets wasteful use run on so far that the logistical problems of 
catching up become insuperable. 
 
- Amory Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken 
 
 
By the late 1990s apprehension that the effects of global warming were 
accelerating become the principal concern of the environmental organizations in the 
United States.374  Increased pollution and production of CO2 and water vapor from the 
combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas and their derivatives) correlating 
with the massive decrease of pristine wilderness areas, significant soil depletion, 
degradation of fresh water supplies and expanding human populations threatened the 
environmental health of the entire planet.375  Reversing this trend would absorb the 
attention of the many of the environmental organizations in the United States, with 
subsequent effect on the operation of the electric power grid over the next decades in 
southeastern New England.  
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The green house effect was considered the primary cause of global warming.  
Burning any type of fossil fuel released these gases into the atmosphere where they 
tended to reflect heat from the earth’s surface though still permitting radiant solar heat to 
penetrate.  The net result was thought to be a buildup of the heat retained by the planet.  
Over time, the increased concentration of these gases could lead to a significantly large 
rise in the temperature of the planet, which in turn could result in deleterious conditions 
world wide.376  The consequences of a global temperature increase could be severe.  The 
large masses of ice at the earth’s poles could decrease in size, leading to an increase in 
the water level of the oceans and subsequent flooding of low lying areas throughout the 
globe.  The shift in the oceanic water temperature could lead to altered weather patterns, 
affecting agricultural production, a higher frequency of extreme storms, and even a 
greater production of malarial carrying mosquitos.377  While the relative effect of 
increased production of CO2 from industrial activity on the measured increases on the 
earth’s temperature was debated, that human action was responsible for a large 
percentage of that change seemed reasonable.   
New Problems and Older Concerns in the Environmental Movement 
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Such concerns and the desire to take action to reduce human created damage were 
an extension of environmental thoughts that stretched back generations.  In the 1940s, 
Aldo Leopold had warned of the consequences of unremitted human activity on the land 
and had promoted a new ethical concern for the environment.  By the 1960s Rachel 
Carson was advocating for the elimination of harmful chemicals that were affecting local 
ecological systems.  In the 1970s, Barry Commoner had expanded these horizons by 
noting the interconnectedness of human economic activity and the environment, while 
Arne Naess had proposed that a new “Deep Ecology” philosophy was needed to guide 
non-privileged human behavior in a finite world.  With the increasing number of 
scientific journals suggesting that global warming and climate change was not merely an 
ethical concern of inter-species domination over the world, earlier successes in limiting 
the use of pesticides or preserving small, local patches of wilderness seemed 
insignificant.378       
Commentators on environmental affairs noted these trends and saw a validation of 
their earlier concerns.  Yet with the “easy” environmental problems having been 
addressed, the population’s continued interest in possible future catastrophes appeared to 
decline.  To some extant this was due to the environmental movement’s previous success 
in preventing the construction of the most polluting power plants, cleaning up some of 
the worst environmentally damaged sites, and the expanding populations of some of the 
previously designated endangered species.  The longer term dangers from continuing 
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human population growth, depletion of natural resources and reduction in the numbers of 
plant and animal species were still causes for concern if not alarm.  Coupled with the 
potential for rising sea levels from the reduction of the polar ice caps, there were 
heightened concerns that the overall effect of human activity might cause global 
cataclysms.  Since the time horizon for these problems was much longer, the threat from 
such environmental problems was more difficult to present.   The Dean of the Yale 
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, James Gustave Speth, noted that “We 
dealt with the more blatant immediate problems so people do not see that the world is 
flying apart.”379  The larger challenges of climate change required a higher national and 
even global level approach than the local or even regional actions to achieve the desired 
effects.    
National level organizations within and outside the government took on efforts to 
reduce the human actions leading to global warming and alleviate its effects. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted research on the potential causes and 
effects of global warming; the Department of the Interior (DOI) incorporated climate 
change in its wildlife and wetlands management programs; the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) used its satellites to monitor the extent of the polar ice 
caps; and other federal agencies developed their own plans to monitor or limit its 
consequences.  This process accelerated over the years as different administrations 
occupied the White House.  The Clinton administration showed interest in climate 
change, signing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at Kyoto 
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in 1996.380  The George H. Bush administration feigned concern while back pedaling 
from previous actions that might affect the nation’s economy, while the Obama 
administration augmented federal activity and funding for research and actions to limit 
the consequences of climate change.381   
The national level environmental organizations were catalysts to the federal 
government’s actions.  Groups such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, the National Wildlife 
Foundation, the National Audubon Society, the World Wildlife Federation and others 
took the issue of climate change to heart, incorporating it in their mission statements.  
“Our nation must address climate change, continue moving toward cleaner energy 
sources, and make wildlife habitat and communities more resilient to such change,” 
cautioned the National Wildlife Federation.”382  The Sierra Club set up programs to 
protest against the use of every fossil fuel since they all generated CO2 and harmed the 
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global environment when burned.383  The National Audubon Society suggested that not 
only were the earth’s birds under threat from climate change, but that a new strategy of 
cleaner electrical energy generation and transmission was required.384  The national 
groups were well funded and spent tens of millions of dollars to lobby and fund the 
political campaigns of their supporters.385         
Unlike previous issues where particular authors or speakers had become known as 
the leading spokesperson on an issue, the sheer number of scientists and 
environmentalists warning about the possible dangers of climate change reduced the 
effects of any individual forecaster.  Some of the earlier thinkers remained salient to the 
continuing conversation.  Arne Naess linked the “increasing environmental degradation 
or devastation perpetuated through firmly established ways of production and 
consumption and a lack of adequate policies regarding human population increase 
(italics in the original)” to the crisis.386  Naess promoted a lower level of energy 
consumption and a more distributed energy production with greater emphasis on smaller 
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and non-fossil fuel energy sources.  Self reliance for both individuals and communities 
should be encouraged to resist the continuing technological juggernaut and the 
“megasociety.”387  Increasing the economic output of the developed world was 
increasingly harmful to the overall health and well being of the globe and its human 
population and thus should be rejected.  The ecophilosophical model previously 
postulated was still vital to pursue.388 
Despite Naess’ statements, there was not universal agreement that the problems of 
climate change had an ethical component, or that Deep Ecology was the best means to 
explore it.  Others suggested that Deep Ecology and other ecological ethics were merely 
filling the void left by the erosion of older faith traditions.  Human reason had led to the 
questioning of some of the basic precepts of the Western religious traditions.  Yet that 
same rationality was still insufficient by itself to further enhance human flourishing in an 
era where a belief in God was no longer axiomatic.  Unwilling to accept either of the 
divergent poles of anti-Christian eliminatory or extreme reductionist rhetoric the 
population looked for other moral touchstones to guide their actions.389  The ecological 
movement used human reason and science to detect the upsetting of biological 
equilibrium, but concurrently rejected the notion that the environment was only a 
medium for human endeavors.  Such a frame of reference closed individuals off from 
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nature and the effects it had on human flourishing.390  Naess’ Deep Ecology attempted to 
open up humans to the sources of power within nature itself to achieve personal 
completeness.391  While acknowledging human activity within the earth’s complex 
biologic community was not privileged, Deep Ecology could still promote a means of 
“non-exclusive humanism,” though not using the trappings of traditional religious 
ceremony.392   
By this time even the Roman Catholic Church was concerned about the religious 
component of the ongoing ecological crisis.  In 1990 Pope John Paul II stated that this 
was not only an environmental issue, but a moral issue as well.  Respect for human life 
and dignity should be the most important consideration in resolving these complex 
economic and technological problems.  While acknowledging that scientific and 
technological advances had brought benefits for humanity, the Pope stressed that the 
unrestrained use of these advances had adverse effects on both man and the earth.  The 
Pope’s communiqué discussed possible solutions to the ecological crisis but stressed the 
common responsibility of mankind to address and solve the problems.  Echoing White, 
the Pope called the example of Saint Francis of Assisi a “striking witness that when we 
are at peace with God we are better able to devote ourselves to building up the peace with 
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all creation which is inseparable from peace among all peoples.”393  Pope John Paul II’s 
consistent message indicated that ecological concerns were not inimical to the Roman 
Catholic faith and that protecting the biosphere was a moral imperative.   
Nay-sayers rejected not only the alleged ecological crisis of global warming 
caused by fossil fuel combustion, but also any moral basis requiring action.  
“Environmentalism seems to be the religion of choice for urban atheists,” argued noted 
science fiction writer Michael Crichton.394  Crichton viewed environmentalism as a type 
of displaced mysticism or religion.  As the masses in cities no longer viewed their faith 
traditions with any seriousness, they had shifted to environmentalism to fill the void.395   
Crichton saw the tenets of environmentalism as based on misguided faith that accepted 
no reason.  Technology and human decisions helped create environmental problems; only 
humility and reason could help humanity solve them.396   
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Amory Lovins was more specific regarding how the electric power grid might be 
transformed to limit the environmental damage it created, as well as provide reliable 
power to maintain the economic vitality of the nation.  Lovins had continued to study the 
nation’s electric power systems during the 1980s and 1990s and had noted many of the 
problems bedeviling the electric utility industry.  The large scale power plants were too 
expensive, were inefficient, broke down too often, and were environmentally malignant.  
Rather than continue to pursue the old model of small numbers of power plants of 
increasing electrical capacity and efficiency, a goal that was no longer economically 
viable, the utilities should shift to a more distributed power generation model.397  The 
growing efficiency and capacity, along with the declining cost, of renewable energy 
sources, such as wind power turbines and solar powered photovoltaic cells, made their 
use more attractive to utilities and consumers.  Less expensive energy storage devices in 
the form of fuel cells would allow more convenient methods to meet smaller loads and 
some of the peak electricity demands without the need of greater numbers of larger power 
plants.  The improved digital power inverters permitted new electricity sources to plug 
into the grid producing the same voltage and frequency as all of the other electric power 
generators.  A larger number of smaller but more reliable electric power sources would 
reduce the requirements for large scale distribution power lines that took up huge swaths 
of land and wasted energy from the electric line losses in the cables.398  The lower 
capacity and less technically demanding units would be a smaller financial risk to the 
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utilities.  Fewer oscillations in the electric utilities’ business models would be 
experienced during the construction of these types of power plants, as opposed to the 
stresses that the expensive nuclear or conventional powered plants had created when they 
had not been completed on time or budget.399  Improving the means and number of 
electric power generators and taking advantage of the increased computing power now 
available would permit the producers to improve the quality of service as well as reduce 
the cost.400  The smaller plants were typically less environmentally harmful than the 
larger ones.  They tended to have fewer polluting emissions per the unit of electric power 
delivered, reducing the harm to nearby fish and wildlife, and required less land and water 
to operate than the larger plants.401  Since the smaller plants had a smaller physical 
footprint and levied fewer social costs on the public they served, the political rancor of a 
“megaproject” being imposed on a smaller community could also be reduced.402 
This democratic nature of smaller scale energy production was consistent with 
Lovins’ previous writing.  By now, Lovins had two more decades of technological 
development and utility experimentation to buttress his arguments.  He was able to offer 
specific policy recommendations to utility mangers, federal and state regulators, electric 
power generation and distribution companies, and even real estate developers.  The 
benefits that would accrue to local, regional and national users of the electric power grid 
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would be substantial, even leading to global benefits because of the greater cleanliness of 
Lovins’ proposed distributed system.  A distributed system was less open to catastrophic 
failure from technical failures or external attacks.  A less expensive system could 
potentially bring the benefits of electric power to the large portion of the global 
community that still did not have any.  The resultant system would be more reliable and 
make the world safer and more just.  Conservation of electric power was also important 
as wasting energy could overcome any improvement that a distributed system might 
provide.403  For Lovins, reforming the electric power grid could be accomplished in a 
manner that not only protected the environment but maintained the comfort of the 
population enjoying its technological benefits.   
Rhode Island Environmental Groups in the New Century 
The consensus view on the perils of climate change caused by fossil fuel use and 
the possible methods to decelerate these trends diffused down to the regional and state 
environmental groups.  These concerns impacted the operation of the electric power grid 
in the New England region, though not with the alacrity that environmentalists might 
have desired.  Towards the end of the 1990s, the Rhode Island government funded studies 
that noted the costs, both economic and environmental, on the continued suburban sprawl 
in the state.  A greater suburban population along with a decaying urban core required 
longer electric power transmission lines, using up more land than the report’s authors 
though necessary.  The report advocated improving urban infrastructure, while 
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purchasing land for natural conservation was recommended as a method to limit the 
declining rural character of the state.  The study concluded that Rhode Island could 
devise effective strategies to reverse the trend.  Limiting such suburban sprawl would 
lead to improvements in the environmental quality of the state.404  Another study, written 
in 2007, envisioned much of the city of Providence under water if the worst case scenario 
of ocean level increase caused by climate change occurred.  The Coastal Resource 
Management Council of Rhode Island recommended improved federal and state 
coordination, including the emphasis on renewable energy, to help prevent increased 
erosion of the coastline.405 
The numerous Rhode Island environmental groups were receptive to the issues of 
climate change.  The groups often proposed new state regulations and actions to limit the 
production of any carbon emission, whether coming from the smokestacks of electric 
generation plants or the automobiles on the state highways.  Save the Bay considered 
climate change as one of the larger threats to the ecosystem of Narragansett Bay.  The 
organization noted changes to the bay’s “salt marshes and fish habitat, changes in species 
diversity, and challenges with water quality.  In Narragansett Bay, water temperatures 
have increased 3° F in the last hundred years. In that same time, Bay waters have risen up 
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to seven inches and the rate of sea level rise has increased.”406  These changes led to 
increased beach erosion, damage to coastal facilities and property, and more dynamic 
weather patterns affecting the area.  Save the Bay advocated renewed efforts to limit such 
change, stating:   
We must also work to mitigate climate change. We can do this by supporting 
efforts to reduce the use of fossil fuels, creating more renewable energy, and 
increasing the efficiency of our buildings and homes. It is important that the 
people who live and work in and around the Narragansett Bay watershed and 
coastal communities understand the Bay's role as part of a global ecosystem.407 
 
The Audubon Society of Rhode Island had similar concerns, supporting the use of 
sustainable energy sources and energy conservation to limit environmental damage to the 
region.408  The Environment Council of Rhode Island (ECRI), leading an assembly of 
approximately 60 state groups, said that “Climate change poses significant threats to 
Rhode Island’s health, economy, and environment.”409  The organization proposed 
numerous actions that the state government should take to resolve some of the problems, 
including increasing energy efficiency, maintaining the state subsidy of sustainable 
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energy sources and insulating homes in lower income housing areas.410  The 
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) echoed these apprehensions, calling climate change 
“the defining environmental issue of our generation.”411  Having expanded its influence 
and now with local offices across the entire New England area, CLF, continued to 
advocate for greater energy conservation, investment in renewable energy sources and the 
reduction of fossil fuel burning to limit the overall production of CO2.  CLF would also 
become a party in the class action suit of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, a case that confirmed the power of the Environmental 
Agency to further regulate emissions affecting climate change.412 
The smaller Rhode Island environmental and conservation groups often advocated 
actions to limit carbon emissions leading to global climate change as well.  The South 
Kingstown Land Trust, for example, working with the University of Rhode Island’s 
Graduate School of Oceanography and the College of the Environment and Life 
Sciences, studied the effects of climate change in its area.  The association was concerned 
that more dynamic weather events (storms and increasing sea water temperatures) were 
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leading to rapid environmental damage from invasive species migration and coastal 
property damage.  To limit the damages, improved monitoring of local and invasive non-
native animal and plants and the use of “Low Impact Development” to improve 
environmental resilience in the most threatened areas was advised.413  The People’s 
Power and Light group, organized in 2002, advocated for the more environmentally 
friendly use of energy and the reduction of fossil fuel use to generate electricity.  The 
organization proposed more efficient energy use, conservation, and wind powered 
turbines to generate more “green energy.”414   
Another organization looked at the religious component of the environmental 
crisis as a major motivating force.  The Rhode Island Interfaith Power & Light 
assemblage established in 2007, suggested that people of all faith traditions in the state 
should work together to tackle the issue of climate change “so we can fulfill our moral 
obligation to care for creation.”  This association of 15 other like minded faith 
organizations worked with People’s Power and Light and coordinated with National Grid, 
now the operator of the transmission and distribution portion of the electric power grid in 
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the state, to shift portions of the monthly electric bill to subsidize the production of 
renewable energy sources.415   
Such groups exhibited the intermingling of both religious and environmental 
ethical outlooks.  Proponents of these perspectives suggested that the more ancient faith 
traditions did share concepts with the modern environmental movement, including the 
virtue of sustainability.  Sustainability included such human activity as protecting the 
commons against pollution, minimizing excessive production and using appropriate 
technology, extolling greater local and regional self-sufficiency, and delivering 
environmental justice to the most susceptible members of society.416  Environmental 
activists emphasized the “ethical responsibility to respect and conserve Earth’s ecological 
integrity and biodiversity while acting to achieve social and economic justice.’417  
Guarding the environment was not only important to protect human health and 
biodiversity, it was also an important facet of attaining a more just, sustainable and 
democratic social order.  Such tasking was seen as harmonious with other Judeo-
Christian teachings from the Bible, as opposed to Lynn White’s earlier critiques.  
Humans, however, were no longer privileged over other species to go forth and multiply 
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or establish dominion over the earth, but should act in concert with all species to attain a 
more just community.  Producing sustainable energy resources would assist in limiting 
those emissions that were causing global environmental damage.  Promoting effective 
policies to enhance these issues should be a part of every congregation’s concerns.  
Failure to do so would only accelerate the damage being caused and would essentially be 
a sin.418  
Promoting social justice received greater emphasis in the environmental 
movement.  Climate change was seen as a forcing function for these groups to attain 
“climate justice.”  Newer groups were still interested in preventing pollution, conserving 
land and wildlife for future generations, and appreciating the natural world on its own 
merits.  Proponents for climate justice additionally were concerned that the greatest harm 
caused by climate change was affecting those least capable of withstanding it.  With 
limited economic resources and lower levels of environmental awareness, society’s 
poorest members were not prepared to suffer through any catastrophe, whether caused by 
more dynamic weather patterns or the flooding of lower elevation shoreline areas.  
Climate justice developed as a more radical concept of limiting environmental damage 
caused by climate change and went beyond mainstream efforts to create larger scale 
social fairness.419   
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While few of the approximately thirty new environmental or conservation groups 
that were organized in the state during the first decade of the century espoused this view 
directly, more of the established groups were open to this perspective.420  Some of the 
newer groups, such as Ocean State Earth First, were further amenable to direct action to 
sabotage other businesses or organizations that were polluting the environment.  Another, 
the Environmental Justice League of Rhode Island, suggested that “health, environmental 
quality, and social justice are all connected,” and that the ills of environmental damage 
disproportionately affected the lower income members of the state.421  While these were 
more minority views, the evolution of the environmental movement to generate this stray 
voltage from the more humble origins of John Muir’s vision is remarkable.   
Continuity of Power: Rhode Island Politics in the New Century 
With national and local organizations driven by the concerns of global climate 
change, it is not surprising that the state agencies interacting with them also proclaimed 
interest in those worries.  Having been involved in the deregulation of the utility industry 
in Rhode Island, Lincoln C. Almond, the Republican Governor from 1995 to 2003, 
displayed some awareness of this problem.  In 2001 the Almond administration worked 
with other states and Canada to create a Climate Change Action Plan, which eventually 
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led to many actions taken by the Department of Environmental Management to limit 
pollution and CO2 production in the state.422  A subsequent study, the Rhode Island 
Greenhouse Gas Action Plan was completed in 2002 near the close of Almond’s term.  
The report, authored by members of the state’s business, government, industry and 
environmental organizations and stated departments, concurred with the scientific 
consensus that the increased production of CO2 by human sources was accelerating the 
temperature rise of the planet.  To limit this growth, the members recommended a 
number of actions, such as increasing the energy efficiency of state industries, using 
natural gas to heat buildings, and providing tax credits for the purchase of more efficient 
home appliances.  Lower priority options also included spending tax money to build 
larger numbers of renewable energy sources and subsidizing the installation of 
photovoltaic electrical systems.423  The subsequent administration of Republican Donald 
                                                 
422.  Almond also had to deal with a major home heating oil spill on Narragansett 
Bay in 1996 that required substantial effort to clean up.  Subsequent work to approve 
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the Army Corps of Engineers, the Almond Administration and local environmental 
groups.   See Environment Council of Rhode Island, “Governor Carcieri: A Legacy of 
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Environmental Management and the Rhode Island State Energy Office, 2002), 3-6.  
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Carcieri (2003-2011), was not as enthusiastic about environmental issues in the state.  
The Environment Council of Rhode Island considered Carcieri as a particularly 
uninterested executive, as the new governor rejected many of the recommendations from 
the wide variety of interested organizations and actors to address climate change during 
his administration.424   
While the successive Republican governors were reticent to propose new methods 
to address the problems or even implement earlier recommendations, the state 
administrative organs continued to support these actions.  The Department of 
Environmental Management (DEM) coordinated actions with adjoining states in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  This program required electric power generators in 
the New England and Mid-Atlantic area to provide the states an exchangeable grant 
based on the amount of CO2 they generated.  These grants were auctioned off quarterly, 
whereupon Rhode Island used the money to help fund energy efficiency and conservation 
programs, including “renewable non-carbon emitting energy technologies.”425   
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Another source of money came from consumer electric bill. As part of the Rhode 
Island Utility Restructuring Act of 1996 Act, every electric distribution company was 
tasked to charge customers a small fee that the state could then use to fund energy 
efficiency programs and renewable energy sources.426  Such remittances allowed the 
Department of Environmental Management and other state agents to subsidize several 
actions that promised to lower the state’s overall CO2 production, provide for more 
sustainable energy sources and promote social justice.  The DEM also synchronized its 
actions to reduce car emissions with the other states in an effort to lower the total amount 
of CO2 being generated.427 
Acclimatizing the IEEE Code of Conduct 
Attaining a sustainable civilization, particularly with reference to the use of fossil 
fuels that produced climate affecting greenhouse gases, was not merely the concern of the 
local and national environmental organizations and the federal and state governments.  
Such concerns also diffused into the organizations that produced the designers and 
operators of the electric power grid.  College electrical engineering departments had 
addressed some of these issues in their programs in the preceding decades.  The 
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engineering curricula had changed to take into account some of the environmental issues 
that influenced federal and state laws and regulations concerning its discipline.  At 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, the faculty and administration had begun to change the 
teaching methods and curriculum in the 1970s, updating their techniques using a 
“radically different approach to technological education.”428  The plan removed standard 
grading criteria, shortened semesters and refocused class topics.  Projects conducted by 
small groups of students included work on comprehending the environmental issues of 
the assignment.429  The core engineering disciplines were still emphasized, but other 
activities and educational programs began to open up to non-engineering perspectives.  
By the new millennium students were expected to not only be adept in the engineering 
arts, but also assess the design parameters of their structures “to meet desired needs 
within realistic constraints such as economic, environmental, social, political, ethical, 
health and safety, manufacturability, and sustainability.”430  Classes included not only 
electric power engineering topics crucial to designing new electric power grid systems, 
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but also on “Social Entrepreneurship,” for the “design of sustainable social business 
models.”431 
Brown University’s Electrical Engineering Department saw a similar shift in 
emphasis while still maintaining its emphasis on the core topics.432  A new major, 
Environmental Engineering, was introduced in 2013, examining such topics as energy 
and the environment, “Sustainable Energy Technologies,” and “Principles of Ecology.”433  
The University of Rhode Island had comparable Expected Student Outcomes to Brown 
and Worcester Polytechnic Institute.  While URI graduates were expected to have an 
“understanding that engineering knowledge should be applied in an ethically responsible 
manner for the good of society,” the concept of sustainability was not emphasized.434  
The syllabus description of classes in the Electrical Engineering Department at Kingston 
looked comparable to those of the preceding decades.  Similar to Brown, URI had also 
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established a college of Environment and Life Sciences, including a program for 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics.435   
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) code of conduct for its 
members had also undergone a subtle shift since the 1970s.  In 1974, following the 1963 
amalgamation of the American Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and the 
Institute of Radio Engineers to form IEEE, a new code of ethics was produced.  The code 
of ethics was similar to the previous one published in 1950, calling for high standards of 
“diligence, creativity and productivity.”436  Absent were the earlier admonitions that the 
public was not capable of comprehending the work that electrical engineers performed.  
Instead, the new code exhorted electrical engineers to “fulfill their responsibilities to the 
community” by protecting “the safety, health and welfare of the public and speak out 
against abuses in these areas affecting public interest.”437  These changes were in part due 
to the membership’s emphasis on professionalism, a quality “based not only on 
traditional high standards of technical achievement but that embraces concern for the 
impact of technological developments on society as well.”438 
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Changes to the society’s code of conduct in the 1980s made it more inclusive.  All 
members of the society, not merely the engineers, were now considered subject to the 
code’s parameters.  In 1988, the new president of the society, Emerson W. Pugh presided 
over another alteration to the code of ethics.  The code was shortened; some redundancy 
was eliminated, and it was rewritten with more aspirational goals to guide how members 
should act.  After several years of work in committee and comments from the IEEE 
membership, the new standard took effect in 1991.439  The code of conduct now had ten 
canons, the first of which directed the members to “accept responsibility in making 
decisions consistent with the safety, health and welfare of the public, and to disclose 
promptly factors that might endanger the public or the environment.”440  Though minor 
changes were enacted in 2006 to further acknowledge the occupational diversity of the 
membership, the code remained essentially the same.441  While the “environment” now 
received mention in the first tenet of the new code and IEEE members were enjoined to 
inform the public on the ramifications of their work, sustainability was not a concern.442  
                                                 
439.  “Emerson W. Pugh, “Creating the IEEE Code of Ethics,” Proceedings of the 
2009 IEEE Conference on the History of Technical Societies, 5-7 August 2009 
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Members were exhorted to “improve the understanding of technology, its appropriate 
applications and potential consequences” in the 1991 ethical standard, yet the older 
themes of technical excellence were still predominant.443  This was a step towards 
addressing the population’s concerns regarding the effects of technological change on the 
environment and their health.  It appeared to lag a step behind popular concern of what 
the operators of the electric power grid, or any technological system should do.   
Gas Turbines Triumphant 
Toward the end of the 1990s, essentially all of the government agencies 
regulating the electric power generation facilities and distribution system, the 
environmental groups concerned with anthropomorphic global warming, and the even the 
electric utilities themselves, endorsed the use of sustainable energy sources to power the 
electric power grid.  With such agreement among these organizations, one might have 
expected a myriad of renewable energy systems to be built that could all plug into the 
distribution network of National Grid.  In a relatively small state such as Rhode Island, 
the best practices of Amory Lovins could be economically practiced and the more 
exacting ethical standards of Save the Bay could be met even as the electric utilities made 
a profit and the lights remained on.  While the desire to do all of these may have been 
high, the actions of the interested parties belied a sense of true urgency regarding the 
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proposed challenges of global warming and how the electric power grid might exacerbate 
them.   
The construction of the natural gas fired electrical generation plants in Tiverton 
and Johnston, Rhode Island at the turn of the current century reflected this discordance.  
Both stations were of medium size (265 and 576 megawatts respectively) and were built 
in the period following electric utility deregulation in the Ocean State.444  While still 
supplying electricity to ISO New England, the parent entity operating the electric power 
grid, the plants were smaller than the larger scale nuclear or coal-fired plants of the 
previous decades.  Gas turbine technology was sufficiently mature to limit the risk of 
building and operating the facilities.  Burning natural gas limited the air pollution the new 
electric power plants caused, though they still created CO2 and water vapor while 
operating. 
The Tiverton plant had its genesis in 1996 when the Energy Management Inc. of 
North Dartmouth, Massachusetts, the same company that ran the cogeneration plant in 
Pawtucket, bought a parcel of land in the Tiverton Industrial Park to build a natural gas 
burning electric power plant.445  The company filed its proposal for the plant in 1998 with 
the state’s Energy Facility Siting Board, beginning a review process that could be 
expected to take from one to two years to conduct.  Later that year, the state’s Economic 
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Development Corporation granted the construction company a “Certificate of Critical 
Economic Concern,” which caused state regulatory bodies to accelerate their 
assessment.446  Three months from that decision, a ground breaking ceremony was held 
in Tiverton, headed by Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond.  "Without question, 
we're serving as a model for the rest of the country," Almond stated, claiming that the 
deregulation of the electric utility industry in the state had led to the construction of the 
plant.447  The plant was more efficient than similar gas turbine facilities in the area, 
leading to less expensive energy costs and reduced pollution in the region.448  The 
Tiverton plant became fully operational in 2000.449 
The natural gas burning power plant in Johnston, RI was also constructed rapidly.  
A Texas energy firm, Houston Industries, began negotiating with the town of Johnston in 
1998 to buy a parcel of land near the central landfill to construct a new power plant.  The 
financially strapped town of Johnston was very interested in the company’s pitch.450  
After the construction was placed on the Rhode Island Economic Development 
Corporation’s fast track status in 1998, the state’s regulatory bodies again acted rapidly to 
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gain approval for the project.451  Construction was pushed back for a time in order to 
work out an agreement to use the waste water from the Cranston water treatment facility 
but eventually began in 2001.452  The 545 megawatt plant became fully operational in 
2002.453   
The construction of these two plants raised the electrical energy production in 
Rhode Island to 1945 megawatts, almost all generated by the burning of natural gas.454   
These new plants appeared to validate some of Lovins’ proposition regarding electric 
power grid stability.  On August 14, 2003, most of New England was spared the 
problems of a large scale power outage that affected many of the northern states.  The 
independent electric power plants comprising ISO New England were able to isolate the 
electrical fault that originated in Cleveland, Ohio before it affected the regional power 
transmission system, keeping most of the lights on in the area.455  On the other hand, 
increasing electrical capacity enabled consumer demand to increase as well.  With more 
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plants producing more electricity, even if the price was less expensive, the amount of 
CO2 and other pollutants contributing to global warming also increased.456  While the 
political leaders, consumers and electric power plant operators might enjoy this transient 
condition, the potential environmental damage could not be swept under the rug. 
The Quest for Sustainable Electric Power 
Although gas turbine power plants were being constructed, the desire for more 
sustainable sources of electric power had not been forgotten.  Renewable energy sources 
in the form of wind turbines had been proposed in Rhode Island for decades.  During the 
struggle to gain approval for the nuclear power plant in Charlestown, RI, a University of 
Massachusetts engineering professor, Dr. William E. Heronemus, had proposed building 
a field of approximately 14,000 wind turbines in the waters off of southeastern New 
England.  The wind turbines would produce electricity, and that power would be used to 
electrolyze water to form hydrogen gas.  The gas would be stored and pumped inland for 
future use as a fuel to drive other electric power generators.  This proposal, while 
promising to provide more electric power than the anticipated demand growth in the 
region, was not funded.457   
By the turn of the century, wind turbine technology had advanced sufficiently 
such that large scale variants capable of generating one megawatt of electric power were 
achievable.  In 1999, Endless Energy, a Maine firm cooperating with the Rhode Island 
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Renewable Energy Collaborative, suggested three different locations to build wind 
turbines in the Ocean State.  Sites in Portsmouth, Tiverton and Quonset Point could 
provide the 15 mile per hour average wind speed necessary to generate a “good supply of 
electricity.”458  Eric Stephens, a company spokesman, stated that the wind turbines 
produce “better energy because it's generated by renewable sources. There's no fossil 
fuels, it doesn't lead to oil spills and it lessens our dependency on foreign oil. People 
value it more because it comes from local renewable sources,” though he admitted that 
the turbines did not generate any electric power when the wind stopped blowing.459  The 
Town of Portsmouth responded favorably, if slowly, to such proposals, recommending in 
2003 that a field of twelve 150 to 220 foot towers be erected to provide environmentally 
friendly and economically attractive energy.  Without money to fund the proposal, the 
concept remained merely that.460 
A much larger project was envisioned for the waters off of southeastern 
Massachusetts in Nantucket Sound.  In 2001 Jim Gordon of Cape Wind Associates 
proposed building an offshore wind project with 130 wind turbines, each capable of 
generating a maximum power of 3.6 megawatts for a maximum total of 454 
megawatts.461  Gordon planned to use a similar setup for this development that the Danes 
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and other European nations had used to generate electric power without the attendant 
CO2 pollution.462  While the initial proposal was somewhat vague, this project attracted 
attention from a wide range of local communities eager to lower their electric bills and 
create jobs building the system, including environmental groups interested in lowering 
the carbon output from electric power production and government agencies willing to 
assist the creation of a new source of less expensive power and taxes for the region.  The 
project appeared to have many of the aspects of the future electric power grid that Lovins 
had offered.  It featured sustainable energy production from wind power, had numerous 
independent electrical generators to improve system reliability, did not saddle the 
manufacturer with unaffordable construction costs, and was supportable environmentally. 
Providing power to the region would also limit the necessity to build other transmission 
lines or pipes to bring natural gas into the region.463     
The wind farm proposal also attracted the attention of numerous wealthy and 
politically connected individuals who were opposed to the construction of the wind farm 
in their backyard.  While acquiring the necessary federal, state and local permits might 
have been expected to take several years, the resistance of the moneyed elite of the area 
stretched this process out for over a decade.  Pro-environmentalist luminaries in Congress 
who had castigated the Bush administration for its lack of enthusiasm in limiting the 
global production of greenhouse gases now found the wind turbine farm a hazard to their 
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vacation area.  A well financed “grass roots” organization to oppose the construction was 
organized to promote environmental goals and actions.  The drama of various 
environmental groups such as the Audubon Society and the Conservation Law 
Foundation supporting the project against the pleas of the environmentally minded 
Democratic Senators Ted Kennedy and John Kerry from Massachusetts was compelling. 
The coalition of the wealthy elite politicians with other rich Nantucket property owners 
such as Doug Yearly, a member of the board of directors of Marathon Oil who funded the 
“Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound,” added to the irony regarding of the evaluation of 
the wind farm.464  The resulting rancor also extended the timeline required to start the 
project.  Initially discussed in 2001, Cape Wind Associates spent the next decade earning 
permits from the Army Corps of Engineers, Massachusetts Siting Board, Department of 
the Interior, Department of Defense, Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 
Federal Aviation Administration and others all the while working through the numerous 
legal appeals funded by the affluent summer dwellers.465  While National Grid had 
contracted to purchase 50% of the wind farm’s electric power output, by the middle of 
                                                 
464.  Wendy Williams and Robert Whitcomb, Cape Wind: Money, Celebrity, 
Class, Politics, and the Battle for Our Energy Future on Nantucket Sound (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2007), 83-85, 307-309. 
465. “This was an old story, dressed up in new technology.  It may, in fact, be as 
old as the primate brain, obsessed as it is with power and social status.”  See Wendy 
Williams and Robert Whitcomb, Cape Wind: Money, Celebrity, Class, Politics, and the 
Battle for Our Energy Future on Nantucket Sound (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 
307, and Cape Wind, “FAQs: Cape Wind Basics, Cape Wind,” 
http://www.capewind.org/faqs/cape-wind-basics (accessed June 29, 2015).   
475 
 
the second decade following the announcement of the project, not a single turbine had 
been erected or a single watt of electric power produced.466                   
A much smaller scale project was more successful.  By 2005 Rhode Island was 
able to apportion some of the money collected in its Renewable Energy Fund to assist in 
the construction of a wind turbine in Portsmouth.467  The location selected was on the 
grounds of Portsmouth Abbey, a Catholic school for grades 9 to 12 run by members of 
the Benedictine order.  The electric bill for the school and associated monastery was 
significant and the school administration had looked for ways to reduce the expenditure.  
Energy conservation had some effect but a desire to promote renewable energy led to 
consideration of wind, geothermal and solar power sources to reduce the bill.  The order’s 
concept of stewardship, as well as the economic rationale, certainly charged the monks 
with the grandeur of contributing to the electric power grid.  After some additional study 
assisted by the Renewable Energy Fund and Roger Williams College, the Abbey 
leadership decided to construct a wind turbine.  The location was not optimal, but the 
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wind velocity was sufficient to power the proposed 660 kilowatt turbine.468   The 241 foot 
tall turbine cost 1.2 million dollars, with the state Renewable Energy Fund picking up 
$400,000 of the cost.  The turbine was expected to power half of the school’s electricity 
needs over its twenty five year life.  Surplus power was to be sold back to Narragansett 
Electric Company, the local National Grid subsidiary, which was required to buy it.469  
Construction began in the fall of 2005 and the turbine came on line in March 2006.470  
The project was a success.  Within a year the wind turbine “had generated nearly 1.3 
million kWh of ‘clean’ electricity and had supplied 39.35 percent of the School's 
electrical energy use.”471  The wind turbine significantly reduced the school’s operating 
costs and even permitted some sales back to National Grid.  “Total wind turbine revenues 
during its first year of operation were $222,710, including $64,661 in renewable energy 
credits, $28,496 in wholesale electricity sold back to the grid, and $129,553 in retail 
electricity displaced.”472  For this work, as well as other activities to reduce its energy 
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use, recycle garbage and produce renewable energy from photovoltaic cells, the school 
received accolades from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Garden Club of 
America.  Portsmouth Abbey earned the Environment Council of Rhode Island’s 2006 
“Senator John H. Chafee Award” for “Outstanding Conservation Project.”473 
Given Lynn White’s and Pope John Paul II’s earlier accolades for Saint Francis of 
Assisi, it was intriguing that a Benedictine order installed the first large scale renewable 
electric power source in the state.  The order had a history of supporting both scholarly 
work as well as physical labor.474  Saint Bernard had advocated working in partnership 
with God to develop his creation, or at least give it “a more humane expression.”475  
Much as the medieval monks had used wind and water mills as power sources on their 
monasteries, the contemporary members of the order used wind turbines to generate 
electric power.  Reverence for and conservation of nature along the lines of St. Francis 
was necessary but not considered sufficient for the Abbey to maintain its existence.  
Instead, the Abbey leadership decided that a constructive engagement with nature would 
affect a more positive outcome.476    
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Other Rhode Island communities observed Portsmouth Abbey’s success and 
desired to emulate it for economic and environmental reasons.  The electricity produced 
by the wind turbine could be used to reduce the amount a town would normally purchase 
from National Grid.  Excess power generated could be sold to the utility, though at a 
lower rate.  Renewable Energy Certificates earned from the utility companies that 
purchased power from sustainable energy sources, such as the wind turbines, could be 
redeemed or traded for other funding.477  Portsmouth and Middletown town officials, as 
well as representatives from Raytheon Corporation in Middletown and the Navy facility 
in Newport all toured the Portsmouth Abbey facility.478  Even Governor Carcieri 
promoted a study to investigate the lighting of 150,000 homes by wind power.479  The 
subsequent study indicated that Carcieri’s proposal was achievable, although the best 
locations to site wind turbines were offshore.  Electric power generated using these 
turbines was thought to be competitive with the future costs of electricity from other 
sources.480   
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The town of Portsmouth was particularly enamored with the prospect.  Using 
wind for power had been evident in the community for centuries.  Boyd’s windmill on 
nearby Prudence Island had been constructed in 1810 while the Prescott Farm in 
Portsmouth had a windmill built in 1812 to grind malt for a local distillery.481  After the 
success at Portsmouth Abbey, the town’s population viewed wind power as an attractive 
energy source.482  With this popular support, the town council requested and received 
permission from the state Renewable Energy Fund to borrow up to $2.6 million to 
construct wind turbines at the town middle and high schools to offset the costs of 
electricity to run the schools.483   
Despite this enthusiasm, construction was not imminent.  It would take another 
two years to resolve the financial, regulatory and technical issues before the wind turbine 
was built.  The state legislature froze the funding for the construction as the annual state 
budget deficit crunch required another look at the manner in which these projects were 
financed and approved.484  The project was scheduled to cost 3 million dollars, including 
2.6 million financed by the town from “zero-interest Clean Renewable Energy bonds 
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from the state and a $400,000 loan at 2 percent interest.”485  The town of Portsmouth 
spent the time to examine more powerful models than the one that was operating 
successfully at Portsmouth Abbey.  Town planners eventually settled on a 339 foot tall 
wind turbine design capable of generating 1.5 megawatt of electric power that would be 
constructed on the grounds of the town high school.486  The wind turbine, built by the 
Canadian firm of AAER, was finally erected in March 2009 and immediately began 
generating electric power for the school and making money for the town.487     
 As the Portsmouth wind turbine was being raised, Governor Carcieri’s wind 
energy proposals were also reaching maturity.  Despite a lack of interest at times in the 
Democratic controlled legislature to fund the Republican Governor’s proposals, the 
concept of building an offshore wind turbine farm in the vicinity of Block Island was 
achieving maturity.488  Deepwater Wind, a Providence based firm, won the initial 
contract to build wind turbines to meet Carcieri’s vision of a wind farm capable of 
supplying 15% of the state’s electric power requirements.489  This multi-billion dollar 
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project was projected to bring hundreds of jobs to the Rhode Island, an important 
argument as the state struggled under the latest economic downturn.  The new 
administration in Washington under President Barack H. Obama was favorably inclined 
to fund renewable energy programs such as Deepwater Wind, in part to staunch the 
nation’s carbon dioxide generation.490   
In the meantime, while other wind turbine projects were considered, only a small 
number were actually constructed.  The New England Institute of Technology in 
Warwick, RI installed a 100 kilowatt wind turbine in 2009, financed purely by private 
funds.  Though the school expected to profit from the renewable energy produced by the 
wind turbine, the main purpose of the venture was to “train students for ‘green-collar’ 
jobs in the state's emerging alternative energy industry.”491   
Despite continuing apprehension about the effects of global warming on Rhode 
Island, enthusiasm for wind turbine construction began to wane.  Some of the 
disadvantages of this technology became more evident as its use increased.  The larger 
wind turbines such as the one at Portsmouth High School were noisier than the smaller 
ones and a small number of people claimed that the acoustic frequencies propagating 
from the turbine gear boxes made them ill.492  The rotating blades of the wind turbines 
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killed large numbers of birds.493  The larger capacity and more technologically advanced 
wind turbines cost more money to construct and hook up to the power grid, money that 
the state was always struggling to find.  The town of Jamestown, RI backed away from 
their ambitious plan to construct three large wind turbines as the cost became 
prohibitive.494  Local communities were undecided regarding the aesthetic appeal of the 
turbine towers as well, with some residents opposed to any new edifice in their backyard.  
North Kingstown, RI residents attempted to halt construction of a 427 foot wind turbine 
that home owners feared would be located too close to their dwellings, while the town 
council of Charlestown, RI voted to prohibit the construction of any “Wind Energy 
Facility or Wind Turbine” in the town limits.495  
Some of this newfound angst resulted from the lessons being learned from the 
operation of the town of Portsmouth’s wind turbine.  The turbine was designed to directly 
power the high school with surplus generated power to be sold to the electric utility 
company.  When it was constructed, the wind turbine’s output was installed directly into 
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the electric power grid distribution system, not the high school, and all of its electric 
power went to National Grid first.  This difference allowed the utility to charge the town 
for electric power distribution services, lowering the overall amount the town was saving 
in its electric bill.  The Public Utilities Commission later resolved the price differential in 
favor of the town, but this still adversely affected the community’s budget.496   
Worse was to come.  In February, 2012 the Portsmouth High School wind turbine 
started to experience mechanical problems that required week long shutdowns.  In June 
the expensive gear box atop the turbine tower failed, the turbine stopped spinning and 
electric power generation ceased.  The company that had manufactured the wind turbine 
had gone bankrupt in 2010 and the successor company was unwilling to honor the 
previous warranties on the components.  Repairs were estimated to cost $460,000 with no 
guarantee that they would work.  Justifiably apprehensive on such new costs, the town 
council debated the future of the wind turbine and studied alternatives.  The idle wind 
turbine remained in place but failed to achieve its purpose of lowering the town’s electric 
bill or reducing the human effects on global warming.497   
Other Rhode Island wind turbine projects progressed more smoothly, though not 
at the pace or magnitude initially desired.  A wind turbine in North Kingstown, RI was 
erected in 2012 by a private firm, Wind Energy Development.  Sited next to the president 
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of the company’s home, the 411 foot turbine delivered electricity straight into the electric 
power grid.498  Unlike the Portsmouth wind turbine that did not function, the North 
Kingstown one operated smoothly with one exception; it was unprofitable to operate 
without a substantial government subsidy.  The company sold electricity produced by the 
wind turbine at a rate approximately $.10/kWh less than required to meet the rate of 
return required by investors to fund the initial cost.  Without substantial long term federal 
and state government subsidies to fund wind powered electricity generation, the entire 
enterprise was at risk.499  The firm continued to propose further wind powered renewable 
energy projects in the state despite their unprofitability.500   
The Narragansett Bay Commission’s battery of three wind turbines in Providence 
was a more successful endeavor.  In 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency funded a 
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study to investigate the use of wind turbines to power the waste water treatment facility at 
Fields Point near Providence.  The Narragansett Bay Commission used the next two years 
to examine the environmental effects of installing wind turbines at the site, as well as the 
costs, wind strength and other technical issues associated with the project.  Working with 
the community as well as the Federal Aviation Administration to gain approval to install 
the 365 foot wind turbines, the Narragansett Bay Commission finally acquired all the 
permits necessary to commence construction in 2011.501  It was projected that the three 
1.5 megawatt wind turbines would be able to meet 35 to 60% of the waste water facility 
electric power requirements while preventing the emission of up to 3,000 tons of CO2 gas 
per year that would otherwise have been released from the combustion of fossil fuels at a 
conventional electric generation plant.502  The turbines were projected to cost a total of 
$12 million dollars to build.503  The three wind turbines were finally constructed in 2012 
but took another eight months to be connected to the electric power grid.  In the first year 
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of operation the turbines were required to operate at a reduced capacity, but they still 
exceeded the projected electric power generation.504   
The state’s efforts to encourage the construction of renewable electric power 
sources for the electric power grid were an attempt to minimize the production of 
greenhouse gases while creating a more sustainable society.  Combining the larger scale 
wind turbines in the state, Rhode Island created 8.260 megawatts of renewable energy 
sources in the first twelve years of the new century.  This total came from the three 1.5 
megawatt wind turbines at Fields Point in Providence, a 1.5 megawatt wind turbine in 
North Kingstown, a 1.5 megawatt wind turbine at Portsmouth and another 660 kilowatts 
wind turbine at Portsmouth Abbey.  Excluding the Portsmouth wind turbine that was not 
producing any power, a maximum renewable electric power capacity of 7.166 megawatts 
from wind power was available in the state.   
Compared to other sources of electric power being generated in the state this 
amount was essentially negligible.  Of the approximately 1800 megawatts of electric 
power capable of being generated in the state, a maximum of perhaps 50 came from 
renewable energy sources and of that barely seven came from wind power.505  Other 
sources of renewable energy in the state, such as the West Davisville solar arrays in 
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North Kingstown, the equivalent solar panel system in West Greenwich, the Forbes Street 
solar plant in East Providence and the hydroelectric plants along the Blackstone River 
could only add approximately 9.6 megawatts at peak capacity.  The biomass incinerator 
at Johnston generated more that all of these combined, with a maximum capacity of 24 
megawatts.506   
The vast majority of the electric power made in the state was produced by burning 
natural gas at the electric generation plants at Manchester Street in Providence, 
Burrillville, Johnston and Tiverton.  The capacity of these plants dwarfed the production 
from the wind turbines scattered throughout the state, and the correlating reduction in 
CO2 production appears minimal.  This is not to say the overall work done by electric 
utilities, consumers, and state regulatory organs to reduce the production of greenhouse 
gases were irrelevant.  Rhode Island ranked lowest in the nation in terms of energy 
consumption per capita and was among the leaders in limiting CO2 production.507  This 
did come at some cost, with the “Average Retail Price of Electricity to Residential 
Sector” being the fourth highest in the nation.508  Compared to the rhetoric of the various 
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governmental and non-governmental organizations touting the advantages of the 
renewable energy sources to energize the electric power grid and mitigate the 
acceleration of global warming, the effects of these sources appear much restricted.  The 
amount of green justice attained was unable to be determined.   
Greater Regionalization and the Repeal of PUCHA 
While these efforts to increase the capacity of renewable energy sources and 
lower the amount of CO2 produced were taking place, the operators of ISO New England 
continued their work to supply electric power to the region.  The companies operating the 
generation portion of the grid were now divorced from those performing the distribution 
and transmission assignments.  While the electric utility companies were buffeted by the 
competing environmental demands from the federal and state regulatory bodies on 
emission standards and the amount of electricity that they were required to purchase from 
renewable energy sources, new legislation helped out their business models.  The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 passed during the second term of the George W. Bush administration 
had a number of facets that directly affected the operation of the electric power grid.  The 
law required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to stand up a new 
body, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), mandated to supervise the electric 
utility companies’ actions to meet the required standards for electric power generation 
and transmission reliability.  Greater authority was granted to the Secretary of Energy to   
purchase easement rights for transmission lines.  No longer would electric utilities be 
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required to buy electric power from all qualifying facilities and other smaller generating 
firms based on the larger utilities’ avoided costs, as long as FERC had determined that 
these smaller facilities had sufficient access to the wholesale electricity market.509  With 
the deregulation of the electric utility industry in Rhode Island, this last requirement was 
assured.  The legislation carried provisions for increasing the use of renewable energy 
sources, improving energy efficiency standards and initiatives to improve the cleanliness 
of coal-fired power plants.  There was even a gesture to the nuclear power industry, 
already languishing, by renewing the Price-Anderson Act, an law that dealt with 
insurance liabilities in case of a nuclear accident.510   
Perhaps most significant in the new legislation was the elimination of an old 
ordinance, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA).  Congress had 
been convinced by electric utility industry leaders that the rationale for the older 
regulation was no longer valid.  With the deregulation of the electric utility industry 
however, the electric utilities were no longer natural monopolies that owned all aspects of 
the generation, transmission and distribution of electric power.  Independent operators 
could plug into the electric power grid and sell their product without being frozen out of 
the market by the larger electric power generation firms.  Less expensive natural gas 
powered plants could be built more rapidly, lowering the capital cost requirements of any 
new competitor.  To prevent the exploitation of consumers, state regulatory bodies had 
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been established.  Federal regulatory bodies such as FERC and the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) were now available to prevent financial abuses of 
consumers and stock holders.511  Despite some resistance from environmental and 
consumer groups as well as state politicians, the bill passed and was signed into law on 
August 8, 2005 by President Bush.512   
The repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was one more 
disruption to the system first envisioned by Samuel Insull.  The fracturing of the natural 
monopoly and the lessoning of regulatory oversight had been transients in the system, but 
the utilities had still been required to be singularly focused on the production of electric 
power.  With the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 no longer maintaining that 
focus, the utilities could become just another asset in a larger corporation, one that may 
or may not have the efficient operation of the electric power grid in mind.  Additionally, 
PUCHA had been successful in meeting the earlier goals of breaking up the unwieldy 
holding companies of the 1920s and had created national regulation standards that the 
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electric utilities and the nation had profited under.  The abandonment of the successful 
law suggested that forces beyond those merely driving the electric power grid toward 
greater efficiency were at work.513   
Brayton Point Revisited 
As the technology and regulations that had influenced operation of the electric 
power grid for generations was changing, one of the few remaining edifices of the 
electric power generation component of the system in southeastern New England was the 
coal-fired plant at Brayton Point.  Having weathered numerous technical problems, 
regulatory confrontations with state public utility commissions and federal direction from 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the plant continued to produce hundreds of 
megawatts of electric power to meet regional demands.  The provisions of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 were favorable for the use of coal as a fuel but the organizations 
arrayed against the continued operation of Brayton Point remained.  Save the Bay and the 
Conservation Law Foundation continued to lobby for the plant to be shut down, noting 
problems with air and water pollution emanating from the plant.514  Despite the numerous 
                                                 
513.   Mark Holt and Carol Glover, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and 
Analysis of Enacted Provisions (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2006), CRS-82 – CRS-84.   
514.  Conservation Law Foundation, CLF 40 Years, Protecting New England’s 
Environment (Boston, MA: Conservation Law Foundation, 2006): 14-15 and Save the 
Bay, “Our History,” Save the Bay, http://www.savebay.org/history, (accessed  June 23, 
2015). 
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upgrades the plant had received since it had been first constructed, the coal-fired units 
were among the most polluting units energizing the electric power grid.515   
At the turn of the current century, the Environmental Protection Agency became 
concerned with the thermal pollution from the cooling system at Brayton Point.  The 
water from Mount Hope Bay, the northern portion of Narragansett Bay where Brayton 
Point was located, was used to condense the steam at the plant and then pumped back 
into the bay.  The heated effluent water raised the overall temperature of the tidal waters, 
killing large quantities of fish larvae.  The EPA had earlier reached an agreement with the 
plant owners to lower the cooling water flow rate to limit the environmental damage plant 
operation was causing to the watershed.  In 2002 the federal agency and the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection conducted public hearings for a 
new plant site license.  The proposed certificate would require the plant to lower its use 
of the bay water by 94% in order to further reduce the harm it was causing to the natural 
habitat of the bay.516  The agencies desired the plant owners to build large cooling towers 
                                                 
515.  Brayton Point was awarded the moniker of being one of the “Filthy Five” 
power plants in Massachusetts.  See Conservation Law Foundation, CLF 40 Years, 
Protecting New England’s Environment (Boston, MA: Conservation Law Foundation, 
2006): 14-15.   
516.   The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management was also 
heavily involved.  See Environmental Protection Agency, Brayton Point Station 
Somerset, MA, Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit, 
October 2003, Environmental Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/region1/braytonpoint/pdfs/finalpermit/braytonpointfactsht2003.pdf, 
(accessed June 23, 2015) and Environmental Protection Agency, EPA - New England 
Clean Water Act NPDES Permitting Determinations for Thermal Discharge and Cooling 
Water Intake from Brayton Point Station in Somerset, MA (NPDES Permit No. MA 
0003654) Date: July 22, 2002, 1-2, 
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to act as the heat sink for the plant condensers, a system that would use a minimal amount 
of water from the estuary.  The EPA estimated it would cost approximately 80 million 
dollars to construct, a figure that Dominion Energy, the new owner of Brayton Point 
disputed.517    
The analysis and new restrictions were contested by Dominion Energy after the 
EPA issued a new operating permit for the plant in October 2003.  By November, the 
company had appealed the permit to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB).  
Like previous environmental litigation, the appeal took many years to resolve.  In 
September 2007 the Environmental Appeals Board finally upheld the parent 
organization’s initial decision.  Dominion Energy consequently went to the Federal Court 
in the Fourth Circuit to petition for redress, but eventually accepted the EPA’s demands.  
On December 17, 2007 the company reached an agreement with the EPA to end all 
litigation and accept the draft permit requirements.518  Subsequent discussion resulted in 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.epa.gov/region1/braytonpoint/pdfs/BRAYTONtableofcontents-chapter1.PDF 
(accessed June 23, 2015).   
517.  Dominion Energy calculated a cost of $176.7 million to build the new 
cooling system and that it would take 29 months to build it.  The company was not 
enthusiastic about having to pay for and build this system as it envisioned an eight month 
period when the units at Brayton Point would not be able to generate electricity, or make 
a profit for the company.  See Environmental Protection Agency, EPA - New England 
Clean Water Act NPDES Permitting Determinations for Thermal Discharge and Cooling 
Water Intake from Brayton Point Station in Somerset, MA (NPDES Permit No. MA 
0003654) Date: July 22, 2002, 4-64 – 4-74,    
http://www.epa.gov/region1/braytonpoint/pdfs/BRAYTONchapter4.PDF (accessed June 
23, 2015). 
518.  Environmental Protection Agency, Brayton Point Station: Final NPDES 
Permit, NPDES Permits in New England, EPA United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/region1/braytonpoint/ (accessed June 24, 2015).   
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the company agreeing to build two huge, natural draft cooling towers on the Brayton 
Point property.  The initial design envisioned the cooling towers to be 500 feet tall with a 
220 foot diameter exhaust exit.  Dominion Energy also was required to build a new waste 
water treatment system and storage basins, as well as install a new and more efficient 
emissions control system to reduce the amount of SO2 and mercury exhausted into the 
atmosphere from burning coal.519   
Building the cooling towers took less time than had been devoted to the permit 
discussion and subsequent litigation.  Design work began in 2008 with an initial 
completion scheduled for May 2012 in order to meet the EPA’s permit requirements.  
The actual construction was completed a year in advance though the final project cost 
550 million dollars, considerably more than estimated by any of the parties back in 2003.  
With the completion of the system, all of the turbine generators at the plant could be 
operated at full capacity, increasing the overall efficiency of the system while having a 
minimal effect on the waters of Narragansett Bay.520  While the thermal pollution into 
Narragansett Bay had been reduced, the cooling towers were not a panacea.  The 
cascading water in the towers was noisy, requiring a 50 foot noise reduction wall to be 
                                                 
519.  Environmental Protection Agency, FACT SHEET, Dominion Energy 
Brayton Point, LLC, Closed Cycle Cooling Tower and Unit 3 Dry Scrubber/Fabric Filter 
Projects, EPA Draft Permit Number, 052-120-MA13 (Boston, MA: Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2008), 5-7.   
520.  Other reports put the total costs at 620 million dollars.  The engineering firm 
contracted to build the towers suggested they had saved the company 100 million dollars 
in the construction efforts.  See Mott MacDonald, “Brayton Point Cooling Towers, New 
England, USA,” Mott MacDonald, https://www.mottmac.com/article/2409/brayton-point-
cooling-towers-new-england-usa (accessed June 25, 2015) and Grant Walker, “Big 
Tower Power: New ‘Twins’ At Somerset's Brayton Point Dominate Region’s Skyline,” 
The Herald News, October 10, 2010.   
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built around the base of the structure.  Reaction from the local and regional 
environmental groups was mixed.  Save the Bay saw that the towers provided “progress 
for the bay.”521  The Conservation Law Foundation was less effusive.  Noting the age of 
the plant, the group’s spokesman, Jonathan Peress, stated that the power plant at Brayton 
Point was “environmentally and technologically obsolete” and building the cooling 
towers was a “bad deal for ratepayers and the environment.”522   
While the Brayton Point plant was being altered to meet the requirements of the 
Clean Water Act, the EPA was gaining more regulatory powers to control greenhouse 
gases under the guise of the Clean Air Act.  In 2003 the EPA was petitioned by a number 
of environmental organizations to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases such as 
CO2, CH4, N2O and hydrofluorocarbons from “new motor vehicles and new motor 
vehicle engines” using the provisions of the Clean Air Act.523  The EPA rejected the 
petition in August 2003 stating that Congress had neither authorized the EPA to regulate 
                                                 
521.  Grant Walker, “Big Tower Power: New ‘Twins’ At Somerset's Brayton 
Point Dominate Region’s Skyline,” The Herald News, 10 October 2010 
http://www.heraldnews.com/article/20101010/NEWS/310109722#310109722/?Start=3&
_suid=143519255792909308421216612761 accessed June 25, 2015).   
522.  Ibid.   
523.  The Petitioners included the Green Party of Rhode Island.  The organization, 
headquartered in Providence, RI was a member of the international Green Party 
movement though in the Ocean State its candidates had focused on “environmental issues 
as well as justice, non violence, and democracy issues.”  See “Petition For Rulemaking 
And Collateral Relief Seeking The Regulation Of Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New 
Motor Vehicles Under Section 202 Of The Clean Air Act,” International Center For 
Technology Assessment, 310 D Street, N.E., Washington, DC 20002, et al. vs. HON. 
CAROL BROWNER, in her official capacity as Administrator of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W., Room W1200, Washington, DC 
20460.   
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greenhouse gases using the Clean Air Act nor had the EPA determined what the emission 
specifications should be.524  The petitioners’ case was picked up by numerous states and 
environmental groups, including Rhode Island and the Conservation Law Foundation.525  
The suit was argued in front of the U.S. District Court in Washington, DC, in April 2005.  
In July the District Court found for the EPA, stating that the court would “uphold agency 
conclusions based on policy judgments . . .  when an agency must resolve issues `on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge.'"526  The plaintiffs then took the case to the Supreme 
Court where they were finally successful.  In June 2006 the Supreme Court decided that 
the “EPA has statutory authority to regulate emission of such gases from new motor 
vehicles.”527  The Court did not suggest what the limits should be, though the majority of 
the court concluded that the “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and 
‘imminent.’”528   
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Additional action did not occur during the election year of 2008 but in 2009 under 
the Obama administration a new EPA administrator presented updated findings on 
regulating greenhouses gases.  After months of public comments, the agency stated in 
December 2009  
that the current and projected concentrations of the six key well-mixed 
greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6) — in the atmosphere threaten the public health and welfare of current and 
future generations.529   
 
These gases from the combustion of fossil fuels in motor vehicles contributed to air 
pollution and threaten the “public health and welfare.”530   
Though the EPA findings only applied to motor vehicle emissions, the possible 
expansion of new regulations to fossil fueled power plants was not far behind.  Brayton 
Point created all of these gases in large amounts.  The EPA estimated that in 2010 the 
plant generated approximately 5.9 million metric tons of greenhouse gases.  Most of this 
pollution was carbon dioxide, but smaller amounts of nitrous oxide and methane were 
also emitted.531  Burning coal generated large amounts of other air pollution, such as coal 
ash particulate, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic and mercury, all related to deleterious health 
                                                 
529.  Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
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effects on humans and the environment.532  Based on these findings, environmental 
groups under the banner of “Coal Free Massachusetts” continued to protest the operation 
of the plant, even with the new cooling towers and upgrades installed.533 
With the increasing federal and state interest in regulating the production of 
greenhouse gases, Dominion Energy became apprehensive about the future operation and 
profitability of the Brayton Point units.  Even without the possibility of additional 
alterations to the plant to maintain its licensing, other economic factors were working 
against keeping the plant running.  In 2008 a sharp reduction in natural gas prices made 
operation of the gas turbine electric power plants in the region more profitable than 
Brayton Point.  This fuel price decrease resulted in lower energy costs for the electricity 
available from ISO New England.  With total energy consumption in the region flattening 
and the price of coal increasing, the profit margin for running the fifty year old plant was 
not sufficient.  The plant was no longer efficient enough to operate compared to the other 
electric power generation plants connected to the electric power grid.534   
   In 2012, Dominion Energy decided to sell the power plant despite having 
invested over 500 million dollars to keep it running.535  The subsequent sale to Energy 
                                                 
532.  Coal Free Massachusetts, Brayton Point, Operating at Our Expense, (MA: 
Coal Free Massachusetts, 2013), 7.   
533.  Ibid., 14-16.   
534.  Schlissel, David and Tom Sanzillo, Dark Days Ahead: Financial Factors 
Cloud Future Profitability at Dominion’s Brayton Point (Boston, MA: Conservation Law 
Foundation and The Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis, 2012), 5-22. 
535.  The Conservation Law Foundation estimated a billion dollar upgrade with a 
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Ahead: Financial Factors Cloud Future Profitability at Dominion’s Brayton Point 
499 
 
Capital Partners, a private equity firm based in California and New Jersey, was part of a 
three coal burning electric power plant deal, with a total cost to Energy Capital of 472 
million dollars.536  Within a few months of ownership, Energy Capital announced that it 
would shut down the entire plant by 2017.  Acceding to a “perfect storm” of low natural 
gas prices, a weak demand for electricity following the 2008 economic downturn, the 
increasing cost of environmental regulations, and the demand by public utility regulators 
to buy electricity produced from renewable sources, the plant was no longer considered 
economically viable by the owners.537  Even ISO New England no longer looked 
favorably on the plant, though the loss of 1,500 megawatts of electric power would 
reduce the overall reliability of the system.  With a declining fortune, the plant was no 
longer essential to keep electric power flowing through the electric power grid.538  
Environmental groups lauded the decision to shut down the most polluting plant in the 
region though the future of the plant residue remained undetermined.  The vice president 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Boston, MA: Conservation Law Foundation and The Institute for Energy Economics & 
Financial Analysis, 2012), 5. 
536.  The price for only the Brayton Point plant was not disclosed.  See Emily 
Overholt, “Dominion Sells Power Station In Somerset,” Boston Globe, August 31, 2013. 
537.  Alex Kuffner, “Brayton Point To Close; Twilight For Coal In N.E.?,” 
Providence Journal, October 9, 2013. 
538.  Plant operating time had declined from 85% in 2008 to 16% in 2012.  See 
Alex Kuffner, “Brayton Point To Close; Twilight For Coal In N.E.?,” Providence 
Journal, October 9, 2013. 
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of the Conservation Law Foundation, Jonathan Peress, stated that “the two cooling towers 
will stand as reminders of an obsolete technology.”539   
With this decision, the half century of electric power generation at Brayton Point 
appeared to be approaching its end.  The resultant force of technical problems from age, 
environmental regulations, fuel price differences and local animus eventually drove the 
efficiency of the plant below that of the other natural gas fired plants, a reduction that 
could not be endured.  Visible across Narragansett Bay, the two cooling towers stood as a 
testament to the conflict between the technical demands of the electric power grid and the 
ethical demands of the environmental movement.   
Technological Determinism and Momentum in the 21st Century 
Much like the earlier periods examined, the 21st century holds interesting trends 
to support both theories of technological momentum and technological determinism as 
applied to the electric power grid in southeastern New England.  Which trend is the more 
important is equivocal.  Weighing the data to support one theory over another may not be 
defensible in this short period of time.  It may simply be that it is too early to tell and the 
ramifications of all of the actions occurring in this period have yet to play out.  Much like 
the operators attempting to resurrect the electric power grid following the 1965 Northeast 
blackout, it may be best to step back and allow the transient to moderate prior to making 
any final determination for the period.   
The behavior of the electric power grid in the first decades of the new millennium 
could certainly be understood to support the theory of technological momentum.  Under 
                                                 
539.  Alex Kuffner, “Brayton Point To Close; Twilight For Coal In N.E.?,” 
Providence Journal, October 9, 2013. 
501 
 
limited stress from contingency or catastrophe, the system puttered along with few 
unexpected technical salients to resolve.  The government and its regulatory bodies were 
eager and willing to assist the electric utilities in most of their designs for new 
construction or in limiting legislative interference.  The Republican administrations in 
Providence moved mountains to accelerate the construction of the gas turbine electric 
power plants in the state.  Nationally the elimination of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 ended other restrictions on how the electric utilities could organize 
their businesses following the deregulation of the industry during the preceding decade.  
To some extant, this reversion to the 1920s non-regulatory model was due to the fact that 
the utilities had solved many of the problems that had caused them friction earlier.  The 
natural gas burning electric power plants were cleaner than the older coal burning ones.  
The reliability and efficiency of the electric power grid was improving with the 
incorporation of new technology in the system.  Greater regionalization in the form of 
ISO New England compensated the most efficient and reliable electric power plants by 
awarding their parent companies with the most beneficial contracts.  With more 
companies competing to be the most efficient electric power provider, the opportunity for 
any one of them to cause unwarranted problems was reduced.  Whether the elimination of 
PUCHA would lead to the earlier financial exploitations of the holding companies was 
still unknown.   
If there were no striking system catastrophes or external contingent forces that 
affected the electric power grid performance, the conversion of the population to support 
many of the considerations of environmental ethics was marked.  While the worst case 
fears of global warming may have convinced the politically naïve, the long term 
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education efforts by the national, regional and local environmental organizations was 
effective.  It was no longer merely the devoted senior leadership of groups such as Save 
the Bay advocating actions to reduce pollution from elements of the electric power grid.  
Now state legislatures and town councils were willing to expend valuable resources to 
support a more sustainable infrastructure.  Wind turbines would be subsidized, even if 
their operation was less than the most efficient way of generating electric power.  If 
progress was uneven or limited by political forces and ego, efforts to limit environmental 
damage were still applauded.  When the future shut down of the units at Brayton Point 
was announced, it appeared as if all of the parties involved, from the ownership of the 
facility, the state and federal regulatory bodies and the local environmental organizations 
were relieved that the whole ordeal was finally ending.  Even the conservative 
engineering societies amended their codes of conduct to incorporate some of the intent of 
the environmental movement’s ethical concerns.  Though the net change in the electric 
power grid in southeastern New England might be considered small, one could certainly 
discern a shifting mindset in the people and organizations that operated, maintained and 
regulated the advanced technology system.  While the rate of change of the electric grid 
might have slowed compared to earlier decades, the baseline assumption of the net worth 
of the technology to the population was fluctuating.  How this would affect the electric 
power grid remained to be seen.    
The preceding narrative would be dismissed as being inconsequential by the 
adherents of technological determinism.  The continued expansion of natural gas burning 
electric power plants was evidence that more efficient technology was replacing the less 
efficient machines.  Shutting down Brayton Point was not as much the success of a 
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coalition of grass root and national organizations imbued with the spirit of limiting 
environmental damage than the scrapping of a 50 year old obsolescent electric power 
plant that was no longer efficient enough to operate in the system.  Constructing wind 
turbines was a method to keep the less perceptive members of the population happy but 
was trivial in terms of actual electric power generation.  The increased regionalization of 
electric power generation and transmission was in line with Mumford’s proposals for the 
electric power grid.  Even the most ardent of the environmental organizations were using 
the vocabulary of efficiency to evaluate the operations of the electric utilities.  The 
alteration of the IEEE Code of Ethics to be more consistent with the expanding 
environmental ethic was not important.  The actual numbers of megawatts generated by 
the new construction power plants should be the true measure of effectiveness of whether 
technological determinism was the more accurate model for predicting the development 
of advanced technology systems.    
Herein lies the conundrum.  Advocates of technological determinism could pull 
out the figures associated with the operation of the electric power grid during this period 
and make a persuasive case that the electric power grid was being operated to increase its 
efficiency with negligible external retarding forces.  Looking at the numbers of 
megawatts generated by the sustainable sources in Rhode Island compared to other 
sources creates little sanguinity that wind turbines were the wave of the future.  A more 
sustainable future may be a more just one, but this was of little regard compared to the 
increasing number of megawatts of electricity produced from the thousands of cubic feet 
of natural gas burned.    
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Technological momentum proponents would suggest these numbers were of 
interest but were not irresistible.  Of far greater importance than increasing the overall 
system efficiency by another few tenths of a percentage point was the change in outlook 
of the humans using the technology.  While society had experienced and often exalted the 
advances and opportunities that the electric power grid had provided, the unchallenged 
benefits of the electric power grid had evaporated much like the steam issuing from the 
cooling towers at Brayton Point.  How society would construct the benefits of the 
technology compared to its disadvantages remained to be determined in the future.  With 
the penetration of environmental ethics throughout society, one should not be too 
confident that the promise of cheaper electricity would be sufficient to motivate the 
population to permit future operations of electric power grid in the manner that the 
electric utilities desired.   
Using two different coordinate systems, one quantitative and the other qualitative, 
to compare and contrast the two models is somewhat unsatisfying.  This does not allow 
an adequate evaluation of which model best represents the expected actions of advanced 
technology systems.  The perspectives appear to be talking past one another with little 
appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the other point of view.  Stating that 
technological momentum is a better approximation for the electric power grid’s 
development during this period is undemanding, but it also limits the comprehension of 
the potency of its competition.  One is left less with an appreciation of the greater validity 
of either model than with the thought that the pronouncements of both may just be 
whistling in the graveyard of discarded theories.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 CONCLUSION 
 
In human affairs, the willed future always prevails over the logical future. 
- René Dubos 
It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future. 
- Lawrence Peter "Yogi" Berra  
 
Findings: Technological Momentum or Determinism?   
     One of the advantages of observing the electric power grid in southeastern 
New England is that this advanced technology system evolved over a long period of time.  
With the events of the preceding century in mind, one should be able to compare the 
electric power grid’s growth against the theories of technological determinism and 
technological momentum.  Perfection of either theory is not anticipated; however the 
model that best fits the data gleaned from the history of this advanced technology system 
should be apparent.  Discontinuities and divergences between theory and reality should 
also be expected, indicating issues that the theories fail to consider or weight properly.  
These variations are places that additional research and theoretical development may 
prove rewarding to better comprehend the development of advanced technology systems.       
With this in mind, it appears that technological momentum is the better model to 
explain the development of the electric power grid in southeastern New England during 
the period examined.  Technological momentum is not a perfect representation as has 
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been revealed over the course of this analysis, but it is a more solid explanation of how 
the electric power grid progressed in the manner that it did.  While both theories are 
sound on the genesis and initial growth of an advanced technology system, Hughes’ 
propositions show how the forces of contingency, catastrophe and conversion act to 
deflect the system’s subsequent evolution.  In technological determinism, once a 
technology is accepted by some critical mass of the population, technique or the 
megamachine shapes society to meet its needs.  Altering the subsequent progression of 
the technology appears unlikely or perhaps even impossible.  This is not to suggest that 
many of the elements of technological determinism are not valid or important, only that 
technological momentum provides greater insight on how such advanced technology 
systems are affected by human action beyond the promotion of mere efficiency.   
Looking back at almost a century of development of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England, one is tempted to suggest that because the system developed 
the way it did, that must have been the optimal way for this advanced technology system 
to evolve.  Starting almost simultaneously in Providence, RI and the Connecticut River 
highlands, the separate systems organized by Marsden Perry in Rhode Island and 
Malcolm G. Chase and Henry I. Harriman in Massachusetts slowly but surely grew 
towards one another.  When combined, both electrically and organizationally, the systems 
complemented one another; the steady hydroelectric power and efficient steam plants 
providing a diverse power output to meet the growing consumer and business demand.  
Surviving the financial crisis of the Great Depression, the destructive break up of the 
holding company structure and meeting the power requirements for a World War, the 
resulting New England Electric System’s existence is still problematical.  Did the electric 
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power grid develop in the manner that it did due to the sheer demands of the dominant 
technology, or did the system just happen to work out the way it did due to factors above 
and beyond those resulting from meeting the technical requirements from the laws of 
physics?  Certainly the technical concerns and salients were important to consider and 
resolve, but these alone are only part of the reason why the electric power grid turned out 
the way that it did.   
The period encompassing the initial growth of the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England to its maturation is thus of interest as this evolution is quite 
different from what the theories of technological determinism might propose.  Instead of 
the developing technological system causing other social organizations to adapt to its 
technical demands, the social and political organizations in Rhode Island absorbed the 
nascent electric utilities to strengthen their own efforts.  With Marsden Perry in charge of 
or at least the first amongst equals in the state’s financial, electrical utility and political 
organizations, it is difficult to make the case that technique was the dominant factor in the 
electric power grid’s progress.  The pursuit of political influence using the profits of 
Perry’s commercial concerns to support the Republican Party machine seems to be the 
more dominant force.  The resulting political power was used to meet the desires of the 
electrical utilities in a positive feedback loop.   
This sequence of events in Rhode Island is at variance with both theories of how 
advanced technology systems develop.  Technological determinism suggests that human 
organizations need to alter their operations to assist the required acceleration of 
efficiency.  The modification of all human activity to meet the demands of advanced 
technology systems should be readily apparent.  Businesses, political organizations, and 
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civil society should all evolve to make the electric power grid ever more efficient and 
able to deliver electric power across society.1  Technological momentum proposes that 
new organizations will reinforce the successful growth of the advanced technology 
system as these organizations, with large number of people and immense investments, 
have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.2  The former theory suggests that 
these organizations should be dynamically altering their actions to make the advanced 
technology system even more powerful.  In the latter, they almost act as symbionts, 
assisting the growth of the advanced technology system, but also siphoning away some of 
its energy for their own ends.  In the early period of the growth of the electric power grid, 
the political desires of the Republican Party machine were as important as the growing 
mass of these “technical, organizational, and attitudinal components” in propelling the 
growth of the advanced technology system.3  Keeping voters honest through the liberal 
application of money gleaned in no small part from the electric utility companies was not 
just good politics, it was good business.  Republican political control of the state led to 
longer term permits that the new utility companies could use to acquire favorable loans to 
further promote their technical monopoly as well as the legislative one.   
As the technical and organizational components of the electric power grid 
matured, the political influence on the electric power grid receded but was never 
                                                 
1.  Jacque Ellul, The Technological Society, Translated by John Wilkinson (New 
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3.  Ibid., 460.  
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completely excluded.  Savvy industrialists such as Samuel Insull proposed trading away 
some of the control of the system to public regulatory bodies in order to maintain the 
natural monopoly of electric power generation, transmission and distribution under the 
electric utility companies.  With the increasing capacity of the technical components of 
the electric power grid, this bargain appeared logical.  Growing and building the electric 
power grid was subsequently accomplished under the watchful eyes of the public utility 
commissions.   
In Rhode Island, with the Republican Party as the dominant political force, 
appropriating Insull’s doctrine was advantageous in maintaining the momentum of the 
electric power grid and its attendant organizations.  As the political fortunes of the 
Republican Party waned and the Democratic Party became preeminent in Providence and 
Washington, the new administrations were less interested in supporting an industry that 
had strong ties to the political opposition.  While the state and federal government were 
involved in maintaining the continuity of electric power for the population, the Public 
Utility Commission would no longer act as a mere adjunct for the electric utilities.  
Greater oversight and regulation, in the form of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935, was going to be the norm in the future, regardless of how this might affect the 
efficiency of the system.  This is not to imply that all members of the Democratic Party 
and the components of the state and federal government were opposed to the electric 
utilities.  Obviously there were instances where the Democrats were as supportive of the 
electric utility companies as the Republicans were, such as the survival of the New 
England Power Association during the breakup of International Paper & Power or 
Thomas McCoy’s efforts to provide Pawtucket with its own publically owned and 
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operated electric utility.  These seemed to be more illustrative of personal and political 
desires than of increasing the efficiency of the electric power grid or maintaining its 
“steady growth and direction” than Hughes might suggest.4      
With the maturation of the electric power grid in the 1940s, both political parties 
were more inclined to support the technical requirements of the advanced technology 
system and the desires of the companies that operated and maintained it.  Winning a 
world war and building on post war economic expansion were goals that both parties 
could agree on.  Electricity was seen as a positive good by the vast majority of the 
population and the organizations that engendered the inexpensive ubiquity of this service 
were extoled and well compensated.  During this period the technological momentum of 
the electric power grid seemed fully established, with the virtuous feedback between the 
companies, universities, regulatory bodies, and the population permitting an improving 
quality of life through increasing electric power consumption.   
This happy convergence of opinion was not to last.  Many of the attributes of the 
electric power grid that assisted raising the efficiency of the system also led to greater 
pollution that harmed the environment.  An augmented awareness of aspects of industrial 
pollution, including that from the production and transmission of electric power, became 
prevalent during the 1960s.  The reaction against this pollution became one facet of the 
expanding environmental concern throughout the nation and globe.  This distress grew 
out of the practical attempt to limit the effects of air and water pollution on human health, 
but the concerns grew to encompass the health of the entire planet.  In this evolution of 
                                                 
4.  Ibid.  
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ethical concern for the environment, greater numbers of individuals became energized to 
take action to prevent additional damage to the planet.  Their worries were less about 
maintaining human survival with the style that the electric power grid provided than in 
ensuring the continued existence of all species.  The organizations that this motivated 
cadre created would affect the operation of the electric power gird in a manner that none 
of the leaders of the groups promoting business as usual predicted.   
This is another telling aspect of the development of the electric power grid that 
supports the technological momentum model.  Neither Mumford nor Ellul could truly 
envision how the megamachine or technique could be altered in its drive for domination.  
Mumford appeared to require an act of God to alter the path of technology’s domination 
over human civilization; a new great awakening of the population to change its core 
beliefs.  Ellul was similarly opaque.5   There seemed little opportunity to get off of the 
bus of technique after one had accepted the enticing journey that advanced technology 
promised.  Hughes was more astute in this respect, offering the opportunity of the 
changing human perspective on how a technology is viewed as a means to alter the 
momentum of an advanced technology system.  Hughes was also more appreciative of 
the effects that the expanding environmental movement might have on advanced 
technology systems, including the electric power grid.  Writing several years after 
Mumford and Ellul, Hughes noted that the change in attitudes and values, in opposition to 
                                                 
5.  See Donald L. Miller, “The Myth of the Machine: I. Technics and Human 
Development,” in Lewis Mumford, Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha 
C. Hughes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 162, and Jacque Ellul, The 
Technological Society, Translated by John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 
xxxiii. 
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the increased consumption of material, might well lead to new conceptions of how the 
electric power grid might be operated.  Society might well alter how it used a technology 
and not allow itself to be a simple substrate for technology to act upon.6     
This change in the appreciation of the electric power grid’s value to society, as 
viewed through the lens of environmental ethics, certainly did lead to an alteration in the 
momentum of the system.  Individuals and groups desiring to limit the environmental 
damage caused by pollution from the electric power generation plants influenced local, 
state and federal politicians to mitigate these stresses.  Environmentally minded 
organizations led to the cancellation of the Charlestown nuclear power plants, shutting 
down the coal burning electric power plants at Brayton Point, and the construction of 
wind turbines in the state.  Their support of electric utility deregulation, energy 
conservation and their acquiescence in the lower emission natural gas powered gas 
turbines led to the reduction in the amount of air pollution in the Ocean State.  While the 
environmental groups’ ability to prevent a facility from being built was greater than their 
ability to cause the construction of a project, one can not deny that the organizations 
made a difference in how the electric power grid developed.  One can look across 
Narragansett Bay at the mammoth cooling towers at Brayton Point and accept the fact 
that these groups were consequential.  The environmental groups’ actions to affect the 
transmission and distribution portions of the electric power grid was less apparent, but 
they did at least cause the various state and federal regulatory bodies to consider 
                                                 
6.  Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and 
Technological Enthusiasm 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 466-469. 
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ecological aspects of building electric power transmission lines.  Whether the 
organizations were able to enhance environmental justice in any aspect remains unsettled.   
Perhaps of greater importance than shutting down a polluting electric power plant 
was the conversion of the population to accepting an ethical perspective based on 
protecting the environment.  The number of Rhode Island environmental groups 
increased, the state regulatory bodies accepted the vocabulary of these organizations, and 
even the universities educating future electric power grid operators and managers 
modified their programs to consider more sustainable energy systems.  Promoting a 
sustainable electric power grid evolved from being a concern of a small segment of the 
population to a prevalent paradigm that the entire population embraced.  Even the electric 
utilities were attentive to this mindset change.  Conserving energy became an important 
part of the electric utility business model where previously the consumption of electricity 
to improve one’s lifestyle, and utility profits, had been preeminent.   
When this shift in outlook is considered with other contingent factors and system 
catastrophes affecting the electric power grid, one can note that the electric power grid of 
the early 21st century looks dramatically different than the system operators envisioned in 
the early 1970s.  The natural monopolies of the electric utilities have been terminated and 
numerous independent companies compete to provide less expensive electric power to a 
regional coordinating body, ISO New England.  The former local owners of the system 
have been absorbed by a multinational corporation.  Instead of multiple nuclear power 
plants supplying the majority of electric power in state, the preponderance of electricity is 
produced by gas turbine power plants.  Increasing numbers of wind turbines populate the 
state landscape providing electric power to the residents though also draining the state’s 
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coffers.  The long term ramifications of these changes have not been determined, but one 
cannot deny the effects of the environmental movement in achieving them.  In this 
manner the theoretical construct of technological momentum better describes the change 
in the trajectory of the electric power grid.   
Even with this assertion, throwing technological determinism into the trash heap 
with other discarded theories may be premature.  Both Mumford and Ellul may have been 
unable to illustrate how the trajectory of advanced technology systems might be altered, 
but they were very perceptive on many other aspects of these system.  The electric power 
grid certainly encompassed many of Ellul’s characteristics of modern technology.  The 
New England Electric System (NEES) possessed separate design and construction 
subsidiaries to attain the most efficient division of labor when operating the electric 
power grid.  The system constructed its own ethical and technical standards through 
professional organizations such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
(IEEE) to help build the network.  To be fair, NEES did allow for the creativity of gifted 
individuals to achieve its objectives, but the mindset of rationality was encouraged by the 
ethical standards of performance under which these people operated.   
Other characteristics seem less applicable.  While the utility engineers and 
managers were certainly interested in constructing the grid the “one best way,” they were 
often unable to attain such purity.7  Government regulatory bodies often quarreled with 
the utility companies regarding plant siting and company organization, leavening the 
                                                 
7.   Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. Trans. John Wilkinson (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1964), 79-80.     
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automatism of the network.  Ellul stated that “Technical activity automatically eliminates 
every nontechnical activity or transforms it into a technical activity.”8  While the Rhode 
Island Public Utilities Commission could be viewed as having been captured by the 
industry it was created to monitor, the United States Congress’ actions in the Public 
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 should rightly be considered a nontechnical 
decision that affected the grid.  The system had been modified on grounds not related to 
technical necessity, though one might argue that the sloughing off of the non-electrical 
functions of NEES in the 1930s supported the overall efficiency of the system.  On the 
other hand, by forcing the divorce of the actual power companies from the complex 
financial underpinnings of the pyramidal holding company structure, Congress compelled 
the network to operate more efficiently.  Much like entropy, the overall efficiency of the 
system was increased even though the local transient perturbations were unpleasant.  
Humans might think they were making decisions based on various political, economic or 
ethical factors, but in reality, “Man is stripped of his faculty of choice and he is satisfied,” 
Ellul warned.9  Humans had abrogated their decision making over this advanced 
technological system, preferring to meekly acquiesce to the electric power grid’s 
technical demands.  This characteristic was certainly resident in the grid, but Ellul’s 
analysis is not overwhelming.10   
                                                 
8.  Ibid., 83. 
9.  Ibid.,82. 
10.  Ibid., 116. 
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The irreversibility of the electric power grid was unquestioned; few could 
conceive of life in modern society without the basis of its energy.  Yet with society 
conforming to the technical requirements of the grid, the individual’s position in 
“technical evolution” decreases at an increasing rate.11  With electric power reaching 
saturation throughout the region, citizens had little choice but to use the technology or 
essentially live outside of society.  Electric power was essentially ubiquitous as the 
technology had spread so pervasively.  NEES executives might advertise that the better 
living standards that electricity could power were a good thing.  However, the electric 
power grid itself was uninterested in such value judgements. Electricity produced from 
nuclear power plants was neither good nor bad; it was merely 60 hertz power at 120 
volts.  Trying to attain the one best way of creating electric power was not the most 
important thing to accomplish; it was the only objective to be attained.12   
Finally, the development of the electric power grid during this time period does 
contain numerous aspects of autonomy as postulated by Ellul.  Yet to consider the 
electric power grid as a closed system does not appear to be justified.  While the system 
operators did work to insulate their affairs from external influence, this was never 
achieved.  While usually compliant, the state and federal governments acted to retard the 
wishes of the utility companies in numerous instances.  The Supreme Court’s Attleboro 
decision appears in opposition to the best business practices and technical requirements 
of the electric power grid.  The Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 solved this 
                                                 
11.  Ibid., 92. 
12.  Ibid., 94-96. 
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issue in the utility’s favor, but then also split up their labyrinthine financial structure that 
had accelerated their growth.  The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) had 
sections that led to unexpected consequences by the authors of the ordinance and the 
industry leadership.  Proponents of technological determinism might suggest this is 
rearranging the technical cause and political and economic effects, but the reality is more 
ambiguous.13   
Ellul’s description of technique’s affirmation of itself as an independent actor 
unconstrained by other ethical values seems more apt.  Not only did the electric power 
grid operators resist judgment from external organizations, they created their own scheme 
of human behavior standards to support the system’s dominance.  Building a dam for a 
hydroelectric plant was thus easily justifiable, even if the resultant reservoir submerged 
numerous towns.  Meeting the technical demands of the electric power grid would 
provide for the greater good of modern technological society.  Other concerns were not 
considered relevant, or even worth the effort to imagine. Instead, achieving technical 
excellence along the lines of electrical engineering ethics was considered the greatest 
accolade.14   
Other data points strengthen the deterministic model.  When the electric power 
grid collapsed under its own weight during the in 1965 blackout, more of the then nascent 
computer technology was applied to monitor the system performance, removing human 
control to some extent.  Considering the poor human response to the blackout, one might 
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reflect that this was a good decision.  The acceleration of non-human control of the 
expanding technology would be a continuing concern.  “This progressive elimination of 
man from the circuit must inexorably continue,” Ellul argued, suggesting elements of the 
smart grid long before it had even been envisioned.15   
One is left with the thought that though technological determinism and the nature 
of technique are not sufficient to fully describe the development of advanced technology 
systems, the model does have many very perceptive, and at times unsettling insights.  
While accepting that technological determinism provides a better model for the electric 
power grid for the time period examined, perhaps this period was still not long enough 
for the megamachine to emerge as fully victorious.  The current perturbation caused by 
the advent of environmental ethics may be only a minor pause in technique’s advance.  
Conversely the full impact of the population’s acceptance of a new ethic in the light of 
climate change may sweep the old manner of electric power generation away regardless 
of the strength of technique.  The jury may still be out on the ultimate future of the 
electric power grid and the role of humans with this advanced technology system.                 
Implications 
 While every advanced technology system is unique, telling similarities exist.  One 
cannot help but note some of the resemblances between the initial growth of the electric 
power grid in Rhode Island and that of other nascent systems such as the 
telecommunications system and the internet.  Many of the same technical challenges of 
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competing companies vying for monopoly control over specific areas, political problems 
associated with regulation (or lack thereof), financial difficulties from creative funding 
schemes and the intense demand from the population for these services mirror many of 
the events of the early days of the electric power grid.  Other advanced technology 
systems may be following comparable paths but in a later stage of development; the 
railroad transportation system seems a fair candidate here.  In either case the parallels 
suggest that technological momentum may be a suitable model to anticipate the 
development of these systems.  Additionally, the manner in which the momentum of the 
electric power grid was altered may intimate methods to change the direction of these 
newer systems.  A catastrophic system failure scenario might easily be constructed.  
While one hesitates to recommend shutting down the internet or telecommunication 
system in the northeast as the electric power grid was in 1965 to observe the response of 
the population, one might easily imagine the initial panic and longer term consequences 
based on this event.  Converting the population to construct these technologies in a less 
favorable light is more difficult to envision, let alone what other contingent events might 
occur that would affect system operation.  Other technologies may fall into this 
categorization; further research certainly seems warranted. 
Other aspects of the preceding analysis seem illustrative.  While a small area of 
the United States was used to bound the scope of the analysis, the examination of the 
development of the electric power grid in Rhode Island was certainly instructive.   
Despite a small geographic size and similar population, the Ocean State was at the 
forefront of numerous technical events and political incidents affecting the electric power 
grid.  The Supreme Court case of Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island versus the 
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Attleboro Steam & Electric Company was an important factor in the subsequent federal 
regulation of electric power transmission and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935.  Rhode Island’s early deregulation of the electric utility industry was also ahead of 
much of the national efforts.  Examination of advanced technology systems even within a 
limited political entity may be beneficial in confirming or refuting larger trends.  History 
and technical development is apparent even in the smallest state, as long as one is willing 
to patiently observe it happening. 
Finally, human agency was a significant factor while establishing the electric 
power grid’s initial momentum and later altering its trajectory.  Financiers such as 
Malcolm Chase, politicians such as Charles Brayton, and industry leaders such as 
Marsden Perry were all critical actors in the early stages of the system.  Later, industry 
leaders like NEES’s Guy Nichols and John Rowe, and environmental leaders like 
Claudine Schneider and Alfred Hawkes played key roles.  While organizations such as 
the Conservation Law Foundation and Save the Bay were important in the preceding 
analysis, these individuals made an important difference in how the electric power grid in 
southeastern New England evolved.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that other 
individuals, some larger than life, will play key parts in the development of other 
advanced technology systems. The efforts and actions of these individuals warrant further 
examination and illumination. 
Conclusion     
This study has examined the initial growth, development and maturation of the 
electric power grid in southeastern New England over the past one hundred and thirty 
years.  During this time period, this advanced technology system generated significant 
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momentum to surmount the challenges of world wars, economic down turns and political 
regulation.  Catastrophic system events could be analyzed and repaired while the 
contingent events from the world could be managed.  The conversion of a large swath of 
the population to support the precepts of an emerging environmental ethic however led to 
changes in how the electric power grid was constructed, operated and maintained.  The 
change in the trajectory of this advanced technology system indicates that technological 
momentum is a better model than technological determinism to explain the development 
of the electric power grid in the southeastern New England.  It also suggests that other 
advanced technology systems may be equally applicable to analysis using this model.    
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